

**The Metaphysics and Cosmology
of Process
According to Shaykh 'Aḥmad al-'Ahsā'ī**

Critical Edition, Translation,
and Analysis of
Observations in Wisdom

by

Idris Samawi Hamid

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Abstract

The subject of this study is the process metaphysics and cosmology of Shaykh 'Aḥmad ibn Zayn al-Dīn al-'Aḥsā'ī (d. 1826), especially as outlined in *al-Fawā'id al-Ḥikmiyyah* (*The Wisdom Observations*), his philosophical epitome, which we have edited and translated. With Shaykh 'Aḥmad ended the cycle of the great and original philosophers of traditional Muslim civilization, a cycle that began with al-Kindi (d. 870). Shaykh 'Aḥmad belonged to the period of Muslim scholasticism that stemmed from the work of both the *kalām* theologian Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1209) and the last great philosopher in the post-Hellenic tradition, Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 1274). In particular, Shaykh 'Aḥmad worked two centuries after Mulla Ṣadra (d. 1640–41). The latter, through his theory of motion in the category of substance, marked the beginning of a turn towards process philosophy in Muslim scholasticism, a turn marked by a still strict adherence to Peripatetic method. My general contention is that Shaykh 'Aḥmad, whose philosophy in part consists of a critique of Mulla Ṣadra, went beyond the confines of Muslim scholasticism and Peripatetic technique to develop a true *process* metaphysics and cosmology, in contrast with the more traditional *substance* metaphysics.

This four-part study constitutes an investigation of an author and of a tradition that remains virtually unknown to Western philosophers. In Part I, we first give an account of the development and context of Muslim scholasticism. Then we give a brief account of the life, works, influence, and philosophical context of Shaykh 'Aḥmad. Finally, we discuss some problems of textual analysis and interpretation pertaining to the text of the *Fawā'id*. Part II of this study is an analysis of what we consider to be some of the fundamental themes of the metaphysics and cosmology of Shaykh 'Aḥmad. We begin with an investigation and attempt to determine the author's concept of metaphysics and its aim, object, method, and principles. Next we consider Shaykh 'Aḥmad's theory of subsistence. We discuss the relation of that theory to his ontology of the fundamental reality of processes and acts as well as to what he considers to be the aim of metaphysics: cognizance of God and reality. We then discuss the application of the author's theory of subsistence and of the ontology of acts and processes to the traditional distinctions of existence-essence and substance-accident. On the basis of our investigation, we claim to show that Shaykh 'Aḥmad's system of thought is a true process metaphysics and cosmology. We end this part with a very brief comparison and contrast of select elements of the author's ontology with corresponding elements in Whitehead's metaphysics. Part III is our translation of the bulk of the *Fawā'id*, while Part IV contains our critical edition of the original twelve "*fawā'id*" or "observations" penned by the author.

To

My parents

the perfect cause of this work

Abbas Mirakhor

the material cause

Sayyid Jalali

the formal cause

'Abū Abdillāh al-Ḥusayn (upon whom be peace!)

the efficient and the final cause

the gatherer and intersection of all causes . . .

... بِكُمْ فَتَحَ اللَّهُ
وَبِكُمْ يَخْتَمُ ! ...

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السَّلَامُ عَلَيْكَ أَيُّهَا النَّبِيُّ
السَّلَامُ عَلَيْكُمْ يَا أَهْلَ بَيْتِ النَّبُوَّةِ

Praise and thanks belong to Allah. May He grant that I be one of His grateful servants, and that I be a servant of the Chief of the Martyrs, Imam Husayn.

It is enough of a proof of the organic nature of the world and of the inter-subsistence of its parts that I cannot count those persons and other factors who have contributed towards the completion of this dissertation. Among those for whose assistance I am very grateful is Professor Jorge J.E. Gracia. Given that my project involved a philosopher whose work was virtually unknown to the philosophical community in the West, he took a bold risk in agreeing to let me work on the metaphysics and cosmology of Shaykh 'Aḥmad al-'Aḥsā'ī. I also thank my other committee members, Professors Peter Hare, Mendel Sachs, and Father David Burrell for their confidence and encouragement. I thank Professor Morewedge of SUNY Binghamton for introducing me to process metaphysics and for giving me opportunities

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اللَّهُمَّ لَكَ الْحَمْدُ حَمْدُ الشَّاكِرِينَ لَكَ عَلَى مُصَابِهِمْ
الْحَمْدُ لِلَّهِ عَلَى عَظِيمِ رَزِيَّتِي
اللَّهُمَّ ارْزُقْنِي شَفَاعَةَ الْحُسَيْنِ يَوْمَ الْوُرُودِ
وَ تَبَّتْ لِي قَدَمٌ صَدَقَ عِنْدَكَ مَعَ الْحُسَيْنِ وَأَصْحَابِ الْحُسَيْنِ
الَّذِينَ بَذَلُوا مَهَجَهُمْ دُونَ الْحُسَيْنِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ.



Figure 1: Shaykh 'Aḥmad ibn Zayn al-Dīn al-'Aḥsā'ī (1753–1826).

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Abbreviations

SMA Afnan, Soheil. *A Philosophical Lexicon in Arabic and Persian*. Beirut, 1969.

LLPI Goichon, A.-M.. *Lexique de la Langue Philosophique d'Ibn Sīnā*. Paris, 1938.

IS Ibn Sina (Avicenna). *Livre des Définitions*. Edited, translated, and annotated by A.-M. Goichon. Cairo, 1963.

AEL Lane, Edward William. *An Arabic-English Lexicon: Derived from the Best and Most Copious Eastern Sources*. London, 1863–1893.

LAL Freytag, Georg Wilhelm. *Lexicon Arabico-Latinum*. Halle, 1830–1837.

MWDS Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms: A Merriam-Webster. Springfield, MA, 1984.

MWDS Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary. Tenth edition. Springfield, MA, 1996.

ALL Riet, S. Van. *Avicenna Latinus: Liber de Philosophia Prima sive Scientia Divina I–X: Lexiques*. Louvain-la-Neuve, 1983.

MB Al-Ṭurayhī al-Najafī, Fakhr Al-Dīn. *Majma' Al-Bahrayn*. Teheran, 1975.

JU Aḥmad Nagārī, Qaḍī 'Abd al-Nabī. *Jāmi' al-'Ulūm fī 'Iṣṭilāḥāt al-Funūn*. Beirut, 1975.

S Ismā'īl ibn Ḥammād al-Jawhari. *Al-Ṣiḥāḥ: Tāj al-Lughah wa Ṣiḥāḥ al-'Arabiyyah*. Beirut, ?.

Transliteration Scheme

Except for proper names of persons and texts, we use the scientific ZDMG transliteration system for Arabic (Table 1 and Table 2). For proper names of persons and texts we employ the transliteration system of the Library of Congress, partly because most library databases use it to classify Arabic books and authors with Arabic and/or Persian names. The Library of Congress differs from ZDMG for the six letters listed in Table 3. The latter convention is deficient in that, for certain individual Arabic letters, it uses two Latin letters to represent a single Arabic letter. In some instances this leads to ambiguity.

أ, إ, ؤ	ء	د	<i>d</i>	ض	<i>ḍ</i>	ك	<i>k</i>
ب	<i>b</i>	ذ	<i>ḏ</i>	ط	<i>ṭ</i>	ل	<i>l</i>
ت	<i>t</i>	ر	<i>r</i>	ظ	<i>ẓ</i>	م	<i>m</i>
ث	<i>ṯ</i>	ز	<i>z</i>	ع	<i>ʿ</i>	ن	<i>n</i>
ج	<i>ǧ</i>	س	<i>s</i>	غ	<i>ġ</i>	و	<i>w</i>
ح	<i>ḥ</i>	ش	<i>š</i>	ف	<i>f</i>	ه	<i>h</i>
خ	<i>ḫ</i>	ص	<i>ṣ</i>	ق	<i>q</i>	ي	<i>y</i>

Table 1: ZDMG transliteration of Arabic consonants.

short vowels	ا	<i>ā</i>	ي	<i>ī</i>	و	<i>ū</i>
long vowels	آ	<i>a</i>	إ	<i>i</i>	أ	<i>u</i>

Table 2: ZDMG transliteration of Arabic vowels.

ث	<i>th</i>	ذ	<i>dh</i>
ج	<i>j</i>	ش	<i>sh</i>
خ	<i>kh</i>	غ	<i>gh</i>

Table 3: Library of Congress conventions.

Part I

Introduction

Chapter 1

Exordium

At the end of June, 1826, a small group of Mecca-bound pilgrims and exiles from Iraq entered the holy city of Medina. Their destination was the cemetery called *al-Baqī'*, adjoining the mosque containing the grave of the Prophet Muhammad. After paying their respects to the Prophet, the group continued on to al-Baqī', to carry out what they must have considered to be an all-important mission. During the time of the Prophet, al-Baqī' was called by that name because it had literally been “a spacious garden with a relatively dense population of trees” (Arabic بَقِيع *baqī'*), a very welcome and appreciated place in a land surrounded by the deserts of Arabia and encompassed by its heat. Now the trees had long since ceased to be, but this cemetery remained and continued to be one of the most hallowed grounds, containing the graves of many of the early figures of Muslim history including many companions of the Prophet, warriors, and scholars. More important to this particular group of dusty and weary travelers was the fact that al-Baqī' contained the graves of four of the Twelve Imams of the household the

Prophet, including his first grandson, Ḥasan, the son of the first Imam, ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, the cousin and son-inlaw of the Prophet.

After what must have occurred in the way of haggling with the local authorities and convincing them, both in words and in cash, of the importance of their mission, the entourage continued on into al-Baqī’. Between eight and nine meters northwest of the feet of the Imams, the men of the party began digging, joined in their lamentations by the women of the entourage and those of the local community who were aware of the eminence of the personage who was to be laid to rest here. After a few hours, the grave, perpendicular to the direction of Mecca, was complete. We do not know the identity of the person who performed the last rites of the seventy-three year-old leader of this entourage who had answered the call of Logos on 21 Dhul Qa’dah, 1241 / June 27, 1826. He was planning to take his family and a few close friends who could not bear to part with him into exile in Mecca.

With the death of Shaykh ‘Aḥmad ibn Zayn al-Dīn al-‘Aḥsā’ī, the illustrious cycle of the great and seminal philosophers of traditional Muslim civilization comes to an end. This is a bold claim, one we hope to justify and clarify in the course of this work. This cycle begins, in one sense, with the first commentaries by al-Kindī (d. 870) on the heritage of Hellenic philosophy inherited by Muslim civilization. With the sponsorship and blessing of the caliphs of Baghdad, Al-Kindī partly supervised the accurate translation of this heritage into Arabic. In another sense, this cycle begins with the students and disciples of the early Shi‘ī Imams, who suffered the heavy persecution of those same caliphs. Whether of Damascus or Baghdad, the caliphs considered the knowledge and charisma of the Imams as a threat to their

security and rule. Shaykh 'Aḥmad represents a radical confluence and integration of the post-Hellenic and early Shi'ī traditions of philosophy, an event that was one thousand years in the making. At the same time, the contributions of Shaykh 'Aḥmad came at a critical juncture in Muslim history. His period marks the sunset and twilight of traditional Muslim civilization and its defeat at the receiving end of the Age of Imperialism, Western science and technology, and the ideologies derived from the so-called “Enlightenment”.

Yet the work of Shaykh 'Aḥmad, following upon the heels of the revolutionary synthesis of Mulla Sadra (d. 1640-41), constituted an original and radical development out of the traditional scholasticism that developed in the wake of the meditations of figures like the theologian al-Rāzī and the philosopher al-Ṭūsī upon the metaphysics and Peripateticism of Ibn Sīnā, as well as upon the more purely Platonic illuminationism of al-Suhrawardī. Specifically, it represents the culmination of a paradigm shift in post-Neoplatonic and post-Peripatetic thought away from substance and essentialist philosophy towards process philosophy. It also represents the last and boldest in a series of attempts to reevaluate the nature and method of (حكمة *ḥikmat*) or “Wisdom”, with the goal of accommodating

- the demands and ramifications of revelation and prophetic wisdom; and
- those cognitive experiences which follow from the practice of meditative and ethical discipline and which are generally classified under the heading of “mysticism”.

Aside from the seminal work of Henry Corbin who, before he died, had intended to publish a translation and analysis of the *Faww'id Hikmiyyah* [27,

Vol. iv, p. 263], no work has been done in the West on the philosophy of Shaykh 'Aḥmad *qua* philosophy¹. Mongol Bayat's *Mysticism and Dissent* is devoted to some of the political and social consequences of the Shaykh's thought in nineteenth and early twentieth century Iran. While this is a pioneering work, containing many an important insight, it suffers from a serious flaw: the author bases her entire exposition of the thought of the Shaykh on secondary and Persian sources — one notices that, except for his short autobiography (which contains little to no doctrine), not a single work, philosophical or otherwise, of Shaykh 'Aḥmad is mentioned in either the notes or the bibliography. So she proceeds to make what I have discovered to be a very common mistake on the part of later biographers and writers: that of confusing Shaykh 'Aḥmad's thought with that of later thinkers who in some sense followed, or claimed to follow, his school. As a result, the section on his specific doctrine is practically worthless.

Our analysis (Part II of this study) of the fundamental structure of Shaykh 'Aḥmad's metaphysics and cosmology is based upon our translation and critical edition (Parts III & IV of this study respectively) of the author's treatise *al-Fawā'id al-Ḥikmiyyah* or *The Wisdom Observations*. This work is a concise summary of the author's philosophical and mystical commitments.

¹Corbin's work on Shaykh 'Aḥmad includes *Spiritual Body and Celestial Earth*, devoted to eschatology (in large part Shaykh 'Aḥmad's); two articles in *Face de Dieu, Face de l'Homme*, each partially devoted to the Shaykh's metaphysics; the essay, "The Realism and Symbolism of Colours in Shi'ī Cosmology", in *Temple and Contemplation*, which is an analysis of a treatise of a second-generation follower of the Shaykh's school, Muhammad Karīm Khan Kirmānī; and Part VI of his opus, the four-volume *En Islam Iranien: Aspects Spirituels et Philosophiques*.

An exhaustive commentary of the *Fawā'id* is beyond the scope of this study. In the analysis we will just focus on two of the issues mentioned above viz., the nature and method of Wisdom, and the basic process metaphysics and cosmology that follows from the application of the author's method. Process commitments of Shaykh 'Aḥmad include:

- A dynamic concept of ousia. Aristotle also had a dynamic concept of ousia, but Shaykh 'Aḥmad goes further by a reversal of traditional hylomorphism: matter is active and form is receptive;
- A concept of the becoming of actual occasions;
- A concept of “possibility” as the configuration of the Divine Will (analogous to Buchler's notion of possibility as the “contour of a natural complex”);
- Rejection of certain traditional notions of the nature of substance. For Shaykh 'Aḥmad, every substance or accident is actually a correlational accident;
- A polarity-in-process interpretation of the essence-existence distinction;
- A doctrine of novelty in the context of free will.

Now our philosopher is a product of, among other things, the scholasticism of the post-Avicenna era. Because this period is still generally unfamiliar to Western philosophers, we must say something about this development

before discussing the Shaykh and his thought in detail². We will then give a brief account of the life, works, sources and influence of Shaykh 'Aḥmad. We end Part I with a detailed look at the author's *Fawā'id qua* text. We discuss the problems of chronology, content, audiences, interpretation, critical editing, and translation.

²Unfortunately, few complete histories of this period exist. Whereas *Fakhry 1983* is closer to the concerns of analytical philosophers, its section on post-Ibn Sina developments is rather sketchy. *Corbin 1993* is much more extensive, but weak on analysis. Nevertheless, Corbin is masterful at showing some of the more subtle connections and interrelationships between the many schools of both pre- and post-Ibn Sina thought in Muslim civilization.

Chapter 2

The Post-Avicennan Development

When an historically minded philosopher is disabused of the popular notion that the tradition of philosophy in Muslim civilization died after al-Ghazālī's critique of Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna) in the late eleventh century, he must face at least two very important questions:

- In what direction(s) was philosophical speculation pursued after Ibn Sīnā and al-Ghazālī?
- What are the parallels and contrasts between the post-Ibn Sīnā developments of philosophy in Muslim civilization and the post-Ibn Rushd (Averroes) development of Western philosophy?

It can be argued that one of the main roads travelled by the philosophy of Muslim civilization¹ after Ibn Sīnā led to the development of *process philos-*

¹Note that the standard term 'Islamic philosophy', which we may use on occasion, is

ophy — as opposed to the *substance philosophy* of both the earlier *falāsafah* and *mutakallimūn* — with parallels to be found in modern thinkers such as Bergson, Whitehead, and Buchler, among others. In particular, this claim has been made by Morewedge:[48, pg. xiii]

[After Ibn Sīnā] ontology changed from the Peripatetic categories of substances and accidents to the metaphysics of [real] processes, with more emphasis on the ontological roles of time and motion.

really inappropriate for the following reasons:

- philosophy in Muslim civilization was, in general, not founded upon purely Islamic, but also Hellenic sources;
- especially in its early period, most Muslim philosophers, like al-Farabi and Ibn Sīnā, were not considered, and did not consider themselves, to be theologians, as opposed to most of the scholastic scholars of the West.

Yes, the primordial sources of Islam play a much greater supporting role in post-Ibn Sīnā developments, but these developments are still in large part expressed in Aristotelian terminology, and argued for by means of Peripatetic methodology. In general, we try to use the adjective ‘Islamic’ for matters directly derived from the sources of Islam e.g., revelation and the prophetic tradition, and the term ‘Muslim’ for either the things that those called Muslims may engage in, or to describe the work of those who may not be Muslim but who worked in the context of Muslim civilization. Maimonides, for example, was a philosopher of Muslim civilization but not an Islamic philosopher. Muhammad ibn Zakariyyah al-Rāzī (the Latin Rhazes, d. 925 or 932), who denied prophecy, was a Muslim philosopher but not an Islamic philosopher. Also, ‘Islam’ may be used elliptically as in “the philosophers of Islam” i.e., the philosophers of the Islamic era i.e., the philosophers of that civilization that developed in the wake of the state established by the Prophet Muhammad in Medina in 622 C.E.. On the other hand, both Corbin and Nasr argue for the term ‘Islamic philosophy’.

This change began with S. [Shihāb al-Dīn] Suhrawardī's rejection of the Aristotelian categories and culminated in the existent-process metaphysics of Mulla Ṣadra.

According to the process approach to metaphysics, features such as *becoming* and *novelty* must be included in the essential description of a metaphysical primitive².

Let us be more clear about the distinction between process metaphysics and substance metaphysics. We first note that the word 'substance' (translation of Aristotle's '*ousia*') is ambiguous. This ambiguity arises because the word has come to be used, not only in Aristotle's original sense denoting "what there is", but also as connoting a certain notion of "the nature of what there is"³. For our purposes, we need both senses. To avoid ambiguity we adopt for this study the convention that, unless otherwise stated, by 'ousia' we refer to the former connotation (i.e., "what there is"), and by 'substance' we refer to its latter connotation (i.e., a certain notion of "the nature of what there is").

In a substance metaphysics, the fundamental realities of the world are entities (called "substances") with essences which are fixed and unchanging. The loci of these entities may be some atemporal and immaterial realm, as with Plato's Ideas, or else it may be the physical and material realm, as in

²Although I am aware of no systematic study of the development of process metaphysics in the philosophical tradition of Muslim civilization, Morewedge has considered the *application* of modern process metaphysics to problems in Ibn Sīnā's epistemology. See essays four and five of *Morewedge 1995*.

³Leclerc [45, secs. 4 & 7] has a good discussion of this distinction in relation to the term 'substance'.

the case of Aristotle. Important features of substances include the following, among others:

- A substance is a survivor of change. Change may be conceived as, e.g., a subjective feature of reality that lies outside the realm of substances (as in idealism). On the other hand, substances may be considered as the physical substratum of change. Change, in turn, constitutes an accidental feature of reality. A substance is thus oblivious to change (like a Platonic Idea) or is an unchanging subject of change (as in the case of prime matter). It is not *becoming*; it only *is*;
- a substance subsists independently of anything else;
- a substance is an ultimate object of predication;

Given that Western philosophy largely derives from the thought of Plato and Aristotle, it is no wonder that the substantialist paradigm, be it idealist or naturalist, has dominated its history and development.

As opposed to a substance in the sense just mentioned, a “process” or “processual⁴ entity” is characterized by continuous novelty, becoming, dynamism, flux, or essential (as opposed to accidental) motion. Its being is identical to its becoming. The term ‘process’ appears to be more modern than the term ‘substance’, and does not suffer the same level of ambiguity as the second term. For a metaphysician who contends that the fundamental entities of the world are processual in nature, it is not the case that “process can be analysed into compositions of final realities, themselves devoid of pro-

⁴The neologism ‘processual’ is due to Rescher.

cess” [45, p. 64]. That is, there are no fixed entities or essences characterized by accidental change.

We distinguish *philosophies of process* and *metaphysics of process* from *process philosophies* and *process metaphysics*. A philosophy or metaphysics of process may use the *concept* of process without being committed to the fundamental *reality* of process. A process philosophy or metaphysics asserts both the reality and fundamentality of process. Every process metaphysics is a metaphysics of process but not conversely. Thus when we speak of e.g., Ibn Sīnā’s metaphysics of process, it does not follow that we are committing him to a belief in the fundamental reality of process.

2.1 The Philosophical Situation of the Post-Ibn Sīnā Era

2.1.1 The Myth of Ibn Rushd

To appreciate the post-Ibn Sīnā metaphysical developments in Muslim civilization, one must begin by recognizing two points:

- The *مُتَكَلِّم* *mutakallim* or theologian al-Ghazālī’s (d. 1111) heavy-handed critique of Hellenic philosophy as laid out in his *Self-destruction of the Philosophers* adversely affected the long-term pursuit of philosophy only in the western half of the Muslim world, including Spain. As we shall see, in the East, the tradition of *the kalām* (الكلام *al-kalām*) or apologetic-rational theology represented by al-Ghazālī, whose own rationalist methods were derived from the Hellenic tradition, begins to

move ever closer and closer to *فَلَسَفَه* *falsafah*⁵, until it is completely transformed into a natural theology. It can also be argued that al-Ghazālī's influence on philosophy was not entirely negative. While remaining an Ash'arite theologian, he was also a devout Sufi, and helped to pave the way for the acceptance of mysticism (including some Neoplatonic themes) as a legitimate enterprise by many (though by no means all) later theologians. This development paralleled and perhaps influenced the growing interest in mysticism and its theory on the part of other philosophers of the post-Ibn Sīnā era;

- Ibn Rushd (d. 1198) had no impact upon the development of post-Ibn Sīnā philosophy in the East, and is not a member of its canon. As Rescher has noted [54, Ch. 5], two schools of Peripateticism developed in Ibn Sīnā's wake:

⁵It is important to distinguish 'philosophy' in the general sense in which we may use it today, and the sense in which it was used in Muslim civilization. In the latter tradition, "philosophy" or "*falsafah*" is specific to the Hellenic/Neoplatonic tradition and the development, based on Peripatetic methodology, of that tradition by the Persians and Arabs. Neither the *مُتَكَلِّمُونَ* *mutakallimūn* nor the mystics would be considered philosophers in this sense. The earlier *mutakallimūn* used the rational methods of Greek logic, but did not base their metaphysical schemes on deduction from Aristotelian first principles. The early mystics developed Neoplatonic themes, but for the most part rejected Peripatetic methodology. When we are referring to this narrower conception of "philosophy", we will frequently use the Arabic term '*falsafah*'. This is in order to distinguish it from philosophy in general, which we will take as subsuming each of the intellectual strands of the Muslim tradition, including mysticism, the *kalām*, and primordial Shī'ī thought. A practitioner of *falsafah* is called a *فَيْلَسُوف* *faylasūf*, plural, *فَلَّاسَفَه* *falāsafah*.

- the *Eastern* school, spearheaded by Ibn Sīnā, which in refusing to limit philosophy to the mere exposition and interpretation of Aristotelian texts, emphasized original and critical approaches; although an Aristotelian, Ibn Sīnā refused to write a single systematic commentary on any of the texts of the Stagirite [35, pg. 42];
- the *Western* school, represented by al-Farabi (d. 950) and especially Ibn Rushd, who believed in sticking as close as possible to the ancients in general and Aristotle in particular. According to Rescher [55, pgs. 149], Averroes was “a more royalist Aristotelian than King Aristotle himself”. This emphasis on the interpretation of and commentaries upon Aristotle was transferred to the scholastics of the West, who were in large part a continuation of the Western school of the Peripateticism of Muslim civilization. One notices that in his response to al-Ghazālī, the *Self-destruction of the Self-destruction*, Ibn Rushd misses no opportunity to criticize Ibn Sīnā as being unfaithful to the true spirit of Aristotle.

According to Henry Corbin, none of Ibn Sīnā’s successors “had any inkling of the role and the significance attributed by our textbooks to the Ibn Rushd-al-Ghazālī polemic. If it had been explained to them they would have been amazed, as their successors today are amazed” [32, pg. 242].

2.1.2 The Legacy of Ibn Sīnā

Despite his iconoclasm and Neoplatonic sympathies, Ibn Sīnā was by and large a Peripatetic or مَشَائِي *maššāʾī* philosopher. While parting with Aristotle on some particulars, he does not in general appear to have questioned Aristotle's substance-based categorical and metaphysical framework at all. In both *The Healing* and *The Book of Scientific Knowledge*, after treating the question of the delineation of the subject matter and the problems of metaphysics, Ibn Sīnā immediately proceeds to the division of being into substance and accident. Now there are differences between Ibn Sīnā and Aristotle with regards to, for example, the former's inclusion of the soul and the latter's inclusion of God (the Prime Mover) in the category of substance [47, pg. 114], yet Ibn Sīnā basically keeps the categorical framework of Aristotle intact.

It is difficult to overestimate the influence of Ibn Sīnā on the subsequent development of philosophy as it continued in eastern Islam. Whether one were for him or against him, it would become increasingly difficult to do either *falsafah* or *kalām* without dealing with “the Head Shaykh” (الشَّيْخُ الرَّئِيسُ) *aš-šayḥu 'r-raʾīs*), as Ibn Sīnā came to be called. Even Aristotle, though ostensibly still held in higher esteem in the canon, would play second fiddle. While the writing of commentaries on the Stagirite would all but disappear — indeed, even some of the actual commentaries, like a number of al-Farabi's, were lost — commentaries on the metaphysical works of Ibn Sīnā abound right up to our day.

Although the al-Ghazālī-Ibn Rushd polemic was of little significance to either the *falāsafah* or the *mutakallimūn*, there was at least one polemic of

great significance to the future of both groups. This was the famous set of exchanges between the Ash‘arite theologian Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1209) and the Avicennan philosopher, astronomer, and mathematician, Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d.1274).

Al-Rāzī was fundamentally an apologetic theologian, but nonetheless worked hard — like al-Ghazālī a century earlier — to master Hellenic philosophy. His critique of philosophy however was of a different character than that of al-Ghazālī. He is much less heavy-handed than his predecessor, and even concedes to his opponents on occasion, as in his rejection of atomism [32, pg. 242]. He wrote a critical commentary on Ibn Sina’s last work, *Allusions and Admonitions*. And in his *Summa of the Views of the Ancients and Moderns*, he makes a comparative analysis of ancient Greek thought, the Hellenic philosophy of the Muslim era, and the theology of the *kalām*.

The critical and comparative studies of al-Rāzī prepared the way for the synthesis of the metaphysics of *falsafah* with that of the *kalām*, carried out by the Shī‘ī mathematician-astronomer Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, who more than anyone else revived the star of Ibn Sīnā after the beatings he took at the hands of al-Ghazālī and al-Rāzī. He responded to al-Rāzī’s criticisms of Ibn Sīnā by writing his own now famous commentary on the latter’s *Allusions and Admonitions*. In addition, he wrote a critical commentary on al-Rāzī’s *Summa*. Finally, he composed what may be considered the first true natural theology in Muslim civilization, the extremely concise and dense *Tajrīd al-‘Aqāid* or the *Abstraction of Correct Beliefs*, in which he gives the *kalām* a Peripatetic metaphysical foundation. According to Qarai [50, pg 29], more than two hundred commentaries were written on this text by philosophers

as well as both Shī'ī and Sunni theologians. While the *kalām* retained its role as the defender of the faith, it soon became a thoroughly Peripateticized defender of the faith.

While al-Rāzī was criticizing the Peripatetics from the vantage point of the *kalām*, a contemporary of al-Rāzī launched the first major revolution from within the ranks of the *falāsafah*. We are referring to the إشرَاقِيّ *išrāqiyy* (*illuminationist* or *oriental*) movement of Shihab al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī (d. 1191). His was a Platonic reaction against Peripateticism. In opposition to Ibn Sīnā, he affirmed the existence of the realm of Ideas, which he reinterpreted as consisting of angelic lights. He saw himself as completing the task, initiated by Ibn Sīnā, of constructing an *oriental wisdom*, which would draw upon the resources of the ancient Persian sages as well as Plato and Hermes. While his work is full of mystical insights and allusions, al-Suhrawardī was also a critical analyst, whose critiques of certain basic Peripatetic themes influenced both al-Rāzī and especially al-Ṭūsī. As we shall see, al-Suhrawardī tried to make some changes to the traditional Peripatetic scheme of categories. In addition, he was the first great champion of *essentialism*, forcefully arguing the thesis that

1. the essence-existence distinction is purely a mental or conceptual distinction;
2. only essences really exist, and existence is a *subjectively posited abstraction* (مَعْقُولَةٌ ثَانِيَّةٌ) (اعتِبَارٌ عَقْلِيٌّ *i'tibār 'aqliyy*) or second-order intelligible (مَعْقُولَاتٌ ثَانِيَّةٌ) (*ma'qūlat ṭāniyat*), to which nothing corresponds in reality external to

the mind⁶.

This interpretation of the essence-existence distinction was adopted by both al-Rāzī and al-Ṭūsī, and thus came to dominate nearly the entire spectrum of philosophical speculation in the post-Ibn Sīnā era. But not quite the entire spectrum, as we shall see with Ibn al-‘Arabī. Suhrawardi was executed by the regime of the famous Salah al-Dīn Ayyubī, the Saladin of the Third Crusade, at the young age of 36, on the charge of heresy and corrupting the youth (particularly Salah al-Dīn’s son⁷). He is thus referred to as **الشَّيْخُ الْمَقْتُولُ** *aš-šayḥu ’l-maqtūlu*, the Murdered Shaykh.

Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī was the last giant figure of that cycle of philosophers and/or scientists corresponding to the so-called Golden Age of Muslim Civilization. Al-Ṭūsī himself witnessed the end of this age and was a prisoner and astrologer of Hulagu Khan during the sack of Baghdad by the Mongols in 1258. The story of how he nearly single-handedly rescued the heritage of his civilization from destruction and convinced the Mongols to instead become the patrons of scholarship and science has been told elsewhere⁸. The important point here is that al-Ṭūsī also represents the beginning of a cycle of *scholasticism*. Henceforth, work in philosophy is primarily carried out

⁶Another manifestation of al-Suhrawardī’s essentialism is his (and later al-Ṭūsī’s) rejection of *hylē* or prime matter in the category of substance.

⁷It is interesting to note that Maimonides (d. 1204) is said to have served for a time as a physician to Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ayyūbī (the Saladin of the Crusades). This raises the important question of Maimonides’ own exposure to *isrāqīyy* doctrines. Another famous Jewish philosopher, Ibn Kammūnah (d. 1284, converted to Islam in his old age), wrote an important commentary on Suhrawardi’s *Kitāb al-Talwīḥāt*, or *The Book of Intimations*.

⁸See, e.g., *Ragep 93*, Vol 1, §1, and *Ja’fariyan 90*.

by theologians, in a way analogous to the work of the fathers, doctors, and masters of Western scholasticism. Similar to the case with the pre-Suarez scholastics⁹, however, theologians before the rise of the School of Isfahan were rarely called *falāsafah*, even when they either specialized or did work in that field. There was no fast rule in this regard, however. Symbolic of this is the case of the ‘Allāmah (“Distinguished Doctor”) Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī. A Shī‘ī theologian/jurisprudent, he was al-Ṭūsī’s prize pupil in philosophy, and in turn trained many other theologian-philosophers, both Sunnī and Shī‘ī.

At the same time that Suhrawardi and his followers were constructing a mystical oriental philosophy from within the ranks of the *falāsafah*, members of the mystical schools of Sufism were at work developing a philosophy of their own. This movement reached its peak in the massive work of Ibn al-‘Arabī of Murcia, Andalusia (d. 1240 in Damascus). His was a mystical phenomenology of the reality of existence in the sense of *actus* and of continual, teleological change in the essences of things on the path towards union with God. He was not trained as a Peripatetic, but some of his students were, and they developed their master’s ideas into a *theosophy*, that is, a coherent rational system of mysticism. Ibn al-‘Arabī was to have a decisive influence four centuries later upon Mulla Ṣadra as the inspiration for many of the process elements of the latter’s own revolution from within the ranks of the *falāsafah*.

To summarize, we see that, two centuries after the death of Ibn Sīnā, Muslim civilization came to be dominated by four intellectual currents:

⁹See *Gracia 90* (glossary, under *philosophi*)

- the essentialist Peripateticism of al-Ṭūsī¹⁰;
- the essentialist *kalām* of both al-Rāzī and al-Ṭūsī;
- the essentialist illuminationism of Suhrawardi;
- the existentialist mystical phenomenology of Ibn al-‘Arabī.

2.1.3 Mulla Ṣadra

Over the three centuries spanning the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century up to the establishment of the Shī‘ī Safawid dynasty in Iran in the sixteenth, these four currents continued to thrive and develop. During this time, attempts were made to reconcile or synthesize two or more of these systems, with limited degrees of success and popularity. Important philosophers of this period include the theologians Sharīf al-Jurjānī (d. 1413)¹¹, Jalāl al-

¹⁰Even though we have described him as a Peripatetic, it should be kept in mind that al-Ṭūsī and his followers were not mere mouthpieces of Aristotle or even Ibn Sīnā. For example al-Ṭūsī, almost in anticipation of Kant, is the first of the *falāsafah* to stress the distinction between mental existence and extra-mental existence. Some of al-Ṭūsī’s students and colleagues, like Qutb al-Dīn Shirāzī (d. 1311), were quite original philosophers in their own right, and defy strict classification. Unfortunately, this introduction cannot possibly convey the richness of post-Avicennan islamic philosophy; the classifications we are using are only intended to be suggestive of the general outline of the post-Avicennan philosophical situation.

¹¹Al-Jurjānī’s summa, the *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*, is one of the most important works of the period between al-Ṭūsī and the School of Isfahan. It is comparable in scope and breadth to Aquinas’s *Summa theologiae* and Suarez’s *Disputationes metaphysicae*. Although he was ostensibly Sunni in religious persuasion, many of his numerous works maintained constant places in the curriculums of both the Sunni and Shī‘ī scholastic establishments in the

Dīn Dawwānī (d. 1502-3), and the so-called “Eleventh Intelligence” Ghiyāth al-Dīn Dashtakī (d. 1541) (who, following his father, opposed Dawwānī). This process reached a watershed with the establishment of the School of Isfahan during the reign of Shah Abbas I (1587-1629). The leader of this school, Mir Dāmād (d. 1631-1632) was its greatest Peripatetic and was equally at home with the illuminationist mysticism of al-Suhrawardī. Known as “the Third Teacher” (after Aristotle and al-Farābī), he made many important contributions to the study of time¹².

For our purposes, the most important figure of the school of Isfahan is Mir Dāmād’s brightest student, Mulla Muhammad ibn Ibrāhīm Sadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī (d. 1640). It can be said without any exaggeration that Mulla Ṣadra was the greatest philosopher of Islam after Ibn Sīnā. In addition, perhaps no one else since al-Ṭūsī really considered himself as first and foremost a *faylasūf*, and an inheritor of the Hellenic tradition going back to the pre-Socratics, quite to the extent that he did. His summa, *al-’Asfār al-’Arba‘ah al-’Aqliyyah* or *The Four Intellectual Journeys*, is a massive and encyclopedic work covering questions of general metaphysics, theology, natural philosophy, and what is a most extensive analysis of psychology and eschatology.

It is to Mulla Ṣadra that we owe the development of perhaps a true process philosophy from within the tradition of the *falāsafah*. While vigorously defending the thesis that the essence-existence distinction is a mental or conceptual one, he convincingly and decisively rejected the theory of the primacy of essence and claimed to demonstrate in its place the primacy of existence.

following centuries and up to the present day.

¹²See *Rahman 80*, for a critical analysis of Dāmād’s theory.

This paved the way for a synthesis, within the Peripatetic framework of Ibn Sīnā, of the illuminationism of al-Suhrawardī and the theosophical doctrines of Ibn Arabī. In addition, Mulla Ṣadra claimed to have proved the existence of motion in the category of substance, a move that marks the dawn of process philosophy in the tradition of *falsafah*.

Mulla Ṣadra would prove to be a major point of departure for Shaykh 'Aḥmad. He wrote critical commentaries on two of the former's works, and devoted a major portion of his philosophical pursuit to criticizing, among other things, what he saw as certain leanings towards pantheism in Ṣadra's work, leanings which he (rightly) considered to be rooted in Ṣadra's attempt to integrate the theosophical perspective of Ibn 'Arabī into his own system of thought. In any case, the metaphysical school of Mulla Ṣadra had become the predominant school of *falsafah* in parts of Muslim scholasticism — it remained especially strong in Isfahan — by the time of Shaykh 'Aḥmad. (Avicennan and Suhrawardian varieties of essentialism did not die out, however.) In Iraq, however, the leaders of the scholastic establishment in Najaf and Karbala, and whose authority reached even into Isfahan, generally rejected Mulla Ṣadra and his leanings towards Ibn 'Arabī out of hand. It is from this backdrop that Shaykh 'Aḥmad emerged.

2.2 The General Problem of Processes in Islamic Philosophy

The first thing to keep in mind when examining the development of process philosophy in Muslim civilization is that both *falsafah* and the later *kalām*

were dominated by the substance philosophy of Aristotle. Even the Neoplatonic elements appear to have been oriented towards a very static view of the world as opposed to a dynamic view. The theory of the “emanation” of the ten intellects — which are substances — from the One is a case in point. Ibn Sīnā argues in the Fifth *Namaṭ*¹³ of the *Ishārāt* that, while the *concept* of emanation is important, there is no reality to be attached to the *act* or *process* of emanation in itself above and over the agent and the subject of emanation. This is an example of the priority of substances or discreet “things” over processes in Ibn Sīnā’s system. Put another way, while Ibn Sīnā’s theory of emanation constitutes a *philosophy of process*, it does not appear to be a *process philosophy*.

Another point that is important in this regard is the very conservative nature of most Muslim philosophers. It was always considered to be in poor taste to take major leaps away from the Aristotelian tradition. As we alluded to earlier, even the metaphysics of the *mutakallimūn* came to be, after al-Ṭūsī, dominated by the Aristotelian tradition. So we find that right up to Mulla Ṣadra, the ten categories are kept intact. The only major figure in *falsafah* to try changing the traditional categorical scheme was al-Suhrawardī, who eliminated the categories of action, passion, position, time, and place, and replaced them with a single category of *motion*. Morewedge sees this as part of the paradigm shift towards process philosophy. I see it as a move towards pure Platonism, if not outright idealism, for Suhrawardi’s category of motion is still an accidental category. Because his category of motion

¹³‘*Namaṭ*’ is a chapter heading meaning *Way* or *Manner*. Muslim scholars commonly employed suggestive words of their own fancy for chapter headings.

is accidental, flux and becoming do not enter into the essential structure of the *mundus sensibilis* and its contents in the same way that it does for Plato. This moves Suhrawardī to the right of Plato. To accomplish the task of introducing becoming into the quintessence of the sensible world would require a theory of motion in the category of substance itself, a project not successfully completed until the time of Mulla Ṣadra. In any case, it appears that few to none of the major figures in philosophy following al-Suhrawardī accepted his reclassification. Mulla Ṣadra in particular attacks al-Suhrawardī on this point and reaffirms the classification of Aristotle.

On the other hand, we do find al-Suhrawardī's continued influence in the question of determining which of the categories are *ʿiṭibārīyy* concepts. Al-Ṭūsī for example, while clinging to the claim that there are ten categories, considered the categories of correlation, action, and passion to be *ʿiṭibārīyy*. In the category of substance itself, we find both al-Suhrawardī and al-Ṭūsī arguing that there is no prime matter over and beyond the bodies themselves. Following the lead of al-Suhrawardī, we find the philosophers of Muslim civilization engaging in something very similar to what Grossman calls “the unfortunate philosophical practice of trying to define things out of existence¹⁴” [40, pg. 104]. In general, process concepts suffered the fate of being declared *ʿiṭibārīyy*. The category of motion is an exception, but still it remained an “accidental” feature of reality, secondary to static and changeless substances, be they the angelic lights of the realm of Ideas, souls, or bodies. However, as we shall see, the philosophers’ ever-increasingly static, essentialist view of reality came under the heavy attack of the mystics of

¹⁴Including, one should add, “existence” itself!

Islam, especially the school of Ibn al-Arabī. In addition, the early sources of Revelation and Shī'ī tradition were very process-oriented in nature. By the time of the establishment of the School of Isfahan, the following factors were in place:

1. virtually all of the philosophers were now Shī'ī theologians;
2. because they were theologians, the need to reconcile faith and philosophy was more pressing than ever;
3. it was now rare to find a major philosopher who was not in some sense a mystic.

As a result of these factors, the philosophers were increasingly exploring the treasures of Ibn al-Arabī's theosophical mysticism as well as Sufi poetry — the latter of which had become a fixture of Persian culture — for inspiration. It was the school of Ibn al-Arabī, more than anything else, which inspired Mulla Ṣadra to follow a path which would lead to a partial overthrow of essentialist and static, substance-based metaphysics. And delving deeper into the teachings of the earlier Shī'ī Imams/Sages inspired Shaykh 'Aḥmad to radically transform the metaphysics of Mulla Ṣadra into a system that is even more dominated by process themes.

Chapter 3

Biographical Sketch

3.1 The Life of Shaykh 'Aḥmad al-'Aḥsā'ī

Compared with some of the other major figures in the philosophy of traditional Muslim civilization, Arabic and Persian sources on the life, times, and influence of Shaykh 'Aḥmad al-'Aḥsā'ī are plenteous, and a large volume could be devoted to his biography. These sources include an autobiography, a biography by one of his sons, entries in the contemporary or immediately post-contemporary biographical encyclopedias of the age, letters, polemical tracts written by his opponents and supporters, as well as other primary and secondary sources, including the multitudinous work of Shaykh 'Aḥmad himself. From the time of his life and up to the rise of Imam Khumayni this century, the Shī'ī world has not seen as controversial a philosopher-theologian as Shaykh 'Aḥmad. So up to this day many works, most of them brief, in Arabic and Persian continue to be written about both him and the school of theology attributed to him, *Shaykhism*. Here we will give only a very brief

sketch of his life, with an emphasis on his philosophical career¹.

“The Philosopher of the Age”², ‘Aḥmad, the son of Shaykh Zayn al-Dīn, was born in Rajab, 1166 (in or near the month of May, 1753) in the village of al-Muṭayraf of the emirate of al-‘Aḥṣā’, in what is now the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. This emirate was adjacent to that of Baḥrayn, and is sometimes included as part of the latter³. According to Shaykh ‘Aḥmad’s testimony, it had become somewhat of a backwoods, far removed from the centers of civilization. The Shaykh appears to have been gifted with a precocious memory for he claims to remember and recounts in detail a devastating flood that hit the emirate when he was two years of age. As a boy, he was given to contemplation and reflection, even when playing with his friends. He especially meditated upon the relics of bygone potentates and kingdoms of his region. He would cry and contemplate the change and transitoriness that characterized those mighty rulers and kingdoms in particular, as well as the world at large. He was also perturbed by what he perceived to be his people’s ignorance of religious law and norms. He was impatient with their indulgence in merry-making and festivity, and disturbed by his own

¹For this sketch, we draw from numerous sources, the most important of them including his autobiography and other information as contained in the introduction to the latest edition of the author’s *Sharḥ al-Ziyārah*, as well as the entries included in the biographical dictionaries, *Rawḍāt al-Jannāt* by Mīrẓā Khwānsārī, and *‘A‘lām al-Hajar* by Hāshim Shakḥṣ. The most complete bibliography of the Shaykh’s works, including a comprehensive inventory of the available editions and manuscripts, is the monograph by Moojan Momen, *The Works of Shaykh ‘Aḥmad al-‘Aḥṣā’i: a Bibliography*.

²This title, among many others was given by Mīrẓā Khwānsārī in the course of his epitaph of the Shaykh in his *Rawḍāt*.

³Hence our author is sometimes called ‘Aḥmad al-Baḥrānī.

inclinations towards joining them.

After noticing an interest in grammar on the part of his son, Shaykh Zayn al-Dīn sent him to a nearby village to study with a local scholar. Sometime during his studies there, young 'Aḥmad began having visions and dreams in which a young man would teach him the meanings of qur'anic verses, or he would visit strange worlds. Finally, he saw three of the twelve Shī'ī Imams in a dream: the second Imam al-Ḥasan ibn 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, the fourth Imam 'Alī ibn al-Husayn ibn 'Alī, and the fifth Imam Muhammad ibn 'Alī ibn al-Husayn. The high point of this vision is when Imam al-Ḥasan places his mouth over that of 'Aḥmad, who is lying flat on his back, letting him taste the Imam's saliva. Then the Imam places his hand on 'Aḥmad's face, then his chest, sending a cool feeling through his heart. In the tradition of Shī'ī mysticism, the receiving of the saliva of the Prophet or one of the Imams is symbolic of the transmission of some of their knowledge.

In the months that followed, young 'Aḥmad began working on increasing his devotions and recitation of the Qur'an, perfecting his sincerity in those devotions, as well as deepening his meditations on world around him. The intensity of his visions increased until he reached a point where he could "visit" the Imams and the Prophet almost at will, and ask difficult questions of them. This continued, he says, throughout his studies and until his fame as a scholar and leader years later, when his visions of the Imams became intermittent. At one point he claims to have had a vision wherein the tenth Imam passed him twelve licenses, one from each Imam.

At age twenty, al-'Aḥsā'ī went to the centers of the Shī'ī scholastic establishment, in southern Iraq to continue his studies. The holy cities of Najaf

and Karbala, containing respectfully the graves of the first Imam ‘Alī ibn ‘Abī Ṭālib and the third Imam Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alī, were at that time under Ottoman rule, though semi-autonomous. The chief figure of this establishment at the time of al-’Aḥsā’ī’s arrival was Āqā al-Waḥīd Bāqir Bihbahānī (d.1791). Through the sometimes severe efforts, both mental and political, of the Āqā, the analytic school of jurisprudence and philosophy of law and language, together known as the *أُصُولِيّ* *uṣūliyy* school, became the dominant school of jurisprudence in the scholastic establishment, from which it spread to the point where nearly all Shī‘ī scholars today follow the analytic school. Losing this fight was the traditionalist *أَخْبَارِيّ* *aḥbārīyy* school, who generally confined the theory of jurisprudence to a more or less critical discussion of traditions attributed to the Imams. While it appears certain that young Shaykh ‘Aḥmad attended the Āqā’s lectures, the latter was fifty years his senior and politically active. So it is doubtful that he developed much of a relationship with the Āqā.

However, the Shaykh also attended the lectures of many of the most prominent students of Āqā al-Waḥīd, including Shaykh Ja‘far ibn Khiḍr al-Najafī (d. 1813), known by the honorific title of *Kāshif al-Ghiṭā’* (Unveiler of Mysteries), and Sayyid⁴ Muhammad Mahdī ibn Murtaḍā al-Ṭabāṭabā’ī (d. 1797), better known as Baḥr al-‘Ulūm (Sea of Knowledge). Baḥr al-‘Ulūm was also known as a great *عَارِف* *‘ārif* or mystic. Shaykh ‘Aḥmad was to receive licenses from these and other prominent and important scholars of

⁴The title *Sayyid* is generally given to scholars who are descendants of the Prophet Muhammad. Other scholars are given the appellation *Shaykh* in Arabic-speaking areas like Iraq and that of *Mulla* in Persian-speaking regions like Iran.

his day, all of which contain comments praising his erudition and piety in the highest terms.

There does not appear to have been a prominent school of *falsafah* in the ‘Atabāt⁵ during Shaykh ‘Aḥmad’s time. That was to be found in Isfahan, Iran. On the other hand, the scholars of Najaf and Karbala employed Avicennan logic and emphasized a critical, analytic approach to the problems of philosophy of law, jurisprudence proper, and theology. The works of al-Ṭūsī and his successors in the *kalām* were widely available, read, taught, and studied. The numerous libraries of Najaf and Karbala were among the best in Muslim civilization, and the treasures of *falsafah* were put to use in the development of theology and the philosophy of law.

While the metaphysics of Mulla Sadra and its application to theology by his student, Mulla Muḥsin Fayḍ Kāshānī (d. 1680), was well known by the leading scholars of the ‘Atabāt, they generally discouraged the dissemination of this particular school. Many saw in Mulla Muḥsin especially, who was otherwise a quite respected scholar, an unwelcome attempt to introduce the pantheistic doctrine of the perceived anti-Shī‘ī mystic Ibn al-‘Arabī into standard theology. Shaykh Yūsuf ibn ‘Aḥmad al-Bāḥrānī (d. 1772), the last great *‘aḥbāriyy* jurist and theologian, a compatriot of Shaykh ‘Aḥmad, and a wielder of great influence even upon many analytic scholars, considered all of the *falāsafah* to be unbelievers, criticizing even his coreligionist Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī. He reserves some of his harshest criticism for his fellow *‘aḥbāriyy*, Mulla Muḥsin. It was two years after Shaykh ‘Aḥmad had first

⁵The ‘Atabaat comprises the holy cities of Najaf, Karbala, and Kazimayn, burial sites for six of the twelve Imams.

left for the ‘Atabāt that Shaykh Yūsuf passed away⁶. The strength of the anti-Mulla Ṣadra, anti-Mulla Muḥsin sentiment of many scholars was surely not lost on him.

Despite this, Najaf and Karbala were by no means monolithic, and one cannot discount the likelihood of there having been private teachers of *falsafah* proper, including that of Mulla Ṣadra. Indeed, in the early philosophical works — many of which were responses to the questions of other scholars — of Shaykh ‘Aḥmad dating from the period spent in Iraq and eastern Arabia, we see references to, among others, the doctrines of Mulla Ṣadra and Mulla Muḥsin. In some cases it is the questioner who is asking about the interpretation of some of the teachings of the latter two. It is thus certain that the works of these authors, as well as that of other philosophers and mystics, were available and intently studied by some scholars, whatever official attitudes may have been.

It cannot be emphasized enough that opposition to the doctrines of Ibn ‘Arabi and Mulla Ṣadra on the part of the leaders of the scholastic establishment did not necessarily constitute an opposition to mystical wayfaring per se, especially when privately practiced. On the contrary, we find numerous instances of a prominent jurist like Baḥr al-‘Ulūm opposed to Sufism and Ibn ‘Arabi while also being both a mystic and known as a great mystic. Books on mystical wayfaring (*sayr wa sulūk*), that is, the ethical and practical discipline through means of which one is supposed to advance in closeness to God — as opposed to Sufi doctrine — were also written by

⁶Shaykh Aḥmad also received a license from at least four students of Shaykh Yūsuf.

prominent scholars such as Baḥr al-‘Ulūm⁷. What was generally opposed was organizational Sufism and the pantheistic interpretation of mystical experience, which both ran directly counter to direct teachings of the Shī‘ī Imams as well as undermined the authority and political stability of the scholastic establishment.

We do not know whether or not Shaykh ‘Aḥmad attended lectures in the *falsafah* of Mulla Ṣadra or other philosophers. We do know that in addition to his studies in the standard curriculum including prophetic traditions, philosophy of law and language, jurisprudence, ethics, and the *kalām*, he was also interested in and pursued other sciences such as mathematics and astronomy, practical and theoretical chemistry, mineralogy, the occult arts (like numerology and letter-based hermeneutics), and medicine. He had a special attraction towards chemistry and alchemy — which the first Imam, ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, had once called “the sister of prophecy” — doing what appears to have been original research in the field. Some of these disciplines, like alchemy and the occult arts, were only taught privately and secretly, and we do not know who his teachers were in these fields. The most we know is that he was associated with a certain obscure alchemist and occult philosopher Shaykh ‘Alī ibn ‘Abdullah ibn Fāris, upon some of whose works Shaykh ‘Aḥmad wrote commentaries, and whom the latter extols with a kind of praise he bestows upon few other scholars.

Despite his multifarious interests, Shaykh ‘Aḥmad did not neglect jurisprudence, and eventually became a *mujtahid*, that is, one able to deduce by himself, using the principles of the philosophy of law and language, the

⁷See, e.g., Baḥr al-‘Ulūm’s *Risalah-i Siyar va Sulūk*.

laws of jurisprudence from the prophetic sources. This was a very difficult rank to obtain, and it was not uncommon for one to take twenty years or more of difficult study to reach it. He also wrote a number of advanced works in the fields of jurisprudence and philosophy of law and language. Yet he also devoted perhaps the major portion of his energies to the study of *falsafah* and the *kalām*, especially, though not exclusively, that of Mulla Muḥsin and the latter's master, Mulla Ṣadra.

Shaykh 'Aḥmad's life was characterized by a certain restlessness and mobility. From the time he first left al-'Aḥsā' in 1772 up to about 1806, he moved his family no less than ten times to various locations, many of them isolated and remote, between his homeland in eastern Arabia and the 'Atabāt. This was in some part to escape the adulation of an increasing number of admirers. In 1806 he made the fateful decision to go on pilgrimage to Mashhad, in Eastern Iran, to visit the tomb of the Eighth Imam, Imam 'Alī al-Riḍā.

Once he completed his pilgrimage, Shaykh 'Aḥmad settled in the Iranian city of Yazd after the persistent lobbying of its senior scholars and local leaders. Within a short time, he became a major mujtahid and *the* most important theologian on the Iranian scene, attracting the attention of the reigning monarch, Fath 'Alī Shah (r. 1797–1834). He began a correspondence with the Shaykh, and was so self-effacing in the process that some historians have concluded that “the Shah was convinced that obedience to the Shaykh was obligatory, and opposition to him constituted unbelief” [20, p. 67]. He tried in vain to induce the Shaykh to visit Teheran. Shaykh 'Aḥmad tried to return to Iraq, but his hosts persuaded him to stay and he did in fact visit Teheran, whereupon the Shah tried to convince him to stay. Citing the

oppressive and tyrannical nature of monarchic regimes, the Shaykh refused and returned to Yazd. He decided in 1814 to move back to the ‘Atabāt. Upon his arrival in the Iranian city of Kirmanshah — by way of Isfahan, where he stayed forty days and debated Mulla Ṣadra’s doctrines with the *falāsafah* of that town — the eldest son of the Shah persuaded him to stay, which he did. Aside from other pilgrimages and travels, he stayed in Kirmanshah until 1823. Shaykh ‘Aḥmad’s five most important and mature philosophical works were written during his stay here.

In all of his travels in Iran during this period, large crowds and receptions greeted him everywhere he stopped, including Isfahan, where the leading *falāsafah*, while treating him with reverence, debated him on his criticisms of Mulla Ṣadra. Mulla Hādī Sabzavārī, the greatest follower of Mulla Ṣadra in the nineteenth century and a later critic of the Shaykh, recounts attending the lectures Shaykh ‘Aḥmad gave for fifty-three days during his last visit to Isfahān in 1822 [56, p. 14]. Representative of a common attitude among the followers of Mulla Ṣadra, Sabzavārī, despite reservations about the Shaykh’s philosophy, notes that the latter was “unrivaled in his ascetic ways”.

Unfortunately the jealousy of some less senior theologians created problems for the Shaykh⁸. One prominent mulla in Qazvin, Mulla Barghānī, declared the Shaykh an unbeliever, accusing him, ironically, of being a follower of Mulla Ṣadra in eschatology and in the latter’s alleged denial of physical resurrection. This sparked a more general reaction on the part of other

⁸Almost every modern scholar, including Algar, Bayat, and Corbin, concur that jealousy was the original motivating factor in the Shaykh’s being declared an unbeliever. The then contemporary biographer and scholar Mīrzā Khwānsārī, who was not a follower of the Shaykh, also shared this view.

segments of the scholastic establishment. Although few, if any, senior scholars concurred with Barghānī's pronouncement, sincere concern began to be expressed about Shaykh 'Aḥmad's unique and non-standard approaches to theology and the potential effects of his teaching and leadership on the traditional establishment. By the time the Shaykh finally returned to the 'Atabāt in 1824 — taking up residence in Karbala — the atmosphere had been poisoned by Barghānī's propaganda to the point where there were, among other intrigues, even attempts to get him into trouble with the Ottoman authorities in Baghdad. Fearing for his life, the Shaykh decided to go into exile in Mecca. In Damascus he fell ill, and he died just outside of Medina on June 27, 1826, at age seventy-three. His entourage buried him in the cemetery of al-Baqī' in Medina, at the feet of the very first three Imams he had seen in his early visions.

3.2 Works

Shaykh 'Aḥmad's erudition was encyclopedic, and his scholarly output was nothing short of enormous. He wrote over 160 books and treatises. If one keeps in mind that many of these works constitute collections of answers to the questions of other scholars, and that the answer to a single question sometimes constituted a treatise in itself, then we will have to add to that number. Counting only his responses to the questions of scholars and others, these exceed 550. The subjects covered by the Shaykh range over the entire gamut of the disciplines of traditional Muslim civilization, including metaphysics, cosmology, mysticism, theology, ethics and mystical wayfaring, philosophy of

language and law, jurisprudence proper, interpretation of Qur'an and hadith, chemistry, mineralogy, astronomy, the occult arts, poetry and literary arts, music, medicine, grammar, prosody, and others⁹. About half of these works, including the bulk of the larger ones, are dated by the author. This and some scattered cross-references make it possible to do a chronological analysis of the author's thought

While about fifty of his books and treatises, as well as many individual responses, are concerned with philosophy, cosmology, and metaphysics, the most important, comprehensive, mature, and relevant of these to the concerns of *falsafah* are the following (given in approximately chronological order):

- *Fawā'id al-'Uṣūl* or *Observations in the Philosophy of Law*. It is not dated, but a reference to it in the following work shows that it predates the *Sharḥ al-Ziyārah*; I have not as yet investigated its chronological relationship to the *Fawā'id*, but I suspect that it pre-dates the latter. This is an incomplete work. Aside from some notes on the topic of epistemology and the Law, the author only completed a large portion of "Section Three", on the philosophy of language. It is quite extensive, and deals with linguistic issues also fundamental to his metaphysics;
- *Al-Fawā'id al-Hikmiyyah* or *The Wisdom Observations*. It is not dated. This text is a summary of the author's metaphysical and cosmological doctrine. As it is the subject and basis of this study, we will discuss it further below;

⁹As mentioned earlier, a comprehensive bibliography and inventory of editions and manuscripts is given in *Momen 91*.

- *Sharḥ al-Ziyārah al-Jāmi‘ah al-Kabīrah* or *Commentary on the Grand Comprehensive Visitation*, completed in four parts at Kirmanshah on Rabi‘ I 10, 1230. This is Shaykh Aḥmad’s longest, most famous, and most controversial book. It is a commentary on a “visitation”, that is, a formula read when one visits the grave of the Prophet, his daughter Fatimah, or one of the twelve Shī‘ī Imams. These visitations are also read from afar by anyone seeking spiritual communion with one of these figures. The particular visitation commented upon by Shaykh ‘Aḥmad is the “grand comprehensive visitation” by the Tenth Imam ‘Alī ibn Muḥammad al-Hādī. It is doctrinally one of the most difficult of this genre, covering the various facets of the pristine Shī‘ī philosophy of the Logos and the Perfect Man. Shaykh ‘Aḥmad’s massive commentary constitutes, as far as we know, the most extensive and profound elaboration of this concept in Muslim civilization;
- *Sharḥ Risālah al-‘Ilm* or *Commentary on the Treatise on Knowledge*, completed at Kirmanshah on Rabi‘ II 5, 1230. It is a piercing critique of the epistemology of Mulla Muḥsin Fayḍ Kāshānī, the disciple and son-in-law of Mulla Ṣadra. The point of departure for the discussion is Mulla Muḥsin’s theory of the nature of God’s knowledge. The perceived harshness of some of the Shaykh’s criticisms caused some to (wrongly) believe that he considered Mulla Muḥsin to be an unbeliever;
- *Sharḥ al-Fawā'id* or *Commentary on the Observations*, completed at Kirmanshah on Shawwāl 9, 1233. As the title indicates, this book is an elaboration of his philosophical epitome, the *Fawā'id*. It also includes

seven observations meant to be appended to the original twelve *fawā'id*.

There are at least three other commentaries on the *Fawā'id*, each authored by a student of Shaykh 'Aḥmad. These students are Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Shahristānī, Mulla Kāẓim Simnānī, and Shaykh Muhammad Nāṣir Gīlānī. I have found little information about these authors and have been unable to locate any manuscripts of these works;

- *Sharḥ al-Mashā'ir* or *Commentary on the Metaphysical Penetrations*, completed at Kirmanshah on Ṣafar 27, 1234. This is an extensive, critical commentary on the *Mashā'ir* of Mulla Ṣadra, a summary of the latter's metaphysics and ontology. It appears that this book was written concurrently with the *Sharḥ al-Fawā'id*, for in the latter the author makes references to discussions in the *Sharḥ al-Mashā'ir*;
- *Sharḥ al-Ḥikmah al-'Arshiyyah* or *Commentary on the Throne Wisdom* completed at Kirmanshah on Rabī' I 27, 1236. This is the author's longest and most famous work after the *Sharḥ al-Ziyārah*. It is an extensive, critical commentary on the *Ḥikmah 'Arshiyyah* of Mulla Ṣadra, a summary of the latter's philosophical theology, cosmology, psychology, and eschatology. This commentary contains some of the most extensive discussions on eschatology to be written after Mulla Ṣadra's own section on it in the *'Asfār*;
- *Al-Risālah fī al-'Umūr al-I'tibāriyyah* or *Treatise On Matters of Subjective Consideration*. It is not dated, but refers to the *Sharḥ al-Fawā'id*. Given the short time span in which the immediately preceding two long works were completed, I strongly suspect that this work was written

after the above two. Its theme is a critique of that earlier mentioned practice of philosophers and theologians of “defining things out of existence”. One of the interesting aspects of this treatise is its quotations from the *Mufaṣṣal* of Najm al-Dīn al-Katibi al-Qazwīnī, which is a commentary on the earlier-mentioned *Muhaṣṣal* of al-Rāzī. Al-Qazwīnī (d. 1276) was a famous logician and student of al-Tūsī, who is known in the West, thanks to the efforts of Rescher, as an expert in temporal modal logic. The *Mufasssal* appears to be a rather rare book, as I have not been able to find a reference to even a facsimile edition of this important text. Another significant feature of this treatise is the inclusion of a critical commentary on a section of Mulla Ṣadra’s *Asfār*¹⁰.

The last six works contain Shaykh ‘Aḥmad’s mature philosophical views in their most elaborate form. Along with the *Fawā'id*, they constitute the basis of the last major philosophical school of traditional Muslim civilization. The five commentaries in this group constitute the author’s philosophical *opera majora*.

3.3 Sources

From a metaphilosophical point of view, one of the most important features of the philosophy of Shaykh ‘Aḥmad is that it represents a radical confluence

¹⁰Unlike each of the afore-mentioned works, there appears to be no extant manuscript or edition of this work other than that included in Volume II of the *Jawāmi‘ul Kalim* or *Collected Works*, a collection of 52 treatises and books of Shaykh ‘Aḥmad, published in 1276 A.H./1859 C.E.. Volume 1 was published in 1273 A.H./1856 C.E. and contains 40 books and treatises.

of the *falsafah* tradition of metaphysics and theology with the philosophy of pristine Shi‘ism. We will say a few words about this latter tradition below. However, we must emphasize that, although there were almost always some Shi‘ī scholars at the forefront of rational, *falsafah*-influenced thought, there is a sense in which it can be said that this latter method was *imposed* upon Shi‘ī theology, pushing pristine Shi‘ī thought, which Corbin calls “prophetic philosophy”, into the background. In addition to rationalist metaphysics and “prophetic philosophy”, the traditions of natural philosophy and mysticism also play important supporting roles in Shaykh ‘Aḥmad’s philosophy.

We can thus divide Shaykh ‘Aḥmad’s sources of philosophical meditation into four groups: the rationalist traditions of *falsafah* and the *kalām*; the “prophetic philosophy” and hermeneutics of early Shi‘ism; the tradition of natural sciences, especially alchemy and astronomy; and the traditional schools of mysticism. To do an exhaustive inventory of the authors he quotes or is familiar with is beyond our scope. We will only mention some of the most important ones.

3.3.1 *Falsafah* and the *Kalām*

We discussed in the previous chapter some of the character of post-Avicennan philosophy in Eastern Islam. Shaykh ‘Aḥmad appears to have been familiar with the bulk of this tradition, and references to nearly all of the important figures of this tradition appear scattered throughout his works. Of all of these figures, however, the Shaykh appears to have focused the major part of his attention on the works of Mulla Ṣadra and Mulla Muḥsin. Aside from the fact that the philosophy of Mulla Ṣadra was the last major philosophical

school predating Shaykh 'Aḥmad, the reason for this lies at least partly in their attempts to integrate the teachings of the Shi'ī Imams with a synthesis of Peripatetic, Illuminationist, and Sufi theosophical perspectives. Given his spiritual devotion to the Imams and to their teachings, as well as his interest in philosophy and theology in general, it is only natural that he would have an interest in what Mulla Ṣadra and Mulla Muḥsin had to say. Indeed, there is a sense in which one can see Shaykh 'Aḥmad's philosophical career, in metaphysics in particular, as consisting of a long, critical contemplation of Mulla Ṣadra and Mulla Muḥsin. Personally, I see in Shaykh 'Aḥmad's treatment of these two confirmation that criticism is indeed sometimes the best form of flattery.

Despite his original doctrine, there is a strong Illuminationist spirit that runs through Shaykh 'Aḥmad. While he does not consider himself a follower of al-Suhrawardī — and indeed, his processism stands in marked contrast to the latter's extreme essentialism, if not idealism — Shaykh 'Aḥmad shares al-Suhrawardī's negative view of the thesis that purely rational analysis constitutes the one and only proper method of philosophical investigation. The Suhrawardian theme the Shaykh does most to develop is that of the *mundus imaginalis* — the psychic realm posited as spanning the chasm between the *mundus sensibilis* and the *mundus intelligibilis*. He especially develops al-Suhrawardī's concept of *هُورْقَالِيَا* *hūrqalyā*, the region of the *mundus imaginalis* that is closest to and abuts the *mundus sensibilis*. But the Shaykh would have us believe that any appearance of similarity between himself and al-Suhrawardī is superficial at best. The Illuminationist critique of Peripateticism is latent in pristine Shi'ism, and the concept of *hūrqalyā* can be found

in the teachings of the Imams also, except that they use the terms ‘*ǧābalqā*’ and ‘*ǧābarsā*’. All three of these terms appear to be of Syriac and Mandeian origin, and the Shaykh was familiar with the remnants of the ancient Mandeian religion who resided in the vicinity of Basra, where the Shaykh also lived for a time¹¹.

On the question of the origination (*ḥudūt*) of the world, Shaykh ‘Aḥmad sides with Ibn Sīnā, arguing that its origination is ontological, not temporal. I have not come across extensive quotes from Ibn Sīnā, however, except in the area of philosophy of language, where he believes analysis is an appropriate tool.

Shaykh ‘Aḥmad shows thorough familiarity with the works of al-Ṭūsī, his student ‘Allāmah Ḥilli, and the commentary-gloss tradition on the Tajrīd.

3.3.2 Natural Philosophy and Astronomy

Shaykh ‘Aḥmad had a strong interest in natural philosophy. He was familiar with all important figures of the alchemical tradition, including Jābir ibn Ḥayyān (d. 815 (?), *Geber* in Latin), who, that tradition tells us, was a student of the Sixth Imam Ja‘far ibn Muhammad al-Ṣādiq (d. 765). He also discusses the work of al-Jaldakī, the last major synthesizer of the alchemical tradition. One work he highly praises is a large treatise by one Abu al-‘Abbās ‘Aḥmad al-Ramlī, *al-Sirru al-Munīr fī ‘Uṣūl al-Baṣṭ wa al-Taksīr*. In the *Risālah Rashtiyyah*, written in response to one Mulla ‘Alī Rashtī, Shaykh ‘Aḥmad claims that this is one of the best and most comprehensive works in

¹¹Shaykh ‘Aḥmad is explicit about the term ‘*ḥūrqalyā*’ being a term of Mandeian origin. See *Corbin 77*, p. 191–2.

the field [3, Vol. 1, pt. 2, pg. 113]. I have yet to come across any references to this author or his work.

In astronomy, the most important work of post-Ṭūsī astronomy is Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's own *Tadhkirah fī 'Ilm al-Hay'ah* or *Memoir on Astronomy*. This work has been critically edited (with translation, commentary, and glossary) in two volumes by F. G. Ragep. Modern scholars recognize al-Ṭūsī as having been the initiator of a new school of astronomy which was based in Marāgha, Azerbaijan. According to Swerdlow and Neugebauer, this school had a major influence upon Copernicus [63, Vol. 1, pgs. 45–8]. As in the case of al-Ṭūsī's *Tajrīd*, this work dominated its field like no other in the centuries following its author. Shaykh 'Aḥmad was familiar with both this work and the commentary tradition that followed in its wake.

3.3.3 Pristine Shi'ī Philosophy

Of all of Shaykh 'Aḥmad's sources, the philosophy of pristine Shi'ism provided him with his most important muse. For a comprehensive analysis of the prime importance of philosophical Shi'ism in both the historical development and for the modern understanding of philosophy in Muslim civilization, one is referred to Henry Corbin's *History of Islamic Philosophy*, Ch. 2. We have already had occasion to describe Shaykh 'Aḥmad's work as a radical confluence of *falsafah* and the philosophy of pristine Shi'ism. We may add that it also represents the most sophisticated attempt to articulate a fully systematic account of the philosophy of pristine Shi'ism itself. By “the philosophy of pristine Shi'ism” we mean that set of philosophical commitments, both explicit and latent, expressed in the Qur'an and the corpus of tradi-

tions containing the teachings of the Prophet, his daughter Fatimah, and the Twelve Imams of his household.

While Western scholars typically equate philosophy in Muslim civilization with a continuation of the Hellenic tradition (as in the case of the *falāsafah*), or else with an indirect outgrowth of that tradition (as in the case of the *mutakallimūn*), the fact of the matter is that these represent only two particular trends of philosophical meditation in Islam. The school of philosophical meditation founded by the Shī'ī Imams of the household of the Prophet has been generally ignored in the West.

It is well known that the historical split of the Muslim community into the majority Sunnī and minority Shī'ī schools stems from the passing over, during the political succession crisis that followed Muhammad's death, of Ali ibn Abi Ṭālib, the Prophet's cousin, son-in-law, and progenitor of all of the former's descendants. For Ali and his partisans, the issue was not merely the political leadership, but one of carrying on the spiritual and hermeneutic functions of the Prophet — minus revelation — including but not limited to interpreting the Qur'an and unfolding its deeper meanings over time as the community matured. The superior knowledge of Ali was never contested by anyone, even his bitterest enemies. Before and after he was finally elected as the fourth caliph of the community, he gave numerous speeches and lectures which contain the elements of an entire system of ontology, epistemology, natural philosophy, and ethics. After his murder in 661, his oldest son Hasan inherited the mantle of the imamate (from the Shī'ī perspective) and was elected as caliph of the entire community by the elders of the territories controlled by his father. Six months later he was forced to abdicate by the

forces of Muawiyah, the first caliph of the Umayyad dynasty. Muawiyah and his successors then initiated a reign of terror that lasted for nearly a century against the small Shi'ī population. The high point of all of this was the massacre in 680, instigated by Muawiyah's son Yazid, at Karbala, Iraq, of nearly every male descendant of the Prophet, including the Third Imam, Hasan's younger brother Husayn, a sacrilege that even the overwhelming majority of Sunnis deplore up to this day. As a result of this oppression, the later Imams, except intermittently, could not openly teach and train disciples, though they did so secretly. At about the time the twelfth and last imam disappeared in 873, political and social conditions allowed their disciples to begin organizing and publishing sections from the corpus of their teachings.

Now the dicta of the Imams come in the form of aphorisms, short treatises, speeches and lectures, and supplications. Many of these were written or transcribed under difficult circumstances. Partly in order to preserve themselves, their teachings, and their followers from extinction by the so-called "orthodox" authorities, the Imams employed at least two techniques:

1. The Imams practiced, and insisted that their followers practice, something they called *taqiyyah*, meaning "dissimulation" or to use Corbin's interpretation, "the discipline of the arcane" [32, p. 37].
2. The Imams also practiced the art of "dispersion of knowledge" [41, pgs. 6-7]. As opposed to laying out a complete and systematic exposition of philosophical doctrine and methodology, the Imams would mention a metaphysical issue while discussing a legal issue, or discuss a point of doctrine in a lecture, whose deeper implications may only be gathered

by meditating upon a particular supplication, whose understanding in turn depends on a verse of the Qur'an, the understanding of which depends on other verses including a verse which can only be understood in light of that original point of doctrine, and so forth.

Thus the Shī'ī system is a very organic and holistic body of teachings. This raises serious problems for the philosophical hermeneuticist, not only because the corpus of imami teachings is so huge — many tens of volumes in fact — but because of the use of the techniques of dispersal of information and dissimulation to protect their school from the attacks of the authorities.

While the Imams were largely successful in protecting their teachings, after the disappearance in 873 of the twelfth Imam, we see the mainstream scholars of the Shī'ī community gradually placing increasingly greater emphasis and reliance upon the methods of rational theology, many of which were derived from Hellenic thought. Amir-Moezzi [21, Ch. 1] and Modarressi [64, Ch. 4] each has a good description of this trend¹². Due to the need to defend their faith in polemics with the Mu'tazilites and 'Ash'arites, they soon produced great figures in this field. Unfortunately, when looked at through the eyes of Hellenic rationalist technique, a significant number of the traditions of their Imams appeared to be quite irrational. Later theologians generally bracketed these and focused on those of the Imams' traditions which gave support to a system of rational *kalām*. This process reached a high point with the school of systematic theology of Shaykh Mufīd (d. 1032) and his

¹²Moezzi and Modarressi approach this problem from entirely different angles (theosophical and legal respectively); nevertheless, their conclusions are basically the same.

student al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā (d. 1044)¹³.

In the process of expounding the metaphysical and cosmological system of Shaykh 'Aḥmad, we will have occasion to point out some of the salient features of pristine Shī'ī thought. Here we list some basic themes:

- Man's highest goal is cognizance of God. Yet He is utterly transcendent. How then can one have cognizance of Him? The answer to this question consists in a doctrine of the Perfect Man as Logos, and a cultivation of the *fuṣād* (which we translate by 'heart-flux') as the *organ* of cognizance, and of the *ʿaql* (which we usually translate by 'nous', though it actually means "the process of consciousness-awareness"), as the *guide* to cognizance¹⁴;

¹³The degree to which major (though by no means all) segments of Shī'ī scholarship was won over by Hellenic rationalist methods can be partly gauged from the fact that al-Farābī and Ibn Sīnā both had Shī'ī kings or princes for benefactors, and Corbin and others have argued that these two philosophers, while by no means theologians, were themselves Shī'ī. It is interesting to note that al-Kindi (d. 870) knew the Eleventh Imam, Ḥasan al-'Askarī (d. 873).

¹⁴The concept of *al-ʿaql* has a history that is not particularly gratifying. As we will see, it plays a very important role in philosophical Shī'ism. When the sources of Greek philosophy were translated into Arabic, a word was needed to translate the Aristotelian notion of the *nous* (reason, intellect). Unfortunately, the Arabic term *al-ʿaql* was chosen for the job. I say "unfortunate" because as time passed, virtually every school of thought in Muslim civilization, whether or not it was sympathetic or hostile to Greek philosophy, eventually came to understand *al-ʿaqlu*, a gerund, to mean the substance "reason" or "intellect". Later Shī'ī thinkers, when reading the works of the Imams on *al-ʿaql*, tended to interpret it as a purely rational faculty. Most translators, when translating the traditions of the Imams on the subject of *al-ʿaql* — translate it as "intellect" or "reason". For details about the impact the rationalist, Neoplatonic interpretation of *al-ʿaql* had on the later

- Everything has a *ẓāhir* or “manifesting” aspect and a *bāṭin* or “occulting” aspect. For example, the exterior Law (*aṣ-ṣarīḥ*) is a manifestation of the inner realities of faith, while the inner realities of faith cannot manifest without the Law. An expanded version of Cohen’s principle of polarity¹⁵ is strictly adhered to and applied: it is generally folly to reduce either of a pair of contraries needed for the understanding of something to the other.
- A naturalistic and processual tendency permeates the teachings of the Imams. We will elaborate upon this in the sequel.

While pristine Shi‘ī thought remained on the sidelines of mainstream Shi‘ī scholasticism, it never died out. Figures like Ibn Ṭāwūs (d. 1274–75) and Ni‘matullāh al-Jazā‘irī (d. 1700) kept the tradition alive in a purely Shi‘ī doctrinal context, while others like Ḥaydar al-‘Āmulī (died after 1385) and Ibn ‘Abī Jumhūr al-‘Aḥsā‘ī (d. 1401–2) sought the integration of pristine Shi‘ī thought with the theosophy of Ibn ‘Arabi.

3.3.4 The Mystical Schools

The Theosophy of Ibn ‘Arabi

As we said above, Shaykh ‘Aḥmad represents the most sophisticated attempt to realize a systematic account of the philosophy of pristine Shi‘ism. Before his synthesis, however, the mystical schools of Islam were also interested in the teachings of the Imams, and applied them to the construction of their

development of Shi‘ī theology, see *Amir-Moezzi 94*, Ch. 1.

¹⁵See Part II, Ch. 3, sec. 3.2.3.

own theosophical systems. This is especially true of the school of Ibn ‘Arabi. The epitome of the latter’s thought, the *Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam* or *Bezels of Wisdom*, played virtually the same role in Sufic theosophy as the *Tajrīd* of al-Ṭūsi did in later *kalām* and *falsafah*. It produced a very rich commentary tradition. The two most important commentaries on the *Fuṣūṣ*, and with which Shaykh ‘Aḥmad was familiar, were that of a Shī‘ī scholar, Abd al-Razzāq al-Kāshānī (d. 1330–4), and that of his Sunnī student, Dawūd a-Qayṣarī (d. 1350–1). Shaykh ‘Aḥmad was familiar with these works, as well as al-Kāshānī’s commentary on the Qur’an and ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Jīlī’s (d. 1403) *Kitāb al-‘Insān al-Kāmil* or *The Book of the Perfect Man*.

We should mention that Shaykh ‘Aḥmad was familiar with another major school of theosophical Sufism, that of the Kubrawiyyah and some of its figures like Sayyid Muhammad Nūrbakhsh (d. 1464) and ‘Alā’ al-Dawlah al-Simnānī (d. 1336). There are some aspects of similarity between certain aspects of Shaykh ‘Aḥmad’s thought and that of al-Simnānī in particular, but deciding whether or not these similarities are due to direct influence is difficult to determine. The only thing I can say for sure at the present time is that Shaykh ‘Aḥmad’s use of the terms ‘الْوُجُودُ الْحَقُّ’ *al-wuğūd al-ḥaqq* (“Real Existence”), ‘الْوُجُودُ الْمُطْلَقُ’ *al-wuğūd al-muṭlaq* (“Absolute Existence”), and ‘الْوُجُودُ الْمَقْيَدُ’ *al-wuğūd al-muqayyad* (“Delimited Existence”), are probably taken directly from al-Simnānī since the Shaykh, in his *Sharḥ al-Ḥikmah al-‘Arshiyyah*, quotes this division from him [4, p. 96]. Al-Simnānī was also opposed to the panentheism of Ibn ‘Arabi.

While a large part of mainstream Shī‘ī scholarship developed scholastic interpretations of theology and jurisprudence, some aspects of the themes

of pristine Shi‘ism were gradually integrated into Sufic theosophy. While it is clear that Shaykh ‘Aḥmad was quite familiar with this tradition, he very strongly felt that the integration of pristine Shi‘ī thought into the panentheist system of the perceived anti-Shi‘ī Ibn ‘Arabi was a very misguided venture. For, according to him, the theosophists subvert the meanings and intentions of the Imams to fit the intentions of Ibn ‘Arabi and his followers.

The Occult Arts

Spanning the amorphous boundaries between pristine Shi‘ism, Sufic theosophy, and alchemy lie the occult arts, collectively called in Arabic by the title *al-Jafr*. Virtually all sources, whether Shi‘ī, Sufi, or alchemical, trace this “science” back to the Sixth Imam Ja‘far ibn Muhammad al-Ṣādiq. Shaykh ‘Aḥmad was an acknowledged expert in this field. His sources in this field include famous scholars like al-Būnī (d. 1225) and the Andalusian philosopher Ibn Sab‘īn (d. 1270).

3.4 Shaykh ‘Aḥmad vs. Mulla Ṣadra

One of the most significant episodes in the later history of philosophy in Muslim civilization is Shaykh ‘Aḥmad’s critique of Mulla Ṣadra. The Shaykh’s second and third longest works are commentaries on epitomes of the Mulla. Some of the scholars of Isfahan wrote responses to his criticisms, although a few others of that city, like Muhammad ibn Muqīm Māzandarānī (dates unknown), tried to defend the Shaykh against his detractors. Two of the most important of these responses are the *Sharḥ al-Mashā‘ir* of Muhammad

Ja‘far Lahījānī (died after 1840) and the *Sharḥ al-‘Arshiyyah* of Mulla Ismā‘īl Isfahānī (d. 1861). Both authors knew Shaykh ‘Aḥmad personally, and one cannot help but be struck at the hurt and perplexity these scholastics feel with respect to Shaykh ‘Aḥmad, upon whom they bestow, despite their vigorous defense of Mulla Ṣadra, the highest praise and reverence. I am aware of no philosophical study in Arabic, Persian, or any European language, of this hot exchange between the last two major philosophical movements in Muslim civilization¹⁶.

Aside from the charge of panentheism of which Shaykh ‘Aḥmad accuses Mulla Ṣadra, the crux of his criticism revolves about at least two issues:

1. Mulla Ṣadra attempts to reconcile various currents of Muslim thought, including Ibn ‘Arabī’s theosophy, into a single system reducible, in true Peripatetic form, to rational first premises. Shaykh ‘Aḥmad rejects the notion that cognizance of God, the goal of Wisdom, can be achieved through analysis and derivation from rational first principles. He has his own method which he considers to be superior to that of the Mulla;
2. Shaykh ‘Aḥmad also rejects what he sees as the subversion of the intentions of the Imams to make them jibe with those of Ibn ‘Arabī.

Mulla Ṣadra’s defenders in Isfahan came to the conclusion that Shaykh ‘Aḥmad really did not understand *فَلَسَفَه* *falsafah* and its jargon. Shaykh ‘Aḥmad’s defenders, including Corbin, claim that the *فَلَأَسَفَه* *falāsafah* really understood neither Shaykh ‘Aḥmad’s terminology nor what he was doing¹⁷.

¹⁶Corbin comes the closest to this, discussing this issue in his translation-analysis of Mulla Ṣadra’s *Sharḥ al-Mashā‘ir* entitled *Le Livre des Pénétrations Métaphysiques*.

¹⁷See *Corbin 64*, p. 49, and *Corbin 77*, p. 218.

3.5 Influence

As we have indicated above, the influence of Shaykh 'Aḥmad upon the *فلاسفه* *falāsafah* of Isfahan was mostly negative. By the turn of the twentieth century, we hardly see any more references to him in their works. By the time of the death of Sabzavāri (d. 1878), the philosophy of Mulla Ṣadra resumed its place as the dominant philosophical school in Iran, a position it maintains up to the present day. The responses to the criticisms of Shaykh 'Aḥmad were not the main reason for this, however. That is to be found in the subversive and repressive nature of parts of his contemporaneous and post-contemporaneous audiences¹⁸.

We mentioned above that by the time of his death in 1826, Shaykh 'Aḥmad faced enmity and opposition to his views on the part of some of the scholastic establishment. The declaration on the part of some segments of the scholastic establishment that the Shaykh was an unbeliever forced a polarization in some parts of the Shī'ī community. Students and close associates of Shaykh 'Aḥmad had to make the choice to defend or abandon their master's teachings. Choosing the former, Shaykh 'Aḥmad's fiercest devotees gathered around his favorite disciple, Sayyid Kāẓim Rashtī (d. 1844). From his home in Karbala, Sayyid Kāẓim worked both to defend his master against polemical attacks and, either wittingly or unwittingly, organize Shaykh 'Aḥmad's followers into a distinct theological school, which came to be known as "Shaykhism". We agree with Corbin [32, p. 352] that Shaykh 'Aḥmad had no intention of setting himself apart from mainstream Shi'ism.

¹⁸For the theory of the subversive and repressive nature of audiences, See *Gracia* 96, p. 161–166.

We also concur with Algar [20, p. 69] to the effect that the establishment of the Shaykhi school of theology as a distinct theological school would not have occurred if that segment of the scholastic establishment which declared him an unbeliever had not done so.

Although Sayyid Kāẓim was a devout follower of his master, he was also an original thinker who made his own departures in many respects. The same is true of Sayyid Kāẓim's student Muhammad Karīm Khan Kirmānī (d. 1870), a member of the royal family and founder of a prominent Shaykhi school of theology in Iran. He appears to have tried to make Shaykhism a viable alternative to the mainstream *أُصُولِيّ* *uṣūliyy* establishment. The author of about 270 works, he was one of the most productive and original philosophers in the tradition of Shaykh 'Aḥmad. His was a phenomenon that appears to be remarkably akin to the contemporaneous phenomenon of the Hegelian right in Europe. While he and his successors did not succeed in making Shaykhism the dominant school in Iran, they maintained influence in the royal family and other elite circles. At least one of the Iranian monarchs, Muzaffaruddīn Shah (r. 1896–1907), followed the Kirmānī school of Shaykhism. Followers of this school are still to be found in Kirman, Yazd, and Teheran.

Mīrzā Ali Muhammad (born in 1819; executed in 1850) of Shiraz, Iran, attended Sayyid Kāẓim's lectures in Karbala for up to two years. After the latter died, he declared himself to be the *Bab* or “gate” to the Twelfth Imam, who disappeared in 873. Later, he claimed to be the Twelfth Imam. Finally, he declared his own prophethood and superiority over Muhammad, Jesus, and the rest of the Abrahamic messengers. Leaders of the Babi move-

ment that he initiated sought a radical fulfillment of certain ideas of Shaykh 'Aḥmad and Sayyid Kāẓim in the socio-political sphere. They launched a rebellion against the monarchy in Iran, espousing ideas remarkably similar in content to those of the Hegelian left. After the execution of the Bab and the suppression of the insurrection, a new leader, Mīrzā Husayn Ali Nūrī, emerged from the Babi ranks. Suppressing all elements of militancy in the movement, he superimposed a universalist doctrine on the top of Shaykhi teachings, left Islam and Shi'ism altogether, took the title *Bahā'ullah* and initiated what is today known as Bahaism.

The jurists who tried and sentenced the Bab to death for apostasy and corruption were disciples and students of disciples of Shaykh 'Aḥmad. Their leaders included the jurist Mulla Muhammad Mamaqānī (d. 1851–52) of Tabriz and the philosopher Mīrzā Ḥasan Gawhar of Karbala. After the death of Sayyid Kāẓim, they, like Shaykh 'Aḥmad, sought peace and harmony with the mainstream scholastic establishment. Except for their preservation and defense of the Shaykh, they did not seek a separate identity for themselves. Their successors and followers survive in Karbala, Basra, eastern Arabia, and Tabriz. It appears that Mīrzā Ḥasan Gawhar was one of the Shaykh's most prominent students in philosophy. Among his own works is one critical of Muhammad Karīm Khan Kirmānī's interpretation of Shaykh 'Aḥmad's philosophy¹⁹.

Bayat [23] contains a detailed description and analysis of the impact of

¹⁹ Except for the fact that the Iranian monarch Nāṣir al-Dīn Shah (r. 1848–1896), was tutored by scholars from the Tabriz school, their influence on the Iranian socio-political scene appears to have been minimal.

the Kirmānī school of Shaykhism, the Babi movement, and Bahaism on nineteenth and early twentieth century Iran. She also discusses the influence of Shaykhism on figures who belonged to none of these movements, such as the enigmatic ideologue Jamāl al-Dīn Afghāni.

After the upheavals of mid-nineteenth century Iran, the negative attitude of segments of the scholastic establishment towards the teachings of Shaykh 'Aḥmad intensified. Since followers of the school of Mulla Ṣadra were never involved in anything even remotely approaching the revolutionary activities that took place with respect to the school of the Shaykh, it was much more tolerated, despite the fact that the theology of Shaykh 'Aḥmad was in many ways closer to their own. This partly accounts for the phenomenon we mentioned earlier: the reestablishment of the school of Mulla Ṣadra as the dominant school of philosophy in Iran. While the followers of this school never bore any animosity to the person of Shaykh 'Aḥmad, they could not be expected to contribute to his defense. Shunned by most (though never all) of the scholastic establishment, ignored by the *فلاسفة* *falāsafah*, subverted by the Babis and Bahais, the philosophy of Shaykh 'Aḥmad has until recently remained in a state of isolation and near oblivion. Recent years have seen a resurgence of interest in Shaykh 'Aḥmad. Biographies and collections of his works are being published in Lebanon and Syria, and there have been signs of a relaxing attitude in the scholastic establishment. So perhaps we are witnessing that phenomenon which is so common in the history of thought: many a thinker is shunned in his life and his thought repressed after his death, only to be reborn in a future era.

Chapter 4

The *Fawā'id Hikmiyyah*

4.1 Chronology

Unlike many of Shaykh 'Aḥmad's works, *al-Fawā'id al-Hikmiyyah* is not dated. According to his disciple Sayyid Kāzīm Rashtī, the *Fawā'id* was written “after his return to Yazd from Isfahan” [53, p. 38]. Historical sources mention two trips to Isfahan, both of which occurred after he moved away from Yazd. Now Yazd is in the same region of Iran as Isfahan. Given the Shaykh's wanderlust, and the fact that Isfahan was the center of scholastic activity in Iran, it is not unlikely that he may have quietly visited Isfahan during his sojourn in Yazd. This means that the *Fawā'id* was written some time between 1221/1807 and 1229/1814. Another possibility is that since Isfahan was probably on the road to Teheran, he passed through it on his way to visit the Shah and on his way back. He returned to Yazd from Teheran in early 1809, and assuming he wrote this work with Isfahan fresh on his mind, then he wrote this work in 1224/1809. Corbin, without giving any evidence

other than the Sayyid's statement, estimates its composition as having occurred in 1225/1810 [27, Vol. 4, p.263.]. On the other hand, Momen quotes a manuscript catalog to the effect that one of the surviving manuscripts is dated 1216 A.H.. The author of the bibliographical encyclopedia *al-Dharī'ah* [65, Vol. 16, no. 333], giving no source for his information, states that this text was written in 1211 A.H.. Most likely, the author of *al-Dharī'ah* based this on a date given in the Istanbul edition of the *Fawā'id*. We will discuss that edition in the sequel. In 1211 A.H. the Shaykh was in Najaf and Karbala, while in 1216 A.H. he was moving between rural towns in the vicinity of Basra. A number of the Shaykh's work are titled by the very generic heading, “فَوَائِدُ *fawā'id*”, and it is possible that in the case of the 1216 A.H. manuscript (as well as that of the source of the author of *al-Dharī'ah*), the heading, “فَوَائِدُ حِكْمِيَّةٍ *fawā'id ḥikmiyyah*”, was used to describe the nature of the material as opposed to indicating an actual title. Another important point is that Sayyid Kaẓim did not join the Shaykh's circle until about 1813. It could also be that the author redistributed this book after his return from Isfahan, and that the Sayyid confused this redistribution with the original writing of the text.

Based on my preliminary investigations, I lean towards the view that the *Fawā'id* was written in between 1221/1807 and 1229/1814, most likely in 1224–25/1809–10. This is for the following reasons:

1. So far, the earliest reference to the *Fawā'id* that I have come across is in the *Risālah Rashīdiyyah*, completed in mid-1225 A.H. in response to questions of one Mulla Muhammad Rashīd. It is in fact the questioner who makes the reference to the *Fawā'id*.

2. Shaykh 'Aḥmad wrote a very short, dated, treatise on existence, completed in mid-1223 A.H.. The problem discussed is whether or not it is possible to conceptualize delimited existence *qua* delimited existence. Most of the doctrines discussed are also mentioned in the *Fawā'id*, albeit not in the context of the problem as posed here. Yet at the end of this treatise the Shaykh says that “you will not find this in any book...”. While word for word, there are comments in this treatise that are not *directly* mentioned in the *Fawā'id*, the *substance* of his remarks are. This may indicate that *Fawā'id* was written after mid-1223 A.H.. On the other hand, it could be that this treatise is building on some of the ideas of the *Fawā'id* in order to address a particular problem;
3. In a treatise written in response to Shaykh 'Aḥmad ibn Ṣāliḥ al-Qaṭifī, written in 1213 A.H., Shaykh 'Aḥmad mentions twice that God's power of choice is a type of *intention* (قصد *qaṣd*) and *resignation* (رضى *riḍā*); this is Mulla Ṣadra's doctrine. But in the *Fawā'id*, the Twelfth Observation in particular, the Shaykh goes to great lengths to refute this view. So it is very unlikely that the *Fawā'id* was written in 1211 A.H.¹.

These observations are tentative and in need of further research. In any case, until the manuscript dated 1216 A.H. is examined, it will be difficult to pass any final verdict on this issue.

This question is important inasmuch as it would help explain part of the

¹In my perusal of Shaykh 'Aḥmad's writings up to now, this is the only instance of a significant change in opinion I have yet to come across. Otherwise, many of his original ideas are to be found even in his earliest writings.

writer's motivation in writing this text. After the exordium, the first words of the author's prologue read, "After I noticed many of the seekers penetrating deeply into the divine sciences, and supposing that they have penetrated deeply into the[ir] intended meaning [which they think is God Himself] — but which is only a deep penetration into semantics (الْأَلْفَافُ *al-alfāz*), nothing else ...". If he wrote these words in Yazd after a visit to Isfahan, then it would indicate that he wrote this work in response to what he saw as an overemphasis on analysis, on the part of the philosophers of Isfahan, with respect to the problem of the cognizance of God and the realities of things. If it was written in Iraq, it would indicate that there was some quite significant teaching of the doctrines of Mulla Ṣadra and Mulla Muḥsin going on in Najaf and Karbala. This is since the Shaykh indicates in his commentary that when he wrote the words, "[it] is only a deep penetration into semantics (الْأَلْفَافُ *al-alfāz*), nothing else", he partly had in mind the Ṣadrian doctrine of the univocity of existence.

4.2 Nature of the Text

The style of this text is that of an epitome, called in Arabic a مُوجِز *mūǧaz* or مُخْتَصَر *muḥtaṣar*. Such a text is generally quite dense and makes use of the almost unique features of Arabic prosody to achieve a level of conciseness that is all but impossible in English. Two of the best examples of this style in philosophical literature are the *'Ishārāt* of Ibn Sīnā and the even more concise *Tajrīd* of al-Ṭūsī. Sometimes in the *Fawā'id* Shaykh 'Aḥmad departs from this format of conciseness in style and engages in occasional elaboration and

repetition. At the end of the original twelve فَوَائِد *fawā'id*, he is unapologetic about these departures, telling his readers that they are for their own sake, since the doctrines and much of the technical terminology he is presenting will not be found elsewhere.

The first word in the title of this work, فَوَائِد *fawā'id*, is the plural of the word فَائِدَة *fā'idat*. This is a difficult term to translate. It comes from the root ف ي د *f y d*, which connotes the idea of giving profit, advantage, or benefit. Lane's *Lexicon* quotes from the author of the *Tāj al-Urūs* that 'fā'idat' itself connotes, among other related things, "what one gains, or acquires, of knowledge". In scholastic practice this term signifies a note, observation, brief teaching, or lesson that a scholar has written on a particular topic, and which is meant to be of benefit to others. It was a particularly generic term found in the titles to many books. Shaykh 'Aḥmad had a very down-to-earth personality, and for the most part did not give fancy and flowerful titles to his works as was the current practice among great scholars. So the title of his text, *al-Fawā'id al-Ḥikmiyyah*, only indicates that this book contains notes and observations pertaining to *ḥikmat* or "Wisdom".

On a more speculative note, we see that Lane mentions that other authorities have said that some have improperly derived فَائِدَة *fā'idat* from فَوَاد *fuwād* (whose root is ف أ د *f ā d*). Now as we shall see, Shaykh 'Aḥmad considers the *fuwād* or the *heart-flux* as the proper organ of "the proof of Wisdom". Through my perusal of this and other works of his, it appears that the Shaykh had sympathies for the minority Kufan school of grammar. This school, in contrast to the standard and still prevalent Basran school, tended to be more flexible about the root origins of words, and even about

the relations between very similar roots. It is also the case that philosophers and mystics, including Shaykh 'Aḥmad, frequently left hints to their readers alluding to points that they chose not to make explicit. It is quite possible then that Shaykh 'Aḥmad's choice of the word *fā'idat* for his chapter headings had something to do with his doctrine of the *fu'ād*. The word '*fā'idat*' would then signify something like, "what one gains, or acquires, of cognizance through the *fu'ād*". In the same article mentioned above, Lane also quotes from the author of the *Tāj al-'Urūs* that the primary meaning of '*fā'idat*' is that "*Profit, advantage, benefit, [or] good, which God bestows upon a man, and which he [the latter, consequently] gains, or acquires...*". So for Shaykh 'Aḥmad, '*fā'idat*' may signify "what one gains or acquires, through the grace of God, of cognizance through the *fu'ād*". This interpretation of the term *fā'idat* is both plausible from a certain grammatical perspective, as well as consistent with the author's philosophical inclinations. I have translated '*fā'idat*' with 'observation', which may still be unsatisfactory. According to *MWDS* (under 'remark'), the term 'observation' belongs to a class of synonyms each member of which can "denote a brief expression intended to enlighten, clarify, or express an opinion". Of this class, I have chosen 'observation' because it carries connotations of beholding and recognition, connotations relevant to the intensions of '*fā'idat*' and of '*fu'ād*'.

Another feature of the text is its web-like character or nonlinearity. In many of his works in general, and in the original twelve *fawā'id* in particular, the Shaykh writes in a *spiral* manner. That is, given a particular topic of interest, he discusses it at several places, each time at a higher level of sophistication and broader range of application. Bamberg and Sternberg

have pointed out that while this pedagogical method demands patience and faith on a reader's part, it may serve to impart a deeper, more intuitive, understanding of the subject matter [22, Vol. 1, p. xi]. Corbin appears also to have noticed this feature of Shaykh 'Aḥmad's writing style, noting that Shaykh 'Aḥmad "makes his thought more explicit with each stage of his exposé" [28, p. 319, n. 1]. In addition, it is hard to separate the issues. For example, his notion of the "heart-flux" partly assumes his notion of "existence". And his doctrine of "existence" depends on cognizance through the "heart-flux". This style of writing is to be distinguished from the then prevalent scholastic styles of writing, which generally employed a strictly logical arrangement of topics.

The nonlinear aspects of the text, I believe, stem in part from the very holistic character of his philosophy. Unlike Isaac Newton, for example, Shaykh 'Aḥmad does not bracket his knowledge of alchemy and the occult arts as something distinct from other cosmological and metaphysical concerns. Nearly all elements of traditional learning, whether rational, practical, or mystical, have a role to play in the author's system. Indeed, it is arguable that if a distinction must be made between pure metaphysics and cosmology, it is that philosophical cosmology strives for the harmonious inclusion, within a consistent and organic perspective, of as many strands as possible of the scientific and other disciplines that underlie a given civilization or culture.

This brings us to a more difficult problem in the *al-Fawā'id* than just the spiral method of exposition. The integration of various traditional disciplines, some of them obscure in themselves, into a single framework can be very taxing on the reader. In addition, sometimes a very clear and easy-

to-follow argument or line of thought is followed by a most obscure allusion or intimation. In addition, the author makes frequent transitions between the terminology of *falsafah* and that of Shī'ī mystical iconology. In many instances a term from Shī'ī iconology may have the same extension as a philosophical term. In this case it would seem that a point the author wants to make would have been easier understood by a *faylasūf* if he had just used the term from *falsafah*. But part of the author's objective is to encourage the reader to, after working out the extensional correspondences between the terms of *falsafah* and those of the Imams, to contemplate the issues as much as possible through the terminology used by the Imams, whom the author considers to be real sources of Wisdom.

4.3 Audiences

When one considers a given text of a given philosopher or any other writer or composer, it is important to be aware of the *audience* of the text. Specifically, one must look at the following five jointly exhaustive, though not necessarily mutually exclusive, sets of individuals: the author, intended audience, contemporaneous audience, intermediary audience, and contemporary audience².

4.3.1 Author

When we consider Shaykh 'Aḥmad *qua* audience of his own work, we note that he is keenly aware of both the originality of his thought and the diffi-

²See *Gracia96*, Ch. 4, for a detailed discussion of texts and their audiences.

culties his readers will face. So both in this text and in the commentary he composed on it he tends to repeat himself more than was standard practice among other scholastic writers. As we mentioned above, he explains at the end of the Twelfth Observation that he consciously makes frequent departures from the demands of conciseness dictated by the format he has chosen so that the reader will better understand him. In addition, the author realizes that on many points, reading other books will not assist the reader in his efforts to comprehend him.

There is a perspective from which one can see the bulk of the philosophical output of the author after the composition of the *al-Fawā'id* as consisting in the application of the “proof of Wisdom” explained there or as an elaboration of various themes touched upon in this work. In the *Sharḥ al-Fawā'id* especially, we see the author engaged in the process of not only trying to remove some of the obscurities of the original text, but also of unfolding implied but latent themes and introducing new technical terms. It also appears that the decision to append seven new observations to the first twelve was made in the immediate wake of the completion of the commentary.

4.3.2 The Intended Audience

That set of individuals for whom a given author composes his text constitutes the *intended audience* of the text³.

In the prologue to the *al-Fawā'id* Shaykh 'Aḥmad clearly states his audience to be those “seekers” (*aṭ-ṭalabah*) i.e., seminary students and researchers, specializing in the “divine sciences” (*al-ma'ārif al-ilāhiyyah*) i.e., those disci-

³See *Gracia96*, p. 144.

plines, be they mystical (*ʿirfānī*), philosophical (*falsafī*), theological (*kalāmī*), or some combination of these, in which in some sense the cognizance of God is sought. Particularly he has in mind those who, in the Ṣadrian and larger *ʿishrāqī* tradition, seek to apply the techniques of Peripatetic analysis to discover true propositions pertaining to the nature of God *qua* God and *qua* his relation to His creation.

While he does not say this explicitly, it is also clear that his intended audience includes his own students in philosophy and mysticism. It is likely that the book was used as a text in courses he taught or as corollary reading for his lectures. It also appears that while primordial Shīʿī thought is his principal philosophical muse, and that he has in mind a Shīʿī audience, he expresses his ideas in a universal, non-sectarian manner that leaves open the door for those Sunnis sympathetic or inclined towards the Imams — and this was not something uncommon — to take profitable advantage of his work. That is, he rarely makes explicit mention of strictly Shīʿī theological doctrines. One notes that there was at least one edition of the *Fawā'id* published in Istanbul, the then world capital of the Sunni faith. It is a matter of controversy as to whether the author was intent on establishing a distinct theological school within the scholastic establishment. However, the universal, even perennial and metahistorical, manner of the author's presentation, as well as his keen awareness of the original character of much of his doctrine, indicates that his intended audience included not just his own but the coming generations of philosophers, mystics, and theologians. So there is a sense in which his intended audience extends down to our own times.

Shaykh 'Aḥmad also assumes a certain sophistication on the part of his audience. In addition to a strong grasp of traditional scholastic theology, including the massive corpus of traditions that goes back to the Imams, and of the basic subjects taught in the standard curriculum, some knowledge of subjects like alchemy and astronomy is needed. Encyclopedic learning was not so uncommon then as it is now, and it seems that only the elite and more advanced researchers from amongst the scholars would have had the necessary equipment needed to competently tackle the ideas discussed in the text.

4.3.3 The Contemporaneous Audience

The set of individuals who are contemporaneous with a given author, belong to the same traditional milieu, and have a similar cultural and educational background, constitute the *contemporaneous audience*⁴. In the case of the *Fawā'id*, this would include that part of the intended audience contemporary with him. It would also include those from within the scholastic establishment who worked to discredit him and his ideas. This effort has resulted in the persistent crisis of division and misunderstanding in Shi'ī scholastic establishment with regards to Shaykh 'Aḥmad. This crisis and division, as discussed in Chapter 3, sections four and five, can be viewed in part as a manifestation of the subversive and repressive character of parts of his audience.

⁴See *Gracia96*, p. 146.

4.3.4 Intermediary Audience

The *intermediary audience* includes that set of individuals who may have had access to a given text of a given author and who span the generations between the author's time and the contemporary attempts to understand the given text of that author⁵. This would include those influenced directly by the text itself, and perhaps even those who are indirectly influenced by the ideas contained in the text. This has already been discussed in sections four and five of Chapter 3.

4.3.5 The Contemporary Audience

As the *contemporary audience*, we are faced with the challenge of *interpreting*, inclusive of translating, the *Fawā'id*. This is discussed in the next section.

4.4 Problems of Interpretation

4.4.1 Challenges of Interpretation

From a philosophical perspective, the challenge of interpreting the *Fawā'id* encompasses not only the deciphering of what the author is trying to convey to his contemporaneous, intended audience, but also of presenting his ideas in a way that contemporary philosophers and thinkers can judge what degree of relevance, if any, this text has to contemporary problems and concerns. This is a daunting challenge for a number of reasons, including the following:

⁵See *Gracia96*, p. 146.

- While the chronological distance between our own time and that of Shaykh 'Aḥmad is not that long, the cultural, scientific, and ideological distances are immense. Shaykh 'Aḥmad lived in a milieu whose counterpart in the West had begun to fade after the Copernican Revolution, and which was a bygone era after Kant and the rise of the so-called Enlightenment. Despite the ingenious refinements made by the scientists of Muslim civilization to Ptolemaic astronomy and chemistry, these sciences as practiced by their specialists are theoretically and quantitatively obsolete. Occult arts like letter-based hermeneutics are now considered to be in disrepute by mainstream scholarly circles. And the Pontifical conception of Man — which took him to be the vicegerent of God on the Earth and conceived of him as a microcosm in harmony with the Earth and the universe at large — has been replaced by the Promethean conception of Man — which conceives of Man as being in constant struggle with God and the forces of nature, and which underlies modern humanist ideologies of the right and the left. To understand what Shaykh 'Aḥmad is trying to do requires the interpreter to almost literally enter a cultural, scientific, and ideological universe very alien to his own;
- Even in the universe of scholarly discourse within which the Shaykh 'Aḥmad operated, traditions like alchemy and the occult arts were not openly taught disciplines. Modern scholarship in these sciences is still either in infancy or barely beyond it. For example, despite the attention modern scholars have given to alchemy and its practice, there is still much work to be done in the area of the *philosophy of alchemy*;

- Mystical wayfaring and experience are not a part of the training of contemporary philosophers. Yet much of post-Avicennan *falsafah*, especially the Illuminationist variety, is tied up with the phenomenology of mysticism. To interpret the works of these authors without such phenomenological preparedness is a difficult, if not a dangerous, task;
- Despite the above difficulties, there are Western analogues to many of the elements of traditional Muslim civilization, be it in the Pontifical conception of Man, Ptolemaic astronomy, alchemy and the occult arts, or philosophical mysticism. Yet Shaykh 'Aḥmad takes a step that Mulla Ṣadra and even al-Suhrawardī avoid: the near-total rejection of Peripatetic analysis. Because logic, Peripatetic analysis, as well as many philosophical concepts in the philosophy of Muslim civilization came from ancient Greece, and because much of the heritage of Hellenic and Muslim civilization passed into Europe, Western philosophers have an advantage in studying this tradition that is lost when studying, e.g., Chinese philosophy. In the case of Shaykh 'Aḥmad, however, we lose even more of this advantage because the Shaykh takes the inner structure of the Arabic language as a muse, seeing in it a manifestation of some of his most important ideas. So the interpreter is faced with the task of appreciating the inner structure of the Arabic language to a degree greater than would be the case if he were interpreting, say, Ibn Sīnā, or even Mulla Ṣadra. He is also faced with the task of conveying some sense of the role this structure plays into English.

4.4.2 Metaphilosophical Considerations of Interpretation

In presenting the ideas of Shaykh 'Aḥmad to contemporary philosophers, it may help to chose a paradigm of the modern tradition upon which to, at best *model* the system under discussion, or at least give a familiar vantage point from which to relate to some of the author's concerns. So in trying to convey the ideas of a philosopher who belongs to a different age and milieu to contemporary philosophers, the job of the interpreter is, at least in part, one of comparative philosophy. This runs the risk of imposing an alien system upon the author's thought. This can perhaps be partly avoided if the interpreter keeps in mind that comparison and interpretation involve the following metaphilosophical considerations:

- Object Language vs. metalanguage concerns. The terms and expressions used by the author, in this case Shaykh 'Aḥmad, to express his ideas constitute the *object language* under consideration by the interpreter. The terms and expressions in which the interpreter poses and seeks to answer questions about the object language of the author constitute the *metalanguage* of the interpreter's investigation;
- Object philosophy vs. metaphilosophy concerns. The set of propositions and concepts which contain the philosophical commitments of the author, constitutes the *object philosophy* under investigation. The set of propositions and concepts which contain either the philosophical commitments of the interpreter or those of the philosophical paradigm the interpreter chooses to model the object philosophy upon or relate

the object philosophy to constitutes both another object philosophy and a *metaphilosophy* for purposes of the investigation. It constitutes another object philosophy because the interpreter may at times want to draw out implications of the object philosophy under primary investigation for the contemporary philosophical paradigm he is employing. It constitutes a metaphilosophy in the sense that it is the paradigm within which the interpreter is trying to situate the object philosophy under consideration. When considered in the role of an object philosophy, the philosophy originally under investigation takes on the role of a metaphilosophy. The point is that one must always be aware of the distinction between the philosophy one is studying and the philosophy used to study it.

The term ‘metaphilosophy’ is ambiguous. It may refer to the paradigm philosophy discussed above or it may refer to the meta-theoretic set of propositions used by the interpreter to govern his investigation of a given set of object philosophies. When we speak of the “metaphilosophical concerns” of interpretation and comparison, we are using ‘metaphilosophy’ in the latter sense. We hold the view that meta-theoretic metaphilosophy is not devoid of philosophical commitment. With respect to the job of interpreting a philosophical text it is, in fact, just a higher order paradigmatic metaphilosophy, specifically, a second-order metaphilosophy;

- Mystical vs. metamystical concerns. Within the object language and object philosophy under investigation, one must always distinguish between the expressions of mystical *experience* and expressions of propo-

sitions which serve to *analyze* that experience. Yazdi [70, Ch. 10] has forcefully argued that the failure of Russell and others to be aware of this distinction *within* the context of the mystical philosophy under investigation has led to grievous misinterpretations or the rash dismissal of the conclusions of mystical philosophy;

- Extensional vs. intensional correspondences. Given both a paradigmatic metaphilosophy and an object philosophy, the interpreter seeks to identify, whenever possible, the *extensions* or *denotations* of terms and sentences of the object philosophy with the extensions or denotations of terms and sentences of the paradigmatic metaphilosophy. One must, however, keep in mind that the *intensions* or *senses* of the terms of the object philosophy will generally be different from those of the corresponding terms in the paradigmatic metaphilosophy which have the same extension or denotation.
- *Wesenchau* or eidetic intuition. An important question remains: How does one *judge* when extensional identifications of terms is appropriate, *distinguish* between mystical and metamystical expression, *know* where to make appropriate comparisons and contrasts? The distinctions within each the orders of linguistic analysis and those of philosophical analysis cannot help us unless there is some means for the interpreter to *know* the set of propositions and concepts which constitute the object philosophy under investigation. Borrowing a phrase from Husserl's phenomenology, we say that the essential requirement interpreter must meet is to have some degree of *Wesenchau*, or eidetic

intuition, of the set of propositions and concepts which constitute the object philosophy under investigation. According to Corbin, [29, p. 4]

... what a comparative philosophy must strive for in the different sectors of a defined field of comparison, is above all that which is called in German *Wesenchau*, the intuitive perception of an essence.

Corbin goes on to explain that *Wesenchau* is a term “belonging to the vocabulary of phenomenology”. For present purposes, we adopt Corbin’s notion of phenomenology, a notion that he claims is “independent of every particular phenomenological school”. He argues that phenomenology attempts to realize [29, p. 4–5]

... the motto of Greek science: *sôzein tà phainόμενα*, saving the appearances. . . [This] consists in saving the phenomenon, while disengaging or unveiling the hidden which shows itself beneath this appearance. The *Logos* or principle of the phenomenon, phenomenology, is thus to tell the hidden, the invisible present beneath the visible. It is to make the phenomenon show itself forth such as it shows itself to the subject to whom it reveals itself.

With respect to the job of interpreting a text, what is hidden is just that set of propositions and concepts which constitute the object philosophy under investigation. The goal of making the object philosophy “show itself forth such as it shows itself to the subject to whom it reveals itself” is an ideal which perhaps is perhaps unachievable. Even among

the closest disciples of a philosopher, there may occur differences of interpretation of a given text of the master. *Wesenchau* is like the mathematical limit that a series may forever approach but never reach. It follows that there can be no perfect interpretation of a text, whether by the author or someone else, because this eidetic intuition is not transferable from one individual to another in the same way that the expressions and sentences which go into the make-up of texts and their interpretations are.

On the other hand, through long-term familiarity with an author, and through meditation upon his work that is as much as possible devoid of presuppositions, preconceptions, and historical time and circumstances, it is to be hoped that the interpreter will have gained some insight into the object philosophy under investigation, insights that he can share with an audience both not as familiar with the object philosophy as he, as well as more familiar with the modes and categories of philosophical discourse in which the interpreter expresses his insights.

Given the above, admittedly rudimentary, meta-theoretic metaphilosophical considerations, the interpreter must chose some contemporary or contemporarily understood philosophical paradigm(s) to serve in the paradigmatic role described above. For purposes of pure comparative philosophy, any philosophy of interest to the comparative analyst will do, since any two objects within a universe of discourse, in this case the set of all philosophies, may be compared and contrasted. For purposes of interpretation of a philosophical text, however, one must exercise more circumspection in the choice of paradigmatic metaphilosophy(ies). One of the qualities to look for in a candi-

date for paradigm is sufficient richness in its ontological and epistemological categories to accommodate a sufficiently large amount of the concepts and objects posited by the object philosophy under investigation. For purposes of our study of the metaphysics and cosmology of Shaykh 'Aḥmad's *Fawā'id*, our discussion seeks to situate his thought mostly in the context of *Neoplatonism* and *process metaphysics*. We mentioned some of the processual themes to be found in Shaykh 'Aḥmad's thought in the Exordium.

In Part II of this study we begin an analysis and interpretation of Shaykh 'Aḥmad's thought as expressed in the *Fawā'id*, making use of other works of the author to help clarify or elaborate upon certain themes. Ours is in no way a comprehensive interpretation; it represents only an introductory foray into a very difficult system of thought. Through the application of the afore-mentioned meta-theoretic considerations, we hope to shed a small ray of light upon the metaphysics and cosmology of the *Fawā'id*.

4.5 The Edition

In our critical edition of the *Fawā'id*, we have relied on one autograph manuscript and one edition.

The autograph manuscript is owned by the Madrasah Ibrāhīmīyyah in Kerman. Photocopies of the entire manuscript collection of the Madrasah Ibrāhīmīyyah are owned by the University of Chicago and the Bibliotheque Nationale in Paris [46, pg.8]. The collection is divided into sections, one of which is called *Rasā'il-i 'Aḥmad-i 'Aḥsā'ī* or *Treatises of 'Aḥmad al-'Aḥsā'ī*. The copy of the manuscript of the original twelve *fawā'id* begins on page 171

and runs through page 216. Immediately following the end of the twelfth *fā'idah* are the first few lines of the thirteenth *fā'idah* added some years later. The quality of the ink is markedly different from that used for writing the first twelve, which supports the notion that the seven appended *fawā'id* were written some time after the original text. On page 217, however, there begins a manuscript for another treatise altogether. From the bibliography of Shaykh 'Aḥmad compiled by the late Shaykhi leader and former curator of the Kirman collection, 'Abu al-Qāsim Khān Ibrāhīmī (d. 1969), it appears that the rest of this autograph manuscript is lost [18, p. 231].

The next curator of the collection, the late 'Abd al-Riḍā ibn 'Abi al-Qāsim Khān, says on the frontpiece of this collection that they are all in the hand of the author, but the *Fawā'id* has no signature after it. In addition, there are indications in the manuscript that it was copied from another manuscript. In the margins of folio pages numbered 180 and 205, there are proofreader marks indicating that this text was proofread by two readers, as was common during those times. Nevertheless, we can be highly certain and confident that this is an autograph manuscript for the following reasons:

- The curator of the collection was also the head of the Shaykhi school of theology in Kirman from 1969 to 1980. He thus had a special interest in Shaykh 'Aḥmad's writings, and assumedly would be able to distinguish his writing from others. His testimony then that this is in the handwriting of Shaykh 'Aḥmad does carry some weight;
- Comparisons with other samples of Shaykh 'Aḥmad's handwriting, samples where there *is* a signature of the author following, show a striking resemblance to the handwriting of this text. From an alphabetical

arrangement made by the author of his research notes and observations, called *Kashkūl*, there are numerous instances of the author signing his name after a note, comment, or observation. See Appendix ? for a comparison of some of these signed notes with the handwriting of the manuscript under consideration;

- A strong indication that this is the author's handwriting is a crossed-out half-page of writing that occurs in this manuscript, on page 209, between the Eleventh and the Twelfth *fā'idah*. Despite the crossing out, it is still legible. To my reading it appears to be an earlier draft of parts of the concluding paragraphs of the eleventh *fā'idah*. The differences appear to be far too great to be attributable to copyist error.

I am thus confident that this is an autograph manuscript. The possibility remains that there may have been earlier versions or at least drafts of the *Fawā'id*. There was likely at least an earlier draft because there are a numerous amount of corrections, marked by the then standard symbol صح (signifying “correction”) in the margins of the manuscript, many of which appear to be attributable to errors of transcription. Aside from these likely transcription errors, there are at least two instances, in the margins of pages 195 and 204, where a minor *variant*, marked by the then standard symbol for a variant reading, خ ل (short for نُسخة بَدَل *nushat badal* or “variant manuscript”) is mentioned. Final judgement on these questions must await further research and examination of other manuscripts of the text.

There is at least one published edition of the *Fawā'id*. This is the lithographed facsimile edition published in Tabriz in 1274/1856. This contains the commentary, the seven addenda added on by the Shaykh, a treatise

by his disciple Sayyid Kāzīm Rashtī, and a concluding, very short and enigmatic, cabbalistic treatise written in 1197 A.H., making it perhaps his earliest dated composition. In the commentary on the *Fawā'id*, the author quotes a passage from the text signified by the device قُلْتُ *qultu* (“I said”) followed by an elaboration signified by أَقُولُ *ʾaqūlu* (“I say”). This was a common commentary format in Muslim scholasticism.

In our edition we have made the autograph manuscript, which we will call A., our primary source. Variants in the Tabriz edition, which we will call T., are given in one layer of the footnotes. Following the textuality theory of Gracia, we do not try to construct a “best possible text”, mixing what I see to be preferable readings from T. with those from A.. On the other hand, the most obvious typographical errors in A.. (very few) have been corrected; these corrections and the reasons for them are recorded in one of the layers of notes. We have indicated in brackets the corresponding page numbers from the manuscript collection containing the *al-Fawā'id*.

There is a third and very rare edition of the *al-Fawā'id*, published in Istanbul in 1287/1870-1871 in beautiful nasta'aliq calligraphy. I have not depended on this edition because it has a number of features that make me suspect that it has been interpolated to some degree. For example, it includes a long explanatory phrase towards the end of the Eighth Observation that does not appear in either T. or A.. The last sentence of the Eighth Observation as it appears in T and A. is missing. There also appears to be an interpolation in the prologue, as we will discuss below. At the end of the book, the scribe claims that the author finished this text in 1211 A.H., “in the night of the Ninth of [the month of] Shawwāl”. For now, I consider this

edition to be, for purposes of establishing a critical edition, unreliable. Final judgment must of course await further research on the origins of this edition.

At first glance, it appears to be quite odd that someone would go through the trouble of publishing the work of a Shi'ite philosopher-theologian in the then capital of the Sunni world, Istanbul. It may be that it was written by someone attached to the Iranian embassy. As is well known, students of the Shaykh had a large degree of influence in the royal family (see [23]). On the other hand, there may have been some interest among Sunni philosophers in this work, as it does not explicitly emphasize any sectarian issues. An interesting feature is the inclusion of the companions of the Prophet along with his family in the short exordium of the Prologue (this inclusion is not to be found in A. and T.). While such an inclusion is not uncommon for Shi'ī writers — I have even seen it in some of Shaykh 'Aḥmad's works other than the *al-Fawā'id* — it is more standard for Sunni scholars. The addition of this phrase indicates perhaps an element of an attempt on the part of the editors to attract the interest of Sunni scholars in the text.

4.6 The Translation

For purposes of this study, we have translated all of the original twelve observations except for numbers five and ten. The Fifth Observation is actually something of an appendix to the previous observation. It discusses twelve different ways to categorize the world and the hierarchy of ontological realms. It then discusses, from a very anthropological point of view, the problem of the activity of matter and the receptivity of form. Then the author attempts

to answer the question as to whether the Prophet, Fatimah, and the Imams belong to the same species as ordinary human beings. Many of the important philosophical points are repeated in the Seventh Observation. The subject of the Tenth Observation is mental existence and epistemology. The author defends a position of extreme realism, and outlines what is basically a theory of cosmological prehension and ingression. Of the seven addenda, we have translated numbers thirteen, fifteen, sixteen, and eighteen. The Fourteenth Observation continues the discussion of the end of the Fifth Observation on the metaphysical relationship of the Prophet and his family to the rest of creation. The Seventeenth Observation discusses the philosophical meanings and reasons of obligation to follow God's law, be it religious or cosmological. The Nineteenth Observation explains the philosophy of reward and punishment. I have left these out of the translation primarily for purposes of manageability. Aside from the Tenth Observation, I believe that what I have translated represents the core metaphysical and cosmological doctrine of the *Fawā'id*. For details on the translation apparatus, see the beginning of Part III.

Part II

Analysis

Chapter 1

What is Wisdom (*al-ḥikmat*)?

1.1 Introductory Remarks

At the outset of the *Fawā'id*, Shaykh 'Aḥmad expresses his dissatisfaction with the then prevalent modes of investigation in “the sciences that pertain to cognizance of the Divine” (الْمَعَارِفُ الْإِلَهِيَّةُ *al-ma'ārif al-ilāhiyyat*), inclusive of *falsafah* and the *kalām*. In particular, al-'Aḥsā'ī takes issue with the methods of rational analysis employed by these schools to reach their goal i.e., cognizance of God and reality. As an alternative and replacement of pure rational analysis, Shaykh 'Aḥmad proposes what he calls “the proof of Wisdom (دَلِيلُ الْحِكْمَةِ *dalīl al-ḥikmat*)”. In this chapter we will explore this concept and try to find out exactly what the author means by “the proof of Wisdom”.

Upon preliminary observation, we see that the very expression, ‘proof of Wisdom’, invites a number of questions, including the following:

- What is “Wisdom” (الْحِكْمَةُ *al-ḥikmat*)?;

- What is a “proof” (دَلِيل *dalīl*)?;
- By “proof of Wisdom”, does the author mean there is a science called Wisdom, and that there is a method of proof specific to it; or does he mean that ‘Wisdom’ is the name of a kind of proof (the expression, ‘*dalīl al-ḥikmat*’, carries an ambiguity similar to that carried by its translation)?

Based on the commentary and other statements of the author, it appears that sometimes he uses the word ‘*ḥikmat*’ in the sense of method and sometimes in the sense of a science. For example, immediately upon the author’s first use of the expression ‘*dalīl al-ḥikmat*’ in the main text, he says in the commentary: [2, p. 4]

I said: [We will accomplish] this [task] through the proof of Wisdom.

I now say: Sometimes, by ‘*al-ḥikmat*’ is meant “theoretical wisdom” (الْحِكْمَةُ الْعِلْمِيَّةُ *al-ḥikmat al-‘ilmiyyat*), and sometimes, “practical wisdom” (الْحِكْمَةُ الْعَمَلِيَّةُ *al-ḥikmat al-‘amalyyat*). Now we mean by ‘*al-ḥikmat*’ that Wisdom which is, at once, both theoretical *and* practical...¹.

1

قُلْتُ: وَ يَكُونُ ذَلِكَ بِدَلِيلِ الْحِكْمَةِ.
أَقُولُ: الْحِكْمَةُ قَدْ تُطْلَقُ وَ يُرَادُ بِهَا الْحِكْمَةُ الْعِلْمِيَّةُ وَ قَدْ يُرَادُ بِهَا الْحِكْمَةُ الْعَمَلِيَّةُ. وَ نَحْنُ نُرِيدُ بِهَا
الْحِكْمَةَ الْعِلْمِيَّةَ وَ الْعَمَلِيَّةَ مَعًا ...

From this passage in the commentary, it appears that, in this case, ‘*ḥikmat*’ is used not for the method but that science to which the method applies.

We will say more about the ambiguity of ‘*ḥikmat*’ below. We point out here that one of its most common uses among the learned was as a synonym for *falsafah*. In this regard, it was also used as an ellipsis for الْحِكْمَةُ الْإِلَهِيَّةُ *al-ḥikmat al-ʾilāhiyyat* i.e., that branch of philosophy that pertains to divinity i.e., metaphysics. In the First Observation of the *Fawāʾid*, the author says that the “proof of Wisdom”

...is an instrument of the sciences pertaining to the real. By means of it one becomes cognizant of Allah as well as cognizant of that which is there besides Him.

This statement can be placed into one-to-one correspondence with the traditional division of metaphysics into “general” (أُمُورٌ عَامَّةٌ *umūr ʿāmmah*) and “specific” (أُمُورٌ خَاصَّةٌ *umūr ḥāṣṣah*). General metaphysics deals with the problem of determining what there is (“that which is there besides Him”) and with the classification of what there is i.e., what is “real”. Specific metaphysics deals with the problem of God and theology. So it is plausible to suggest that the “proof of Wisdom” is a tool of metaphysics. In the course of a treatise, *Commentary on the Hadith of Kumayl*, Shaykh ʾAḥmad is more explicit: [3, Vol II, p. 315]

...it has been firmly established in metaphysics (*al-ḥikmat al-ʾilāhiyyat*), through the proof of Wisdom (*dalīl al-ḥikmat*), that all of the modes of existence, of both the invisible and visible realms, including [what are traditionally classified as] substances

and accidents, are [actually] correlational accidents...².

Here we see a more explicit connection between “the proof of Wisdom” and “metaphysics”. Yet we cannot simply identify Shaykh ’Aḥmad’s science of “Wisdom” with the traditional scholastic science of metaphysics that goes under the same name. Traditional metaphysics (*al-ḥikmat al-ilāhiyyat*) is a branch of *falsafah* that comes under the Peripatetic category of “theoretical wisdom” (*al-ḥikmat al-ilmīyyah*). Our author has something else in mind, something which does not fit exactly into this categorical scheme. For he clearly states that what he means by ‘*al-ḥikmat*’ is something that cannot be classified as either theoretical or practical, but not both. Yet there can be little doubt that what the author has in mind is in fact a metaphysics of some sort.

The foregoing preliminary observations indicate the following:

- Shaykh Aḥmad does have in mind a science called “Wisdom” to which the “proof of Wisdom” applies;
- The proof of Wisdom deals with topics which are clearly metaphysical;
- The science of Wisdom is not identical to metaphysics in the traditional scholastic sense.

On the basis of the foregoing, we will approach the question, “What is the proof of Wisdom”, within the context of a larger question, “What is

2

تَقَرَّرَ فِي الْحِكْمَةِ الْإِلَهِيَّةِ، بِدَلِيلِ الْحِكْمَةِ، أَنَّ جَمِيعَ ذَرَاتِ الْوُجُودِ، مِنْ عَالَمِ الْغَيْبِ وَالشَّهَادَةِ، مِنْ
الْحَوَاهِرِ وَالْأَعْرَاضِ، أَعْرَاضٌ إِضَافِيَّةٌ ...

Wisdom?”. Determining the intension of ‘Wisdom’ will involve answering the following:

- What is the aim of Wisdom?;
- What is the object of Wisdom?;
- What is the method of Wisdom? Under this heading we will discuss the “proof of Wisdom” proper;
- What kind(s) of proposition is (are) the subject of Wisdom?;
- What are the first principles of Wisdom?

1.2 The Ambiguity of ‘Wisdom’

As we indicated above, the word ‘*ḥikmat*’, an indefinite noun, is very ambiguous. This also goes for the definite form of the noun, ‘*al-ḥikmat*’. In early Arabic, ‘*ḥikmat*’ appears to have been a close synonym of ‘*علم*’ ‘*ilm*’, which means “knowledge”. According to Lane, the *Tāj al-‘Urūs* defines ‘*ḥikmat*’ to primarily mean, “*What prevents, [or] restrains, from ignorant behavior*”. The *Ṣiḥāḥ*, one of the earliest authorities, defines it as simply “knowledge (*ilm*)”.

The word ‘*al-ḥikmat*’ is also used in the Qur’an and in sayings of the Prophet and Imams. When asked about the meaning of the verse, **And surely, We gave Luqmān [an ancient sage] Wisdom...** [31:12]³, the

3

seventh Imam Mūsā al-Kāzīm said that what is meant is that he was given “consciousness-awareness (عقل *‘aql*) and understanding (فهم *fahm*)” [11, Vol 3., p. 270]. Another verse which speaks of ‘*al-ḥikmat*’ is 2:269:

He grants Wisdom to whomsoever He wills. Whomsoever has been granted Wisdom has surely been granted abundant goodness. And none are mindful except those who possess kernels of consciousness⁴.

According to Imam Ṣādiq, the *ḥikmat* referred to here is “cognizance of the Imam and obedience to God”. Here “the Imam” is to be understood as the *logos* through which cognizance of God is obtained.

As Hellenic literature was translated into Arabic, Aristotle’s ‘*sophia*’ was translated by ‘*ḥikmat*’. So as a technical term, *al-ḥikmat* became synonymous with *falsafah*. In the category of practical wisdom (*al-ḥikmat al-‘amaliyyah*), the word ‘*al-ḥikmat*’ also came to be synonymous with ‘medicine’ (الطَّبّ *at-ṭibb*), a usage which is common in Muslim lands up to the present day.

1.3 The Aim of Wisdom

What is the aim of Wisdom, and what benefit is it supposed to provide? In the *Fawā’id*, there are clear indications that the aim and benefit of *ḥikmat* is the cognizance (مَعْرِفَة *ma‘rifat*) of God and of the realities of things. At the beginning of the Prologue, Shaykh ‘Aḥmad states:

4

يُؤْتِي الْحِكْمَةَ مَنْ يَشَاءُ. وَ مَنْ يُؤْتِ الْحِكْمَةَ فَقَدْ أُوتِيَ خَيْرًا. وَ مَا يَذْكُرُ إِلَّا أُولُوا الْأَلْبَابِ.

After I noticed many of the seekers penetrating deeply into the divine sciences, and supposing that they have penetrated deeply into the[ir] intended meaning — but which is only a deep penetration into semantics (الْأَلْفَاظُ *al-ʾalfāz*), nothing else...

In the commentary [2, p. 3], Shaykh ʾAḥmad says that the “intended meaning (الْمَعْنَى الْمَقْصُودُ *al-maʿnā ʾl-maqṣūd*) is the cognizance of God...”. In the main text, he goes on to claim that rational analysis is an inappropriate tool for the cognizance of things, and that only the “proof of wisdom” can lead one to that goal. In the commentary he clarifies what he means by “the cognizance of things”: [2, p. 4]

I said: It [rational analysis] does not lead one to the cognizance of things as they are, as he (upon him and his family be the blessings of Allah and peace) said:

O Allah, make us see things as they are!

I now say: The proof of Wisdom leads the one who uses it to the cognizance of the *realities* (حَقَائِقُ *ḥaqāʾiq*) of *things* (أَشْيَاءُ *ašyāʾ*) in the state in which they really are. This cognizance is what he (upon him and his family be the blessings of Allah and peace) asked of his Lord, that He show him those very realities. This is because things, when you contemplate them *qua* themselves, and cut off any contemplation of those factors which individuate them and distinguish them, are then abstracted from everything besides their quintessences. A given thing, when you contemplate it, and cut off any contemplation of those factors which individuate it

and distinguish it, [you see it] purified of all aspects, modalities, and relations. When it is purified of all of these, it has become abstracted from all indications, configurations, and positions. It is neither an [intelligible] meaning (مَعْنَى *maʿnan*) or a [psychic] image (صُورَة *ṣūrat*), since both of the latter entail [some kind of] indication (إِشَارَة *iṣārat*)⁵.

What Shaykh 'Aḥmad appears to be saying is that psychic and intellectual grasping and perception involve making distinctions by means of which one can “point to” or “indicate” (from “indication” *iṣārat*). What one “points to” or “indicates” in the course of intellectual or psychic grasping is either a psychic image (*ṣūrat*) of the *mundus imaginalis* or an intelligible meaning of the *mundus intelligibilis*. But seeing a thing in its deepest state, contemplating it in its reality, in that whereby it acquires its realization, involves bracketing all of its individuating and distinguishing factors so that one can no longer indicate it or point at it. Once one has accomplished this, one can be said to have true cognizance of it. This cognizance I call *ousiological*

5

قُلْتُ: وَلَا يُوصَلُ إِلَى مَعْرِفَةِ الْأَشْيَاءِ كَمَا هِيَ كَمَا قَالَ (ص): «اللَّهُمَّ أَرِنَا الْأَشْيَاءَ كَمَا هِيَ!»
 أَقُولُ: إِنَّ دَلِيلَ الْحِكْمَةِ يُوصَلُ مَنْ اسْتَعْمَلَهُ إِلَى مَعْرِفَةِ حَقَائِقِ الْأَشْيَاءِ عَلَى مَا هِيَ عَلَيْهِ فِي نَفْسِ
 الْأَمْرِ وَهِيَ الَّتِي سَأَلَهَا (صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَآلِهِ) مِنْ رَبِّهِ، أَنْ يُرِيَهُ إِيَّاهَا، لِأَنَّ الْأَشْيَاءَ، إِذَا نَظَرْتُ إِلَيْهَا
 مِنْ حَيْثُ هِيَ، مَعَ قَطْعِ النَّظَرِ مِنْ مُشَخَّصَاتِهَا وَ مُمَيَّزَاتِهَا، كَانَتْ مُجَرَّدَةً عَنْ كُلِّ مَا سِوَى ذَوَاتِهَا. وَ
 الشَّيْءُ، إِذَا نَظَرْتُ إِلَيْهِ، مَعَ قَطْعِ النَّظَرِ عَنْ جَمِيعِ مُشَخَّصَاتِهِ وَ مُمَيَّزَاتِهِ، خَلَصَ مِنْ جَمِيعِ الْجِهَاتِ وَ
 الْكَيْفِيَّاتِ وَ النَّسَبِ. وَإِذَا خَلَصَ مِنْ ذَلِكَ كُلِّهِ، تَجَرَّدَ عَنِ الْإِشَارَاتِ وَ الْهَيْئَاتِ وَ الْأَوْصَاعِ. فَلَا يَكُونُ
 مَعْنَى وَلَا صُورَةً لِإِسْتِلْزَامِهِمَا الْإِشَارَةَ.

intuition and the process by which one arrives at it I term *ousiological reduction*. As we shall see, Shaykh 'Aḥmad considers this reality of which one obtains cognizance as the *ousia* or ground of all created things. This 'ousia' is coextensive with 'existence' (وُجُود *wuǧūd*), 'matter' (مَادَّة *māddat*), 'hyle' (هَيْوَلَا *hayūlā*), and other terms we will discuss later.

We see that for Shaykh 'Aḥmad, *al-ḥikmat* appears to contain what we could call a major "phenomenological" component. This phenomenology is a reversal of Husserl's essentialistic method, whereby one seeks to bracket existence (eidetic reduction) of a given thing and intuit its essence (eidetic intuition). By bracketing, if not denying, the reality of existence, Husserl, following Kant's lead (for whom existence was nothing but a secondary intelligible), is left with nothing but empty structural phenomena. Being empty, they cannot lead to any reality outside of his mind. Interestingly, Shaykh 'Aḥmad's commitment to uncovering *ousia* is in consonance with Aristotle's own claim that the fundamental quest of metaphysics is the grasping of what exactly *ousia* is. So in one sense the aim of Wisdom is analogous to the aim of metaphysics in Aristotle's view: the cognizance of *ousia*.

We will see that it turns out that cognizance of God and cognizance of *ousia* amount to the same thing. However, this does not, as the Shaykh goes to pains to point out, mean that there is any identity whatsoever between God and *ousia*. There is also something of a dialectic involved here, for cognizance of God is achieved through cognizance of the realities of things, that is, cognizance of the ground or *ousia* of things. After cognizance of God has been achieved, one can "look" at the essences of things through the "eye" of that very *ousia*, for it is through *ousia* that essences are realized and

interconnected, while it is through essences that *ousia* is manifested. That is, what we call “eidetic intuition”, for Shaykh ‘Aḥmad, can be accomplished only by seeing through the eye of *ousia*. As we shall see, this results in, by Muslim scholastic standards, a very unconventional view of essence. In the First Observation, Shaykh ‘Aḥmad quotes one of the Imams as saying, “Beware of the penetration of the faithful; for he contemplates through the light of Allah” i.e., through *ousia*, not through bracketing *ousia*. Eidetic intuition can only come about *through* ousiological intuition.

In the Eighteenth Observation, Shaykh ‘Aḥmad says that the cognizance of God is the *final cause* (عِلَّةٌ غَايِيَّةٌ *‘illat gā’iyyat*) of all creation, and constitutes the purpose of creation. In a sense, this doctrine lies at the heart of philosophical speculation in Muslim civilization in general, and Shī‘ī thought in particular. In a famous sermon, the first Imam ‘Alī ibn ‘Abī Ṭālib states, “the first part of religion is cognizance of Him. . . [sermon16]”.

1.4 The Object of Wisdom

Given the foregoing, the object or subject matter of Wisdom should not be too difficult to discern. However, there is an important subtlety involved. Given that the aim of Wisdom is the cognizance of God and the cognizance

The most important and authoritative collection of the sermons, letters, and aphorisms of Imam ‘Alī is the *Nahjul Balāghah*, compiled by Sayyid al-Raḍiyy. The number of editions of this work are countless. For ease of reference, we refer to it by sermon, letter, or aphorism number.

of “things”, it may appear to follow that the object of Wisdom comprises God and everything else. Such a judgement would be hasty.

With respect to God, Shaykh 'Aḥmad emphasizes, especially in the Second and Twelfth Observations that cognizance of God is *not* cognizance of His *Quintessence* (ذَات *dāt*). God *qua* God is unknowable and incomparable. Following the lead of the Imams, the Shaykh adheres to the strictest possible negative theology. Even the One of the Neoplatonists is not equivalent to the God of Shaykh 'Aḥmad, for the One shares the ontological rank of *mundus intelligibilis* with at least two others, nous and soul. Nothing shares in rank with the God of Shi'ism. Indeed, it is not even a “rank” in the strictest sense of the term. It is beyond categories, classification, and ontology. It is the *Deus Absconditus*, *hyperousia*, the *coincidentia oppositorum*, beyond the beyond and yet present, the Unnamable, the Indescribable, the Ultimate ?.

In Muslim scholasticism, the *subject matter* of a science (مَوْضُوع *mawḍūʿ*) was defined as “that whose quintessential affections [i.e., essential aspects] are discussed in that science” [13, p. 212]. Jurjānī, who gives this definition in his *Kitāb al-Taʿrīfāt* (*Book of Definitions*), goes on to give two examples. The subject of the science of medicine (*aṭ-ṭibb*) is the human body. The essential aspects of the human body at issue in this science are its states of health and illness. The subject matter of syntax (النَّحْو *an-naḥw*) comprises words (الكَلِمَات *al-kalimāt*). The essential aspects of words at issue in this science are their declension (taking on the signs of the nominative, accusative, or genitive case) and indeclension.

At the end of the Second Observation, the Shaykh 'Aḥmad says in his commentary:

The subject of the science of the *profession of unity* (التَّوْحِيدُ *at-tawhīd*) [i.e., theology] is not the Quintessence of God (Exalted is He!), as the theologians claim. This is because [of the following:] The Quintessence of Allah cannot be grasped, so how can its quintessential affections be discussed when He (Exalted is He!) has no affections other than qualities which are, from every consideration, including the propositions pertaining to those Stations which comprise His Designation, His very own Quintessence?⁷

We will discuss what he means by “Stations” and “Designation” momentarily. The main point to be noted here is that not only is God unknowable, but He is also not the subject of Wisdom. This leads to what appears at first glance to be a paradox: The aim of Wisdom, nay, of creation itself, is cognizance of God. Yet He is Unknowable. Every proposition about his Quintessence *qua* Quintessence is a tautology and thus devoid of any information whatsoever. So how can one have cognizance of Him at all? It is perhaps no exaggeration to say that this question constitutes the fundamental problem of philosophical Shi‘ism.

This problem is not as crucial for the ‘Ash‘arites, who represent the dominant school of Muslim theology, because they believe that the believers will actually see God on the Day of Judgment. They also affirm that His At-

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وَلَيْسَ مَوْضُوعُ عِلْمِ التَّوْحِيدِ كَمَا قَالَهُ الْمُتَكَلِّمُونَ أَنَّهُ ذَاتُ اللَّهِ تَعَالَى لِأَنَّ ذَاتَ اللَّهِ لَا تُدْرَكُ، فَكَيْفَ يُبْحَثُ عَنْ عَوَارِضِهَا الدَّائِيَّةِ، مَعَ أَنَّهُ تَعَالَى لَا عَوَارِضَ لَهُ إِلَّا صِفَاتٍ هِيَ عَيْنُ ذَاتِهِ بِكُلِّ اعْتِبَارٍ أَوْ أَحْكَامِ الْمَقَامَاتِ الَّتِي هِيَ عُقُودُهُ.

tributes are distinct from His Quintessence and coeternal with his Quintessence. Therefore, propositions pertaining to God are not tautologous. Since they are not tautologous, they give us information about God's Quintessence.

Some details of Shaykh 'Aḥmad's solution to the problem of reconciling God's unknowability with cognizance of Him will be discussed in the next chapter. Fundamental to his solution is his breaking up of this issue into two problems: a phenomenological problem and an ontological one. We consider the phenomenological problem first.

Consider the proposition, "There is nothing like It". The statement of this proposition occurs in the Qur'an, [42:11]⁸. God describes Himself by this proposition, so one should be able to have cognizance of Him through it. The method by which one obtains cognizance of God through this proposition is that of ousiological reduction, which we will discuss in more detail in the next section. Briefly, it involves a series of meditations on the *signs* (آيَاتٍ *āyāt*) and *impressions* (أَثَارٍ *ātār*) of God around us and in one's own self. When one reaches that state mentioned by the author where one has transcended both psychic and intelligible indication, one has what mystics generally hold to be an indescribable or ineffable experience. Upon return to the reality of essences and distinctions, the mystic can only describe this experience in negative terms. He may say, e.g., "there is nothing like it", where "it" covers every possible subject of human grasping, be it psychic or intelligible.

Imam 'Alī is famous for the dictum, "Whoever has cognizance of his

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self (نفس *nafs*), surely has cognizance of his Lord”. According to Shaykh ‘Aḥmad, one’s experience of the cognizance of the self (*nafs*) as “There is nothing like it” constitutes one’s very cognizance of God: [2, p. 15]

When you abstract (تَجَرَّدَتْ *tağarrad-ta*) your self (*nafs*) from every thing, including resemblance to anything whatsoever, and so that self comes to be so that “there is nothing like it”, then your self has come to be a *sign* (آيَة *āyat*) of cognizance of Him. So when you have achieved cognizance of Allah through your self, you have achieved cognizance of the fact that “There is nothing like It”. Understand this, and do not understand from this discourse what the Sufis understand. For the Sufis say that when you abstract your self this way, then it *is* Allah. Due to this, one of their representatives proclaims, “I am God; indeed I am”. This is clear disbelief. The fact of the matter is that when you abstract your self, it becomes a *sign* of Allah and a *mark* (عَلَامَة *alāmat*) of his cognizance. This is as He has said (Exalted is He!):

***We will show them Our signs in the horizons
and in their selves until it becomes clear to
them that He is the Real.***

And He did not say, “We will show them our Quintessence”, so understand and think about it!⁹

9

... تَجَرَّدَتْهَا [أَي، نَفْسَكَ] عَنْ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ حَتَّى مِنَ الْمِثَالَةِ لِشَيْءٍ مِنَ الْأَشْيَاءِ؛ وَ حِينَئِذٍ تَكُونُ «لَيْسَ

The category of experience referred to in the above quote is called by Shaykh 'Aḥmad **الْوُجُودُ الْحَقُّ** *al-wuḡūd al-ḥaqq* or “Real Existence”. In this phenomenological category, the realization of the propositions of negative theology is achieved. But this category must not in any way be confused with experience of God *qua* God. Yes, we may say of God that “There is nothing like It”. But the proposition relates to Him only in a metaphorical sense because to posit a relation between God and a proposition in itself compromises his Indescribability. This proposition relates to something else, namely, this category of experience which Shaykh 'Aḥmad calls the *Designation* (**عُنْوَان** *unwān*) of God and the *Stations* (**مَقَامَات** *maqāmāt*) of God. It is this “Designation” and these “Stations” which constitute the object of Wisdom, as the author makes clear at the end of the Second Observation.

If it is not God that one experiences in the category of **الْوُجُودُ الْحَقُّ** *al-wuḡūd al-ḥaqq*, then what exactly is the object of experience, and where does it fit in the ontological scheme of things? It turns out that for Shaykh 'Aḥmad, the ontological category corresponding, but not identical, to the phenomenological category of Real Existence is that of existence *qua* existence. As we will discuss in more detail in the next chapter, this existence is the first and most immediate outcome of the Acting or Will of God. It

كَمِثْلَهَا شَيْءٌ؛ فَإِنَّهَا حِينَئِذٍ تَكُونُ آيَةً مَعْرِفَتِهِ. فَإِذَا عَرَفْتَ اللَّهَ بِهَا، عَرَفْتَ أَنََّّهُ لَيْسَ كَمِثْلِهِ شَيْءٌ. فَافْهَمْ هَذَا، وَلَا تَفْهَمْ مِنْ هَذَا الْكَلَامِ مَا فِيهِمُ الصُّوفِيَّةُ. فَإِنَّهُمْ يَقُولُونَ إِذَا جَرَّدَتِهَا هَكَذَا، فَهِيَ اللَّهُ. وَلِهَذَا يَقُولُ قَائِلُهُمْ: «أَنَا اللَّهُ؛ بَلَا أَنَا»؛ وَ هَذَا كُفْرٌ صَرِيحٌ. وَلَكِنْ إِذَا جَرَّدَتِهَا، تَكُونُ آيَةً لِلَّهِ وَ عَلَامَةً مَعْرِفَتِهِ، كَمَا قَالَ تَعَالَى: «سُرِّيهِمْ آيَاتِنَا فِي الْأَفَاقِ وَ فِي أَنْفُسِهِمْ حَتَّى يَتَبَيَّنَ لَهُمْ أَنََّّهُ الْحَقُّ» وَ لَمْ يَقُلْ: «سُرِّيهِمْ ذَاتِنَا»، فَافْهَمْ وَ اعْتَبِرْ!

is the *ousia* from which everything was made. It is also an acting, but in a secondary sense to be discussed in the next chapter.

We see that this *ousia* is related to both the Acting of God and to all created things. On this basis we may now introduce the three most fundamental divisions of existence in Shaykh 'Aḥmad's system:

1. *Real Existence* الْوُجُودُ الْحَقُّ *al-wuḡūd al-ḥaqq*;
2. *Absolute Existence* الْوُجُودُ الْمُطْلَقُ *al-wuḡūd al-muṭlaq*), the *Acting* (أَفْعَلُ *al-fi'l*), or the *Commanding that is the Acting* (أَمْرُ الْفِعْلِيِّ *al-amr al-fi'liyy*) of God. It is *existence totally unconditioned* (الْوُجُودُ الَّلَا بِشَرَطٍ *al-wuḡūd al-lā bi-ṣarṭ*). This is, in fact, the first *ousia*, as we will discuss in the sequel;
3. *Delimited existence* الْوُجُودُ الْمُتَقَيَّدُ *al-wuḡūd al-muqayyad*). It is the *Commanding that is the outcome of the Acting* (أَمْرُ الْمَفْعُولِيِّ *al-amr al-maf'ūliyy*). It is the second *ousia*. It may be considered from two angles:
 - (a) It may be considered *qua* itself. That is, delimited existence may be considered *qua* delimited existence. This is *existence negatively conditioned* (الْوُجُودُ بِشَرَطٍ لَّا *al-wuḡūd bi-ṣarṭi lā*). It is a dynamic intermediary between the Acting of God and the particularized outcomes of that Acting, outcomes conditioned by essence;
 - (b) It may be considered as determined or particularized by something other than itself. This is *existence conditioned by something*

else (أَلْوُجُودُ بِشَرَطِ شَيْءٍ *al-wuġūd bi-šarṭi šayʿ*). This division comprises all of the outcomes of God’s Acting conditioned by something other than existence alone.

For Shaykh ’Aḥmad, the object of Wisdom consists of the contents of these three categories. The cognizance of God and of the realities of things depends on an understanding of the relations between these three divisions of existence i.e., the phenomenological category of Real Existence and the ontological categories of Absolute Existence and delimited existence. These relations are the subject of the next chapter.

1.5 The Method of Wisdom

Ousiological reduction and intuition, as well as discovering true propositions about those things that constitute the object of Wisdom, is achieved through the “proof of Wisdom”. In the First Observation, which is devoted to the proof of Wisdom and its distinction from rational demonstration and moral exhortation, is discussed the *support* (مُسْتَنَدٌ *mustanad*) of Wisdom and the *condition* (شَرَطٌ *šarṭ*) of Wisdom. In the commentary [2, p. 7], Shaykh ’Aḥmad defines the “support” of the proof of Wisdom to be “that source from which it [i.e., Wisdom] is obtained”. The “condition” of the proof of Wisdom is defined to be that “through which it is realized according to the perfection of what ought to be” i.e., that through which it is a cogent proof. Shaykh ’Aḥmad postulates two sources or “supports” of the proof of Wisdom and three “conditions”. The two sources of the proof of Wisdom are the *the heart-flux* (أَلْفُؤَادٌ *al-fuʾād*) and *the tradition* (أَلْتَقْلُ *an-naql*).

1.5.1 The *Fu'ād*

The term '*fu'ād*', although a fairly common Arabic word, does not appear to have had any major technical usage in Muslim scholasticism before Shaykh 'Aḥmad. It figures in neither Jurjānī's dictionary of technical terms, Aḥmad Nagari's, nor even Ibn Arabi's glossary of Sufi technical terms. It does occur in the Qur'an and in the hadith of the Imams. In the Qur'an it is mentioned sixteen times. On seven occasions it is mentioned along with the faculties of hearing (السَّمْعُ *as-samʿ*) and seeing (البَصَرُ *al-baṣar*), and once with just the faculty of seeing. So the ancient Arabs surely saw it as a faculty of some sort. The first eighteen verses of sura fifty-three give a description of the Prophet's own witnessing of God. In verse eleven we find, "**And the *fu'ād* did not lie about what it saw**"¹⁰. Here, the *fu'ād* is treated as a faculty of vision. Imam Ṣādiq is reported to have said, "When the light of cognizance becomes revealed in the *fu'ād* (of the servant), then he loves. And when he loves, that which is besides Allah will not occasion any impression upon him"¹¹ [3, Vol. 1, pt. 2, 36].

There is no word in English which exactly corresponds to '*fu'ād*'. Lane (*AEL*, under ف أ د), quotes earlier Arabic authorities in lexicography to the effect that the *fu'ād* is so-called because of its تَفَادُّ *tafaʿud*. Now تَفَادُّ

10

مَا كَذَبَ الْفُؤَادُ مَا رَأَى.

11

وَ إِذَا انْجَلَى ضِيَاءُ الْمَعْرِفَةِ فِي الْفُؤَادِ، أَحَبَّ. وَإِذَا أَحَبَّ، لَمْ يُؤَثَّرْ مَا سِوَى اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ.

tafaʿud, from the same root, means “burning brightly or fiercely”, “blazing”, “flaming”, “ardour”, or, according to some, “being in a state of motion”. The primary meaning of the gerund most immediately related to ‘فُؤَادُ’ *fuʿād*, فَادًا *faḍān*, is, according to some authorities, “motion” or “putting into motion”. This primitive significance of *fuʿād* is consistent with the dynamic role it plays in the metaphysics of Shaykh ‘Aḥmad.

In ancient Arabic, there was a close connection between the *fuʿād* and the قَلْب *qalb* or “heart”, so much so that sometimes the words ‘*fuʿād*’ and ‘*qalb*’ are frequently treated as synonymous. However, as Lane points out, the two are generally distinguished. There appears to be no general agreement on the precise relationship between ‘*qalb*’ and ‘*fuʿād*’. The *fuʿād* is variously considered to be a covering (غِشَاءٌ *ḡiṣāʾ* or وَغَاءٌ *wiʿāʾ*) of the heart, the middle of the heart, or the interior of the heart. According to Ṭurayḥī (*MB*, under ف أ د), whose *Majmaʿ Al-Baḥrayn* was in large part based on the traditions of the Shīʿī Imams, “There is nothing in the human body more subtle than the *fuʿād*, nor which suffers damage as easily¹²”.

Lane quotes the *Tāj al-ʿUrūs* to the effect that the heart (*al-qalb*) is the سُوَيْدَاءُ *suwaydāʾ* or حَبَّةٌ *ḥabbat* of the *fuʿād*. Now under the article ح ب ب, Lane quotes the *Tāj al-ʿUrūs* to the effect that ‘*ḥabbat*’ is used in the expression, “حَبَّةُ الْقَلْبِ *ḥabbat al-qalb*”, meaning, “the heart’s core”, or “the black, or inner part of the heart”. Under the article س و د, Lane quotes the same source to the effect that ‘*suwaydāʾ*’ signifies “the heart’s core;

12

وَلَا شَيْءٌ فِي بَدَنِ الْإِنْسَانِ أَلْطَفُ مِنَ الْفُؤَادِ، وَلَا أَشَدُّ تَأْدِيًا مِنْهُ.

the black, or inner part of the heart. The point I want to make is that the author of the *Tāj al-ʿUrūs* has been somewhat inconsistent. First, under the discussion of *fuʾād*, he says that the heart (*qalb*) is both the *suwaydāʾ* and the *ḥabbat* of the *fuʾād*. Then, under the discussion of the former two, he describes the *suwaydāʾ* and the *ḥabbat* as each signifying the innermost part of the heart (*qalb*). So by describing the *qalb* as the *suwaydāʾ* and the *ḥabbat* of the *fuʾād*, he has, in effect, said that the *qalb* is the innermost part of the *qalb* of the *fuʾād*, which seems ridiculous. If we follow the opinion that the *fuʾād* is actually the interior of the heart, instead of its exterior, then the inconsistency disappears and we see that ‘*fuʾād*’ is coextensive with both ‘*suwaydāʾ*’ and ‘*ḥabbat*’.

Based on the foregoing, we have translated ‘*fuʾād*’ as “heart-flux”. This is meant to connote that the *fuʾād* is more specialized than the heart itself, and that a notion of motion or flux is fundamental to its meaning. This interpretation is also consistent with Shaykh ʿAḥmad’s use of ‘*fuʾād*’, which is definitely consistent with the view that the *fuʾād* is more specialized than the *qalb*.

Shaykh ʿAḥmad calls the heart-flux “the highest of all of man’s *loci of sensation* (مَشَاعِر *mašāʿir*, s. مَشْعَر *mašʿar*)”. Not counting the five senses, the Shaykh says that there are three *mašāʿir*: the *bosom* (صَدْر *ṣadr*), the *heart* (*al-qalb*), and the *heart-flux* (*al-fuʾād*). To each of these there corresponds a mode of cognition, an ontological rank in the Neoplatonic hierarchy, a set of objects of cognition, and a set of sciences to which that mode of cognition is appropriate. Shaykh ʿAḥmad works out some of these correspondences in the course of his section on epistemology in his *Observations on the Philosophy of*

Law, during the course of an attempt to define knowledge¹³. Briefly, the *bo-* som corresponds to *knowledge* (ʿilm), which consists of *images* or *forms* (صُور *ṣuwar*) in *the universal soul* (النَّفْسُ الْكُلِّيَّةُ *an-nafs al-kullīyyat*), mirrored by the *imaginal faculty* (خَيَال *hayāl*). The heart corresponds to *certainty* (يَقِين *yaqīn*), which consists of *intelligibles* (مَعْقُولَات *maʿqūlāt*) or *intelligible meanings* (المَعَانِي الْعَقْلِيَّةُ *al-maʿānī ʿl-ʿaqliyyat*) in the *intellect* or *nous* (عَقْل *ʿaql*). The *fuṭūḥ* corresponds to *cognizance* (*maʿrifat*), which consists of that which cannot be intellected or perceived by intellectual or psychic differentiation or discrimination. The accompanying table summarizes the relations between these three organs and faculties. We will discuss the corresponding sciences later.

In the *Fawā'id*, Shaykh 'Aḥmad says that the *fuṭūḥ* is actually existence itself. As we will discuss in Chapter 3, Shaykh 'Aḥmad argues that every individual thing is a composite of existence and essence. In other words, the essence-existence distinction is a proposition of ontological, not subjective import. This runs against the entire gamut of Muslim scholastic thought going all the way back to Suhrawardī. This existence is a secondary acting of God which proceeds or emanates from His primary Acting or Willing. It is from God, whereas the act of becoming of the individual, called “essence” (مَاهِيَّة *māhiyyat*), is from the individual himself. Chapter 3 will cover this distinction in more detail.

¹³This extensive section on epistemology is interesting in that the author follows the standard scholastic procedure of attempting to determine the genus and differentia of knowledge. He engages Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, and many others in his search for the proper definition. The use of Peripatetic methodology here is in marked contrast to the approach of the *Fawā'id*.

<i>mode of cognition</i>	<i>locus of cognition</i>	<i>objects of cognition</i>	<i>ontological rank of objects of cognition</i>
knowledge	bosom	forms or images	the universal soul
certainty	heart	meanings/intelligibles	the universal nous
cognizance	heart-flux	light of cognizance	existence <i>qua</i> negatively conditioned

Table 1.1: The three types of cognition.

1.5.2 Tradition

The other “support” or source of Wisdom is *the tradition* (*an-naql*). For Shaykh ’Aḥmad, the tradition consists of the Qur’an and the Sunnah i.e., the word of God and the sayings and practice of Prophet Muhammad, his daughter Fatimah, and the twelve Imams from his household.

Placed in a larger context, what Shaykh ’Aḥmad is attempting is an integration of the *sapientia* of the representatives of revelation with philosophical speculation and mystical experience. In principle, “tradition” could mean the scholastic tradition, the Sufi theosophical tradition, or any other transmitted body expressive of teachings or doctrines which constitute a philosophy or a set of related philosophies. In the West, India, China, and other civilizations, there exist bodies of transmitted literature which express, whether

potentially or in actuality, philosophies or sets of philosophies. Individual philosophers are interested in studying a given body of literature so as to either systematically express the philosophy or set of philosophies latent in that body of literature, or else to develop a systematic philosophy of their own, but building upon that which is latent in that body of literature. Frequently, a given philosopher is engaged in both activities at once.

Given a body of literature potentially expressive of a philosophy or a set of philosophies¹⁴, how does one approach this body of literature in order to express its philosophical content? One may simply read a body of literature and not try to systematize anything. If a body of religious literature is at issue, one may simply accept everything one reads on faith, ignore apparent contradictions or paradoxes, and simply act out whatever doctrinal, moral, or legalistic demands he finds. Similar scenarios may obtain with a reader of the transmitted teachings of, say, Plato or Confucius.

Another way to approach a given body of literature is to apply some degree or other of rational analysis to both the goal of determining the propositions expressed by the body of literature and to those very propositions themselves. Given those propositions, the investigator tries to express, in a systematic way, the philosophy latent in the body of literature under investigation. In the tradition of Muslim civilization, this method is the preferred method of the *falāsafah* and the *mutakallimūn*. The *falāsafah* were, by and large, pure rationalists, investigating whatever they put their hands one, be

¹⁴For purposes of this discussion, we accept Gracia's definition of philosophy as "a view of the world, or any of its parts, which seeks to be accurate, consistent, comprehensive, and supported by sound evidence".

it Hellenic or Islamic, through the method of demonstration through first premises. The *mutakallimūn*, especially the later ones, accepted certain doctrines on faith but still used rational analysis to systematize the philosophy they considered to be latent in, e.g., the body of Islamic religious literature. In both cases, with the exception of some of the earlier *mutakallimūn*, rational analysis constituted the primary tool of investigation. One could say that for post-Ṭūsī scholasticism, as well as most Western philosophy, the sources of philosophical speculation are the rational intellect and the philosophical tradition. In the case of the Muslim scholastic theologians, one must add the body of purely Islamic literature, namely, the Qur'an and the Sunnah.

A third way to approach a given body of literature potentially expressive of a philosophy or set of philosophies is to approach it through some form of intuition that is supra-rational. This was the approach of the Sufi theosophists to revelation and prophetic traditions, while al-Suhrawardī and his followers applied this approach to the Hellenic tradition, while keeping the intellect or nous in its privileged position.

Shaykh 'Aḥmad was, of course, keenly aware of the attempts of his predecessors to integrate the traditions of *falsafah* with that of the *sapientia* of the Imams. He approaches the problem by replacing the twin sources of *falsafah*, intellect or nous and the Hellenic tradition (inclusive of its Muslim representatives), with the *fuṭūḥ* and the Islamic twin sources of revelation and the traditions of the Prophet, Fatimah, and the Imams. He justifies this in part by appealing to the legend, propagated by the *falāsafah* themselves, that Plato derived his philosophy from Pythagoras, who in turn learned it from the Prophet Solomon, who in turn transmitted it from the earlier

prophets. Shaykh 'Aḥmad claims that then, philosophy became corrupted because Plato, Aristotle, and other philosophers added things of their own to the pristine wisdom they inherited from the prophets. So the division of the philosophers into Platonists, Aristotelians, and Stoics occurred. Furthermore, the translators from Greek and Syriac made mistakes on account of which the philosophers of Islam compounded upon the mistakes of the earlier philosophers. Now all of the prophets, according to Shaykh 'Aḥmad, received their Wisdom through the intermediary of the Logos, which manifests in this world as the Prophet Muhammad, Fatimah, and the Imams. Since that is the case, it must also be the case that their teachings represent the pinnacles of Wisdom. Philosophical speculation and exposition must therefore begin with them and not with the corrupted baggage left behind by the Greeks. The hermeneutic process is now put in reverse: instead of applying *falsafah* to the interpretation and clarification of religious texts, one first seeks to draw the principles of Wisdom out of the divine sources and then apply these principles to finding solutions to the problems of *falsafah*. This at least partially explains why, although the author says in the First Observation that the sources of Wisdom are the Islamic tradition and the *fuṣūḥ*, he makes full use of the terminology of *falsafah* throughout the *Fawā'id*, and modifies it to suit his objectives.

1.5.3 The Conditions of the Proof of Wisdom

For the proof of wisdom to be realized, it is not enough simply to have these sources. After all, the Qur'an and Sunnah are accessible to everyone, and mystical experience was nothing new. The use of these sources depends upon

three conditions, conditions which he outlines in the First Observation.

The first condition for the cogency of the proof of Wisdom “is that you give your Lord what is His due because, when you contemplate by the proof of Wisdom, you are summoning your Lord and He is summoning you to your heart-flux...”. According to the commentary [2, p. 10–11], in order for the “gates to light” to be opened in the *fuṭūḥ*, one must first respond to the calling of one’s Lord. This requires one to give up all preconceptions and principles and approach the Lord with an empty mind. Then one will discover tidbits of truth in one’s self which may be either accepted or rejected. If one refuses to change accordingly and continues to blindly follow preconceptions and preconceived principles, then the door will not open and the heart-flux will remain “closed” to one. If one accepts and follows that light, then the gate will open and cognizance will be attained. In another place [2, p. 4], the author points out that the approaching God with a mind empty of preconceptions and preconceived principles is the condition of *theoretical Wisdom*.

Later we read in the text, “Then your Lord contends with and overcomes you, so weigh **with an even balance. That is better for you and best in respect of the outcomes [of your deeds]**”. According to the commentary, this means that your Lord shows you the proof of Himself in your innermost self and that if this proof is accepted, and if your actions, discourse, and beliefs manifest this acceptance, then one can begin to employ the proof of Wisdom and to discover many hidden things. By “weigh **with an even balance**”, the author [2, p. 11] is saying that one must exert all one’s effort, through the proof of Wisdom, to contemplating the signs

of God “in the horizons and in one’s self”, that is, in the macrocosm and in the microcosm. At the same time, one must equally exert oneself in the purification and sincerity of one’s intention so that the only goal whatsoever that one has at all times is to please God. In another place [2, p. 4], the author points out that the latter is the condition of practical Wisdom (remember that our author has said that Wisdom is *at once* theoretical and practical). Both theoretical and practical Wisdom must be in balance for the proof of Wisdom to be sound.

The second condition for the soundness of the proof of Wisdom is that one never, in one’s beliefs, investigations, and proclamation, go beyond what one has knowledge of. Arrogance and boldness are grave dangers, even for mystics. According to the Qur’an [17:36], even the *fuṭūḥ* of an individual will be questioned about on the Day of Judgement.

The last condition is that one cultivate one’s vision through the *fuṭūḥ* until, with respect to all of the above mentioned matters, one sees through the “eye of God” i.e., the *fuṭūḥ*. Shaykh ‘Aḥmad then quotes the verse, “***Do not walk exultantly upon the Earth. Surely you will never rend the Earth asunder; nor will you ever surpass the mountains in height.***” According to the commentary [2, p. 11–12], the Earth is symbolic of essence (*al-māhiyyat*). Every individual has two “eyes”: the eye of essence and the eye of existence. The eye of essence can only see tangible, ephemeral, being. The eye of God i.e., the heart-flux i.e., the eye of existence qua negatively conditioned, can see the psychically and intelligibly intangible realities of things. The ultimate goal is that one be guided at all times by the heart-flux and not by essence, for it is prideful to think that one can operate or “walk”

without the guidance of God as manifested through the heart-flux. Without His aid, without existence, one cannot conquer the “mountains” or obstacles present in the self, in one’s essence. Almost paradoxically, the power of God’s “eye” is only available to those who worship him in total humility.

Let us go back to the condition of theoretical Wisdom, that is, emptying oneself. Emptying one’s self of all preconceptions and preconceived principles, combined with a kind of meditation on the signs of God which seeks to remove all factors of discrimination and differentiation, appears to correspond to the notion in Taoist philosophy of *wu*, which Inada translates as “nonbeing”. Nonbeing is intangible with respect to our everyday faculties of psychic and intellectual grasping. It is to be contrasted with the tangible nature of “being”, or that which can be “named” i.e., indicated or pointed to. According to Inada, as Chinese thought incorporated Buddhist elements, the Sanskrit term *śūnyatā*, meaning “emptiness”, was translated with the Chinese term ‘wu’ or nonbeing. Despite certain differences in intension, the Chinese thinkers recognized that ‘emptiness’ and ‘nonbeing’ were coextensive.

According to Inada [42, p. 18],

Buddhist emptiness...is thoroughly experiential or existential.

It does not exist apart from human experience since it is strictly the result of meditative discipline. As one achieves the state of emptiness, the realm of one’s perception also achieves emptiness or the state of non-discriminative knowledge.

Inada’s characterization of “emptiness” appears to constitute an apt description of what Shaykh ’Aḥmad has in mind. I would like to suggest that a

relationship of coextensiveness obtains between our author's phenomenological category of Real Existence and emptiness on the one hand, and between the ontological and metaphysical categories of existence *qua* negatively conditioned and the nonbeing of Inada. In addition, Shaykh 'Aḥmad's 'essence' and Inada's "being" appear to be coextensive. In Chapter three, we will discuss the dynamic polarity and interplay of existence and essence, of nonbeing and being.

One wishes that Shaykh 'Aḥmad would have given more details of the process through which the vision of the *fuād* is attained. That is, Shaykh Aḥmad has described the sources and conditions of ousiological *intuition* or vision but has not provide many details of the process of ousiological *reduction*. Many details may be found by combing through some of his other works. To pull all of this together here is beyond our scope. A good summary though may be found in the author's *Risālah Ja'fariyyah* or *Treatise in Response to Questions of Mīrzā Ja'far*¹⁵. The process of "ousiological reduction" the author calls كَشَف *kašf* or "uncovering". Basically, it involves the "piercing" (خَرَقَ *ḥarq*) of a total of nine "veils" (حُجُبٌ *ḥuḡub*) of essence. These veils roughly correspond to the vertical hierarchy of existence *qua* conditioned-by-something. One pierces these veils through a discipline that

¹⁵See *al-Aḥsā'ī* 1856–59, p. 130. A printed edition (not critical) of this treatise may be found in *al-Aḥsā'ī* 1993, p. 26. Be warned that the editors of this recent collection of some of the author's works accidentally placed the first fourteen lines of this treatise at the beginning of the immediately preceding treatise. The first fourteen and one half lines (ending in the word 'حُدُود') have been taken from the beginning of the immediately preceding treatise and placed at the beginning of the *Risālah Ja'fariyyah*. The names of the two treatises are also reversed. Such sloppiness is really unforgivable.

involves a series of forty-day cycles of intense meditation and worship. In this vein, Shaykh quotes an interesting hadith of Imam 'Alī, one reminiscent of a very Socratic approach to knowledge, and which may serve to summarize the Shaykh's approach:

*Knowledge is not in the Firmament, so that it may descend down towards you. Nor is knowledge in the Earth, so that it may rise up towards you. Rather, knowledge is created as a disposition within your hearts. Become imbued with the temperaments of spiritual individuals, and it will self-manifest to you.*¹⁶

1.6 The Nature of the Proof of Wisdom

Shaykh 'Aḥmad considers there to be three kinds of “proof” (*dalīl*), each corresponding to one of the three types and loci of cognition. From the proof of Wisdom one acquires cognizance (*al-maʿrifat*) and Wisdom; from the proof of “good exhortation” (الموعظة الحسنة *al-mawʿizat al-ḥasanat*) one acquires certainty (*al-yaqīn*); from the proof of “argumentation in the best way” (المجادلة بالتي هي أحسن *al-muḡādalat bi-ʿllatī hiya aḥsan*) one acquires knowledge (*al-ʿilm*)¹⁷, but neither certainty or cognizance. In the

¹⁶

لَيْسَ الْعِلْمُ فِي السَّمَاءِ فَيَنْزِلُ إِلَيْكُمْ . وَ لَيْسَ الْعِلْمُ فِي الْأَرْضِ يَصْعَدُ إِلَيْكُمْ . وَ لَكِنَّ الْعِلْمَ مَجْبُولٌ فِي قُلُوبِكُمْ . تَخْلُقُوا بِأَخْلَاقِ الرُّوحَانِيِّينَ يَظْهَرُ لَكُمْ .

¹⁷Note that Shaykh 'Aḥmad uses 'ilm' in two different ways: when used alongside 'yaqīn' and 'maʿrifat', it has the particular definition we discussed in the previous section. In other places, his use of the term is more general, covering both this sense of 'ilm' as well

commentary [2, p. 7–8], the author gives examples of these three proofs, pointing out the differences between them. Examining this may help to clarify the nature of the proof of Wisdom.

The goal of Wisdom is the cognizance of God. If one tries to reach this by means of “the proof of good exhortation”, then one goes about it something like this [2, pgs. 7–8]:

If you believe that you have a creator, then you can be sure that you will remain free of His wrath. If, however, you choose not to believe in Him, then you have no way of being sure that, if you are wrong, you will be free of His wrath. Rather, He may very well punish you. The only way to be assured of salvation is to believe in God¹⁸.

Although one may obtain salvation by submitting to the proof of good exhortation, it will not give you cognizance of God.

An example of the use of “the proof of argumentation in the best way” is as follows [2, p. 8]:

If it is the case that among existents there is a preeternal creator that is uncreated, then that establishes the existence of the Necessary Existent (Exalted is He!). If not, then the existents [as a whole] must have a Fashioner because it is impossible:

as that of ‘*ma‘rifat*’.

¹⁸

إِنْ اِعْتَقَدْتَ أَنَّ لَكَ صَانِعًا، فَلَا شَكَّ فِي كَوْنِكَ نَاجِيًا مِنْ عُقُوبَتِهِ. وَإِنْ لَمْ تَعْتَقِدْ، لَمْ تَقْطَعْ بِنَجَاتِكَ مِنْ عُقُوبَتِهِ، بَلْ يَجُوزُ أَنْ يُعَذِّبَكَ. فَلَا يَحْصُلُ لَكَ الْقَطْعُ بِالنَّجَاتِ إِلَّا مَعَ اِعْتِقَادِ وُجُودِهِ تَعَالَى.

- that they bring themselves into existence;
- that they exist without something to bring them into existence.

Both alternatives are absurd¹⁹.

This is a very abbreviated version of a popular proof of the existence of God based on contingency and the impossibility of an infinite regress or circle of causes. According to our author, one does not obtain real cognizance from this kind of proof; it is designed only to silence an opponent. It does not create certainty, and an ingenious enough opponent can probably find a way to wiggle himself out of any rational proof of the existence of God. Rational proofs of God's existence have been offered by major philosophers from Plato to Gödel, yet the equally rationalist skeptics never seem to go away.

As an example of the proof of Wisdom, Shaykh 'Aḥmad offers the following. It is particularly useful for our purposes because it constitutes an application of the theory of subsistence to be discussed in the next chapter:

Every impression resembles the actional quality of its agent; it subsists through its agent, that is, through its acting, by means of *processional subsistence* (قِيَامٌ صُدُورٍ *qiyāma ṣudūrīn*). This is like the case of speech: it subsists through the speaker by means of processional subsistence. Similar is the subsistence of rays

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إِنْ كَانَ فِي الْمَوْجُودَاتِ قَدِيمٌ خَالِقٌ، وَ لَيْسَ بِمَخْلُوقٍ، ثَبَتَ الْوَاجِبُ تَعَالَى. وَإِلَّا، فَلَا بُدَّ لَهَا مِنْ صَانِعٍ إِذْ يَسْتَحِيلُ أَنْ تُوجَدَ نَفْسُهَا أَوْ تُوجَدَ بِغَيْرِ مُوجِدٍ لَهَا. وَكَلَّا الْوَجْهَيْنِ مُحَالٌ.

through sources of light, and images in mirrors. Thus, things constitute a self-manifesting of the Necessary to them and through them. This is because He (Exalted is He!) does not self-manifest through His essence. Otherwise, He would differ from state to state.

Now nothing is more intense in self-manifesting, presence, or evidentness than that which self-manifests with respect to the act of its self-manifesting. This is because *that which self-manifests* is more manifest than its *act of self-manifesting*, even though it is not possible to reach cognizance of it except through its act of self-manifesting. Consider the acts of standing and sitting. The stander is more manifest, in the very act of standing, than the act of standing itself, although it is not possible to reach [cognizance of] him except through the act of standing. So you may say: “O stander!”, or “O sitter!”. You are only referring to the stander, not the act of standing. This is because, through his act of self-manifesting to you through the act of standing, he [in effect] prevents you, initially, from witnessing the act of standing [itself]. [This is the case] unless you focus on the act of standing itself, in which case the stander through the act of standing becomes hidden from you.

So by means of this inference, which is from the proof of Wisdom, He (Glorified is He!) is, for the one who has cognizance, more manifest than anything. This is like what the Chief of the Martyrs [Imam Husayn] (upon whom be peace) has said [in the course of a

supplication]: *Can something other than You have an act of self-manifesting which You do not have, so that it comes to be that which manifests You?* So through it [i.e., this type of inference], cognizance [of Allah] occurs, and it cannot occur through [a proof] other than this at all²⁰.

The crux of all this is that, through the proof of Wisdom, the existence of God is no less obvious to the heart-flux than the existence of someone standing is to the eye. In fact it is more obvious, for the heart-flux is “the highest of all loci of cognition”. One has cognizance of a standing person not through his quintessence, but through the field of activity that constitutes his act of standing by which the stander manifests himself to one. Similarly, the heartflux has cognizance of God, not through His Quintessence, but through

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إِنَّ كُلَّ أَثَرٍ يُشَابِهُ صِفَةَ مُؤَثِّرِهِ. وَإِنَّهُ قَائِمٌ بِهِ، أَيْ، بِفِعْلِهِ، قِيَامَ صُدُورِ - كَالْكَلَامِ: فَإِنَّهُ قَائِمٌ بِالْمُسْتَكَلِّمِ قِيَامَ صُدُورٍ؛ وَكَالْأَشْعَةِ بِالنَّيِّرَاتِ، وَالصُّورِ فِي الْمَرَايَا. فَلَأَشْيَاءُ هِيَ ظُهُورُ الْوَاجِبِ بِهَا لَهَا لِأَنَّهُ تَعَالَى لَا يَظْهَرُ بِذَاتِهِ؛ وَإِلَّا، لَأَخْتَلَفَتْ حَالَتَاهُ.

وَلَا يَكُونُ شَيْءٌ أَشَدَّ ظُهُورًا وَحُضُورًا وَبَيَانًا مِنَ الظَّاهِرِ فِي ظُهُورِهِ لِأَنَّ الظَّاهِرَ أَظْهَرَ مِنْ ظُهُورِهِ، وَإِنْ كَانَ لَا يُمَكِّنُ التَّوَصُّلَ إِلَى مَعْرِفَتِهِ إِلَّا بِظُهُورِهِ، مِثْلَ الْقِيَامِ وَالْقُعُودِ. فَإِنَّ الْقَائِمَ أَظْهَرَ فِي الْقِيَامِ مِنَ الْقِيَامِ، وَإِنْ كَانَ لَا يُمَكِّنُ التَّوَصُّلَ إِلَيْهِ إِلَّا بِالْقِيَامِ. فَتَقُولُ: «يَا قَائِمُ!»، وَ «يَا قَاعِدُ!». فَأَنْتَ إِتِمْنَا تَعْنِي الْقَائِمَ، لَا الْقِيَامَ، لِأَنَّهُ يَظْهَرُ لَكَ بِالْقِيَامِ، غَيَّبَ عَنْكَ مُشَاهَدَةَ الْقِيَامِ أَصْلًا؛ إِلَّا أَنْ تَلْتَفِتَ إِلَى نَفْسِ الْقِيَامِ، فَيَحْتَاجِبُ عَنْكَ الْقَائِمُ بِالْقِيَامِ.

فَبِهَذَا الْإِسْتِدْلَالِ الَّذِي هُوَ مِنْ دَلِيلِ الْحِكْمَةِ، يَكُونُ سُبْحَانَهُ عِنْدَ الْعَارِفِ أَظْهَرَ مِنْ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ، كَمَا قَالَ سَيِّدُ الشُّهَدَاءِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ: «أَيُّ شَيْءٍ يَكُونُ لِيْغْيِرَكَ مِنَ الظُّهُورِ مَا لَيْسَ لَكَ حَتَّى يَكُونُ هُوَ الْمُنْظَرُ لَكَ؟» وَ تَحْصُلُ بِهِ الْمَعْرِفَةُ الْحَقَّةُ وَ لَا تَحْصُلُ بغيرِهِ أَصْلًا.

a field of activity or act of self-manifesting which reveals His presence. The object of the proof of Wisdom is not to silence the opponent but to see the realities of things with the heartflux just as one sees the appearances of things through the five senses as well as psychic and intelligible grasping. If someone argues with one who has achieved cognizance of God or something else through this proof, then he or she is no different from any of the blind men arguing about the elephant, or whether there is such a thing as sight.

The mystical experience which constitutes one of the grounds of the proof of Wisdom is, of course, not unique to Shaykh 'Aḥmad or to Muslim mystics for that matter. For Shaykh 'Aḥmad, however, this experience must be grounded in the fountain of revelation and in purity of intention, otherwise one may “follow that of which one has no knowledge”, in contravention to the Qur'anic verse which commands the opposite and which threatens to hold even one's vision through the heartflux to account. Without proper grounding, someone may come up with the notion that all is God, that he or she is God, or other pantheist notions. Because revelation is God's Word, grounding the experience of cognizance in His Word will help shield the mystic from antinomian behavior and from describing God and His relationship to the world in ways which contradict how He Himself has described Himself.

The question of metamystical expression and interpretation is important here. The example Shaykh 'Aḥmad gives above as a proof of Wisdom is, in fact, a metamystical interpretation of the vision of the heart-flux. So we must be careful to distinguish the proof of Wisdom proper from its propositional expression.

Of course, this is also true of a logical proof: its expression must be

distinguished from the epistemic act involved in a proof. A logical proof is communicable only to those capable of the epistemic act of reasoning. Although probably few of us could have come up with Gödel's incompleteness theorem on our own, given the proper tools many of us could follow his proof to the end and rationally concur with its cogency. Similarly, not just any mystical philosopher could come up with Shaykh 'Aḥmad's metamystical interpretation of cognizance through the heart-flux, but other mystics could learn from it and would-be mystics could be given some idea of what to look for as they pursue the goal of Wisdom.

Shaykh 'Aḥmad's metamystical interpretation of the proof of Wisdom is propositional. In the example given above one sees both the statement and application of first principles. One principle he states is that every impression resembles the actional quality of its agent. A principle that he applies but does not state is what I call the *cosmological correspondence principle*: the cognizance of a higher level of existence can only be accomplished through the cognizance of a lower level. He applies this in his correspondence of, on the one hand, the act of witnessing God through the field of activity that constitutes His act of self-manifesting, with the act of witnessing a standing person through the field of activity that constitutes his act of standing. One notices upon reading the *Fawā'id* a plethora of *paradigms* (أَمْثَلَةٌ *amtilat*, s. مِثَالٌ *mitāl*) proffered to serve the purpose of metamystical modeling.

In view of the above, one may interpret the proof of Wisdom as a tool for the discovery of metaphysical and cosmological first principles. Given these general principles, one may rationally deduce other propositions. But, one may ask, doesn't that turn the proof of Wisdom into a propaedeutic to ra-

tional analysis, analogous to Suhrawardī's program of grounding rationalism in mystical experience?

Indeed, one definition the author gives of the proof of Wisdom is that it is an “experiential (ذوقِي *dawqī*), visionary (عَيَانِي *‘ayānī*) proof which entails necessary and immediate knowledge of that which is inferred [2, p. 7]”. In traditional philosophy, propositions of which one has “necessary” (ضُرُورِي *ḍurūriyy*) or “immediate” (بَدِیْی *badīhiyy*) knowledge constitute first principles, which may be used to deduce other propositions. Yet Shaykh ‘Aḥmad appears to go further than al-Suhrawardī in his deemphasis of the role of Peripatetic rational demonstration. This issue must be studied further, however. For example, in the *Sharḥ al-Mashā‘ir* [5, p. 129–31], he tries to show the inadequacies of the logical theory of predication when applied to the interpretations of the paradigms of the proof of Wisdom. Our author does, on occasion, apply some degree of rational analysis to the application of his metaphysical and cosmological principles to the solution of problems in *falsafah*. He also applies rational analysis to the answering of objections to some of his positions. On some occasions, he says that an objection has two answers, one “outward” (ظَاهِر *ẓāhir*) and one “inward” (بَاطِن *bāṭin*). By an “outward” answer, the author means a response based on rational demonstration from propositional principles derived from or consistent with the proof of Wisdom. By an “inward” answer, the author appears to mean a deeper application of the proof of Wisdom. Here, the proof of Wisdom is still modeled in a rational manner, but the principles applied require greater philosophical and experiential depth on the part of reader to be understood. For an example of an “outward” and an “inward” answer to a question, see the Sixteenth

Observation. These degrees of outwardness and inwardness give the proof of Wisdom a certain openness and flexibility, an ability to accommodate various levels of phenomenological and philosophical preparedness. One is not trapped within the confines of any one particular axiomatic system. Rather, repeated application of the proof of Wisdom opens new vistas and horizons to those who continually persist in its application. As Inada would put it, it points towards a *dynamic, open ontology*.

Another possible way of characterizing the difference between Peripatetic metaphysical principles and those of propositional models of the proof of Wisdom is to say that the former constitute synthetic a priori principles and that the latter constitute synthetic a posteriori principles. Now a synthetic a priori principle is a proposition whose truth value

1. does not depend on the respective meanings of the terms of the proposition;
2. is known independently of experience.

A synthetic a posteriori first principle is a proposition whose truth value

1. does not depend on the respective meanings of the terms of the proposition;
2. is not known independently of experience.

Consider the proposition, “God exists”. The truth value of this proposition depends neither on the meaning of ‘God’ nor on the meaning of ‘exists’. So it is synthetic. In an example like the rational proof of God’s existence given above by Shaykh ’Aḥmad, the proposition is also a priori, for one seeks

to discover its truth value through rational deduction, not experience. In the metamystical propositional model of the proof of Wisdom, the knowledge of the truth value of the proposition that God exists is just as dependent on experience as the knowledge of the truth value of, say, “John is standing”. For Shaykh ‘Aḥmad then, the proposition is synthetic a posteriori. The only difference is the organ of experience involved.

Gracia points out that most philosophers today, presumably inclusive of rational metaphysicians, reject the notion of a synthetic a priori proposition. Shaykh ‘Aḥmad would probably reject it also, for at least two reasons:

1. The whole thrust of Shaykh ‘Aḥmad’s program is to discover the truth values of certain metaphysical principles through ousiological intuition grounded in revelation; To acknowledge the existence of synthetic a priori propositions would probably defeat, or at least undermine, his purpose;
2. In Shaykh ‘Aḥmad’s psychology, knowledge (*‘ilm*), certainty (*yaqīn*), and cognizance (*ma‘rifat*) are all rooted in experience. The notion of an a priori proposition is thus difficult to hold, and the definition of an a posteriori proposition is vague because it does not distinguish between knowledge, certainty, and cognizance;

Our author would probably define a synthetic a priori proposition as something like “a synthetic proposition whose truth value is both only *thought* to be known in general, as well as *thought* to be known independently of experience”. For a precondition of the knowledge and cognizance obtained through the proof of Wisdom is the emptying of one’s self of all preconcep-

tions and preconceived notions. Until one sees through the proof of Wisdom, one's metaphysical principles remain purely suppositional.

1.7 The Principles of Wisdom

Based on my perusal of the *Fawā'id*, its commentary, and other writings of Shaykh 'Aḥmad, I have come across a set of nine general principles that appear to include the most fundamental philosophical commitments of the author. We will not give a detailed analysis of those commitments here. We will restrict ourselves to mentioning some of the most immediate consequences of these propositions. The author summarizes these principles in the form of formulae. These formulae are repeated over and over again, especially throughout the author's later works (See, e.g., the end of the Thirteenth Observation). Most of them are in the form of verses of the Qur'an or traditions; As is his wont, he prefers to speak his mind through the Islamic sources of revelation and the traditions of the Shi'ī Imams whenever he can. Also, some of the following formulae are very closely related and may be applied to more than one of the following principles:

1. The principle of ousiological reduction and ousiological intuition. According to this principle, the cognizance of God depends on the cognizance of the realities of things, and the cognizance of the realities of things depends on the cognizance of God. This is illustrated by the following verse of the Qur'an [41:53]:

***We will show them Our signs in the horizons and in
their selves until it becomes clear to them that He***

***is the Real*²¹.**

For Shaykh 'Aḥmad, this meditation upon the signs of God includes meditation upon the objects of the macrocosm (العَالَمُ الْكَبِيرُ *al-ʿālam al-kabīr*) and the astronomical sciences, as well as those of the microcosm (العَالَمُ الصَّغِيرُ *al-ʿālam aṣ-ṣaḡīr*) and the natural sciences;

2. The topological principle. This is the ontological principle that functorial relationships obtain between realms in the ontological hierarchy. That is, each realm shares characteristics that belong to the realm beneath it, but in “a more sublime way” (عَلَى نَحْوِ أَشْرَفٍ *alā naḥwin ʿašraf*). For example, the dualism between intelligible and corporeal, between ideal and material, disappears. Whatever is corporeal has an intelligible aspect; whatever is intelligible has a corporeal aspect. As one climbs the ladder of existence *qua* conditioned-by-something, in ascent towards the Divine Will, the corporeal aspect becomes more and more subtle, while the intelligible aspect becomes more intense. Similarly, as one descends from the Nous, the intelligible aspect decreases in intensity while the corporeal aspect increases. Nothing is absolutely incorporeal except God, and since all propositions about Him are tautologous, no one can know what this incorporeality means. Shaykh 'Aḥmad uses the following statement of Imam Ṣādiq as a formula to illustrate this state of affairs:

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«سُرِّيهِمْ إِيَّاَنَا فِي الْأَفَاقِ وَ فِي أَنْفُسِهِمْ حَتَّى يَتَبَيَّنَ لَهُمْ أَنَّهُ الْحَقُّ»

Servitude is a jewel whose ultimate reality is lordship. So what is missing (*fuqida*) in servitude is found (*wuğida*) in lordship; what is hidden in lordship is attained in servitude²²;

3. The codependent origination principle. This is an ontological principle that states that whatever is higher in the hierarchy of conditioned existence depends on that which is lower for *manifestation* (ظُهور *zuhūr*); that which is lower depends on that which is higher for *realization* (تَحَقُّق *ttahāquq*); and finally, that neither can exist without the other. This is illustrated by the same saying of Imam Ṣādiq as the previous principle;
4. The cosmological correspondence principle. This is an epistemic principle, according to which the inference of truths about realms higher in the vertical hierarchy of conditioned existence can not be attained without a knowledge of the state of affairs of the sensible realm. This may at first glance appear to contradict what was said above to the effect that the proof of Wisdom requires an emptying of the self of all preconceptions and preconceived notions. This is not the case. If I am understanding Shaykh 'Aḥmad correctly, the cosmological principle is applicable primarily to the metamystical, quasi-rational modeling of the experience of cognizance. Presumably, the one exercising this principle should already be able to “see” with the heart-flux. So as one

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الْعُبُودِيَّةُ جَوْهَرَةٌ، كُنْهَهَا الرُّبُوبِيَّةُ. فَمَا فُقِدَ فِي الْعُبُودِيَّةِ، وَجَدَ فِي الرُّبُوبِيَّةِ. وَ مَا خَفِيَ فِي الرُّبُوبِيَّةِ، أَصِيبَ فِي الْعُبُودِيَّةِ.

applies this principle he should be under the guidance of the light of the heart-flux. This principle is represented by the saying of Imam Riḍā:

*Surely, those who possess the kernels of consciousness-awareness know that the way of guidance to what is there cannot be known except by what is here!*²³. ;

The cosmological principle has far-reaching consequences for Neoplatonic-type philosophy. Neoplatonists, and Platonists in general, saw in the science of mathematics the ideal paradigm upon which an understanding of reality must be based. Based upon the supposedly a priori and ideal objects of arithmetic and geometry, Neoplatonists like Proclus tried to construct deductive metaphysical systems. Sensible reality, containing only imperfect representations of these mathematical and other ideal objects, was thus considered to be somehow unreal, and the locus of reality was determined to be in the immaterial, atemporal, and intelligible realm.

This is reversed in Shaykh 'Aḥmad. For our author, there are two sciences most important to the development of metaphysical and cosmological models based on the proof of Wisdom. These are chemistry and astronomy. In the traditional civilization to which Shaykh 'Aḥmad belonged, astronomy was considered as one of the mathemat-

ical sciences. But our author shows little interest in the structures of astronomical models *qua* ideal structures. Rather, he tries to apply the principles of post-Ptolemaic celestial physics to the processes of becoming he calls essences²⁴. And the interplay of essence and existence at every rank of both conditioned existence and Absolute Existence is modeled on principles of physical science, including alchemy. For Shaykh 'Aḥmad, astronomy is the science of the macrocosm (*al-ālam al-kabīr*) and alchemy is the science of the microcosm (*al-ālam aṣ-ṣaḡīr*).

The use of physical science in metaphysics is not altogether new. And Shaykh 'Aḥmad would find partial justification for such a use of physical science in the legendary words of Imam 'Alī to the effect that “Alchemy (الكيمياء *al-kīmyā*) is the sister of prophecy” [4, p. 168]. This emphasis by our author on physical science in the *Fawā'id* and in other works of his points to a very *naturalistic* approach to metaphysics²⁵. His proof of the dual principality of essence and existence rests on what are fundamentally naturalistic principles. In addition, Shaykh 'Aḥmad makes the fateful move of reversing the order of traditional hylomorphism, through his theory of the active, dynamic nature of matter, and

²⁴According to *Swerdlow & Neugebauer 1984*, p. 43, one of the distinguishing features of the Marāgha school of astronomy, initiated by al-Ṭūsī and studied by Shaykh 'Aḥmad, is an emphasis on the *physical* problems of Ptolemy's models. Al-Ṭūsī, following Aristotle, says that the principles of astronomy are derived from metaphysics, geometry, and physical science. See *Ragep 1993*, pgs. 38 & 90.

²⁵According to *Schmitt 1995*, naturalism “holds that the best methods of inquiry in the social sciences or philosophy are, or are to be modeled on, those of the natural sciences”.

the receptive, becoming nature of form.

As a consequence of this principle, we find a certain fondness on the part of Shaykh 'Aḥmad for a kind of demonstration called *الْبُرْهَانُ الْإِنِّيّ* *al-burhān al-innī* or “demonstration derived from the that”. It is opposed to another kind of demonstration called “the demonstration derived from the why (*al-burhān al-limmiyy*)”. According to al-Jurjānī [13, p. 37–38], in a demonstration (*burhān*), the middle term of the syllogism or deduction must be the cause (*al-illat*) of the relation between the major term and the minor term. If the causal relation also obtains in external existence, then the demonstration is a “demonstration derived from the why”. For example, consider the following deduction:

Premise 1. This thing is decomposing.

Premise 2. Everything that decomposes gives off heat.

Conclusion. Therefore this thing gives off heat.

Here, according to al-Jurjānī, it is the case that the mind makes a logical connection between decomposition and the giving off of heat, and it is also the case that, in external existence, decomposition is an actual *cause* of the giving off of heat. So this example constitutes a “demonstration derived from the why (*al-burhān al-limmiyy*)”. If, on the other hand, the middle term only gives a logical connection in the mind between the major and minor terms, without a corresponding causal connection in external existence, then the demonstration constitutes a “proof of the that”. For example

Premise 1. This thing is giving off heat.

Premise 2. Everything that gives off heat is decomposing.

Conclusion. Therefore this thing is decomposing.

In this case, the giving off of heat is not the cause of decomposition. This proof only gives information *that* “this thing” is decomposing, not why.

Al-Jurjānī gives another definition of ‘*al-burhān al-limmiyy*’ and of ‘*al-burhān al-inniyy*’. He says that an inference (*al-istidlāl*) from the cause to the effect is called *al-burhān al-limmiyy*, while an inference from the effect to the cause is called *al-burhān al-inniyy*. The origins of this discussion lie in Aristotle’s distinction, mentioned in Bk. I, Ch. 13 of his *Posterior Analytics*, of the distinction between the proof of the fact and the proof of the reasoned fact. In Latin scholasticism, it was referred to as the *quia/propter quid* distinction²⁶. ’Aḥmad-Nagārī explains (*JA*, under بُرْهَان) that there is controversy among his fellow scholastics as to whether Ibn Sina held that *al-burhān al-inniyy* really constitutes a demonstration at all. This controversy is rooted in Ibn Sīnā’s statement in the *Shifā’* that “certain knowledge of whatever has a reason (سَبَب *sabab*) can only come to be with respect to knowledge of its reason”.

For Shaykh ’Aḥmad, the matter is reversed. In the Sixth Observation, where he describes the generation of delimited existence, or existence *qua* negatively conditioned, he makes an interesting statement in the

²⁶ *Ragep 1993*, Vol. 2, p. 386, also has a good discussion of this issue in the context of the application of *al-burhān al-inniyy* in al-Ṭūsī’s astronomy.

commentary to the effect that his discussion constitutes a دَلِيلٌ إِنِّي *dalīl ḥinnīyy*, or “proof of the that²⁷”. In this observation, he describes the process of God’s generation of delimited existence in terms taken directly out of physical science. In this matter he claims to be guided by the three afore-mentioned formulae [2, p. 126]:

This [observation] is an allusion to the manner of the genesis and generation of delimited existence. It is a *dalīl ḥinnīyy* of which Allah has apprised some of His servants in His Book. He has said:

***We will show them Our signs in the horizons
and in their selves until it becomes clear to
them that He is the Real.***

And al-Ṣādiq (upon whom be peace) has made this clear in his saying:

Servitude is a jewel whose ultimate reality is lordship. So what is missing (fuqida) in servitude is found (wuğida) in lordship; what is hidden in lordship is attained in servitude;

And there can be no doubt that this is an inference from “servitude” (*al-ḥubūdiyyat*), which constitutes the effect, to “lordship” (*ar-rubūbiyyat*), which constitutes the cause. And Imam Riḍā (upon whom be peace) has also made this clear

²⁷Muslim scholastics made a subtle distinction between *ad-dalīl al-ḥinnīyy* and the class of *al-burhān al-ḥinnīyy* to which the former belongs. But that need not concern us here.

in his saying:

Surely, those who possess the kernels of consciousness-awareness know that the way of guidance to what is there cannot be known except by what is here!;

So we have obtained access, through the manner of what is *here*, to the manner of what is *there*²⁸. .

The author then goes into a detailed discussion of the physical principles upon which his theory of the generation of delimited existence depends. The basic idea is that, when one seeks to generate something, one starts with some matter and then generates the thing. The “matter”, in this case, is the God’s Active Commanding or Absolute Existence.

The role of *ad-dalil al-inniyy* in Shaykh ‘Aḥmad’s thought needs much more research. I am convinced that it holds an important key to understanding the proof of Wisdom. If one wants to construct a “logic”

هَذَا إِشَارَةٌ إِلَى كَيْفِيَّةِ تَكْوِينِهِ فِي بَدْئِهِ. وَهُوَ دَلِيلٌ إِنِّي، نَبَّهَ اللَّهُ سُبْحَانَهُ بَعْضَ عِبَادِهِ إِلَيْهِ فِي كِتَابِهِ. فَقَالَ: «سُرِّيهِمْ آيَاتِنَا فِي الْأَفَاقِ وَفِي أَنْفُسِهِمْ حَتَّى يَتَيَّنَ لَهُمْ أَنَّهُ الْحَقُّ». وَبَيَّنَ هَذَا الصَّادِقُ (عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ) بِقَوْلِهِ: «الْعُبُودِيَّةُ جَوْهَرَةٌ، كُنْهَهَا الرُّبُوبِيَّةُ. فَمَا فَقَدَ فِي الْعُبُودِيَّةِ، وَجَدَ فِي الرُّبُوبِيَّةِ. وَ مَا خَفِيَ فِي الرُّبُوبِيَّةِ، أُصِيبَ فِي الْعُبُودِيَّةِ» الْحَدِيثِ. وَ لَا رَيْبَ أَنَّ هَذَا إِسْتِدْلَالٌ بِالْعُبُودِيَّةِ الْمَعْلُولَةِ عَلَى الرُّبُوبِيَّةِ الْعِلَّةِ. وَ بَيَّنَّهُ أَيْضًا الرَّضَا (عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ) بِقَوْلِهِ: «قَدْ عَلِمَ أُولُوا الْأَلْبَابِ أَنَّ [الْإِسْتِدْلَالَ عَلَى] مَا هُنَاكَ لَا يُعْلَمُ إِلَّا بِمَا هُنَا!». فَتَوَصَّلْنَا بِكَيْفِيَّةِ مَا هُنَا عَلَى كَيْفِيَّةِ مَا هُنَاكَ.

underlying the proof of Wisdom, this is probably an important place to start. Shaykh 'Aḥmad's emphasis upon it also opens the possibility that this or a similar "logic" is appealed to at places in the Qur'an and its interpretation by the Prophet and Imams. Our author appears to be headed in that direction in the course of the epilogue of the *Sharḥ al-Mashā'ir*.

The naturalistic inclinations of Shaykh 'Aḥmad also link him to Chinese thought. Consider the case of the Chinese philosopher Huai-Nan Tzū. According to him: [24, p. 308]

Heaven, earth, infinite space, and infinite time are the body of one person, and the space within the six cardinal points is the form of one man. Therefore he who understands his nature will not be threatened by Heaven and Earth, and he who comprehends evidences will not be fooled by strange phenomena. Therefore the sage knows the far from what is near, and to him all multiplicity is one.

In the first sentence, Huai-Nan Tzū is clearly stating the cosmological principle that man and universe are mirrors of one another. That which appears external to an individual also has a corresponding aspect immanent in that individual. Now Shaykh 'Aḥmad sometimes (e.g. [4, p. 139]) refers to the Great Realm *al-ʿālam al-kabīr* (macrocosm) and the Small Realm *al-ʿālam aṣ-ṣaḡīr* (microcosm). At other times (e.g. [3, Vol. 1, pt. 1, p. 9]) he refers to the Great Man *الإنسان الكبير* *al-insān al-kabīr* and the Small Man *الإنسان الصغير* *al-insān aṣ-ṣaḡīr*.

Following is a “metahistorical” commentary of Shaykh ‘Aḥmad on the words of Huai-Nan Tzū. We quote from his *Sharḥ al-‘Arshiyyah*: [4, p. 139]

[According to the Eighth Imam] ‘Ali Riḍā (Peace be upon him!): *Surely, those who possess the kernels of consciousness-awareness know that the way of guidance to what is there cannot be known except by what is here.* [Compare with Huai-Nan Tzū: “The sage knows the far from what is near”.] Now the scholars and sages are agreed that Man is the Small Realm, and that within it is everything that is in the Great Realm. So Man is a model-form of it. A sign for it and a witness to them is His saying (Exalted is He!)

We shall show them our Signs in the Horizons and in their own Souls, until it becomes clear to them that it is the Truth. [Qur’an 41:53];

and in His saying (Exalted is He!)

And in your Souls. Do you not see? [51:21];

and in what has been attributed to [the First Sage] ‘Ali (Peace be upon him!), in his saying:

*And you are the Clear Book which
By its letters the hidden is manifest.*

*Are you really sure that you are just a small body?
While within you the Greatest Universe is enfolded!*

When it is affirmed that you are a transcript of the Great Realm, then it is also affirmed that within you are the seven spheres:

- the sphere of your life-process is like the sphere of the moon;
- the sphere of your thought-process is like the sphere of Mercury;
- :²⁹

5. The causal principle. This principle states that “every impression (أثر *atar*) resembles the actional quality (صفة *sifat*) of its proximate agent (مؤثر *mu'attir*)”³⁰. The words ‘*atar*’ and ‘*mu'attir*’ are basically co-

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... قَوْلِ الرِّضَا (عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ): «قَدْ عَلِمَ أُولُوا الْأَبَابِ أَنَّ الْإِسْتِدْلَالَ عَلَى مَا هُنَاكَ لَا يُعْلَمُ إِلَّا بِمَا هُنَا!». هُوَ أَنَّ الْعُلَمَاءَ وَالْحُكَمَاءَ اتَّفَقُوا عَلَى أَنَّ الْإِنْسَانَ هُوَ الْعَالَمُ الصَّغِيرُ، وَأَنَّ فِيهِ مَا كُلُّ مَا فِي الْعَالَمِ الْكَبِيرِ؛ فَهُوَ أَمْثُودَجٌ مِنْهُ. وَ آيَةٌ عَلَيْهِ وَ شَاهِدُهُمْ قَوْلُهُ تَعَالَى: «سَنُرِيهِمْ آيَاتِنَا فِي الْأَفَاقِ وَ فِي أَنْفُسِهِمْ حَتَّى يَتَبَيَّنَ لَهُمْ أَنَّهُ الْحَقُّ»، وَ قَوْلُهُ تَعَالَى: «وَ فِي أَنْفُسِكُمْ أَ فَلَا تُبْصِرُونَ؟»، وَ مَا نُسَبِّ إِلَيْهِ (عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ) مِنْ قَوْلِهِ:

وَ أَنْتَ الْكِتَابُ الْمُبِينُ الَّذِي بِأَحْرِفِهِ يَظْهَرُ الْمَضْمَرُ.
أَ تَحْسَبُ أَنَّكَ جِرْمٌ صَغِيرٌ وَ فِيكَ انْطَوَى الْعَالَمُ الْأَكْبَرُ!
فَإِذَا ثَبَّتَ أَنَّكَ نُسخَةُ الْعَالَمِ الْأَكْبَرِ، ثَبَّتَ أَنَّ فِيكَ عَالَمٌ أَفْلَاكٌ سَبْعَةٌ: فَلَكَ حَيَاتِكَ كَفَلَكَ الْقَمَرُ؛ فَلَكَ فِكْرَكَ كَفَلَكَ عَطَارِدُ؛ [إِلخ].

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كُلُّ أَثَرٍ يُشَابِهُ صِفَةً مُؤَثِّرِهِ الْقَرِيبِ.

extensive with ‘effect’ (*ma‘lūl*) and ‘cause’ (*‘illat*) respectively. The Latins translated *‘aṭar* with ‘impressio’, and *mu‘attir* with ‘agens’ and ‘imprimens’ (see *LAL*, under *أ ث ر*). The word *mu‘attir* literally means “that which occasions an impression. The corresponding gerund is *تأثير* *taṭīr*”, meaning, “the occasioning of an impression”. Muslim scholastics frequently defined the concepts of “action” (*al-fi‘l*) and “passion” (*al-‘infi‘āl*) in terms of *taṭīr*³¹. This principle expresses at least two ideas:

- (a) That actions are real. On this point, Shaykh ‘Aḥmad is in sharp disagreement with Ibn Sina, al-Ṭūsī, al-Suhrawardī, and Mīr Dāmād, all of whom denied the external reality of *taṭīr qua taṭīr*, and hence, of both action and passion. They claimed that admitting the ontic status of *taṭīr* would result in circularity or infinite regress. This is because a given *taṭīr* would need its own *taṭīr* to come into being. But then that other *taṭīr* would need its own, and so forth. With respect to God, this meant denying that there was such a thing as a distinct Willing (*مَشِيَّة* *mašīyyat*) or Acting (*fi‘l*) distinct from God Himself and the outcomes of His action. Mulla Ṣadra, while more lenient on the issue of the reality of action and passion, sides with his predecessors on the issue of a separate Willing of God. We will give Shaykh ‘Aḥmad’s response to this in the next chapter. We should add that there are few issues over which he takes such strong issue with his fellow philoso-

³¹Shaykh ‘Aḥmad, on the other hand, prefers to define these in terms of *motion* (*أَلْحَرَكَةُ* *al-ḥarakat*).

phers and theologians as this one. He vents particular anger at Mīr Dāmād (as in, e.g., his *Treatise on Knowledge*) and Mulla Ṣadra (as in, e.g., his *On Matters of Subjective Signification*), because, as Shī'ī theologians, they were definitely aware that their Imams were unequivocal about the separate and distinct reality of actions in general and God's Action in particular. Instead, as Shaykh 'Aḥmad sees it, they twist the intentions of the Imams to fit the requisites of Peripatetic method (as in Mīr Dāmād's case) and of both Peripatetic method and Sufism (as in Mulla Ṣadra's case);

- (b) that whatever characteristics which are manifest in a given outcome of acting (مَفْعُول *maf'ūl*) are latent in the acting (*fi'l*) from which the outcome of acting originated. For example, the configuration of a sample of writing may be either smooth or crooked. For Shaykh 'Aḥmad, this smoothness or crookedness of the writing sample is a manifestation of something latent within the field of activity from which the sample of writing originated. In the Third Observation, the author uses this principle in an attempt to resolve the dichotomy between unity and multiplicity. While I have not come across a particular reference in this vein, it appears that this principle is a manifestation of the formula

Servitude is a jewel whose ultimate reality is lordship. So what is missing (fuqida) in servitude is found (wuğida) in lordship; what is hidden in lordship is attained in servitude;

So this principle appears to be very closely related to the topological principle;

6. The realist principle. This is basically equivalent to Meinong's thesis to the effect that to every thought there corresponds a real object. Shaykh 'Aḥmad uses the following tradition of Imam Ṣādiq as his formula of epistemological realism:

*Anything that you discriminate through your minds, in its deepest meanings, is created like you are, and is reverted to you*³².

This formula contains information beyond that which is indicative of Meinongian realism. For it also ties in to Shaykh 'Aḥmad's strict negative theology. Any concept, notion, or term that the human mind can imagine or devise denotes a created thing and only a created thing. In reality, none of these things denote God *qua* God, and no propositional combination of them will give any information whatsoever about His Quintessence.

We cannot go into the details of Shaykh 'Aḥmad's theory of objects here. Relevant portions of the *Fawā'id* include the first, tenth, and fifteenth observations, especially the tenth (which we have not translated). Putting all the pieces of this theory together is a problem for further research;

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كُلُّ مَا مَيَّرْتُمُوهُ بِأَوْهَامِكُمْ، فِي أَذَقِّ مَعَانِيهِ، فَهُوَ مَخْلُوقٌ مِثْلَكُمْ، مَرْدُودٌ إِلَيْكُمْ.

7. The ontological polarity principle. This principle states that every created, contingent thing is a complex of acting (*fi'l*) and becoming-in-yielding-to-acting (*ʿinfi'āl*). That is, everything is composed of an act of existence and an act of becoming or essence. Assuming the ontological import of the essence-existence distinction, this principle takes both existence and essence as coprincipal, coterminous, and coincident, although existence is ontologically prior to essence. Both originate and subsist codependently. A polar dialectic obtains between them so that there can be no question of a separate entity called “existence” and a separate entity called “essence”. Existence is the all-pervasive and unitary active matter and *ousia* which constitutes the necessary and sufficient condition for the *generation* or *becoming-generated* (تَكْوُن *takawwun*) and the *realization* or *becoming-realized* (taḥaqquq) of essences, while essences are the individuated acts of becoming which constitute the necessary and sufficient condition for the manifestation of existence. Another implication of this principle is the denial of certain presuppositions underlying Peripatetic and scholastic conceptions of substance. We will discuss this in further detail in Chapter Three. Shaykh Aḥmad’s views in this regard are in profound agreement with those of Whitehead. The author’s formula corresponding to the polarity principle is the following saying of Imam Riḍā;

Allah definitely did not create any single thing subsisting through itself and without something else. [This is a point] for whoever desires an indication of Him and the affirmation

of His existence.³³.

8. The principle of the relation between quality and qualified. This principle has two parts, an ontic and an epistemic part. The ontic part Shaykh Aḥmad states as follows: the existence of a given qualified subject is a condition of the existence of the quality. The epistemic part states this: the existence of any given quality, in the condition (*ḥāl*) of being a quality³⁴, prior to the existence of the qualified subject is neither intelligible nor conceptualizable (See the Seventeenth Observation). What I suspect is going on here is that Shaykh 'Aḥmad is taking Ibn Sina's principle of moderate realism and turning it to serve his own purposes. Usually the author appeals to this principle on occasions when he is using an "outward" proof or demonstration, such as in the Eleventh Observation, when he discusses the relation of existence to essence, and the Sixteenth Observation, in answer to a possible objection to his theory of preponderance (تَرْجِيح *tarjīḥ*). After using this principle to deduce what he wants to get at, he immediately follows with an assertion that the conclusion reached is only an outward, though somewhat legitimate, view of matters. For example, in the Eleventh Observation, he uses this principle to deduce that essence is a quality of existence, and acquires its existence from the

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إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَمْ يَخْلُقْ شَيْئًا فَرْدًا قَائِمًا بِذَاتِهِ دُونَ غَيْرِهِ لِلَّذِي أَرَادَ مِنَ الدَّلَالَةِ عَلَيْهِ وَاثْبَاتِ وُجُودِهِ.

³⁴Note that, as we will discuss in some detail in Ch. Three, that a given actional quality from a certain perspective constitutes a qualified subject. This is probably why he adds the phrase "in the condition (*ḥāl*) of being a quality".

latter. This is very close to Mulla Ṣadra's doctrine. Then he says that in reality, essence and existence are both "made", and that existence may equally be seen as a quality of essence. That is, just as essence is a condition for the completion of the receptivity on the part of existence to the Divine Will, it is equally the case that existence is a completion of the receptivity on the part of essence to the divine act. Existence and essence, in this view, constitute a pair of correlational accidents. And Shaykh 'Aḥmad says this explicitly in various places, (e.g., the *Sharḥ al-'Arshiyyah*, p. 67). The substance-accident distinction is thus undermined.

9. The creation principle. According to this principle, God created everything in the best possible way, and in accordance with the exigencies of His own Wisdom, a Wisdom that is latent within the realm of His Acting-Possibility. The formula the author uses to express this is the following verse of the Qur'an [23:71]:

And if the Real chose to follow their passions, the Heavens, the Earth, and whoever is in them would have been corrupted. Rather, we have presented them with their presence; and from their presence do they turn away³⁵.

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وَلَوْ اتَّبَعَ الْحَقُّ أَهْوَاءَهُمْ، لَفَسَدَتِ السَّمَوَاتُ وَالْأَرْضُ وَمَنْ فِيهِنَّ، بَلْ أَتَيْنَهُمْ بِذِكْرِهِمْ فَهُمْ عَنْ
ذِكْرِهِمْ مُعْرِضُونَ.

The implications the author draws out of this principle and the accompanying formula are among the most profound and also most difficult to follow. He tries to explain that God is present³⁶ to His creatures through the very bounds of their acts of becoming, and yet that past, present and future are all identical for Him. He is also at pains to show that God's Wisdom in the ordering of the world does not entail determinism. Rather, the Acting of God and the set of acts of becoming that constitute His creatures are engaged in a continuous dynamic interplay wherein each one operates only through the other. Unfortunately, the author left no commentary on the Eighteenth Observation, where these themes are laid out in most detail. Written later than the twelve observations that constitute the original *Fawā'id*, the Eighteenth Observation, proceeding from this principle, contains some of the highest philosophical speculations of the author.

It appears to be the case that some of these principles are reducible to others. It is a task for further research to determine the smallest, irreducible set of principles upon which Shaykh 'Aḥmad's system is based. The above list should not be considered at all exhaustive, and I am sure that I have left

³⁶Some Arabic scholars may question my translation of 'ذِكْر' *ḍikr* with 'presence'. The word '*ḍikr*' commonly means "reminder" or "mentioning". Its literal meaning, however, is "presence in the mind" (See *AEL*, under ذِكْر). Based on Shaykh 'Aḥmad's use of the term, it is clear to me that he is interpreting '*ḍikr*', as used in the Qur'an and some of the traditions of the Imams (as in the beginning of the Fourth Observation) to signify "that through which a given thing is present to something else". Both the remembering and mentioning of a given thing presume some kind of presence of that thing to the one mentioning or remembering.

a few things out, especially in the area of epistemology (such as his theory, apparently not explicitly articulated until late in his career, of the identity of knowledge with the subject of knowledge).

1.8 Towards a Definition of Wisdom

Let us return to Shaykh 'Aḥmad's division of cognition and organs of cognition. Knowledge proper (*ʿilm*) has its locus in the soul and the imaginal faculty; true certainty (*yaqīn*) has its locus in the nous, and cognizance (*ma-ʿrifat*) has its locus in the heart-flux. To each of these types of cognition there corresponds a method of proof (*dalīl*) appropriate to it. To knowledge there corresponds the proof of "argumentation in the best way" (*al-muḡādalatu bi-ʾllatī hiya ʾaḥsan*), or logical analysis; to certainty there corresponds the proof of "good exhortation" (*al-mawʿizat al-ḥasanat*); to cognizance there corresponds the proof of Wisdom (*al-ḥikmat*). These three types of proof are referred to in the Qur'an [16:125]:

Call to the path of your Lord with Wisdom and good exhortation. And argue with them through that which is best³⁷.

Given a method of proof, there should be a science or sciences to which that proof is applied. Shaykh 'Aḥmad finds the key to this question to lie in a tradition of the Prophet to the effect that there are only three useful

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أَدْعُ إِلَى سَبِيلِ رَبِّكَ بِالْحُكْمَةِ وَالتَّوَعُّظِ الْحَسَنَةِ؛ وَجَادِلْهُمْ بِأَلَّتِي هِيَ أَحْسَنُ.

branches of knowledge: the *firm sign* (آيَةُ الْحَكْمَةِ *al-āyat al-muḥkamat*), the *just duty* (الْفَرِيضَةُ الْعَادِلَةُ *al-farīdat al-ādilat*), and the *established Sunnah* (السُّنَّةُ الْقَائِمَةُ *al-sunnat al-qāimat*) [2, p. 14]. According to Shaykh 'Aḥmad, the firm sign corresponds to the science of Wisdom, the just duty to the science of ethics and purification of the soul, and the established Sunnah corresponds to the science of the Law (الشَّرِيعَةُ *aš-šarī'at*). The accompanying table summarizes the relations between these sciences and the types of cognition.

Although he does not say so explicitly, this does not mean that he rejects other sciences. It is just a matter of appropriately fitting them somehow into these categories. The usefulness of other sciences, regardless of the type of proof appropriate to it, is to be measured in accordance with how it relates to the sciences mentioned by the Prophet. For example, medicine can come under the category of Sunnah because the Prophet encouraged his followers to learn it; it is covered by “the just duty” because spiritual development is not independent of corporal soundness; and it is covered by Wisdom because it gives some knowledge of the human microcosm, meditation upon which is a requisite of the proof of Wisdom.

In other places (such as the *Sharḥ al-‘Arshīyyah*, p. 100), Shaykh 'Aḥmad mentions that the proof of “argumentation in the best way”, inclusive of semantic and conceptual analysis (تَصْحِيحُ الْأَلْفَاظِ وَالْمَفَاهِيمِ *taṣḥīḥ al-alfāz wa 'l-mafāhīm*), is an appropriate tool in those sciences which pertain to language, in the mathematical sciences (which include astronomy), and in “some of the physical sciences”. In as much as each of these sciences has a role to play in the construction of metaphysical and cosmological models based

<i>mode of cognition</i>	<i>corresponding type of proof</i>	<i>science mentioned by the Prophet</i>	<i>science mentioned by Shaykh 'Aḥmad</i>
knowledge	logical argumentation	the established Sunnah	the Law
certainty	good exhortation	the just duty	ethics and spiritual development
cognizance	the proof of Wisdom	the firm sign	Wisdom

Table 1.2: The three sciences.

on the proof of Wisdom, the man of Wisdom must be familiar with rational analysis. In as much as the sciences of ethical and spiritual discipline must be mastered so that vision of the heart flux be attained, the man of Wisdom must also be familiar and conversant in the “proof of good exhortation”. Indeed, the author says that the way of practical spiritual advancement is the inner spirit of the way of traveling the road of advancement in knowledge [2, p. 12]. And one of the supports of the proof of good exhortation is the tradition, which for Shaykh 'Aḥmad is comprised of the Qur'an and the Sunnah, which in turn includes the Law.

Thus, we see that Wisdom is a very organic and holistic science. It deals primarily with metaphysical questions. But, analogous to the Wisdom of Plato's *Timaeus*, the answers to these questions depend upon a method which requires the resources of many of the theoretical sciences and practical

disciplines that underlie the traditional civilization to which Shaykh 'Aḥmad belonged. It is thus a *cosmological* science. According to Whitehead [68, p. xii],

“...it must be one of the motives of a complete cosmology to construct a system of ideas which brings the aesthetic, moral, and religious interests [of a given civilization] into relation with those concepts of the world which have their origin in physical science.

I believe that the entire foregoing discussion illustrates the applicability of this statement to our author's concept of Wisdom. Yet Wisdom and cosmology aim for more than a structure and a system of ideas. At the end of a complicated analysis in the *Sharḥ al-Ziyārah* of the concept and reality of Wisdom, Shaykh 'Aḥmad [6, Vol 1, p. 173] concludes,

What is meant by 'Wisdom' is an all encompassing (إِحَاطِيّ *iḥā-tiyy*), experiential knowledge associated with that which is tied to it in the way of practical action. It occurs in everything in a way appropriate to it³⁸.

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الْمُرَادُ مِنَ الْحِكْمَةِ الْعِلْمُ الْإِحَاطِيّ الدَّوْمِيُّ مَقْرُونًا بِمَا يَرْتَبِطُ بِهِ مِنَ الْعَمَلِ. وَ هَذَا فِي كُلِّ شَيْءٍ بِحَسَبِهِ.

Chapter 2

The Metaphysics of Subsistence

2.1 Preliminary Remarks

One of the aims of this study has been to show that the metaphysics of Shaykh 'Aḥmad is a kind of process metaphysics. In our view, key processual features of Shaykh 'Aḥmad's metaphysics are to be found in his theory of the fundamental reality of both existence *qua* active and essence *qua* becoming/receptive, as well as the dynamic interplay between them. Based on this theory, the author proceeds to undermine the traditional substance-accident distinction. The author's reworking of the existence-essence distinction is very closely related to and in large part depends upon both the author's theory of subsistence and his insistence on the reality of actional qualities like action and receptivity. In turn, all of the above are tied in to the author's phenomenology of cognizance. After all, the aim of Wisdom for Shaykh 'Aḥmad is not simply the laying out of categories; it is the cognizance of God and reality.

In this chapter we discuss in some detail Shaykh 'Aḥmad's metaphysics of subsistence. First we will go over the four modes of subsistence considered fundamental by the author. Then we will develop in some detail the author's ontology of quintessence and actional quality, inclusive of what we consider to be a strong phenomenological component. We will then be prepared for the discussion of Shaykh 'Aḥmad's doctrine of the polarity of existence and essence which we will take up in the next and final chapter of this part.

2.2 What is Subsistence (*qiyām*)?

One of the original, as well as more difficult to understand, contributions of Shaykh 'Aḥmad to metaphysics is his relational ontology of *subsistence* (قيام *qiyām*). By means of this ontology the author tries to account for the subsistence of a given entity through (or dependence upon) another entity which is either ontologically prior or posterior to that given entity. The application of this theory ties in to a fundamental revision and reinterpretation of such traditional issues as the Neoplatonic hierarchy of existents, the substance-accident distinction, hylomorphism, and the existence-essence distinction.

The word '*qiyām*' literally means "standing". When followed by the preposition 'بـ *bi*' (*with, through, or by*), '*qiyām*' signifies "subsisting through" or "depending upon". The early translators used this term and its derivatives to signify the Aristotelian notion of "subsistence through" or "dependence upon" (see *SMA*, under 'قائم'). The philosophers and theologians of Islam continued to make much use of this term. Consider one of Ibn Sina's definitions of substance (*IS*, under الجوهر *al-jawhar*): "A substance is subsistent (قائم *qā'im*)

through its quintessence¹”. Modern philosophers still use the term ‘subsistence’ in virtually the same sense. According to substance-theorist Peter Simons [60]:

The ontological primacy of substances arises chiefly from their independence, or ability to *subsist alone*. [My emphasis.]

On the other hand, the Latins frequently translated this sense of ‘*qā'im*’ (*subsistent*) with ‘*existens*’, at least in the case of Ibn Sina (see *ALL*, under ‘قائم’). According to Merriam-Webster (*MWDS*, under ‘be’), ‘to subsist’, beyond the connotation of ‘to exist’, “often suggests a relation to or dependence on something...”. Merriam-Webster (*MWCD*, under ‘subsist’) also points out that ‘to subsist’ connotes continuance and persistence. These connotations of ‘to subsist’ allow us to posit, for philosophical purposes, a virtually exact intensional and extensional correspondence between ‘*qiyām*’ and ‘subsisting’, as well as between ‘*qā'im*’ and ‘subsistent’. It is interesting that the Latin root ‘*subsistere*’ is akin to the Latin ‘*stare*’, which means “to stand”, which in turn corresponds to the literal meaning of ‘*qiyām*’. The Latin ‘*subsisto*’ means [36, p. 266] “to take a stand, to stop, to stand, to support”. The reason the Latin translators did not translate ‘*qiyām*’ with ‘*subsistere*’ may be related to what Suarez considered to be the failure of some of his predecessors to distinguish “existence” from “subsistence” [36, p. 266]. Yes, it is the case that the Latin ‘*existentia*’ (*existence*) is also ultimately derived from ‘*stare*’ (to stand). On the other hand, the verb ‘*existere*’ (*to exist*) was

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generally used [36, p. 213] in the sense of “to spring, emerge, appear, exist, be”, and its intensional connection to ‘*stare*’ appears to be more remote than that of ‘*subsisto*’.

Significantly, the verb ‘قَامَ بِـِ qāma bi’ in the sense of “to subsist through (something)” is already to be found in the early religious literature of Islam, a fact of which Shaykh ‘Aḥmad was keenly aware. In the Twelfth Observation, he gives one example of this usage of ‘*qāma bi*’ from the Qur’an, and one from the hadith, that is, the traditions of the Prophet, his daughter Fatimah, and the Twelve Imams. In the Qur’an we find (30:25):

***And among his signs is that the Firmament and the Earth subsist through His Commanding!*²**

Shaykh ‘Aḥmad also quotes from the *Miṣbāḥ al-Mutaḥajjid*, a book of supplications, that one of the Imams said:

*Everything other than you subsists through your Commanding!*³

Shaykh ‘Aḥmad’s cosmology of subsistence, built upon the ontology of subsistence we are about to discuss, is in some ways a commentary upon the last two quotes.

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وَمِنْ آيَاتِهِ أَنْ تَقُومَ السَّمَاءُ وَالْأَرْضُ بِأَمْرِهِ.

3

كُلُّ شَيْءٍ سِوَاكَ قَامَ بِأَمْرِكَ.

2.3 The Metaphysics of Subsistence I: The Four Modes

2.3.1 The Four Modes of Subsistence

Shaykh 'Aḥmad outlines his ontology of subsistence in the course of his commentary upon the *Hikmah 'Arshiyyah* of Mulla Ṣadra. At one point in the original text, Mulla Ṣadra defines a “speaker” as “one through whom speech subsists”⁴. At the outset of his commentary upon Mulla Ṣadra’s words, Shaykh 'Aḥmad makes the following remarks: [4, pgs. 74–75]

When he says, “the speaker is one through whom speech subsists”, what does he mean? For when one uses the word ‘subsisting’, one can intend one of four meanings:

First is *processional subsisting* (قِيَامُ الصُّدُورِ *qiyāmu 'ṣ-ṣudūri*), like the subsisting of the light of the Sun through the Sun. What it means is the subsisting of a given thing through the [process of] existentiating⁵ of its existentiator, in such a way that the given thing not become realized for a duration greater than the duration of its existentiating. This is like the light of the Sun, and like a given image in a mirror [with respect to the source of the image].

4

الْمُتَكَلِّمُ مَنْ قَامَ بِهِ الْكَلَامُ.

⁵‘Existentiating’ is a neologism which translates ‘إِجَادٌ’ *igād*, a single term which literally means “occasioning of existence”.

Second is *manifestational subsisting* (قِيَامُ الظُّهُورِ *qiyāmu 'z-zuhū-ri*), like the subsisting of [the act of] “breaking” through [the act of] “becoming-broken”. Now [the act of] “breaking” is quintessentially prior [to the act of “becoming-broken”]. However, it is not possible for its self-manifesting among entities to take place except through [the act of] “becoming-broken”, because [the act of] “becoming-broken” is the receiving by [the act of] “breaking” of its existentiation. Due to this it is said that [the act of] “breaking” exists primarily and quintessentially, while [the act of] “becoming-broken” exists secondarily and by accident.

Third is *realizational subsisting* (قِيَامُ التَّحَقُّقِ *qiyāmu 't-taḥaqquqi*), like the subsisting of [the act of] “becoming-broken” through [the act of] “breaking”. This means that it [i.e., the act of “becoming-broken”] is not realized, neither in external existence nor in the mind, unless it is preceded by [the act of] “breaking”. This is because it [i.e., the act of “becoming-broken”] is “breaking’s” “becoming-in-yielding-to-acting” due to the acting of the actor, since it is not intelligible to speak of a given quality prior to the qualified subject. Sometimes the term *base subsisting* (الْقِيَامُ الرُّكْنِيّ *al-qiyāmu 'r-rukniyyu*) is applied to this third type of subsisting. This means that in reality, the matter of [the act of] “becoming-broken” comes from the very “breaking” *qua* “breaking”, not *qua* acting of the breaker. This is like the subsisting of a bed through wood by means of base subsisting, because wood constitutes the base of the bed through which it

becomes-subsistent. The second, lower, and less important base is the form [of the bed]. So you can say that it becomes-subsistent through the wood by means of realizational subsisting, and you can say that it becomes-subsistent through the wood by means of base-subsistence.

Fourth is *affectional subsisting* (تَقَوُّمٌ غُرُوضٍ *taqawwama ʿurūdīn*). It is like the becoming-subsistent of some given dye through a given garment. ... [Affection is also] called “inhering” (حُلُولٍ *ḥulūl*) as in their [i.e., some of the traditional Muslim scholastics] saying, “a given accident is that which inheres in a given localizable entity (مُتَحَيِّزٍ *mutahayyiz; habens locum*)”⁶.

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قَوْلُهُ: «الْمُسْكَلَمُ مَنْ قَامَ بِهِ الْكَلَامُ»، مَا يُرِيدُ بِهِ؟ فَإِنَّ الْقِيَامَ يُرَادُ بِهِ، إِذَا أُطْلِقَ، أَحَدَ مَعَانٍ أَرْبَعَةٍ. أَحَدُهَا قِيَامُ الصُّدُورِ، كَقِيَامِ نُورِ الشَّمْسِ بِالشَّمْسِ. وَ مَعْنَاهُ قِيَامُ الشَّيْءِ بِإِبْجَادِ مُوجِدِهِ بِحَيْثُ لَا يَتَحَقَّقُ فِي مَدَّةٍ أَكْثَرَ مِنْ مَدَّةٍ إِبْجَادِهِ. وَ ذَلِكَ كَنُورِ الشَّمْسِ، وَ كَالصُّورَةِ فِي الْمِرَاةِ. وَ ثَانِيهَا قِيَامُ الظُّهُورِ، كَقِيَامِ الْكَسْرِ بِالْإِنْكَسَارِ. فَإِنَّ الْكَسْرَ سَابِقٌ بِالذَّاتِ. وَ لَكِنَّهُ لَا يُمَكِّنُ ظُهُورَهُ فِي الْأَعْيَانِ إِلَّا بِالْإِنْكَسَارِ، لِأَنَّ الْإِنْكَسَارَ هُوَ قَبُولُ الْكَسْرِ لِلْإِبْجَادِ. وَ لِهَذَا قِيلَ الْكَسْرُ وَجِدَ أَوَّلًا وَ بِالذَّاتِ، وَ الْإِنْكَسَارُ وَجِدَ ثَانِيًا وَ بِالْعَرَضِ. وَ ثَالِثُهَا قِيَامُ التَّحَقُّقِ، كَقِيَامِ الْإِنْكَسَارِ بِالْكَسْرِ، بِمَعْنَى أَنَّهُ لَا يَتَحَقَّقُ، لَا فِي الْخَارِجِ وَ لَا فِي الدِّهْنِ، إِلَّا مَسْبُوقًا بِالْكَسْرِ، لِأَنَّهُ إِنْفِعَالُ الْكَسْرِ لِفِعْلِ الْفَاعِلِ، إِذْ لَا تَتَعَقَّلُ الصِّفَةُ قَبْلَ الْمَوْصُوفِ. وَ قَدْ يُطْلَقُ عَلَى هَذَا، أَعْنِي، الْقِيَامُ الثَّلَاثِ، الْقِيَامُ الرِّكْنِيُّ، بِمَعْنَى أَنَّ الْإِنْكَسَارَ، فِي الْحَقِيقَةِ، مَادَّةٌ مِنْ نَفْسِ الْكَسْرِ مِنْ حَيْثُ هُوَ هُوَ، لَا مِنْ حَيْثُ فِعْلُ الْكَائِرِ. وَ ذَلِكَ كَقِيَامِ السَّرِيرِ بِالْخَشَبِ قِيَامًا رِكْنِيًّا، لِأَنَّ الْخَشَبَ هُوَ رُكْنُهُ الْأَعْظَمُ الَّذِي يَتَقَوَّمُ بِهِ، وَ الرُّكْنُ الثَّانِي الْأَسْفَلُ الْأَيْسَرُ هُوَ الصُّورَةُ. فَلَكَ أَنْ تَقُولَ أَنَّهُ تَقَوَّمُ بِالْخَشَبِ التَّقَوُّمَ الرِّكْنِيُّ، وَ أَنْ تَقُولَ أَنَّهُ تَقَوَّمُ بِالْخَشَبِ تَقَوُّمَ التَّحَقُّقِ. وَ رَابِعُهَا تَقَوُّمٌ غُرُوضٍ، كَتَقَوُّمِ الصَّبْغِ بِالثَّوْبِ. ... [وَ الْغُرُوضُ، هُوَ الْمُسَمَّى بِالْحُلُولِ فِي قَوْلِهِمْ:

Shaykh 'Aḥmad then proceeds to determine which of these modes of subsistence is meant by Mulla Ṣadra in his definition of ‘speaker’, as well as take him to task on his entire theory of God’s speech.

Shaykh 'Aḥmad is thus proposing that any given existent entity may be characterized by one or more of a set of four modes of subsistence. These four modes are processional subsistence, manifestational subsistence, realizational or base subsistence, and affectional subsistence. Our author attaches a great deal of importance to these modes of subsistence, and describes the relationships between the cosmological divisions of Absolute Existence, delimited existence *qua* negatively conditioned (corresponding to the phenomenological division of Real Existence), and delimited existence *qua* conditioned by something else, including all intelligible, psychic, and corporeal entities. Let us go over the intensions of these four modes.

2.3.2 Processional Subsistence

A given entity X subsists through another entity Y through “processional subsistence” if it is the case that

1. Y is the *process of occasioning-of-existence* or *existentiation* by an agent Z (*ṛiḡād*) of X;
2. The duration of X’s realization is not longer than the duration of Y.

The gerund ‘*ṣudūr*’ (*proceeding, procession*) was already in common use among the *falāsafah* to denote the “emanation” of the Neoplatonists. Al-

«الْعَرَضُ هُوَ الْحَالُّ فِي الْمَتَحَيِّرِ»

Farābī, Ibn Sīnā, and Mulla Ṣadra each spoke of all existents as having “emanated” from God, and of the nous as “the first emanation (الصَّادِرُ الْأَوَّلُ *aṣ-ṣādir al-awwal*)”. As we mentioned in Part I, Ch. 1, Ibn Sina, representative of the *falāsafah*, argued that no independent reality was to be attached to the process of occasioning-of-existence over and above the agent of emanation and the emanation itself. That is, there is an agent or actor, there is an emanation or outcome of acting, but there is no real nexus or process of “acting”, “emanating”, or “occasioning-of-existence”.

Shaykh ’Aḥmad strongly disagreed with this rejection of the real ontological status of the *process* of existentiation or occasioning-of-existence. We will discuss this in more detail below. At this point we note that Shaykh ’Aḥmad describes proceeding or procession as a relation between, not the agent and the emanation, but between, on the one hand, the *act* of existentiation by the agent, and on the other hand, the emanation itself. In the example the author gives of the Sun and its light, the Sun must be understood as corresponding to, not an agent or existentiator, but to a process of existentiation.

One may object that the example of a given image in a mirror does not constitute an example of processional subsistence because the image in the mirror is one of its subject or agent itself, not of a process of existentiation. Shaykh ’Aḥmad would probably reply that the image in the mirror is not one of the quintessence of the agent or the existentiator but of the *self-manifesting* of that agent or existentiator through what we may call the “field of activity” that constitutes a process of existentiation. For example, an image in the mirror of John standing is not an image of John *qua* John, but of the self-

manifesting of John through his act of standing. As soon as John is no longer standing, that is, at the moment the process of existentiation which culminates in John's act of standing is no more, the image of John standing is also no more⁷.

There is another objection one may bring against Shaykh 'Aḥmad's definition of processional subsistence. In other places, the author says that the process of existentiation depends on its agent through processional subsistence. This would appear to lead to an infinite regress. How might Shaykh 'Aḥmad answer this? Let us go back to the author's definition of processional subsistence: it is the "the subsisting of a given thing through the [process of] existentiating of its existentiator, in such a way that the given thing not become realized for a duration greater than the duration of its existentiation". Let us note that, as we will discuss below, Shaykh 'Aḥmad holds that when an agent acts, there is only one process of existentiation per act, and that this process of existentiation does not need another process of existentiation in order for it to take place. That is, the agent "creates the acting through itself, not through another acting". Now if the process of existentiation subsists through its existentiator by processional subsistence, then this means that it must subsist through "the [process of] existentiating of its existentiator, in such a way that the given thing not become realized for a duration greater than the duration of its existentiation". But here, this means that it must subsist through itself. The subsistence of God's acting through itself is, in fact, a major theme of the Shaykh. In the course of his commentary

⁷Note that we speak of the "process of existentiation" and the "act of standing". In the sequel, we will make clear our distinction between *act* and *process*.

on the *Fawā'id*, Third Observation, the author says that God's process of existentiation, the Acting, subsists through itself by base subsistence, i.e., it is its very own matter. Since it may only exist for as long as it itself, the process of existentiation, exists, then its subsistence through its agent by processional subsistence is consistent with Shaykh 'Aḥmad's definition. We will return to this point in the later section where we discuss the reality of actional qualities.

2.3.3 Manifestational and Realizational Subsistence

One of Shaykh 'Aḥmad's most important metaphysical distinctions is that which obtains between *realization* (*at-taḥaqquq*) and *manifestation* (*aẓ-ẓuhūr*). According to Lane (*AEL*, under ح ق), '*at-taḥaqquq*' signifies being, becoming, or proving to be, a truth, reality, or fact. In contrast, '*aẓ-ẓuhūr*' signifies appearance, being or becoming outward, manifest, plain, or apparent, after having been concealed or latent (*AEL*, under ظ ه). The way Shaykh 'Aḥmad sees it, each and every entity has two mutually dependent aspects: an aspect of manifestation and an aspect of realization. The principle of manifestation is that through which a given entity may appear, be visible, and distinguished; the principle of realization is that through which the reality of a given entity is sustained, and is the ground from which it is derived. We will develop this theme in greater detail in the following chapter.

Every fact or occasion of realization, if it is to appear and be present as an actual entity, depends upon a corresponding fact or occasion of manifestation. For example, when one breaks a stick, the stick becomes broken. When an agent breaks a stick, he initiates a motion — which in other places

the author dubs “existential motion (حَرَكَةٌ إِيجَادِيَّةٌ *ḥarakat ʾiǧādiyyat*)” — through which the act of breaking (كَسْرٌ *kasr*) occurs. This act is manifested when the stick actually becomes broken, that is, when the act of becoming-broken (إِنْكَسَارٌ *inkisār*) takes place. According to Shaykh ʾAḥmad, the act of breaking is ontologically or etiologically prior to the act of becoming-broken. However, unless there is an act of becoming-broken, which is the “breaking’s” own receiving of the agent’s “existential motion”, the fact of breaking will not be manifested. That is, the act of breaking is an outcome of the existential motion of the agent. As an outcome of the process of existential motion, it generates its own reflexive response to the process of existential motion. That response is the act of becoming-broken, which is the receptivity of the act of breaking with respect to the process of existential motion. Although the act of breaking and the act of becoming-broken are together *coincident* and *coterminous* (مُسَاوِقَانِ *musāwiqān*), the agent’s act of breaking manifestationally subsists through the stick’s act of becoming-broken. There is an important subtlety here that lies in the distinction the author makes, in the context of the act of an agent, between its existential motion component (the “breaking *qua* acting of the breaker” mentioned by the author above) and its outcome of existential motion component (the “breaking *qua* breaking” in this case). We will expound upon this theme in a later section.

When the existential motion of the agent culminates in the act of breaking, the act of becoming-broken is immediately and coincidentally generated. The act of becoming-broken, as a condition for the manifestation of the act of breaking, is thus a *quality* (صِفَةٌ *ṣifat*) of the act of breaking. One

of Shaykh 'Aḥmad's first principles is that it is unintelligible to speak of a quality prior to the qualified subject. In this case, the actional quality of becoming-broken generates from the act of breaking and the former's realization depends upon it. That is, the act of becoming-broken realizationally subsists through the act of breaking. This kind of subsistence is also called "base subsistence (*al-qiyām ar-rukniyy*)" because that through which a given entity subsists realizationally also generally constitutes the *ground* or *base* (رُكْن *rukṇ*) through which that entity is generated.

One may ask, "Is it not the case that the act of breaking also realizationally subsists through the act of becoming-broken? Where does the asymmetry come from?" Shaykh 'Aḥmad would probably give two answers to this question. First of all, from an etiological and common sense point of view, the act of breaking is definitely prior to the act of becoming-broken, despite their coincidence. Further, the act of breaking realizationally subsists through the existentiational motion of the agent. The latter motion constitutes the ground or base through which the act of breaking is generated. Second, it is indeed the case that, on a deeper level of consideration, it is just as correct to say that the act of breaking is a quality of the act of becoming-broken as to have it the other way around. At this level, both are correlational accidents. But there is still an asymmetry because, as we will discuss in the next chapter, becoming is the principle of the manifestation of actual entities, while acting is the principle of their realization.

Shaykh 'Aḥmad himself alludes to this in the course of his comments on the Eleventh Observation. At one point, the author tries to head off a possible objection to a passage in the main text: [2, p. 227]

I said: ... So the shining becomes-subsistent through the light of the sun by processional subsistence, and through the wall by *realizational subsistence*....

I now say: ... If you say: This is contrary to what you have established. This is because you have established that ‘realizational subsistence’ applies to base subsistence. That which corresponds to what you have established is [the proposition] that the shining is subsistent through the wall by manifestational subsistence;

I will say: The matter is apparently as you say. However, we use the term manifestational subsistence to express the difference between *material realization* (*at-taḥaqquq al-māddiyy*), which we call “realizational” and “base subsistence”, and *formal realization* (*at-taḥaqquq aṣ-ṣuwariyy*), which in our terminology we term “manifestational subsistence”.

The author then explains in detail why he used the term ‘realizational subsistence’ in the original passage.

2.3.4 Affectional Subsistence

Affectional subsistence (*qiyām al-ʿurūd*), the last mode mentioned by Shaykh ʾAḥmad, is not defined; only an example is given, that of the subsistence of dye in a garment. Later on in his comments, the author says that this mode of subsistence is also called one of *ḥulūl* (*permeation, inhering or indwelling*), like that of a traditional Peripatetic accident in its subject. The definition quoted by Shaykh ʾAḥmad of an accident as “that which inheres in a given

localizable entity (*mutahayyiz*)” is also quoted by ‘Aḥmad Nagārī (*JU*, Vol 2, p. 316). Like Shaykh ‘Aḥmad, he fails to identify his source by name. We do know that the term ‘مُتَحَيِّز’ *mutahayyiz*, translated by the Latins with ‘*habens locum*’ (see *ALL*, under حوز), was used by Ibn Sīnā [61, p. 73] to denote a natural (and hence localizable), as opposed to immaterial, substance. It turns out that when the Muslim scholastics used the term ‘*qiyām bi*’, they generally meant affectional subsistence. So we sometimes find Shaykh ‘Aḥmad using the term ‘*qiyām bi*’ in the same way as his fellow scholastics, i.e., as elliptical for “affectional subsistence”. The context is usually clear enough for the reader to know what he is doing at any given use of the term.

Significantly, Shaykh ‘Aḥmad does not consider actions to be accidents of their agents in this sense. That is, the field of activity of an individual which constitutes an actional quality (*ṣifah fi-liyyah*) of that individual does not, in Shaykh ‘Aḥmad’s view, permeate the quintessence of that individual, although it is unique to that individual. Only those accidents, affections and qualities that can be said to permeate or inhere within their subject can be said to subsist by means of affectional subsistence. On the other hand, as we shall see in the next chapter, many of these types of qualities will turn out to be *subsistence factors* (*muqawwimāt*) in the acts of becoming or actual entities Shaykh ‘Aḥmad calls “essences”. One of the difficulties here is that the author sometimes uses the classifications of traditional scholasticism to make his point, even when, in the final analysis, he does not really accept those classifications.

We should note that on occasion, Shaykh ‘Aḥmad uses the term ‘realiza-

tional subsistence' to denote processional subsistence in opposition to affectional subsistence⁸. Why he does this is not immediately clear, though the context in which this usage occurs remains basically one and the same: the distinction between processional and affectional subsistence, which will come up in the next section. Perhaps we can say that realizational subsistence is of three types: processional, base, and manifestational subsistence. When used in opposition to manifestational subsistence, 'realizational subsistence' denotes base subsistence; when used in opposition to affectional subsistence, it denotes processional subsistence. It also appears to be the case that, in general scholastic usage, the term 'subsistence' was generally elliptical for 'affectional subsistence'.

One notices that each of these four modes of subsistence is exemplified by some natural or physical phenomena. Yet we will see that Shaykh 'Aḥmad unhesitatingly applies these modes to the vertical hierarchy of existents, from the sensible to the intelligible. This is an application of the cosmological principle, that the inference of truths about the higher ranks of existence and the relationships between them may only be attained through knowledge of the state of affairs of the sensible realm.

2.4 The Metaphysics of Subsistence II: Ontology

Let us return to the fundamental problem, introduced in the last chapter, of Shaykh 'Aḥmad's metaphysics: The ultimate aim of Wisdom is knowledge

⁸See *al-'Aḥsā'ī* 1856–1859, Vol. 1, pt. 3, p. 39., and Vol. 1, pt. 3, p. 242.

of God. Yet God is utterly unknowable. How then can we know God? This epistemic question leads us to the ontic question of God's relationship to the world. One of the ways the author develops his approach to this problem is by means of an analysis of the problem, discussed in philosophy of language, of *origin* (أَلْمَبْدَأُ *al-mabda'*) and *derivative* (أَلْمُشْتَقُّ *al-muštaqq*). Shaykh 'Aḥmad develops this in a number of places, including the *Risālah Qaṭīfiyyah I*, question 3, the *Risālah Rashīdiyyah*, question 4, *Observations in the Philosophy of Law*, part 4, problem 2, and the *Treatise in Response to Mirza Muhammad 'Alī al-Mudarris*, question 2. The last two are the most detailed⁹. Shaykh 'Aḥmad's development of this theory of origin and derivative is one of those cases where the structure of the Arabic language plays a crucial role. Before we discuss this issue, however, we must consider the following distinctions.

2.4.1 Quintessence and Quality

One of the most common and general metaphysical distinctions, that between *subject* and *attribute*, corresponds to the Muslim scholastics' distinction between *quintessence* (ذَات *dāt*, pl. ذَوَات *dawāt*) and *quality* (صِفَة *ṣifat*, pl. صِفَات *ṣifāt*). The quintessence-quality distinction is also analogous to the traditional substance-accident distinction. Shaykh 'Aḥmad generally spoke in terms of the quintessence-quality distinction, which appears to be, for him, more general than the traditional distinction between substance and accident.

Afnan [1, p. 101] points out that the term '*dāt*' was sometimes, though

⁹Each of these treatises is contained in Volume one of the *Jawāmi' al-Kalim*.

not generally, used as an equivalent of Aristotle's *ousia* (*entity* or *substance*). More often it was used to signify the Greek reflexive pronoun *tó hotó* (*that in itself*). The noun '*dāt*' is derived from the possessive noun 'ذُو' *dū* (*having, possessing, or endowed with*). Its feminine singular form is 'ذَاتُ' *dātu*, from which the substantive is obtained. Philosophers and theologians, consistent with its literal usage as a substantive, used '*dāt*' in two major ways:

1. To signify the most general notion of *thing, entity, individual, or object*, without signifying any particular aspect of it, as opposed to many other technical terms like 'essence' and 'existent'. Goichon is of the opinion that it is due to this general significance of '*dāt*' that Ibn Sina does not define it. On the other hand, Ibn Sina does use it in the definition of other terms such as 'جَوْهَر' *ġawhar* (*substance*) and 'عَرَض' *ʿaradʿ* (*accident*). He says: "Every *dāt* that is not in a subject is a substance. Every *dāt* whose subsistence is through a subject is an accident" (see *LLPI*, under ذَات);
2. In the possessive case, or as an adverbial, or adjectival, derivative or phrase, to refer to the inner nature, essence, reality, self, ipseity, or fact of a thing. One can say, e.g.,
 - The *dāt* of a thing is good or evil, not its exterior form [possessive case];
 - We can know nothing of the *dāt* of God [possessive case];
 - A substance is that which subsists through its own *dāt* [adverbial phrase];

- The property of knowledge is ذَاتِي *dātiyy* (*essential*) to God [adjectival derivative];

I have generally translated ‘*dāt*’ with ‘quintessence’. Although slightly awkward at times, ‘quintessence’ covers virtually all of the usages of ‘*dāt*’ derived from the substantive sense.

The subject-attribute distinction, in its most general sense, is just as natural in Arabic as it is in European languages. In the case of ‘*dāt*’, note that its original, possessive, connotation is “having”, “possessing”, or “endowed with”. I suspect that, when transferred to usage as a substantive, the word ‘*dāt*’ literally meant “that which possesses, has, or is endowed with”. From the ontological perspective, what a *dāt* possesses, has, or is endowed with consists at least of its properties and effects. Shaykh ‘Aḥmad generally contrasts *dāt* or quintessence with *ṣifat* or quality. Although the analogous substance-accident distinction is ultimately undermined in Shaykh ‘Aḥmad’s metaphysics, the quintessence-quality distinction still plays an important role in the development of his metaphysics.

In general, the Arabic word ‘*ṣifat*’, which we translate with ‘quality’, covers every sort of property, attribute, characteristic, or predicate that can be ascribed to a quintessence¹⁰. The word ‘*ṣifat*’ is ambiguous; it also denotes the *name* of a quality, that is, an *adjective*. Very early in the development of Muslim theology, a distinction was made between, on the one hand, God’s *qualities of quintessence* (صِفَاتُ الذَّاتِ *ṣifāt ad-dāt*) or *quintessential qualities* (صِفَاتُ دَاتِيَّةٍ *ṣifāt dātiyyat*), and his *qualities of action* (صِفَاتُ الْأَفْعَالِ *ṣifāt al-af‘āl*)

¹⁰Note that we are using ‘quality’ in the most general sense. This sense is to be distinguished from the Aristotelian *category* (مَقُولَةٌ *maqūlat*) of *quality* (كَيْفٌ *kayf*)

al-ʾaḡl) or *actional qualities* (صِفَاتِ فِعْلِيَّةٍ *ṣiḡāt fiʿliyyat*). A quintessential quality of God is defined as a quality by which He is always characterized, and by whose contrary He is never characterized. An actional quality of God is a quality by which He is characterized, but by whose contrary he may also be characterized. This division predates the influence of Greek thought on Muslim theology. It is clearly set forth by the early Shīʿī Imams, who made the affirmation of this distinction a cardinal principle¹¹. “Knowledge” and “Power” were counted among God’s quintessential qualities: the negations of these two may never be predicated of Him. “Willing” and “Speaking” were counted among God’s actional qualities: God could Will or not Will, Speak or not Speak. Of course, the Ashʿarites did not count speech as one of God’s actional attributes; after all, they believed that the Qurʾān, and thus His Speech, is eternal.

2.4.2 Reality of Actional Qualities

Shaykh ʾAḥmad placed a great deal of emphasis on the class of actional qualities, whether with respect to God or with respect to contingent quintessences, so much so that when he uses the word *ʿṣifat*, he is usually referring to actional qualities. It is perhaps no exaggeration to say that, for Shaykh ʾAḥmad, the most basic and simple ontological distinction is the one that obtains between quintessences and their actional qualities. As we shall see in the next chapter, the problem of the quintessential qualities of a given quintessence is one pertaining to the act of becoming through which that quintessence is

¹¹For example, see the traditions quoted in Book II, chapters 12–14, of Kulayni’s collection of traditions *al-Kāfi*, and in Chapter 11 of Ibn Bābawayh’s collection *al-Tawḥīd*.

unique. The latter problem, in turn, revolves about his interpretation of the essence-existence distinction in terms of process. For this to work, one must commit oneself, not only to the concept, but to the reality of processes and acts. Shaykh 'Aḥmad does this by a radical espousal of the reality, and ontological primacy, of the categories of *acting* (فعل *fi'l* corresponding to the Aristotelian category of *action*) and *becoming-in-yielding-to-acting* (إِنْفِعَال *infi'āl*, corresponding to the Aristotelian category of *passion*). There are few issues about which Shaykh 'Aḥmad is as passionate, and with respect to which he uses unusually harsh language against his opponents, as this one.

Although Shaykh 'Aḥmad discusses the problem of the reality of *fi'l* and *infi'āl* on numerous occasions, including his commentary on the *Fawā'id*, two places he deals with it most systematically are in the course of the *Treatise On Matters of Subjective Consideration* (contained in Vol. 2 of the *Jawāmi' al-Kalim*) and the *Commentary on the Treatise on Knowledge* (contained in Vol 1 of the *Jawāmi' al-Kalim*). In the course of the former work, the context is one where Shaykh 'Aḥmad takes the later *mutakallimūn* to task for their denial of, among other things, the reality of relational accidents such as correlation, action, and passion. On this issue in particular he quotes extensively from the *Mufaṣṣal* by the famous logician Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī al-Qazwīnī, a commentary on the very influential *Muḥaṣṣal* of al-Rāzī. Al-Kātibī's views are representative of the *mutakallimūn* in general; Shaykh 'Aḥmad quotes al-Kātibī's argument for the subjectivity of each relational accident, then proceeds to refute it. In the course of the *Commentary on the Treatise on Knowledge*, Shaykh 'Aḥmad is more concerned with establishing the separate and originated reality of God's Willing, in opposition to both

the *falāsafah* and the *mutakallimūn* (he also discusses this towards the end of the *Treatise On Matters of Subjective Consideration*, in the course of a commentary upon a section of Mulla Ṣadra's *Asfār*). Our synopsis is based mainly on the discussions in these two works.

In the course of the *Treatise On Matters of Subjective Consideration*, Shaykh 'Aḥmad quotes al-Kātibi's argument against the external existence of action. He then proceeds to refute it: [3, Vol. 2. p. 225]

In the commentary called al-Mufaṣṣal, [al-Kātibi] said: The proof that a given thing's [process of ¹²] *occasioning* of another thing as an impression (تأثير *ta'tīr*) is not a matter distinct from the quintessence of the agent (المؤثر *al-mu'attir*; Latin *agens* and *imprimens*; literally, "that which occasions as an impression") and the impression (أثر *atar*) [of the agent] is as follows: if it were the case [that it is distinct from the quintessence of the agent and the impression], then it would be an accident, subsisting through the quintessence of the agent and the impression. It is, of course, necessarily the case that it not be a substance and thus subsist through itself independently of the quintessence of the agent and the impression. So if it were the case [that the *ta'tīr* of the agent is distinct from the quintessence of the agent and the impression], then it would be in need of it [i.e., of *ta'tīr*]. It would thus be possible [i.e., contingent] due to its quintessence [since the need of *ta'tīr* is a necessary and sufficient condition of the contingency of

¹²Note that we sometimes use 'process of' and some times 'act of' before a gerund. The reason for this will be explained in a succeeding section.

a given thing] and in need of the agent. Then the agent's [process of] occasioning it [i.e., the original *taṭīr*] would then be another matter distinct from both it [i.e., the original *taṭīr*] and its agent. What has been said about the first [*taṭīr*] also goes for this one. This [state of affairs] entails an infinite regress, which is absurd.

I now say: The [process of] occasioning as an impression constitutes the *acting* (*fiʿl*) of the agent. It does not exist except at the point of the agent's commencement of the acting. The agent is an existent quintessence, subsisting through itself. The [process of] occasioning as an impression is its motion. The latter does not subsist through itself, and is thus distinct from the agent in quintessence, name, and [ontological] rank. The claim that they are identical is just unadulterated ignorance, foreign to the exigencies of the nous. So the agent can exist while the impression does not, because the impression is like [an act of] standing, while the [process of] occasioning as an impression is [the process of] *originating* (إحداث *ihdāt*) that impression. So if your [process of] originating the act of standing were yourself, then [the process of] occasioning as an impression would be the agent. There is no doubt about this. However, affirming its distinctness from the agent does not entail an infinite regress. This is due to what we have repeatedly said, namely, that it is an acting, and that the *actor* (فَاعِل *fāʿil*) originates the acting through itself, that is, through that very acting. As [the Imam Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq (upon whom be peace) has said: *Allah created the Willing through it-*

self. Then he created creation through the Willing. Moreover, the jurists are agreed that the one who lays [a ritual] prayer originates his prayer through a [process of] intending, and that he originates the intending through itself. So the distinctness of the [process of] occasioning as an impression from the agent and the impression entails neither an infinite regress nor circularity. . .¹³.

In the *Commentary on the Treatise on Knowledge*, Shaykh 'Aḥmad approaches the question of the reality of actions in the context of the question as to whether God's Willing (*al-maṣṣat*) and Desiring (*al-irādat*) are identical to or distinct from His Quintessence. In Muslim scholastic terminology,

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فَإِنَّهُ قَالَ فِي الشَّرْحِ الْمُسَمَّى بِالْمُفَصَّلِ: «الدَّلِيلُ عَلَى أَنَّ تَأْثِيرَ الشَّيْءِ فِي الشَّيْءِ لَيْسَ أَمْرًا مُغَايِرًا لِذَاتِ الْمُؤَثِّرِ وَ الْأَثَرِ هُوَ أَنَّهُ لَوْ كَانَ كَذَلِكَ، لَكَانَ عَرَضًا قَائِمًا بِذَاتِ الْمُؤَثِّرِ وَ الْأَثَرِ - ضَرُورَةً أَنَّهُ لَيْسَ جَوْهَرًا قَائِمًا بِنَفْسِهِ، مُبَاطِنًا عَنْ ذَاتِ الْمُؤَثِّرِ وَ الْأَثَرِ. فَلَوْ كَانَ كَذَلِكَ، لَكَانَ مُفْتَقِرًا إِلَيْهِ. فَيَكُونُ مُمَكِّنًا لِذَاتِهِ، مُفْتَقِرًا إِلَى الْمُؤَثِّرِ. فَيَكُونُ تَأْثِيرُ الْمُؤَثِّرِ فِيهِ أَيْضًا أَمْرًا آخَرًا مُغَايِرًا لَهُ وَ لِمُؤَثِّرِهِ. فَالْكَلَامُ فِيهِ كَالْكَلَامِ فِي الْأَوَّلِ. فَيَلْزِمُ التَّسْلُسُ وَ إِنَّهُ مُحَالٌ». إِنْ شَاءَ.

أَقُولُ: التَّأْثِيرُ فِعْلُ الْمُؤَثِّرِ، وَ لَا يُوْجَدُ إِلَّا عِنْدَ الشُّرُوعِ فِي الْفِعْلِ. وَ الْمُؤَثِّرُ ذَاتٌ مَوْجُودَةٌ قَائِمَةٌ بِنَفْسِهَا. وَ التَّأْثِيرُ حَرَكَةٌ؛ وَ لَا تَقُومُ بِنَفْسِهَا. فَهِيَ مُغَايِرَةٌ لِلْمُؤَثِّرِ ذَاتًا وَ اسْمًا وَ رُتَبَةً. فَدَعَاؤِي إِنْ تَحَادِهَمَا جَهْلٌ مُحْضٌ خَارِجَةٌ عَنْ مُقْتَضَى الْعَقْلِ. فَإِنَّ الْمُؤَثِّرَ يُوْجَدُ وَ لَمْ يَكُنِ الْأَثَرُ لِأَنَّ الْأَثَرَ مِثْلُ الْقِيَامِ وَ التَّأْثِيرُ إِحْدَاثُ الْأَثَرِ. فَإِنْ كَانَ إِحْدَاثُ الْقِيَامِ هُوَ أَنْتَ، كَانَ التَّأْثِيرُ هُوَ الْمُؤَثِّرُ؛ وَ لَا شَكَّ فِي ذَلِكَ. وَ لَكِنْ ثُبُوتُ مُغَايِرَتِهِ لِلْمُؤَثِّرِ لَا يَسْتَلْزِمُ التَّسْلُسَ لِمَا قَرَرْنَا مَرًّا بِأَنَّهُ فِعْلٌ. وَ الْفِعْلُ يُحْدِثُهُ الْفَاعِلُ بِنَفْسِهِ، أَيْ، بِنَفْسِ الْفِعْلِ، كَمَا قَالَ الصَّادِقُ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ: «خَلَقَ اللَّهُ الْمَشِيَّةَ بِنَفْسِهَا. ثُمَّ خَلَقَ الْخَلْقَ بِالْمَشِيَّةِ». وَ الْفُقَهَاءُ قَدْ اتَّفَقُوا عَلَى أَنَّ الْمُصَلِّيَ يُحْدِثُ الصَّلَاةَ بِالنِّيَّةِ، وَ يُحْدِثُ النِّيَّةَ بِنَفْسِهَا. فَلَا يَسْتَلْزِمُ مُغَايِرَةُ التَّأْثِيرِ لِلْمُؤَثِّرِ وَ الْأَثَرِ تَسْلُسًا وَ لَا دَوْرًا

this may be expressed as follows: are the Willing and the Desiring *ancient* (*qadīm*, that is, *preeternal*) or not? Shaykh 'Aḥmad first quotes from the Shi'ī Imams to the effect that each of them are not ancient, but rather *originating* (*ḥādīṭ*, that is, *contingent*). According to the Eighth Imam al-Ṛiḍā (d. 818): [3, Vol. 1, pt. 2, p. 181]

The Willing and the Desiring are from among the Qualities of Action [not the Qualities of Quintessence]. Whoever professes that Allah is, from Preeternity, a Desirer and a Willer, is not one who professes [God's] unity¹⁴.

This tradition appears to suggest that positing an identity between God and His Desiring commits one to the declaration of multiplicity in God. That is, the proposition that God and His Desiring are identical implies that God's Quintessence is a locus of multiplicity. The reason for this may be found in the next tradition Shaykh 'Aḥmad quotes from the Sixth Imam al-Ṣādiq: [3, Vol. 1, pt. 2, p. 181]

[ʿĀṣim ibn Ḥamīd] said: I asked [the Imam], “Is it the case that Allah (Exalted is He!) is not, from Preeternity, a Desirer?”

He replied: *Given a desirer, he cannot be unless what is desired is with him. Allah was, from Preeternity, Knowing and Powerful;*

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الْمَشِيئَةُ وَالْإِرَادَةُ مِنْ صِفَاتِ الْأَفْعَالِ. فَمَنْ زَعَمَ أَنَّ اللَّهَ لَمْ يَزَلْ مُرِيدًا شَيْئًا، فَلَيْسَ بِمُوحَّدٍ.

then *He Desired*¹⁵.

Shaykh 'Aḥmad immediately explains that this means that [3, Vol. 1, pt. 2, p. 181], “If, in His Preternity, God was a Desirer, then what was desired was with Him, since it is absurd that He Desire, while at the same time what He Desires is not there”¹⁶. That is, when something is desired, it must have some presence in the mind of the desirer. In this sense it is “with him”. If this were the case for God, then the multiplicity of presences of desired things must exist, from Preternity, within His Quintessence. This makes God into a multiplicity. Rather, as the author points out earlier on, God does not need to think or ponder, and thus present things in His Quintessence, before He acts. According to Shaykh 'Aḥmad: [3, Vol. 1, pt. 2, p. 180–181]

As for Allah (to whom belong Might and Majesty!), there is nothing in His Self because he is Impenetrable; there is no entrance into Him. He neither conceptualizes nor thinks. His existention of a thing is not preceded by that thing's having a state in Himself (Exalted is He!) as those ignorant ones, who make comparisons between Him and His creation, profess. In *al-Kāfī*, with [the author's] chain of transmission reaching Ṣafwān [there is the following tradition:]

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قَالَ [عَاصِمُ بْنُ حَمِيدٍ]: قُلْتُ: «لَمْ يَزَلِ اللَّهُ مُرِيدًا؟»
قَالَ: إِنَّ الْمُرِيدَ لَا يَكُونُ إِلَّا الْمُرَادُ مَعَهُ. لَمْ يَزَلِ اللَّهُ عَالِمًا قَادِرًا، ثُمَّ أَرَادَ.

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لَوْ كَانَ فِي الْأَزَلِ مُرِيدًا، لَكَانَ الْمُرَادُ مَعَهُ، لِاسْتِحَالَةِ أَنْ يُرِيدَ وَ لَا يَكُونُ مَا أَرَادَ.

I asked Abu al-Ḥasan [al-Riḍā] (upon whom be peace), “Inform me about the desiring, both Allah’s and that of creation. He replied: *The desiring which comes from a given creation is its inner disposition. That which appears after it comes from its acting (fiʿl). As for that which comes from Allah, then it is the case that His Desiring is His Originating, nothing else. This is because He does not deliberate, meditate, nor think. These latter attributes are negated of Him; they are attributes of creation. The Desiring of Allah (Exalted is He!) is His Acting and not anything else. [His Command is such that, when He Desires something,] He says to it, “Become!”, and it becomes.*¹⁷ This happens without expression and enunciation, and without thinking and meditation...¹⁸

¹⁷Qur’an 36:82.

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أَمَّا الْخَالِقُ عَزَّ وَجَلَّ، فَلَيْسَ فِي نَفْسِهِ شَيْءٌ لِأَنَّهُ صَمَدٌ، لَا مَدْخَلَ فِيهِ. وَ لَيْسَ يَتَصَوَّرُ وَ لَا يُفَكِّرُ وَ لَمْ يَسْبِقْ إِيجَادُهُ لِلشَّيْءِ حَالٌ لِلشَّيْءِ فِي نَفْسِهِ تَعَالَى، كَمَا يَزْعُمُ ذَلِكَ الْجَاهِلُونَ الْمُشَبِّهُونَ لَهُ بِخَلْقِهِ. فَفِي الْكَافِي، بِسَنَدِهِ عَنْ صَفْوَانَ، قَالَ: قُلْتُ لِأَبِي الْحَسَنِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ: «أَخْبِرْنِي عَنِ الْإِرَادَةِ مِنَ اللَّهِ وَ مِنَ الْخَلْقِ». قَالَ: فَقَالَ: «الْإِرَادَةُ مِنَ الْخَلْقِ الضَّمِيرُ وَ مَا يَدُو لَهُمْ بَعْدَ ذَلِكَ مِنَ الْفِعْلِ. وَ أَمَّا مِنَ اللَّهِ، فَإِرَادَتُهُ إِحْدَاثُهُ، لَا غَيْرُ ذَلِكَ، لِأَنَّهُ لَا يُرَوَّى وَ لَا يَهُمُّ وَ لَا يُفَكِّرُ. وَ هَذِهِ الصِّفَاتُ مَنْفِيَّةٌ عَنْهُ وَ هِيَ صِفَاتُ الْخَلْقِ. فَإِرَادَةُ اللَّهِ تَعَالَى الْفِعْلُ لَا غَيْرُ ذَلِكَ؛ يَقُولُ لَهُ كُنْ فَيَكُونُ، بِلَا لَفْظٍ، وَ لَا نُطْقٍ بِلِسَانٍ، وَ لَا هَمَّةٍ، وَ لَا تَفَكُّرٍ...

After mentioning and commenting upon these traditions, Shaykh 'Aḥmad turns to the arguments of the theologians for the preeternity of the Desiring: [3, Vol. 1, pt. 2, p. 181]

As for the theologians, they seek to prove the ancientness of the Desiring in two ways. In the first place, they say that the Desiring is a quality. Now it makes no sense that a quality subsist through something other than the qualified subject. Nor does it make sense that it subsist through itself. So if the Desiring were an *originating thing* (*ḥādith*, that is, *contingent*), then Allah would be a locus in which originating things could inhere. Second of all, if the Desiring were an originating thing, then it would come to be an originated thing through another Desiring [since every originated thing comes about through God's Desiring]. If that other Desiring is ancient, then that is what we seek to show; if it is not, then circularity or an infinite regress is entailed¹⁹, both of which are void²⁰.

¹⁹Note that for the Ash'arites, this means that the Desiring is a coeternal attribute of God like each of the rest of His Qualities. That is, they are not identical to God's Quintessence. For Shī'ī theology, on the other hand, this argument implies that the Desiring, like each of the rest of His Qualities, is identical to His Quintessence.

²⁰

أَمَّا الْمُتَكَلِّمُونَ، فَاسْتَدَلُّوا عَلَى الْقِدَمِ بِوَجْهَيْنِ. أَحَدُهُمَا، قَالُوا أَنَّهَا صِفَةٌ، وَ الصِّفَةُ لَا يُعْقَلُ قِيَامُهَا بِغَيْرِ الْمَوْصُوفِ، وَ لَا بِنَفْسِهَا. فَلَوْ كَانَتْ حَادِثَةً، كَانَ تَعَالَى مُحَلًّا لِلْحَوَادِثِ. وَ ثَانِيَهُمَا أَنَّهَا، إِذَا كَانَتْ مُحَدَّثَةً، تَكُونُ مُحَدَّثَةً بِإِزَادَةِ أُخْرَى. وَ أُخْرَى، إِنْ كَانَتْ قَدِيمَةً، ثَبَتَ الْمَطْلُوبُ. وَ إِنْ كَانَتْ حَادِثَةً، لَزِمَ الدَّوْرُ وَ التَّسْلُسُ.

The answer to the first [argument] is that the Desiring, even if it is a quality, it is so only in relation to Him (Exalted is He!) [otherwise it is a quintessence]; this is the case for every created thing. Thus Muhammad and his household (May Allah bless them all!) constitute His Names and His Qualities. That is in relation to Him (Exalted is He!). Otherwise, they are quintessences that Allah has made to subsist through His Commanding. The same goes for the rest of creation, as He (Exalted is He!) has said: ***And among his signs is that the Firmament and the Earth subsist through His Commanding!***²¹ So the Desiring is a quintessence; all quintessences become quintessentialized through the impression of its own quintessentialization; Allah (Glorified is He!) made it subsist through itself.

Second, even if we admit their claim that the Desiring is ancient, its subsisting through Him (Exalted is He!) is impermissible because because it is impermissible that He be a subject of affection. It makes no difference whether it is an ancient or an originating affection.

Third, the subsistence of a quality through itself is not forbidden when it is a quintessence in relation to that which is [etiologically] beneath it, when what is beneath it constitutes a relational impression. As is proven in Wisdom, it is a quintessence for its effect.

²¹Qur'an 30:25.

Fourth, what is the difficulty in a quality subsisting through other than its qualified subject, like the subsistence of speech through the air and not through its qualified subject, which is the speaker²².

[The answer] to the second [argument] is that the Desiring is originated through itself as [Imam Ṣādiq] (upon whom be peace) pointed out in his saying: *Allah created the Willing through it-self; then He created the things through the Willing*. [He pointed this out] so that the beliefs of the people [i.e., the followers of the Imams] would not be in confusion. So whoever accepts from them will be guided. Whoso does not accept from them will go astray and be misled. Moreover, the jurists have said that the one who lays [a ritual] prayer originates the prayer through an

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وَالْجَوَابُ عَنِ الْأَوَّلِ أَنَّهَا، وَإِنْ كَانَ صِفَةً، فَإِنَّمَا هِيَ بِالنِّسْبَةِ إِلَيْهِ تَعَالَى؛ وَهَذَا شَأْنُ كُلِّ مَخْلُوقٍ. فَإِنَّ مُحَمَّدًا وَآلَهُ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِمْ أَسْمَاؤُهُ وَصِفَاتُهُ. وَذَلِكَ بِالنِّسْبَةِ إِلَيْهِ تَعَالَى. وَإِلَّا، فَهَمَّ ذَوَاتٌ أَقَامَهُمُ اللَّهُ بِأَمْرِهِ. وَكَذَلِكَ سَائِرُ الْخَلْقِ، كَمَا قَالَ تَعَالَى: وَمِنْ آيَاتِهِ أَنْ تَقُومَ السَّمَاءُ وَالْأَرْضُ بِأَمْرِهِ. فَهِيَ ذَاتٌ، تَذَوُّتِ الذَّوَاتِ مِنْ أَثَرِ تَذَوُّتِهَا؛ وَقَدْ أَقَامَهَا سُبْحَانَهُ بِنَفْسِهَا. وَثَانِيًا أَنَّهُ، لَوْ فَرَضْنَا عَلَى قَوْلِهِمْ أَنَّهُ قَدِيمَةٌ، قِيَامُهَا بِهِ تَعَالَى مَا جَارَ لِأَنَّهُ تَعَالَى لَا يَكُونُ مَعْرُوضًا. فَلَا فَرْقَ بَيْنَ الْعَارِضِ الْقَدِيمِ وَالْحَادِثِ. وَثَالِثًا أَنَّهُ لَيْسَ مُمْتَنِعًا قِيَامُ الصِّفَةِ بِنَفْسِهَا إِذَا كَانَتْ ذَاتًا بِالنِّسْبَةِ إِلَى مَنْ دُونَهَا - وَمَنْ دُونَهَا أَثَرًا إِضَافِيًّا - وَهُوَ ذَاتٌ لِمَعْلُولِهِ، كَمَا بُرِهَنَ عَلَيْهِ فِي الْحِكْمَةِ. وَرَابِعًا: أَيُّ ضَرَرٍ فِي قِيَامِ الصِّفَةِ بِغَيْرِ مَوْصُوفِهَا، كَقِيَامِ الْكَلَامِ بِالْهَوَاءِ، لَا بِمَوْصُوفِهِ الَّذِي هُوَ الْمُسْتَكَمُّ.

impulse, which is a [process of] intending. He originates the [process of] intending through itself; he does not originate the [process of] intending through another [process of] intending. Otherwise circularity and an infinite regress would ensue²³.

Shaykh 'Aḥmad then launches a passionate critique, bordering on tirade, of his fellow Shi'ī philosophers like Mīr Dāmād and Mulla Muḥsin, taking them to task for allegedly misinterpreting the words of their Imams to suit their own philosophical views.

There are two major points underlying Shaykh 'Aḥmad's affirmation of the independent reality of acting. The first is his thesis that an acting is originated through itself, not through an acting other than itself. What does this mean? A satisfactory answer to this question may depend on a much more extensive analysis than we can provide here. On the one hand, Shaykh 'Aḥmad appears to be saying that actings are basic ontological entities, and that it is no more necessary that an acting require another acting than it is necessary that matter need another matter as a substrate. On the other hand, a given acting does require an actor. As we will discuss in a succeeding section, a given acting subsists through its actor by means of processional

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و [الجواب] عَنِ الثَّانِي أَنَّهَا تَكُونُ مُحَدَّثَةً بِنَفْسِهَا، كَمَا نَبَّهَ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ عَلَيْهِ بِقَوْلِهِ، «خَلَقَ اللَّهُ الْمَشِيَّةَ بِنَفْسِهَا. ثُمَّ خَلَقَ الْأَشْيَاءَ بِالْمَشِيَّةِ»، لِأَنَّ يَشْتَبِهَ عَلَى النَّاسِ أَمْرَ اعْتِقَادِهِمْ. فَمَنْ قَبِلَ عَنْهُمْ اهْتِدَى؛ وَ مَنْ لَمْ يَقْبَلْ عَنْهُمْ ضَلَّ وَ غَلَى. وَ أَيْضًا، قَالَ الْفُقَهَاءُ بِأَنَّ الْمُصَلِّيَ يُحَدِّثُ الصَّلَاةَ بِالذَّاعِي الَّذِي هُوَ النَّيَّةُ. وَ يُحَدِّثُ النَّيَّةَ بِنَفْسِهَا وَ لَا يُحَدِّثُ النَّيَّةَ بِنَيَّةٍ أُخْرَى. وَ إِلَّا، لَدَارَ وَ تَسْلَسَلْ. فَالْجَوَابُ هُنَا هُوَ الْجَوَابُ هُنَاكَ.

subsistence. It is thus an emanation of the actor.

Yet there may be another element at work here. In the course of his commentary on the Eleventh Observation of the *Fawā'id* [2, p. 232], the Shaykh says that when some thing subsists through “processional subsistence”, this means that it is *forever fresh* (طَرِيٌّ أَبَدًا *ṭariyyun ʿabadan*). Thus existing things are characterized by continual development and renewal, just as the Sun’s rays undergo continuous renewal. Now the author points out [2, Vol. 2] that the Acting of God itself subsists through Him by processional subsistence, and that it too is “forever fresh”. Now as Shaykh ʿAḥmad points out earlier, God acts without prior thought, meditation, or deliberation. Thus the Acting constitutes pure, continuous novelty. This would appear to correspond to total freedom of action, which is consistent with the Shaykh’s position that God is a completely free agent. Our actings are also characterized by novelty and freedom, except that, unlike the case with the Divine Acting, our wishings and desirings are a part of our own inner dispositions, as Shaykh ʿAḥmad quotes above from the Imams. So we think, deliberate with respect to, and are under the influence of, other factors. This state of affairs in turn restricts the freedom of our actions.

The other major point underlying the author’s view is his doctrine that quintessenceness and qualityness, and by extension, substantiality and accidentality, are relative, not absolute. The first and third replies to the first argument of Shaykh ʿAḥmad’s opponent are based on the author’s thesis that quintessences and substances, as well as qualities and accidents, are actually correlational accidents. We will address and discuss this issue in some detail in the next chapter.




Figure 2.1: The kinds of entity (I).

In summary, there are two kinds of entity: quintessence (ذَات *dāt*) and actional quality (صِفَاتِ فِعْلِيَّةٍ *ṣifāt fiʿliyyat*; see Figure 1.1). The actional qualities of a given quintessence are external to the quintessence itself. Again, it is important to keep in mind that for Shaykh ʿAḥmad, being a quintessence and being an actional quality are relative, not fixed, matters. A quintessence is a quality with respect to its perfect cause; a quality is a quintessence with respect to its effects and impressions. Another point that is important to keep in mind is that, for Shaykh ʿAḥmad, a given entity is not a composite of its quintessence and of the actional qualities it emanates. We will discuss this shortly. First, we will look at Shaykh ʿAḥmad’s division of actional qualities into an existentiational motion component and a component that is the culmination of existentiational motion.

2.4.3 The Denotations of Verbs and Gerunds

The word فِعْل *fiʿl* is ambiguous. In general, it is a gerund which denotes both “verb” as well as “acting” (or “action”). For the purposes of Shaykh ʿAḥmad’s metaphysics, the word *fiʿl* (*qua* significative of “acting”) carries a peculiar connotation. Given a verb, he considers its denotation as consisting of what he calls the *existentiational motion* (*ḥarakat ʿiḡādiyyat*) of the actor.

For Shaykh 'Aḥmad, the precise denotation of a given verb consists primarily of this *existentiational motion* which, in turn, is distinguished from the denotation of the corresponding gerund (مَصْدَر *maṣḍar*, plural مَصَادِر *maṣādir*). The denotation of the corresponding gerund is considered to be the *outcome, fulfillment, or culmination* (تَأْكِيد *taḳīd*) of the denotation of the verb. In other words, the denotation of the verb *existentiates*, that is, “brings into existence”, the denotation of the corresponding gerund. The distinction between denotation of verb and denotation of gerund is crucial to Shaykh 'Aḥmad's metaphysical system. Its origins lie in the structure of the Arabic language itself. This point requires some elaboration.

In Arabic, the overwhelming majority of nouns and verbs are classified under a verbal root of three consonants (four in a few cases). A given verbal root carries the general idea of a particular activity. The simplest word that can be formed from this root is a three-syllable, past-tense, third-person, singular, and masculine ground verb, consisting of only the three root letters. Other persons and tenses are obtained by an appropriate appending of one or more of a set of eight letters of increase²⁴. For example, from the root ك ر س *k r s* (connoting the idea of “breaking”) we have the base or ground verb كَسَرَ *kasara* (“he-broke”). Suffixing a ت *t* gives us كَسَرَتْ *kasarat* (“she-broke”); suffixing a نَا *nā* gives us كَسَرْنَا *kasarnā* (“we-broke”); and so on. The subject pronoun ‘he’ in كَسَرَ *kasara* is implicit; it is understood as part of the intension of the verb. From the same root letters we also obtain the gerund كَسْرًا *kasran* (“breaking”). Notice that, unlike the case for the

²⁴These letters are ا *ā*, ت *t*, س *s*, ل *l*, م *m*, ن *n*, و *w*, and ي *y*. They also comprise the mnemonic سَأَلْتُمُونِي.

verb, the gerund is independent of any subject pronoun.

From the verbal root letters, one may systematically derive, according to specific patterns and combinations of the root letters with one or more members of the set of eight letters of increase, a plethora of words belonging to particular classes of participles and substantives. The consistency of the language in this regard is such that the entries in an Arabic dictionary are generally arranged by root letters, particularly the third person singular masculine past tense. One then systematically looks for the verbal, participle, substantival, and other derivatives of that root.

One of the classic problems in the history of Arabic syntax is as follows: given an Arabic word derived from a verbal root, is its *principle* (أصل *ʾaṣl*) of derivation the corresponding gerund or the corresponding verb? Consider the active participle *kāsir* (“breaker”). Is it originally derived from the gerund *kasr* (“breaking”) or from the verb *kasara* (“he-broke”)?

According to the classical school of Kufa, the verb is the principle of derivation. The classical school of Basra, the overwhelmingly dominant school throughout the post-primordial period of Arabic grammar, the principle of derivation is the gerund. To go into the details of this debate, and to evaluate the relative merits of the arguments offered by each side, would require a major work of its own²⁵. Briefly, we can say that the Kufan school generally took a phenomenological approach to grammar. On the other hand, the Basrans placed much more emphasis on the systematic laying out of ab-

²⁵For the differences between the Basran and Kufan schools of grammar, see *Versteegh 1977*, Ch. 4, and *Versteegh 1993*. The standard reference is still Kamāl al-Dīn Abu al-Barakāt Ibn al-ʿAnbārī’s (d. 1182–1183) classic and monumental *al-ʿInṣāf fī Masāʾil al-ʿIkhtilāf*. On the issue of the principle of derivation, see *Anbārī 1961*, pgs. 235–245.

abstract and general rules and principles to be applied to language²⁶. When considered abstractly, the idea of “breaking”, expressed by the gerund, appears to be prior to a corresponding verb, for a given verb is just one enunciation of this general idea. The idea of breaking is one, whereas the verbs which enunciate this idea are multiple. ‘Breaking’ is a noun. The denotations of nouns subsist through themselves, whereas those of verbs do not. Verbs cannot stand alone; they need nouns.

The substance-metaphysical presuppositions of the Basrans are obvious. The idea of “breaking” is considered as a singular, separate entity, abstracted from the parts of speech containing the root letters *k s r*. Since the gerund represents this general idea of activity, it must be the principle of derivation. This way of thinking appears to be related to the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. This is the fallacy of mistaking an abstraction from actual entities for an actual entity itself. In this case, the Basrans appear to have taken an abstraction from words derivative from a root, associated this idea with the corresponding gerund, and then proceeded to apotheosize the gerund as the principle of derivation. This analysis proceeds somewhat in isolation from the actual development of language on the ground.

The Kufans, on the other hand, looked at the phenomenon of verb and gerund, and observed that the Arabs, in practice, generally used the gerund to signify, not some abstract idea of acting, but to signify the *outcome*, *cul-*

²⁶See, e.g., *Corbin 1993*, pgs. 142–144; *Versteegh 1977*, p. 112, end of footnote 36. Corbin also tries to make a connection between Kufan grammar theory and primordial Shī‘ī thought. Kufa was the major Shī‘ī center during the time of the later Imams. Although this is an intriguing area of research, it is not yet clear to me whether this has any direct bearing on Shaykh ‘Aḥmad’s adoption of the Kufan position on this issue.

mination or fulfillment (*taḳīd*) of that which is signified by the verb. We give some examples of this below. It must be emphasized that the above discussion is perhaps an oversimplification; it surely falls far short of doing justice to this important debate. For his part, Shaykh 'Aḥmad is explicit about favoring the Kufan view²⁷, from which he develops his metaphysical distinction between the denotations of verbs and those of gerunds.

Consider the Arabic sentence:

زَيْدٌ ضَرَبَ عَمْرًا ضَرْبًا *zaydun ḍaraba ʿamran ḍarban*

This sentence may be translated a number of ways viz., ‘Zayd beat ‘Amr really hard’, or, ‘Zayd gave ‘Amr a good beating’. However, a literal translation of this sentence gives us: ‘Zayd *he-beat* ‘Amr [a] *beating*’. According to Arabic grammar, ‘Amr’ is the *direct object* (مَفْعُولٌ بِهِ *mafʿūl bihī*) of the verb ‘he-beat’ (‘*ḍaraba*’). The *maṣḍar* or gerund ‘beating’ (‘*ḍarban*’) in this case constitutes the *absolute object* (مَفْعُولٌ مُطْلَقٌ *mafʿūl muṭlaq*) of the verb. Serious students of Arabic typically read or are told that the absolute object adds a sense of emphasis (*taḳīd*) to the original verb. Hence we may translate the above sentence as, e.g., ‘Zayd beat ‘Amr really hard’. However, the original meaning of *taḳīd* is not “emphasis” but “confirmation”, “ratification”, or “corroboration” (see *ABEL*, under وَكَّدَ). Shaykh 'Aḥmad calls it an “impression of the acting” (أَثَرُ الْفِعْلِ *ʾaṭar al-fiʿl*), that is, its outcome. Hence I have translated *taḳīd* with ‘outcome’, ‘fulfillment’, or ‘culmination’. According to al-Jawhari (d. 1007; see *S*, under وَكَّدَ), *wakada*, the root of *taḳīd*, means “he-intended”, “he-aimed-at”, or “he resolved-upon”. Based

²⁷See, e.g., *al-ʿAḥsāʾ* 1856, p. 210.

on this, the second verb form gives us وَكَّدَ *wakkada*, the gerund of which is *taḳkīd*. The second verb form is sometimes used as an intensive of the ground verb form; hence, “he-firmly-aimed at”, or, “he-firmly-resolved-upon”. So *taḳkīd* also means “that which is firmly intended or resolved upon”²⁸, e.g., “beating” with respect to “he-beat”.

Unlike the case for direct objects, intransitive as well as transitive verbs take absolute objects (which is why these objects are called absolute). For example:

قَامَ قِيَامًا *qāma qiyāman*

This literally means, “he stood a standing”. The gerund ‘*qiyām*’ (“standing”) serves as the absolute object of ‘*qāma*’ (“he-stood”). It signifies that which has been firmly resolved upon by the actor. That which has been resolved upon (“standing”) is thus the “confirmation” of the original willing and resolving to stand, which is signified by the verb ‘he-stood’ (*qāma*). For, Shaykh ‘Aḥmad, the desiring (إِرَادَةٌ *irādat*), willing (مَشِيَّةٌ *mašīʿat*), determining (قَدَرٌ *qadar*), executing (قَضَاءٌ *qaḍāʾ*), and accomplishing (إِمْدَاءٌ *imḍāʾ*)

²⁸Here we are treating *taḳkīd* as the outcome of *wakkada*. This is a common usage. For example, the gerund ‘حَلَقٌ *ḥalq*’ means “creating”, but it also means “the outcome of creating” i.e., “creation”. When used to signify the result or outcome of an acting, the original gerund is called, in Arabic grammar, the “name of the gerund (إِسْمُ الْمَصْدَرِ *ism al-maṣḍar*)”. Some English abstract nouns also have this double usage. ‘Creation’ means both “the act of creating” as well as “something that is created” (*MWCD*). In the terminology of Arabic grammar, ‘creation’ in the first instance functions as a gerund; in the second, it functions as a “name of the gerund”. Similarly, ‘*taḳkīd*’ *qua* gerund means “firmly aiming at” or “firmly resolving upon”. But *qua* name of the gerund it can also signify “that which is firmly intended or resolved upon”.

of *qiyām* constitute the existential motion (*ḥarakat ʾiğādiyyat*) that is precisely the denotation of the verb²⁹. When the actor moves to stand, then the act of standing results. The denotation of the gerund thus derives from the denotation of the verb. And this is consistent with the Kufan position which sees the verb as principle of derivation.

Someone may offer the following objection. One does not need the absolute object to signify the completion or culmination of an acting. In the sentence

زَيْدٌ ضَرَبَ عَمْرًا *zaydun ḍaraba ʿamran*

Zayd he-beat ‘Amr

ḍaraba signifies not only the existential motion of Zayd but also that Zayd did in fact receive the beating. Shaykh ‘Aḥmad might answer that, when used without the absolute object, a transitive verb elliptically denotes both the existential motion of the actor as well as its immediate outcome, that is, the actual beating. When used with the absolute object, the verb only signifies the existential motion.

From a metalinguistic perspective, one notices that we are in fact using gerunds and abstract nouns — like ‘acting’ (*fiʿl*) and ‘motion’ (*ḥarakat*) — to denote the denotations of verbs. This is because there is a problem in speaking of the denotations of verbs. For intellectual purposes one uses gerunds to name these denotations, but this does not mean that gerunds per se signify the denotations of verbs. Failing to recognize this will lead to difficulties. For example, ‘*ḥarakat ʾiğādiyyat*’ (literally, “existential *moving*”) is a

²⁹These five stages of the process of acting are discussed at the beginning of the Fourth Observation.

gerund. One may object that, since *ḥarakat* (“moving”) is a gerund, it must signify an outcome of another denotation of a verb, which in turn constitutes an existential moving, which is an outcome of the denotation of a verb, and so forth. The answer is that verbal nouns like ‘acting’ and ‘moving’ are being used in a different context when the denotation of a verb is involved. One must distinguish the common language usage of a gerund (or English abstract noun) to signify the outcome of the denotation of a verb from the strictly terminological usage of the gerund to intellectually indicate that very denotation which is, strictly speaking, the denotation of a verb and not of a gerund. Note that even the word for “verb”, *fiʿl*, is a gerund, not a verb. To distinguish between these two usages of the gerund, we have adopted the following convention: When a gerund is used to signify the outcome or culmination of the denotation of a verb, we will occasionally prefix the expression ‘act of’ to that gerund. When a gerund is used to signify the denotation of a verb, we will occasionally prefix the expression ‘process of’ to that gerund. From observations three and four of the *Fawā'id*, it is clear that Shaykh 'Aḥmad views the Acting as a process consisting of a number of stages and which constitutes the divine *existentialization* (إِيجَاد *ījād*). The outcome or culmination of this process is the event (حَدَث *ḥadaṭ*) that constitutes the act of *existence* (وُجُود *wuḡūd*).

On the cosmological front, Shaykh 'Aḥmad's distinction between denotation of verb and denotation of gerund leads to positing the ontological priority of existentialization over existence. Now *'wuḡūd*' is a gerund whose denotation, metaphysically speaking, is the outcome of the denotation of the verb 'أَوْجَدَ' *awḡada* (“he-existentialized”). This is the Acting (*fiʿl*) of God




Figure 2.2: The kinds of entity (II).

(again, *qua* denotation of verb, *not* gerund). Shaykh 'Aḥmad, in observations three and four of the *Fawā'id*, offers a detailed analysis of this Acting. It is very difficult because he is trying to explain and express details with regards to what amounts to the denotation of a verb. It is very hard for the intellect to deal with verbal denotations, for to speak of something is to fix it mentally as the denotation of a noun. This is a problem that goes back to Plato and Parmenides, and on the basis of which they were led to deny any ultimate reality to processes altogether.

Figure 1.2 illustrates this added complexity in Shaykh 'Aḥmad's ontology. We now consider the relationships that obtain between quintessence, the process of existentiational motion, and culmination of existentiational motion. These relationships underlie Shaykh 'Aḥmad's theory of God's relation to the world, as well as his cosmology and division of existence into Real Existence, Absolute Existence, and delimited existence. Shaykh 'Aḥmad develops these themes within the context of the problem of *origin* and *derivative*.

2.5 The Metaphysics of Subsistence III: Origin and Derivative

2.5.1 Derivation in General

The Arabic word meaning “derivation” is ‘إِشْتِقَاقٌ’ *ʾištiqāq*; its active participle, ‘مُشْتَقٌّ’ *muštaqq*, means “derivative”. The word ‘*ʾištiqāq*’ is ambiguous, having a number of technical usages in the literature. The one concerning us here is what is properly known as *minor derivation* (الإِشْتِقَاقُ الصَّغِيرُ *al-ʾištiqāq aṣ-ṣaġīr*). According to ‘Aḥmadnagari (*JU*, under إِشْتِقَاقٌ), minor derivation is a derivation of a word from its principle such that both words share the same root letters, the root letters in each occur in the same order, and such that both words mutually correspond through one of the three modes of signification³⁰. There is a class of nouns³¹ that consists of what are called “derived nouns (الْأَسْمَاءُ الْمَشْتَقَّاتُ) *al-ʾasmāʾ al-muštaqqāt*”. This class includes, among others, the class of gerunds (according to the Kufans); the class whose members denote the *place* where the action signified by the root occurs; the class whose members denote the *time* when the action signified by the root occurs; the class whose members denote the *instrument* by means of which the action signified by the root is occasioned; as well as that class whose members may be characterized as what we call “participles”, though the Arabic class of “participles” is far richer than the English variety. The

³⁰That is, the signification of the derived word carries an idea of activity that is either more general, less general, or in exact accord with that signified by the principle word.

³¹Note that, in Arabic, the class of *nouns* (أَسْمَاءُ *asmāʾ*, singular إِسْمٌ *ism*) is inclusive of what we would call pronouns, adjectives, and adverbs.

last class is of most concern to us here.

There are three basic classes of participle :

1. *Active Participle* (إِسْمُ الْفَاعِلِ *ism al-fā'il*, literally, “name of the doer/actor”). Its pattern is فَاعِلٍ *fā'il*. So from ‘كَتَبَ’ *kataba* (“he-wrote”) we have ‘كَاتِبٌ’ *kātib* (“writer”); from ‘ضَرَبَ’ *ḍaraba* (“he-beat”) we have ‘ضَارِبٌ’ *ḍārib* (“a beater”); from ‘قَدَرَ’ *qadara* (“he-became-powerful”) we have ‘قَادِرٌ’ *qādir* (“powerful”);
2. *Passive Participle* (إِسْمُ الْمَفْعُولِ *ism al-maf'ul*, literally, “name of the acted-upon”). Its pattern is مَفْعُولٍ *maf'ul*. So from ‘كَتَبَ’ *kataba* (he-wrote) we have ‘مَكْتُوبٌ’ *maktūb* (“written”); from ‘ضَرَبَ’ *ḍaraba* (“he-beat”) we have ‘مَضْرُوبٌ’ *maḍrūb* (“beaten”);
3. *Participle-like Adjectives* (الْأَسْمَاءُ الْمُشَبَّهَةُ بِأَسْمَاءِ الْفَاعِلِ وَالْمَفْعُولِ *al-asmā'u 'l-mušabbahatu bi-asmā'i 'l-fā'ili wa 'l-maf'ul*, literally, “nouns assimilated with the names of doer and acted-upon”). They have no standard pattern, but are generally formed only from intransitive verbs. For example, from ‘شَجِعَ’ *šaḡu'a* (“he-became-brave”) we have ‘شُجَاعٌ’ *šuḡā'* (“brave”); from ‘حَلُمَ’ *ḥaluma* (“he-became-forbearing”) we have ‘حَلِيمٌ’ *ḥalīm* (“forbearing”).

An important thing to keep in mind is that these participles are actually *verbal adjectives*, even though we may render many of them as substantives in English. For example, the sentence ‘زَيْدٌ كَاتِبٌ’ *zaydun kātibun* can, depending on the context be translated alternatively by, ‘Zayd is a writer’, as well as by, ‘Zayd is writing’. However ‘كَاتِبٌ’ *kātibun* is neither a noun in

our sense, as in the case of ‘writer’, nor is it part of a verb phrase (as is the case of ‘writing’). The closest translation of the above sentence is probably, ‘Zayd is writer’, where the dropping of the article is meant to indicate that ‘writer’ denotes a quality of Zayd. ‘Zayd is *a* writer’, on the other hand, indicates a relation of, not predication, but class inclusion. Yes, the corresponding Arabic sentence can also convey the sense of class inclusion, such as if Zayd’s profession is writing. But this is an elliptical usage of the participle, extracted from its primary usage. That is, the Arabic participle may be used as a substantive, but its original significance is verbal and attributional, not substantival. At the same time, the Arabic participle must be distinguished from the gerund, because the former contains implicit reference to either an agent (as in the case of the active participle) or to an object and an agent (as in the case of the passive participle), whereas the gerund in itself carries reference to neither. This raises problems with respect to precise translation. However, the philosophical problem of origin and derivative is generally discussed in this grammatical context.

The problem may be stated as follows. Consider a derivative expression like ‘قَائِمٌ *qā'im*’, an active participle and verbal adjective naming the quality “standing” or “stander”. What is the extra-mental *meaning* (مَعْنَى *ma'nā*) or denotation of this derivative? In particular, where does the meaning of the derivative stand in relation to the quintessence to which it is attributed? Relatedly, what is the extra-mental meaning or denotation, called the *origin of derivation* (مَبْدَأُ الْإِشْتِقَاقِ *mabda' al-ištiqāq*), which each member of the general class of derivative nouns of a given particular root shares as an element of its own meaning? And what is the relation of this origin to the

quintessence to which it is attributed?

The extension, though not the intension, of the term ‘*mabda*’ appears to roughly correspond to that of ‘property’. Here we are considering that extension of ‘property’ which corresponds to its intension as “an attribute common to all members of a class” (*MWCD*). This intension corresponds to the technical usage of the Latin ‘*proprietas* [37, p. 255]. In our case, a given *mabda* is that which is shared by each member of a class of denotations of derivatives of a particular verbal root. So we can think of the *mabda* as a kind of property.

We should perhaps point out that the terms ‘*mabda*’ and ‘*muštaqq*’ are also used in a more general sense in Muslim philosophy of law and language. In that case, the extension of the term ‘*mabda*’ is virtually identical with that of ‘property’, and the extension of the term ‘*muštaqq*’ is virtually identical with the members of the class of individuals that share a given property. To do justice to this topic would require a major study in its own right³².

Before going on to Shaykh ‘Aḥmad’s analysis of origin and derivative, let us first be clear about what we mean by ‘meaning’. In addition, we must mention Shaykh ‘Aḥmad’s distinction between *name* (*ʾism*) and adjective (*ṣifat*).

³²For details on the modern debates in Muslim scholasticism surrounding this topic, see, e.g., *al-Khurāsānī* 1989, pgs. 38–58; *al-Khūʾī* 1990, Vol. 1, pgs. 215–295; *al-Khumaynī* 1995, pgs. 187–230; and *al-Sīstānī* 1994, pgs. 210–340.

2.5.2 Expression and Meaning

Muslim scholastics, especially the philosophers of law, developed an intricate and complicated machinery for dealing with problems in the philosophy of language. According to Shaykh 'Aḥmad, that of which one has cognizance through the medium of expressions (*ʿalfāẓ*) belongs to one of at least seven divisions³³. The first of these divisions that the author mentions is that of *meaning* (مَعْنَى *maʿnā*). Shaykh 'Aḥmad says that this division is the most important and fundamental one in this regard. He defines the meaning of an expression to be “that which is intended by an expression [on the part of the assigner] at the point of its being assigned”³⁴. He disagrees with the more popular view that defines the meaning of an expression to be the mental form in correspondence to which expressions are assigned. For more on this disagreement, see the glossary, under *maʿnā*. We note that Shaykh 'Aḥmad's concept of meaning is close to that of “denotation” or “extension”, signified in Arabic by مِصْدَاق *miṣḍāq*'. We can illustrate what Shaykh 'Aḥmad means by considering the word 'dodo'. The denotation of 'dodo' is the bird of that name, although the dodo bird is actually extinct. The denotation of an expression is defined by Shaykh 'Aḥmad as that to which an expression may be truthfully applied, regardless of whether it is present or extinct. So it appears that, for Shaykh 'Aḥmad, 'meaning' and

³³See the preliminary remarks in the *Treatise in Response to Mirza Muhammad Ali al-Mudarris*, question 2.

³⁴

فَالْمَعْنَى مَا يُقْصَدُ مِنَ اللَّفْظِ بِأَصْلِ الْوَضْعِ.

‘denotation’ are extensionally, though not intensionally, equivalent. Since ‘denotation’ carries less ambiguity than ‘meaning’, and since the term ‘*miṣḍāq*’ does not arise in Shaykh ‘Aḥmad’s discussion, I will generally translate, in the following discussion, ‘*ma‘nā*’ by ‘denotation’.

2.5.3 Name and Adjective

We mentioned earlier that in Arabic grammar, the class of *nouns* (*asmāʾ*, singular *ʾism*) includes what we would call pronouns, adjectives, and adverbs. Within this class there are various subclasses of noun. One distinction within this class that Shaykh ‘Aḥmad emphasizes is that which obtains between *name* or *substantive proper* (*ʾism*) and *adjective* (*ṣifat*). When discussing this issue in the *Risālah Qaṭīfiyyah I*, question 3, uses the same word for the subclass of names that is used for nouns in general.

After a detailed discussion, Shaykh ‘Aḥmad summarizes the distinction between name and adjective. He begins with ‘name’ (*ʾism*): [3, Vol. 1, pt. 2, p. 116]

To summarize, a given name is assigned in correspondence to a quintessence. It may even be taken from one of its qualities. When using that name, such a quality is regarded [as applying to the named] since one does not, when using that word, consider the distinctness of that actual quality from the named³⁵.

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و بِالْجُمْلَةِ، فَالِإِسْمُ مَوْضُوعٌ بِإِزَاءِ الذَّاتِ، وَإِنْ كَانَ مَنْقُولًا عَنْ صِفَتِهِ وَ لُوحِظَتْ حَالُ الْإِسْتِعْمَالِ
لِعَدَمِ اعْتِبَارِ خُرُوجِهَا عَنِ الْمُسَمَّى عِنْدَ الْإِسْتِعْمَالِ.

Based on his earlier discussion, what Shaykh 'Aḥmad means by the second sentence onward is that, not infrequently, a name is *taken* (*manqūl*) from a quality of the named, whether that quality has real, imagined, posited, or hoped for conformity (*مُنَاسَبَة* *munāsabat*) with the named. For example, someone may name his son 'ḥasan', which means "good", in the hope that he grows up to be a good boy. Now as the son grows up, he may be good sometimes, he may be bad other times, or he may turn out to be irredeemably evil. That is, the quality of goodness is not quintessential to the named, in the sense that the named will still be who he is, whether he is good or bad. But his name will still be 'ḥasan', and 'ḥasan' will still mean "good". This is because, upon using the word 'ḥasan' as a name for the son, we are not considering the distinctness of the quality of goodness from the named. In this example, the quality of goodness is regarded as applying to the named only in the sense that the one who named him 'ḥasan' *hoped* that he would be good. Another example: Sometimes someone may be named, e.g., *al-ḥasan* ("the good") because of some particularly good act he did at some time or because he is particularly good at something. So someone says, e.g., "The good one has just arrived". Here, the quality of goodness is regarded as applying to the named in the sense that the one who named him 'al-ḥasan' ("the good") had in mind that the named is particularly good at something or has done something particularly good.

When discussing this issue in the *Risālah Qatīfīyyah I*, question 3, Shaykh 'Aḥmad uses the same word 'ism' for the subclass of names that is used for nouns in general. From the context, it appears that he is referring to the subclass of nouns called *proper names* (أَسْمَاءُ الذَّاتِ *asmā' ad-dāt* or أَسْمَاءُ الْعِلْمِ

‘asmā’ al-‘alam).

Shaykh ‘Aḥmad now describes ‘adjective’ (*ṣifat*) as follows: [3, Vol. 1, pt. 2, p. 116]

A given adjective is assigned in correspondence to that *aspect* (جَهَة *ḡihat*) [of the quintessence] whose distinctness from the named may, at the time of using [the word], be considered³⁶.

For example, ‘hungry’ and ‘full’ are adjectives. When I say, “Zayd is hungry”, I am considering Zayd’s hunger distinct from his quintessence. For when Zayd is full, he may no longer be called hungry. That is, ‘hungry’ and ‘full’ are assigned in correspondence to, not the *quintessence* of Zayd, but to distinct *qualities* of Zayd.

There is much more to Shaykh ‘Aḥmad’s theory of names than what we have mentioned here. We have only covered what we hope suffices for a brief discussion of his theory of origin and derivative.

2.5.4 Denotation of a Derivative and its Subsistence

Consider the following statement on the part of an observer:

زَيْدٌ قَائِمٌ *zaydun qā'imun* Zayd is standing/stander.

In the *Treatise in Response to Mirza Muhammad Ali al-Mudarris*, question 2 [3, Vol. 1, pt. 2, pgs. 241–242], Shaykh ‘Aḥmad explains that when one

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وَالصَّفَةُ مَوْضُوعٌ بِإِزَاءِ تِلْكَ الْجِهَةِ الْمَعْتَبَرِ خُرُوجُهَا عَنْهُ عِنْدَ الْإِسْتِعْمَالِ.

establishes the *syntactical dependence relation* (الاسناد *al-ʾisnād*) of ‘stander’ on ‘Zayd’, that one does this in correspondence with the actual dependence relation of the denotation of ‘stander’ upon the denotation of ‘Zayd’³⁷. He then claims that the denotation of ‘Zayd’ is not the denotation of ‘stander’. This is because “Zayd” is a *pure quintessence* (ذات بحت *dāt baḥt*), while “stander” is a quality: it is neither a quintessence nor a composite of a quintessence and a quality “as some of them think”³⁸.

Shaykh ʾAḥmad does not specify who “some of them” are. However, according to *JA* (under), there are three views about the *maʿnā* — by which Aḥmadnagari, the author of the *JA*, probably means, not the *denotation*, but the *intension* — of a given derivative (this is clear from his discussion, where he emphasizes the مَفْهُوم *mafḥūm* or intension of the derivative as the issue in dispute):

1. That it is a composite of the quintessence and the quality; this is the view of the grammarians;
2. That it is a composite of the origin of derivation and of its *relation* (نِسْبَة *nisbat*) to the quintessence; this is the view of Jurjāni:
3. That it is simple, and that the derivative is just an expression for its

³⁷This position is based on his theory of *word assignment* (وَضْعُ الْأَلْفَازِ *waḍʿ al-alfāz*), that is, the theory of how words are assigned their meanings. To get into this would take us far afield. A key element of this theory appears to be the conviction that Arabic, the language of revelation, and its structure accurately mirror reality.

³⁸

origin; the author of the *JA* attributes this to “the illustrious of the scholars”. I have not as yet identified who this is.

So by “some of them”, Shaykh ‘Aḥmad is probably referring to the grammarians, as well as, most likely, those theologians who shared this view. Keep in mind that Shaykh ‘Aḥmad is concerned about, not the intension, but the extension or denotation of the derivative (this is because of his concept of *ma‘nā*). This complicates the task of assessing his opinion with regards to the other two views mentioned by Aḥmadnagari. However, the fact that the first view is followed by most of the grammarians may explain why Shaykh ‘Aḥmad uses a grammatical line of reasoning to refute this particular claim.

In any case, Shaykh ‘Aḥmad argues against the view that the denotation of the derivative ‘stander’ is a composite of the quintessence of the one to whom it is attributed and of the quality of standing. The argument is presented somewhat more clearly in the *Risālah Rashīdiyyah*, question 4 [3, Vol. 1, pt. 2, p. 234]. We paraphrase the relevant passage. First, he alludes to a metaphysical distinction he has made elsewhere, that between the *pure quintessence* (الذَّاتُ الْبَاحِثَةُ *ad-dāt al-baḥt*) and the *self-manifesting quintessence through qualities* (الذَّاتُ الظَّاهِرَةُ بِالصِّفَاتِ *ad-dāt aẓ-ẓāhirat bi-’ṣ-ṣifāt*). This distinction is analogous to the Kantian distinction between noumenon and phenomenon. For Shaykh ‘Aḥmad, it is the “self-manifesting quintessence through qualities” that directly and immediately manifests or appears to our outer senses. The actual “pure quintessence” remains hidden from our outer senses. One must be on guard against taking this analogy too far, for Shaykh ‘Aḥmad is an extreme realist. It does not appear that he would consider the phenomenon to be some construct of our minds; the phenomenon

or “self-manifesting quintessence through qualities” is quite real. Indeed, it constitutes the extra-mental denotation of the derivative.

But we are getting ahead of ourselves. He warns the questioner that by a given ‘self-manifesting quintessence through qualities’ he does not mean a composite of a pure quintessence and a quality. When one says “Zayd is stander” and “Zayd is sitter”, then the denotation of ‘stander’ is different from the denotation of ‘sitter’. Now the pure quintessence in question is the *doer* (*fā’il*) of the act of “standing”. As such, it is the *existentiator* (*mū-jīd*) of the act of standing. Now the existentiatio ends with, that is, finds its origin in, the pure quintessence’s very existentiational motion; it does not reach into the quintessence of Zayd. This is because the quintessence of Zayd, *qua* itself, is not motion. Rather, when it existentiates an *acting* (*fi’l*), it existentiates it through itself, that is, through that very acting. This motion is an emanation and quality of Zayd and is external to the reality of Zayd. Indeed, it is the very acting (*qua* denotation of verb) of Zayd. Now when the pure quintessence manifests through that existentiational motion, it is actually manifesting through a quality of the quintessence. When one says, “Zayd is stander”, that through which the act of standing (*al-qiyām*) is supported (المُسْتَنَدُ إِلَيْهِ *al-mustanad ilayhi*) is not the quintessence of Zayd, but rather the very existentiational motion which is an emanation of Zayd. This is because the act of standing is supported by and ends with that very quality of existentiational motion. However, the pure quintessence is not a motion; it only existentiates the motion through that very motion.

Returning to the *Treatise in Response to Mirza Muhammad Ali al-Mударis*, the author says that a given actional quality is something other than

the thing qualified. It does not subsist through the qualified quintessence (through affectional or inhering subsistence); it only subsists through its *aspect of activity* (جَهَةُ الْفَاعِلِيَّةِ *ġihat al-fā'iliyyat*). This aspect of activity constitutes its *process of manifesting through acting*. Zayd is the “doer” of the act of standing, that is, its *originator* (مُحْدِث *muhdiṭ*); the *originating* (إِحْدَاث *iḥdāt*) constitutes the process of the manifesting of the quintessence due to and through the acting. In reality, this process of manifesting, this aspect of the doer, is the very acting itself. So “stander” subsists through the originating of Zayd (*qua* denotation of the verb أَحْدَثَ *aḥdata* or “he-originated”).

This line of thought is very difficult and subtle. There is a strong phenomenological element here that needs to be sorted out. One notices that nearly wherever he gives this example, Shaykh 'Aḥmad always says something like “When you say ‘Zayd is stander...’”. That is, one says this in response to the experience of witnessing Zayd stand. But it is not the quintessence of Zayd that is directly and immediately experienced. Rather, it is Zayd’s manifestation through a field of activity that is an emanation of his quintessence. That phenomenon or manifestation we call “stander”. But the pure quintessence that is Zayd himself supposedly has not moved at all; the existention of the standing is only an emanation of that quintessence. Yet Shaykh 'Aḥmad calls the quintessence of Zayd “the doer of the standing” and its “originator”. The words ‘doer’ and ‘stander’ are also derivative participles. Do they not also signify manifestations? In other words, how is one to refer to the quintessence of Zayd? Although Shaykh 'Aḥmad does not address this, the whole point appears to be that, in reality, you can’t refer

directly to the quintessence of Zayd by means of a derivative *qua* participle and verbal adjective. When one uses such a derivative, such as ‘doer’, to refer to the quintessence of Zayd, perhaps it must be considered elliptically or metaphorically. When one says, “Zayd is the doer of the act of standing”, this is elliptical for something like, “the act of standing is the outcome of the existentiational motion that constitutes an emanation of the quintessence of Zayd”.

There may also be another way of looking at this. One can call the quintessence of Zayd “the doer of the act of standing”; but then we are only using the expression, ‘the doer of the act of standing’ as a *name* of Zayd as opposed to a verbal adjective. As Shaykh ‘Aḥmad has pointed out in his discussion of the distinction between name and adjective, the name of a quintessence may be taken from an adjective corresponding to a quality. For example, God is Creator and Destroyer. ‘Creator’ and ‘Destroyer’ may be used as names of God in any particular instance; but when used as names we are not considering any particular instances of creating a particular thing and of destroying that same thing. One can say, e.g., “The Destroyer is creating something right now”. There is no contradiction because ‘Destroyer’ is a name and ‘creating/creator’ is an active participle and verbal adjective. So no infinite regress is entailed by calling Zayd the “doer of standing”, because we are using ‘doer of standing’ either as a name, or as an elliptical expression.

Shaykh ‘Aḥmad now tries to demonstrate the harmony of his position with the structure of the Arabic language. Consider again the sentence

زَيْدٌ قَائِمٌ *zaydun qā'imun* Zayd is standing/stander.

In this sentence, ‘Zayd’ is the *subject* (مُبْتَدَأٌ *mubtadaʾ*) and ‘standing/stander’ is the predicate. Both are in the nominative case, signified by the suffix ‘-un’. One of the classic problems of Arabic grammar is as follows: what is the *governing word of the nominative* (رَافِعٌ *rāfiʿ*) or *regent* (عَامِلٌ *ʿāmil*), if any, due to which the predicate is in the nominative case, and what is the governing word of the nominative regent, if any, due to which the subject is in the nominative case? According to Shaykh ʿAḥmad, each is the governing word for the other; the subject is in the nominative due to the predicate and vice versa. Once again, Shaykh ʿAḥmad is siding with the minority Kufan view, although he makes no mention of that here³⁹. However, his reasoning is unique. He says that each governs the other because, in a sense, the denotations of subject and predicate each “govern” the other. He defines this *external regent* or governor (ʿāmil) as “that through which the denotation which necessitates *declension* or *inflection* (ʾiʿrāb) [of the word which expresses it] subsists⁴⁰. So through the dependence relation of the act of standing (*qiyām*) on the previously discussed *aspect* (*ḡihat*) of Zayd, the activity which culminates in the act of standing subsists — I assume through manifestational subsistence; the author does not explicitly say — through that very act of standing. So the act of standing is the external governor through which Zayd’s aspect of activity subsists. This corresponds, for purposes of syntax, to saying that the predicate ‘stander’, which represents the

³⁹See *Anbārī* 1961, p. 44, for a discussion of this problem.

⁴⁰

الْعَامِلُ هُوَ مَا بِهِ يَتَقَوَّمُ الْمَعْنَى الْمُتَقَتَضِي لِلْإِعْرَابِ.

act of standing, is the regent through which ‘Zayd’, to whose denotation the aspect of Zayd is attributed, is in the nominative case. Shaykh ‘Aḥmad does not mention it but one may note that, in Arabic, a name does not take any declension at all when it stands alone. Thus the quintessence of Zayd, *qua* itself, neither “governs” nor is “governed”. So Shaykh ‘Aḥmad seems to be saying that the declension of ‘Zayd’ in ‘Zayd is standing’ comes about through the mediation of this aspect of activity which is his emanation. The author makes statements further on which clarify this point.

Shaykh ‘Aḥmad now says that the relation of dependence between the denotation of ‘stander’ (*qā'im*) to Zayd’s aspect of activity is also one of subsistence — presumably realizational subsistence; the act of standing signified by ‘stander’ subsists through Zayd’s aspect of activity by means of its dependence upon that activity. So that dependence necessitates that ‘stander’ be in the nominative case. I am not sure I fully understand and appreciate either the relevance of this issue or Shaykh ‘Aḥmad’s very dense discussion of it. What follows appears to be more directly related to the problem.

In Arabic grammar, there are at least two situations wherein which an inflected or declinable expression must take on the case (nominative, accusative, or genitive) of a previous expression:

1. Where the posterior expression is an *adjective* (*ṣifat* or نَعْت *naʿt*) of the previous expression;
2. Where the posterior expression is a *permutative* or *substitute* (بَدَل *badal*) of the previous expression. It has a number of divisions. That which concerns us is *universal permutation* or *substitution of all for all* (بَدَلُ الْكُلِّ مِنَ الْكُلِّ *badalu 'l-kulli mina 'l-kulli*). An expression is a uni-

versal permutative of a previous expression when the extension of the second term is equivalent to that of the first. An example of this consists of the expressions ‘Zayd’ and ‘your-brother’ (أَخُوكَ ṣaḥū-ka) in the sentence ‘Zayd your-brother came’ (جَاءَ زَيْدٌ أَخُوكَ ḡāʾa zaydun ṣaḥū-ka). The expression ‘your-brother’ is in the nominative case because ‘Zayd’ is in the nominative case. You can substitute one for the other, viz., “Your brother Zayd came” (جَاءَ أَخُوكَ زَيْدٌ ḡāʾa ṣaḥū-ka zaydun).

Shaykh Ḥamad now asks us to consider the following sentence:

جَاءَ زَيْدٌ الْقَائِمُ ḡāʾa zaydun al-qāʾimu

Zayd came while standing (literally, “He-came Zayd the stander”).

Shaykh Ḥamad points out that all are agreed that ‘the stander’ ‘al-qāʾimu’ is a verbal adjective, not a permutative. If it denoted the quintessence of Zayd, then it would be, not an adjective, but a permutative. Next, if it denoted a composite of a quintessence and a quality, then it’s being in the nominative case would be governed, not by ‘Zayd’, but by the verb ‘he-came’ (جَاءَ ḡāʾa), which itself already governs the inflection of ‘Zayd’; that is, ‘Zayd’ is in the nominative case because of the verb preceding it. Shaykh Ḥamad points out in the *Risālah Rashīdiyyah*, question 4 [3, Vol. 1, pt. 2, p. 234] that if ‘al-qāʾimu’ is governed by the same verb then this amounts to the same thing, viz., that ‘al-qāʾimu’ is nominative because of permutativity, not adjectivity. But ‘al-qāʾimu’ is clearly a verbal adjective, as agreed upon by all.

After this discussion, the author claims that when one has real cognizance of the above, one can understand that the origin of derivation is that aspect of activity of the doer which is the process of acting of the doer (again, *qua*

denotation of the verb). The derivative just names the quality derived from that origin. The author then clarifies the statement he made at the outset of this discussion, namely, that when one establishes the syntactical dependence relation of ‘stander’ on ‘Zayd’, one does this in correspondence with the actual dependence relation of the denotation of ‘stander’ upon the denotation of ‘Zayd’. He points out that it is more precise to say that the expression ‘stander’ has a relationship of syntactical dependence to the expression ‘Zayd’ only with respect to the latter expression’s being characterized *de dicto* by the activity that generates the standing. Similarly, the denotation of ‘stander’ has a relationship of dependence *de re*, not directly to the quintessence of Zayd, but to the activity that is emanated by the quintessence of Zayd. This point may serve to clarify part of the previous discussion where Shaykh ‘Aḥmad says in effect that *zaydun* is in the nominative case, not because the quintessence of Zayd himself directly subsists (manifestationally) through the act of standing, but because the field of activity that constitutes an aspect and emanation of Zayd directly subsists through the act of standing that is the outcome of that activity.

Shaykh ‘Aḥmad does not mention it explicitly, but it appears that he has made a direct correspondence between a given *principle of derivation* (*ʿaṣl al-ʾiṣṭiqāq*) (which for Shaykh ‘Aḥmad is the verb) and the corresponding *origin of derivation* (*mabdaʾ al-ʾiṣṭiqāq*) (which is the property shared in common by the denotations of the participles derived from that verb). That origin or property is the emanated *aspect of activity* (*ḡihat al-fāʿiliyyat*) of a quintessence, but is not the quintessence itself. Given an emanated property of a quintessence, it is *not* identical to or part of the quintessence which emanates

it. Now verbal adjectives (like ‘*qā'im*’ or ‘stander’) and gerunds (like ‘*qiyām*’ or ‘standing’) are, *de dicto*, derived from the verb. Correspondingly, both phenomenological actional qualities (like *qā'im* or “stander”) and ontological actional qualities (like *qiyām* or “the act of standing”) are, *de re*, derived from that emanated property that is the aspect of activity of a quintessence.

The Paradigm of the Lamp

Shaykh 'Aḥmad now gives an illustration of his view by means of a classic paradigm (مِثَال *mitāl*) of the proof of wisdom, that of the lamp (السَّراج *as-sirāḡ*). Consider an oil lamp with a burning wick. From the tip of the wick a bright flame can be seen. Apparently, this flame is the very fire itself. Now the rays of light that one sees are analogous to the denotation of ‘stander’; they are in a dependence relationship with respect to the flame. The flame has the status of “origin of derivation”; the rays have the status of “derivative”. Apparently, the rays stand in a relation of direct dependence with respect to the fire itself, where the fire — according to the standard chemistry of Shaykh 'Aḥmad's time — is an element composed of the fundamental natures of heat and dryness. Similarly, when one says “Zayd is standing (*zaydun qā'imun*)”, then, apparently, one is suggesting that “stander” directly depends on Zayd. In reality, however, the rays depend directly on the flame, not the fire. And the flame, contrary to first glances, does not affectionally subsist through or inhere in the fire itself. Rather, it inheres in those parts of the oil which the fire burns and calcines until it turns them into smoke-particles. These smoke particles, in turn, become acted upon by the fire through the giving off of light. When one puts out the fire, the particles

separate as smoke.

So, Shaykh 'Aḥmad concludes, the origin of derivation is not the pure quintessence. Rather, it only subsists through the quintessence through *realizational subsistence* (*taqawwuma taḥaqquqin*), not through *affectional subsistence* (*taqawwuma ʿurūḍin*), nor in the way a whole subsists through its parts. As we pointed out earlier, in this case the author means, by ‘realizational subsistence’, emanational subsistence. While he is not explicit about this in this particular treatise, he is quite clear about this in his *Observations in the Philosophy of Law*, part 4, problem 2 [3, Vol. 1, pt. 3, p. 39], where he discusses the same issue, though in a slightly different context. In the latter treatise, Shaykh 'Aḥmad seeks to show that, for the denotation of a derivative to be truly predicated of a quintessence, it is not a condition that the denotation of that derivative affectionally subsist through that quintessence. Although the line of thought laid out in that treatise provides an excellent complement to the present discussion, we will not pursue it at present.

If it appears that we have belabored this issue, it is because familiarity with it may provide a key for the reader to Shaykh 'Aḥmad's *Fawā'id*. The author himself placed a lot of importance upon this issue, as the last lines of his discussion of origin and derivative confirm:

For sure, great obscurities and grave confusions have occurred as a result of their supposing that the origin of derivation is the Pure Quintessence, and that the derivative denotes it and inheres within It. This entails the corruption of their *professions of God's Unity* (*tawḥīd*) as well as the nullification of their religion. I have extended this discussion and have continually repeated myself

due to the difficulty of these ways and the lack of familiarity with them. So if you desire to provide your beliefs about the matter of existence with a firm base, then you must grasp this foundation. So correctly build upon it!

At the end, we see, Shaykh 'Aḥmad has returned to his most fundamental metaphysical concerns. The whole purpose of the paradigms of Zayd standing and the lamp burning are, in the final analysis, meant to illustrate the relationship of God to the world. He does not specify who it is that maintains that the origin of derivation is identical to or inherent in the Pure Quintessence, but it would appear that he has in mind the 'Ash'arites, who believe that God's speech affectionally subsists through His Quintessence (he forcefully refutes this in his *Observations in the Philosophy of Law*, part 4, problem 2 [3, Vol. 1, pt. 3, p. 39]); those among the Peripatetics and Illuminationists who hold that God's Desiring is identical to his Quintessence; the later Illuminationists of Mulla Ṣadra's school who believe in the univocity of 'existence' and ontological gradation of existence; and those Sufis who believe in the oneness of existence (وَحْدَةُ الوجود *waḥdat al-wuḡūd*).

2.5.5 Cosmological Applications

We are now in a position to better appreciate Shaykh 'Aḥmad's answer, introduced in the last chapter, to the fundamental problem of his metaphysics. Once again, the ultimate aim of Wisdom is knowledge of God. Yet God is utterly unknowable. How then can we know God?

From the ontological point of view, Shaykh 'Aḥmad considers God as a Pure Quintessence about which we can know nothing at all nor with which

we can come into direct contact. He emanates a field of existential motion which constitutes the denotation of verbs like *He-existentiated*, (أَوْجَدَ ʾawğada), *He-Commanded* (أَمَرَ ʾamara) or *Become!* (كُنْ kun). In the Qur'an we read: ***His Commanding is such that, when He Desires something, He says to it, "Become!", and it becomes.***⁴¹ The culmination of this process of *the Commanding that is the Acting* (الأمر الفعليّ al-ʾamr al-fiʿliyy) is the act of existence, or *the Commanding that is the outcome of Acting* (الأمر المفعوليّ al-ʾamr al-mafʿūliyy). That is, it is the ontological correspondent to the absolute object of Arabic grammar. As the denotation of a gerund, it is still active, in accordance with the rule: Every impression resembles the actional quality of its proximate agent. *Existentialiation* (إيجاد ʾiğād) is thus prior to *existence* (وُجُود wuğūd). Since existence is an impression of God's Acting, that Acting is an affection of existence, just as the act of beating is an affection of the one who is beaten. So although existence with respect to its own impressions is active, it *becomes-in-yielding-to-Acting* (يَنْفَعِلُ yanfaʿilu) coincidentally to God's existentialiation of it. We will return to this idea in the next chapter.

Phenomenologically, however, one does not initially "see", through the heart-flux, existence *qua* existence and existentialiation *qua* existentialiation. One sees the manifestation of God *qua* what corresponds to the denotation of a derivative verbal adjective. For example, when one looks at Zayd standing, one is immediately aware and cognizant of, not the actual process of existentialiation of the act of standing, nor of the act of standing that is the culmination of that process, but of the manifestation of Zayd that is his quality denoted by

⁴¹Qur'an 36:82.




Figure 2.3: The kinds of entity (III).

the derivative ‘stander’, and which derives from the actional qualities consisting of process of existentiation of the act of standing and of the actual act of standing. That is, there are two *ontological* actional qualities involved here: the act of standing and the process of existentiation of which it is the culmination. Then there is the *phenomenological* actional quality or *phenomena*: the manifestation of Zayd as “stander” (See Figure 1.3). The manifestation of Zayd is not identical to the quintessence of Zayd, the noumenon. However, it is through that manifestation or phenomenon that we are cognizant of the quintessence or the noumenon. That is, our cognizance of the phenomenon is exactly our cognizance of the noumenon. Yet the phenomenon is definitely not the noumenon.

In the case of the mystical cognizance of God, a similar situation obtains. Corresponding to the phenomenological qualities of “stander”, “sitter”, and

other manifestations of a quintessence are what Shaykh 'Aḥmad calls the *Stations* (مَقَامَات maqāmāt) and *Signposts* (عَلَامَات alāmāt) of God. In the Second Observation, the author gives an analysis of the propositions of a negative theology of the strictest sort. At the end of this chapter, he gives a plethora of titles to the division of Real Existence. Then he explains that these titles and the propositions pertaining to this division are all “created expressions denoting *His Signs and Stations for which there is no divesting of them in any place*” (the slanted text translates a part of a supplication of the Twelfth Shī'ī Imam). When one experiences one of these Stations through the heart-flux, one describes it through statements which are expressive of the propositions of negative theology, e.g., “there is nothing like it”.

Based on the above, we may now better appreciate the proof of the existence of God, based on the proof of Wisdom, mentioned in the previous chapter: [2, p. 7–8]

Every impression resembles the actional quality of its agent; it subsists through its agent [the noumenon], that is, through its acting, by means of *processional subsistence*. This is like the case of speech: it subsists through the speaker by means of processional subsistence. Similar is the subsistence of rays through sources of light, and images in mirrors. Thus, things constitute a self-manifesting of the Necessary to them and through them. This is because He (Exalted is He!) does not self-manifest through His Quintessence. Otherwise, He would differ from state to state.

Now nothing is more intense in self-manifesting, presence, or evidentness than that [phenomenon] which self-manifests with re-

spect to the act of its self-manifesting. This is because *that which self-manifests* [i.e., the phenomenon] is more manifest than its *act of self-manifesting* [i.e., culmination of existentiality], even though it is not possible to reach cognizance of it [i.e., the phenomenon] except through its act of self-manifesting. Consider the acts of standing and sitting. The stander [i.e., the phenomenon] is more manifest, in the very act of standing, than the act of standing itself, although it is not possible to reach [cognizance of] him except through the act of standing. So you may say: “O stander!”, or “O sitter!”. You are only referring to the stander [i.e., the manifestation of the noumenon], not the act of standing. This is because, through his act of self-manifesting to you through the act of standing, he [in effect] prevents you, initially, from witnessing the act of standing [itself]. [This is the case] unless you focus on the act of standing itself, in which case the stander through the act of standing becomes hidden from you.

So by means of this inference, which is from the proof of Wisdom, He [the Pure Quintessence or Noumenon] (Glorified is He!) is, for the one who has cognizance, more manifest than anything. This is like what the Chief of the Martyrs [Imam Husayn] (upon whom be peace) has said [in the course of a supplication]: *Can something other than You have an act of self-manifesting which You do not have, so that it comes to be that which manifests You?* So through it [i.e., this type of inference], cognizance [of Allah] occurs, and it cannot occur through [a proof] other than

this at all.

When the mystic, through ousiological intuition, reaches one of the stations of Real Existence, then that station becomes for him more manifest than anything. Once the station has become manifest to the observer through his heart-flux, he has seen God and has demonstrated his existence to himself, just as when his eyes have seen the phenomenon of Zayd *qua* stander, he has seen Zayd and has demonstrated his existence to himself. In the course of the Ninth Observation, Shaykh 'Aḥmad points out that there is an infinite number of these states — indeed, Zayd too has multiple phenomenal states; ‘stander’, ‘sitter’, ‘eater’, ‘sleeper’, etc. — Whenever a servant of God proceeds to a higher station, he recognizes the lower one as a creation. That is, upon reaching a station where one experiences God, he experiences that station as non-delimited, infinite, indeed, as God *qua* phenomenon. Upon reaching a higher state, he can look back on the earlier state and see that the previous station is actually a creation, and not God *qua* noumenon. When one focuses on that stage *qua* aspect of the culmination of Absolute Existence, then God *qua* phenomenon in that station becomes hidden from the observer, just as if one focuses on Zayd’s act of standing *qua* act of standing, then Zayd *qua* stander becomes hidden.

In the course of his comments on the Ninth Observation, Shaykh 'Aḥmad explains that these Stations and Signs constitute *Names* of God. These names are not to be confused with written symbols and signposts, although there is a correspondence in the following sense. Arabic grammarians frequently named a given part of speech after its actual denotation. In Arabic grammar, one calls the subject of the verb the *doer* (*fā'il*) of the *verb* (*fi-*

‘l). Note that the words ‘*fā’il*’ and ‘*fi’l*’ originally denote, respectively, the corresponding real “doer” (*fā’il*) and its “acting” (*fi’l*). Similarly, as we mentioned above, the word ‘*ṣifat*’ denotes both “adjective” and “quality”. Now once again consider the sentence

جَاءَ زَيْدُ الْقَائِمِ *gā’a zaydun al-qā’imu*

Zayd came while standing (literally, “He-came Zayd the stander”).

Grammatically, ‘Zayd’ is the subject or “doer *de dicto*”, ‘he-came’ is the verb or “acting *de dicto*”, and ‘stander’ is an adjective or “quality *de dicto*” of the subject. The adjective ‘stander’ (*qā’imu*) is an active participle. In Arabic grammar this is called the *name of the doer* (*ism al-fā’il*). Applied to Shaykh ‘Aḥmad’s correspondence theory of language, this means that the quality, manifestation, and phenomenon “stander” also constitutes a “name” *de re* of the actual “doer” *de re*.

In his comments on the Ninth Observation Shaykh ‘Aḥmad says: [2, p. 177]

I said: These stations alluded to are the “Stations for which there is no divesting of them in any place”. Al-Hujjah [the Twelfth Imam] (upon whom be peace) said [in the course of a supplication]: ...and by Your Stations for which there is no divesting of them in any place. Whoever has cognizance of You has cognizance of You through them. There is no difference between You and them except that they are Your servants and Your creation. The rending of them and sewing them up is in Your hands. Their genesis is from You; their returning is to You. . . .

I now say: . . . Those Stations are the Names of the Doer (to Whom belong Might and Majesty). This is because a given station is composed of and self-subsists through the matter of the Acting of the Doer and its form. Its matter is its own reality, and its form is its impression [i.e., culmination of the Acting]. Together they constitute the Name of the Doer. The paradigm of that impression that comes about through the Acting of the Doer is “stander” in relation to Zayd. It is a composite of the motion of originating the [act of] standing with the [act of] standing itself, which is the actual *event* (*ḥadaṭ*) and impression; from these two is composed the name of the doer of the act of standing, that is, [the name of] Zayd during the period of his originating the act of standing, not Zayd absolutely. So ‘stander’, ‘sitter’, ‘eater’, ‘drinker’, ‘sleeper’, and what are similar to these constitute the stations of Zayd and his signposts. And the acts of “standing”, “sitting”, “eating”, “drinking”, and “sleeping” are the *meanings* (مَعَانِي *ma‘ānī*) of Zayd, that is, the meanings of his actings, that is, their impressions, because they are the *loci* (مَحَالَّ *maḥāll*, singular مَحَلَّ *maḥall*; Latin *materia subjecta*) of his actings⁴².

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قُلْتُ: وَ هَذِهِ الْمَشَارُ إِلَيْهَا هِيَ الْمَقَامَاتُ الَّتِي لَا تَعْطِيلَ لَهَا فِي كُلِّ مَكَانٍ. قَالَ الْحُجَّةُ (ع)، فِي الْإِشَارَةِ إِلَى ذَلِكَ، فِي دُعَاءِ رَجَبٍ: «و مَقَامَاتِكَ الَّتِي لَا تَعْطِيلَ لَهَا فِي كُلِّ مَكَانٍ، يَعْرِفُكَ بِهَا مَنْ عَرَفَكَ. لَا فَرْقَ بَيْنَكَ وَ بَيْنَهَا إِلَّا أَنَّهُمْ عِبَادُكَ وَ خَلْقُكَ. فَتَقْهَا وَ رَتَقْهَا بِيَدِكَ؛ بَدْوُهَا مِنْكَ، وَ عَوْدُهَا إِلَيْكَ» (الْدُّعَاءُ).

أَقُولُ: ... وَ تِلْكَ الْمَقَامَاتُ أَسْمَاءُ الْفَاعِلِ عَزَّ وَ جَلَّ لِأَنَّ الْمَقَامَ تَرَكَّبَ وَ تَقَوَّمَ مِنْ مَادَّةٍ فَعَلَ الْفَاعِلِ

Note that the author describes the impression or culmination of the process of Acting as the *form* of the Acting. As we will discuss in the next chapter, for Shaykh 'Aḥmad, 'form' and 'becoming-in-yielding-to-acting' are coextensive. What this implies is that, *with respect to the Acting*, the impression — which turns out to be existence — is an act of becoming and is receptive. With respect to its own impressions, viz., all other delimited existents, it is active, and “resembles the quality of its agent”. This implies that existence constitutes an extensive continuity of becoming. This, in turn, is in contrast to Whitehead's doctrine, which we will mention in the next chapter.

From here we can see the outlines of Shaykh 'Aḥmad's doctrine of the Logos. The Logos is for Shaykh 'Aḥmad that phenomenon through which one has cognizance of God and through which His Will is manifested in the world. It is *the Name of the Doer* (*ism al-fā'il*), *the Designation* (العنوان *al-ʿunwān*), *the Quintessence that Self-manifests through Acting* (الذات الظاهرة بالفعل *al-dāt al-ẓāhirat bi-l-fiʿl*), *the Highest Similitude* (المثل الأعلى *al-maṭal al-aʿlā*), and is called by other titles. The author considers the Logos as rooted in the realities of Muhammad, Fatimah, and the Twelve Imams of the household of the Prophet. In the philosophy of Islam, this Logos is entitled the *Muham-*

و صُورَتِهِ. فَمَا ذَاتُهُ حَقِيقَتُهُ، وَ صُورَتُهُ أَثَرُهُ، وَ مَجْمُوعُهَا إِسْمُ فَاعِلٍ. وَ ذَٰلِكَ الْأَثَرُ بِفِعْلِهِ مِثَالُهُ «قَائِمٌ»
بِالنِّسْبَةِ إِلَى «زَيْدٍ»، فَإِنَّهُ مُرَكَّبٌ مِنْ حَرَكَةٍ إِحْدَاثِ الْقِيَامِ وَ نَفْسِ الْقِيَامِ الَّذِي هُوَ الْحَدَثُ وَ الْأَثَرُ؛
فَتَرَكَّبَ مِنْهُمَا إِسْمُ فَاعِلِ الْقِيَامِ، أَعْنِي زَيْدًا حَالِ إِحْدَاثِهِ لِلْقِيَامِ، لَا مُطْلَقًا. فَعَقَائِمٌ، وَ «قَاعِدٌ»، وَ
«أَكِلٌ»، وَ «شَارِبٌ»، وَ «نَائِمٌ»، وَ مَا أَشْبَهَ ذَٰلِكَ، هِيَ مَقَامَاتُ زَيْدٍ وَ غَلَامَاتُهُ عَلَى نَحْوِ مَا ذَكَرْنَا. وَ
الْقِيَامُ، وَ الْقُعُودُ، وَ الْأَكْلُ، وَ الشَّرْبُ، وَ النَّوْمُ مَعَانِي زَيْدٍ، أَيْ، مَعَانِي أَفْعَالِهِ، يَعْنِي، أَثَارَهَا، لِأَنَّهَا مَحَالُّ
الْأَفْعَالِ.

madi Reality (الْحَقِيقَةُ الْمُحَمَّدِيَّةُ *al-ḥaqīqat al-muḥammadiyyat*). Although he rarely alludes to this directly in the *Fawā'id*, one cannot overestimate the importance of this doctrine for the metaphysics and overall philosophy of Shaykh 'Aḥmad. Indeed, he considers this Logos to be the true subject of theology, which he calls the *science of the declaration* (عِلْمُ الْبَيَانِ *ilmu 'l-bayān*). The author's magnum opus, the vast *Commentary on the Grand Comprehensive Visitation*, is devoted to this topic and is undoubtedly the most important work on the Logos written in the philosophy and mysticism of Muslim civilization. We should point out that, for Shaykh 'Aḥmad, the term 'Muhammadi Reality' is ambiguous, as the author himself discusses [2, p. 35–36]. Sometimes he means the phenomenological division of Logos, and sometimes he means the immediate outcome of the Acting, the act of existence *qua* negatively conditioned (*bi-ṣarṭi lā*)⁴³.


There is an point here that should be noticed. Although a given name of the actor or phenomenon is ontologically *posterior* to the acting or existential motion through which it realizationally subsists, the acting or existential motion *inheres* (يَحِلُّ *yahillu*) in both its culmination and in the phenomenon. Applied to the Logos doctrine, this means that God acts *through* the Muhammadi Reality.

Earlier we mentioned that there are three actional qualities involved in the denotation of a derivative: the two ontological qualities of existentiational and its culmination or immediate impression (*atar*), and the phenomenological quality of the manifestation of the noumenon that emanates the process of

⁴³The terms 'science of the declaration' (*ilmu 'l-bayān*) and 'the meanings' (*al-ma'ānī*) derive from a very cryptic tradition of the Imams. See the glossary, under بَيَان *bayān*.

existentiation. From these two ontological qualities and one phenomenological quality we obtain Shaykh 'Aḥmad's tripartite division of existence into Real Existence (ultimate phenomenological division), Absolute Existence (ultimate division of existentiation), and Delimited Existence (culmination of Absolute Existence). The Pure Quintessence or Noumenon is Something we can know nothing about except through the Self-Manifesting Quintessence Through Actional Qualities that is the Phenomenon. So the Noumenon itself is not an object of investigation because It is utterly unapproachable; even the negative propositions and tautologies that seem to apply to It actually apply to Its Stations and Signposts. See Figure 1.4 for a visual and algebraic representation of the relationships between God, the process of existentiation, the act of existence, and the Logos.

This aspect of Shaykh 'Aḥmad's metaphysics is one of the most difficult to follow, as the author himself recognizes. There is no doubt that our own interpretation of the doctrine is in much need of improvement and clarification. Some of the followers of Shaykh 'Aḥmad also recognized the difficulties involved here. At the end of the Tabriz edition of the *Fawā'id* and its commentary there is a treatise by Sayyid Kāẓim Rashtī, one of the author's most important students, pertaining to the issues of quintessence and noumenon, manifestation and phenomenon, and the denotations of names and verbal adjectives. The treatise was written in response to questions of another important student of the Shaykh, Mīrzā Muḥammad Shafī' Tabrizī, who complains about his confusion on this topic. So it is clear that this issue was considered a thorny one even by the author's students. After a dense and systematic elaboration that goes much further and deeper than anything



$\dashv\rightarrow$ stands for the relation of *emanational subsistence*. The T-bar at the end of the arrow symbolizes that there is no nexus between the emanation and its source.

\rightarrow stands for *base* or *manifestational subsistence*.

P *Process of Existentialiation*.

A stands for *Act of Existence*.

M stands for *The Muhammadi Reality or Logos*. It is a noncommutative, nonsymmetrical product (symbolized by \otimes) of P and A . By this we mean that, although P combines with A to *produce* M , P is still ontologically prior to A .

Figure 2.4: The basic cosmological scheme.

we have said here, Rashtī concludes: [2, p. 28]

If you understand what I have written, then all praise is due to Allah. If not, then it is not due to any lack of ability to grasp or understand on your part. Rather it is due to the profundity of the issue and the absence of a clear way to perceive it. And Allah is the Master at granting success

2.5.6 Looking Ahead

One must be on guard not to read more than what is intended into paradigms like that of the quintessence of Zayd and its manifestations. For the quintessence of Zayd is actually knowable, though not directly through the external senses. Through ontological intuition, one has cognizance of, not just God, but of the realities of things. As Imam Ja‘far al-Ṣādiq said: *Beware of the penetration of the faithful; for he contemplates through the light of God.* The intimation of inaccessibility to Zayd’s or any other object’s quintessence is only meant in a particular context. Taken by itself, this paradigm makes it appear that Shaykh ‘Aḥmad is really committed to some version of the traditional substance-attribute framework which views substances as unchanging. This is not the case. Rather the given quintessence of a thing which emanates its own existential motions is actually, to use Whitehead’s term, a *concrecence*, a process of dynamic interplay between existence and essence, acting and becoming, active matter and receptive form. Like an actual entity of Whitehead, it does not move in any traditional accidental sense. It is to this issue that we will now turn.

Chapter 3

The Polarity of Essence and Existence

3.1 The Essence-Existence Distinction

3.1.1 Preliminary Remarks

In the last chapter, we suggested that one can, at least for propaedeutic purposes, take the quintessence/actional-quality distinction as the most basic starting point for Shaykh 'Aḥmad's ontology. We also outlined the subdivisions of actional quality to which Shaykh 'Aḥmad is committed. We will now take a closer look at the category of quintessence. In this chapter we intend to demonstrate that Shaykh 'Aḥmad is committed to a position that sees any given quintessence, not including the Divine Quintessence, as a process characterized by the polarity and dynamic interplay of active existence and receptive and becoming essence. From here, we will try to show how the

doctrine of the polarity, coterminousness, and codependent origination of existence and essence leads to an undermining of the traditional substance-accident distinction. Finally, we will very briefly compare and contrast aspects of Shaykh 'Aḥmad's doctrine with that of Whitehead.

Exactly what is that thing which emanates existential motion processes and acts? At first glance, it appears to be some version of a traditional Aristotelian substance, and in some sense it is. Upon closer look, however, we see that the quintessence considered *qua* itself, that is, considered without regard to its existential motions, is also a dynamic entity. Shaykh 'Aḥmad expresses this idea through a development of the traditional distinction between existence and essence.

At the crux of Shaykh 'Aḥmad's approach, and from where he departs from Peripateticism, is the framework of extensional (though not intensional) identity he posits across the distinctions between existence and essence, matter and form, and acting and becoming-in-yielding-to-acting. For Shaykh 'Aḥmad 'existence', 'matter', and 'acting' on the one hand, and 'essence', 'form', and 'becoming-in-yielding-to-acting' are extensionally identical.

The notion of extensional identity between 'existence' and 'act' is not unusual. We find it in Aquinas and even Mulla Ṣadra. The coextensiveness of 'essence' and 'form' was also not uncommon, especially in Latin scholasticism¹. The identification of matter with existence, however, is rather unusual, although language suggestive of such a correspondence, if not identity, may be found in Reinhardt Grossmann². The identification of matter with act,

¹See *Gracia 1982*, p. 234.

²See *Grossmann 1992*, p. 108.

and of form with becoming-in-yielding-to-acting, is closely related to Shaykh 'Aḥmad's reversal of traditional hylomorphism. For him, in contrast to Aristotle, matter is active and form is receptive. But this receptivity is itself to be understood actively, as an act of becoming, which he identifies with essence.

3.1.2 Historical Background

Although adumbrations of it may be found in Aristotle, it is now generally accepted that the distinction between essence and existence was first set forth by al-Fārābī and made famous by Ibn Sīnā³. What al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā emphasized was that the question of *what* a thing is, i.e., its *essence* (*al-māhiyyah*), is distinct and separate from the question of *whether*, i.e., *that* a thing is, i.e., its *existence* (*al-wuḡūd*). The essence of a contingent entity is that through which the contingent entity is what it is and not something else. The existence of a contingent entity is that through which the essence is realized *in concreto*. A general statement of this distinction is that every contingent entity is a composite of essence and existence.

The philosophical problems and controversies engendered by this doctrine played a major role in the development of both Muslim and Latin scholasticism. For example, is the proposition “every contingent thing is a composite

³See Izutsu 1971, p. 95. See also Hyman & Walsh 1973. Hyman and Walsh mention that the authorship of certain works attributed to al-Fārābī, works where the distinction is explained, is a matter of dispute. Corbin [32, p. 159] rejects the doubts upon the authenticity of the *Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam* (*Gems of Wisdom*) as baseless. It is the latter work that Izutsu cites to show that al-Fārābī is the first to state the distinction.

of essence and existence” one of epistemic or ontic import? That is, does the distinction occur only at the level of conceptual analysis or does it have real, extra-mental reference? In a move fateful for the development of Muslim scholasticism, both the Platonist Suhrawardi (d. 1191) and the Peripatetic al-Ṭūsī argued that existence was a purely subjective factor or secondary intelligible. As a result, the metaphysics of Muslim scholasticism was dominated by essentialism for the next four hundred years, during which time that essentialism acquired a rather high degree of sophistication⁴. We should also note that, as Muṭahharī points out [49, p. 119–120], the problem of the *principality* (أَصَالَة *aṣālat*) of either existence or essence but not both was precisely formulated first by Mīr Dāmād (d. 1631–2). That is, he was the first clearly and forcefully to formulate the position that it was only a conceptual, epistemic distinction, and that only one of the two components at issue could have a referent in external reality. It is due to Mīr Dāmād and the attention given to this issue by his student Mulla Ṣadra that this problem became one of the most fundamental in later Muslim scholasticism. This does not contradict the fact that al-Ṭūsī and especially Suhrawardi were essentialists who viewed essences as real and existence as subjective or as a secondary intelligible⁵. Mulla Ṣadra emphasized the supposed epis-

⁴See *Izutsu 1974* for a discussion of some key problems in the essentialism of Muslim scholasticism.

⁵The term ‘مَعْقُولَة أُوْلَى’ *ma‘qūlat ʾulā* (*first intelligible*) is elliptical for Ibn Sīnā’s ‘مَعْنَى مَعْقُولَة أُوْلَى’ *ma‘nā ma‘qūlat ʾulā* (*first intelligible intention*; Latin *prima intentio intellecta*). The term ‘مَعْقُولَة ثَانِيَة’ *ma‘qūlat tāniyat* (*secondary intelligible*) is elliptical for Ibn Sīnā’s ‘مَعْنَى مَعْقُولَة ثَانِيَة’ *ma‘nā ma‘qūlat tāniyat* (*secondary intelligible intention*; Latin *secunda intentio intellecta*). See the glossary in *Ibn Sīnā 1960*, p. 470. Note that

temic import of the distinction, but vigorously established a metaphysics of existence in place of the previously prevalent essentialism. By the time of Shaykh 'Aḥmad, the philosophy of Mulla Ṣadra was well entrenched in many scholastic circles. We now turn to Shaykh 'Aḥmad's interpretation of the essence-existence distinction.

3.2 On Existence and Essence

3.2.1 Introduction

In the course of chapters seven and eleven of his book *Observations in Wisdom*, Shaykh 'Aḥmad addresses the essence-existence distinction. The following passage (lines 17–27 of the *Seventh Observation* of the critical edition) summarizes the author's approach to this issue:

Furthermore, know that there is very much disagreement about

 here we have translated 'ma'nā', a notoriously ambiguous term, with 'intention'. This corresponds with its usage in Latin scholasticism. In general, however, it is best translated with 'meaning'. See the glossary, under مَعْنَى.

According to Jurjānī [13, p. 197], a *first intelligible* (*ma'qūlat ʿulā*) is that concept to which there corresponds an actual existent in external reality of which it may be predicated. Examples include “man” and “animal”, as in the statements, “Zayd is a man”, and “the horse is an animal”. On the other hand, a *secondary intelligible* (*ma'qūlat t̄ā-niyat*) is that concept which to which nothing in external reality corresponds of which it can be predicated. Examples include “species”, “genus”, and “specific difference”. Mulla Ṣadra [10, p. 8] gives other examples such as “thingness”, “substantiality”, “accidentality”, and “blackness”. The distinction between first and second intelligibles is analogous to the distinction between first-order and second-order concepts in analytical philosophy.

what a “thing” is. These disagreements are reducible to four views, no regard being due to mentioning any others:

The first view is that a thing is [constituted by] existence, and essence is an accident inhering in existence;

The second is that a thing is [constituted by] essence, and existence is an accident of essence;

The third is that a thing is [constituted by] existence, and essence is only in succession to existence;

The fourth is that a thing is [constituted by] existence and essence. It is thus a composite of both of them because the condition for existence’s generation, by way of emanating and perduring, is essence; the condition for essence’s becoming-generated, by way of becoming-emanated and perduring, is existence. As long as each is existent and conjoined with the other, then the thing is existent. There is no “thingness” to a thing with the absence of either one or the other of them. Existence is its own matter; its own form is the attachment of essence to it. Essence is its own matter; its own form is the connection of existence to it. Allah (Exalted is He!) has said: ***They [your wives] are a garment for you and you are a garment for them.*** So they both make up a given thing. Thus, it is forever a composite of both of them.

At the outset of the author’s commentary [2, p. 140] on this passage, Shaykh ’Aḥmad first gives a very brief synopsis of his position, which he

further develops later on in his discussion. First he makes clear that he considers existence, that is, the immediate outcome of God's Act, to be a substance (*ḡawhar*) and not an accident (*ʿarad*). Here he is using the traditional Muslim scholastic terminology with which his readers are familiar. We have already mentioned that he considers this "delimited existence" to be an active, dynamic entity; it is the Act of God, the Culmination of His Process of Existentiality. Shaykh 'Aḥmad says that this act is a substance because, otherwise, it would be an accident. If it were an accident, then it would be ontologically preceded by a *subject of affection* (*maʿrūd*). The author does not say why this is unacceptable. This may lead to the an objection.

The objection is as follows: Is not existence just an affection of God's Willing and Acting, and thus an accident? The answer is that Shaykh 'Aḥmad does not consider the relation between God's Willing or Acting (Absolute Existence), and the immediate outcome or culmination of that Will (delimited existence) as a strict substance-accident relation in the Peripatetic sense. Rather, it is one of realization and manifestation. Existence is not an accident in the sense that it inheres in the Divine Acting, that is, it does not subsist through the Acting by means of affectional subsistence. On the other hand, the Process of Acting *is* an affection of existence — although the act of existence is ontologically posterior to the Acting — in the sense that the act of existence *receives* that Acting. This is analogous to a beating's subsistence through the one who is beaten. The beating ultimately comes from the beater. However, it is the one who is beaten who *feels, receives*, and is *affected* by the beating. But it is also the case that existence is an

outcome of the Acting. Thus existence is an “accident” of the Acting in the sense that, coincident to its own generation, existence reflexively generates its own receptivity to the Process of Existentialization, a receptivity which constitutes its own *form*. We will see later that Shaykh ‘Aḥmad will call the act of existence an accident of the Acting in this latter sense, while it is a substance with respect to its own impressions and effects. With respect to each delimited existent entity, existence is active. With respect to the Divine Acting, existence is receptive in that, in addition to being the culmination and outcome of the Process of Existentialization, it also receives that very existentialization so that it itself may be active with respect to its own effects and impressions.

This may be compared to the process of momentum transfer in physics. A baseball may receive the acting generated by the swinger of a bat, but when that ball hits someone in the head as a result, the ball is now active. The one hit by the ball then receives the activity which was generated by the batter. This activity then inheres in the ball and is absorbed by the head of the person hit by the ball. We will return to this point in a succeeding section where we discuss Shaykh ‘Aḥmad’s doctrine that substances and accidents are actually correlational accidents.

After saying that existence is a substance, Shaykh ‘Aḥmad then goes on to claim that existence is the substratum of all created entities. As the substratum of all entities, it can be called the *matter* (*māddat*) of all entities. Now every contingent thing is a composite-pair (*zawǧ tarkībīyy*). Shaykh ‘Aḥmad then claims that composition is always preceded by a substrate of matter; the composition comes about through that matter’s configuration,

its form. For example, a seal or stamp is a configuration of preexisting silver; a door is a configuration of preexistent wood. Thus every contingent entity is a composite of matter and a form the fashioner originates *from* the matter. Matter is the first creation that exists through itself, that is, not through any other substratum; essence is the configuration of that existence, just as form is the configuration of matter for Aristotle.

After this brief synopsis, Shaykh 'Aḥmad then discusses four interpretations of the essence-existence distinction. Before going on to this, I would like to make the following observations:

- Shaykh 'Aḥmad's extensional identification of 'matter' and 'existence', as well as 'form' and 'essence', suggests that the author's approach to the problem of existence and essence has strong naturalist overtones. As we discussed in Chapter 1, Shaykh 'Aḥmad frequently uses natural science, including chemistry, physics, and astronomy, as paradigms upon which to model much of his metaphysics and cosmology. So here we see one of the author's applications of "the cosmological correspondence principle", the epistemic principle according to which the inference of truths about realms higher in the vertical hierarchy of conditioned existence can not be attained without a knowledge of the state of affairs of the sensible realm. This is in contrast to traditional Neoplatonism, according to which truths about the world are best modelled on the ideal, intelligible, and fixed structures of mathematics;
- This discussion is closely related to Shaykh 'Aḥmad's reversal of traditional hylomorphism. The author explicitly claims during the course of the Fifth Observation, which we have not translated, that this is

what he is doing. His attempt there at justifying this approach is anthropological, and we will not pursue it. However, it is not difficult to see that the author has committed himself to such a reversal. This is because, as we will see in the sequel, he posits an extensional correspondence between ‘matter’, ‘acting’, and ‘existence’, on the one hand, and between ‘form’, ‘becoming-in-yielding-to-acting’, ‘essence’, and ‘receptivity’ on the other. So Shaykh ‘Aḥmad conceives of matter as a dynamic quantity. Form is also dynamic in the sense that it constitutes an effective *act* of receptivity. This reversal marks something of a Copernican revolution in the metaphysics of Muslim civilization, just as Mulla Ṣadra’s affirmation of the principality of existence over essence was itself a revolutionary development in Muslim scholasticism. On the other hand, due to reasons discussed in Part I, the philosophy of Shaykh ‘Aḥmad was heavily censored and marginalized throughout the century following his death, and its long-term impact on mainstream Muslim scholasticism was slight.

Shaykh ‘Aḥmad’s reversal of traditional hylomorphism links his speculations with Joanna Seibt’s very insightful remark that the transition from a scholastic substance ontology paradigm to a process ontology paradigm can be viewed as a transition from “an ontology based on substance in the [traditional] philosopher’s sense to an ontology based on (abstractions of) substances in the *chemist’s* sense [57, p. 485]” (my emphasis). Given that Shaykh ‘Aḥmad was a practicing chemist himself, this statement rings particularly true here.

- The notion that existence is the substratum of the world finds a parallel

in the work of Reinhardt Grossmann, as we alluded to earlier. In fact, Grossmann says just that [40, p.107]: “*Existence is the substratum of the world*” (his emphasis). He acknowledges the similarity between his conception of existence and the notion of matter. But Grossmann tries to distinguish the “world” of the ontologist and the “universe” of the physicists: [40, p.107]

If we allow ourselves some poetic freedom, we could say that existence is the “matter” or “stuff” of the world. From our ontological point of view, there exists a physical universe and there also exists a world. *The “matter” of the physical universe is not the “matter” of the world. While the former consists of the ultimate building blocks discovered by physicists, the latter is the ontologist’s entity.* (Grossmann’s emphasis)

Shaykh ‘Aḥmad would probably say that the sensible realm, which Grossmann calls the physical universe, is just one level in the graded hierarchy of existents which constitutes the world. Hence physical matter is only a special case of that more general matter which is existence itself.

3.2.2 Critique of the First Three Views

Let us now return to Shaykh ‘Aḥmad’s commentary on the above-quoted passage. He now proceeds to discuss the four views on essence and existence mentioned in the main text. The fourth is the author’s own. In this chapter we are primarily concerned with explaining the author’s own view and the

process commitments it entails. We will give only the briefest summary of his criticism of the first three. Shaykh 'Aḥmad says that he and the rest of the theologians and philosophers are all agreed that the proposition “every contingent thing is a composite of essence and existence” is true (at least, presumably, at the level of conceptual analysis). He then proceeds to discuss various views on its ontological significance.

The view that a given existing thing is constituted by just existence (*al-wuḡūd*), and that essence (*al-māhiyyat*) is an accident which inheres in existence, is attributed by Shaykh 'Aḥmad to the Sufis. For them there is only one existent, God, who is existence, while everything else is just an accident or modality of Him. Some of them posit that God's Will is the one existent after Him. This is an uncharitable interpretation of Sufi doctrine, but Shaykh 'Aḥmad in the course of this and many other works tries hard to show that nearly every attempt to formulate a non-pantheist formulation of the Sufi doctrine of the “oneness of existence” (وَحْدَةُ الوجود *waḥdat al-wuḡūd*) or existential monism is doomed to failure;

The second view is that of some of the Peripatetics and theologians, namely, that a given thing is its essence, while existence is an accident which inheres in essence. Shaykh 'Aḥmad claims that this false because of the following: essence constitutes the ipseity (هُويّة *huwiyyat*) or inner reality of a thing. Now the subject of affection is prior to the affection itself. If essence were that which is originally and primarily “made”, while existence is only an affection of it, then it would necessarily be the case that essence precede existence. But essence can only precede its existence through existence. This entails an infinite regress. Rather, existence is a necessary condition

for the realization of essence. Shaykh 'Aḥmad then proceeds to develop this argument. He does not mention here the related view of the Illuminationists and some of the other Peripatetics, namely, that the essence-existence distinction is a purely conceptual one, with only essence having a correlate *in concreto*. Possibly this is because, by Shaykh 'Aḥmad's time, that view had been completely supplanted by Mulla Ṣadra's doctrine.

The third view is that of Mulla Ṣadra. Before giving Shaykh 'Aḥmad's critique, let us note the following: According to Mulla Ṣadra, existence is that which primarily and essentially *is*. Essence is a subjective feature of reality. This follows if one argues, as Mulla Ṣadra does, that the essence-existence distinction is purely a conceptual one. The problem is, how does one then account for the multiplicity of existents? For Mulla Ṣadra, existence is a unitary, dynamic reality that is “self-unfolding” (مُنْبَسِط *munbasit*) and descending from Absolute Existence or God, and whose modes or “existences” (وُجُودَات *wuḡūdāt*) reveal themselves to the mind as essences. These modes are concomitant to the dynamic nature of existence itself. The essences generated in the mind by these modes represent negations or limitations of the act of existence. This is what Mulla Ṣadra means when he says that essence comes about “in succession” (تَبَعِيَّة *bi-taba'iyyati*) to existence. These negations and limitations have no reality of their own, and the essences representing them cannot capture the dynamic flow of existence (See *Rahman 1975*, p. 29).

Shaykh 'Aḥmad shares much of the spirit, if not the letter, of Mulla Ṣadra's notion of existence as a dynamic reality. However, he takes strong issue with the notion that essences are unreal. In his vast commentaries

on Mulla Ṣadra, especially the *Commentary on the Metaphysical Penetrations*, this issue is dealt with at great length. In his commentary on the above-quoted passage of the *Fawā'id*, Shaykh 'Aḥmad gives the gist of his objections:

- If essence does not exist at all, then it would not be the case that a contingent existent is a composite-pair. If essence is only a thing in the mind but not *in concreto*, then again, each contingent thing would constitute a simple reality, not a composite, whereas only God is a simple reality;
- If one tries to say that a given thing is a composite of two realities or existences, one contingent and one preeternal, then this amounts to the first view. However, any composition and marriage with contingents is inconsistent with God's nature;
- If one says that essence is not made with a making specific to it, rather, it is made through the making of existence, then this is wrong because one simple making cannot generate two opposing things. For example, the act of making through which water is boiled cannot be the same act of making through which it is frozen (my example). Since essence cannot be made directly from the very act of making existence, and since it has no act of making specific to it, then it is not made at all. If it is not made, then it is either preeternal or not a thing. The essence of a contingent thing cannot be preeternal. But if essence is not a thing (شَيْءٌ *šay'*), then that contradicts the proposition that a contingent is a composite-pair. This is also inconsistent with there

being anything, because that which has no essence has no thingness. If one objects that God has no essence, only existence, then Shaykh 'Aḥmad, consistent with his own theory of *coincidentia oppositorum*, says that this is wrong; God's Essence *is* his Existence. Furthermore, the affirmation of essence as subjective or in the mind does not establish it in reality; a thing can have no essence unless essence subsists outside the mind. Without essence, the thing cannot be said to be a thing;

- Finally, opposing inclinations may emanate from a single thing such as a human being. For example someone, say Zayd, sometimes acts obediently and sometimes disobediently. The followers of Mulla Ṣadra claim that obedience of God emanates from existence and that disobedience of Him emanates from essence. Now the act of disobedience is a thing. So how does a thing emanate from nothing?

We have discussed Shaykh 'Aḥmad's objections to Mulla Ṣadra in more detail because the latter is in many ways a point of departure for Shaykh 'Aḥmad. In marked contrast to his predecessors, however, he vigorously espouses the essence-existence distinction as a real ontological distinction. Although he never directly says it, his position is actually a reformulation of the Avicennan position, if we accept Rahman's interpretation of Ibn Sina. According to Rahman [52, p. 27], Ibn Sina held that, given a contingent entity, its existence is "borrowed" from God and is additional to its essence. On the other hand, existence is not additional to the actual contingent entity. Shaykh 'Aḥmad reformulates this in the course of explaining the fourth view (which is his own), namely, that a given *thing* شَيْء *šay'*) is a composite *in concreto* of existence and essence. Shaykh 'Aḥmad starts by stating that

every originating entity has *two factors* (إِعتِبَارَانِ *ʿiṭibārān*): one reality (حَقِيقَةٌ *ḥaqīqat*) from its Lord and one reality from itself. The reality from its Lord is existence and the existentiality of existence. The reality from itself is its essence, thingness, and ipseity. Without a real *aspect* (جِهَةٌ *ġihat*) from its Lord, it would be free of need of God and thus no longer contingent; without an aspect from itself, it would not be a thing at all.

3.2.3 Acting and Becoming-in-Yielding-to-Acting

At this point in his exposition, Shaykh ʿAḥmad begins to make what I consider to be the crucial metaphysical point which lies at the heart of his process metaphysics. “The created thing”, he proclaims [2, p. 140],

is not realized except through an “acting (*fiʿl*)” and a “becoming-in-yielding-to-acting (*ʿinfiʿāl*)”. The acting is from the agent; the becoming-in-yielding-to-acting is from the very created thing. Consider the proposition “He-created it; so it-became-created”. Existence, which is matter, comes from “He-created”. Essence, which is form, comes from “it-became-created”; it is that which comes from itself. Just as “acting” does not become-realized except through “becoming-in-yielding-to-acting”, analogous to the case of “breaking” and “becoming-broken”, existence does not become realized except through essence⁶

6

إِنَّ الشَّيْءَ الْمَخْلُوقَ لَا يَتَحَقَّقُ إِلَّا بِفِعْلٍ وَ إِنْفِعَالٍ. وَ الْفِعْلُ مِنَ الْفَاعِلِ وَ الْإِنْفِعَالُ مِنْ نَفْسِ الْمَخْلُوقِ. وَ ذَلِكَ مِثْلُ «خَلَقَهُ فَانْخَلَقَ». فَالْوُجُودُ الَّتِي هُوَ الْمَادَّةُ مِنْ «خَلَقَ» - وَ هُوَ الَّذِي مِنْ رَبِّهِ - وَ الْمَاهِيَّةُ الَّتِي هِيَ الصُّورَةُ مِنْ «انْخَلَقَ» - وَ هُوَ الَّذِي مِنْ نَفْسِهِ. وَ حَيْثُ لَا يَتَحَقَّقُ الْفِعْلُ إِلَّا

In presenting his position here, Shaykh 'Aḥmad is in part making use of an interesting feature of the Arabic language. We explained in the previous chapter that the overwhelming majority of Arabic nouns and verbs are derived from a verbal root of three consonants (four in a few cases). This verbal root connotes the general idea of a particular activity. Again, the simplest word that can be formed from this root is a three-syllable, past-tense, third-person verb. For example, from the root ك س ر $k\ s\ r$ (connoting the idea of “breaking”) we have the base verb كَسَرَ *kasara* (“he-broke”). We also explained that from the base verb is derived a plethora of verbal, substantival, and adjectival derivatives, each of whose connotations are generally in correspondence to a set pattern of derivation through specific letters of increase. Furthermore, from each base or ground-form verb there is a total of fourteen possible derivative verbs, although few if any actual roots may be found in all fifteen forms. Each derivative form connotes a certain modification of the connotation of the original verb. For example, one signification of the second form is an occasioning of the idea expressed by the first form. So from عَلِمَ *alima* (“he-knew”) we have عَلَّمَ *allama* (“he-made know”, that is, “he-taught”). Of the various verb forms, some signify the reflexive, yet effective act of *complying* or *yielding* (مُطَاوَعَةٌ *muṭāwa'at*) to the act signified by another form. For example, given a transitive ground-form verb, it can generally be associated with a verb of the seventh derivative verb form that denotes the idea of becoming through compliance with an action. Consider the base verbs كَسَرَ *kasara* (“he-broke”), ضَرَبَ *daraba* (“he-beat”), and

بِالْإِنْفَعَالِ - كَالْكَسْرِ وَالْإِنْكَسَارِ - لَا يَتَحَقَّقُ الْوُجُودُ إِلَّا بِالْمَاهِيَةِ.

‘خَلَقَ *halaqa*’ (“he-created”). The seventh form gives us ‘انْكَسَرَ *ʾinkasara*’ (“it-became-broken”), ‘انْضَرَبَ *ʾindaraba*’ (“he-became-beaten”), and ‘اِنْخَلَقَ *ʾinḥalaqa*’ (“it-became-created”). The most general word for action is ‘فَعَلَ *faʿala*’ (“he-did” or “he-acted upon”). To express the dyad of acting-becoming, one contrasts ‘فَعَلَ *fiʿl*’ (“acting”) with the corresponding gerund derivative of the seventh verb form, namely, ‘اِنْفِعَالَ *ʾinfiʿāl*’ (“becoming-in-yielding-to-acting”).

I have belabored this point because it is crucial to an understanding of what I consider to be Shaykh ʾAḥmad’s philosophy of acting and becoming. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that the dynamic interplay of acting and becoming-through-compliance is the engine that drives his philosophy. In addition, it points towards the natural way in which a processual approach to philosophical issues is accommodated by the structure of the Arabic language. Arabic is a language based on verbs and gerunds; anyone who has ever had to use an Arabic dictionary knows that one always looks up a given word by the ground verb form from which it is precisely derived in accordance with that given word’s grammatical function. On the other hand, Arabic only unnaturally fits the demands of Greek philosophies of being, be they idealist or naturalist⁷. For example, Arabic has neither a copula nor a precisely present tense of any given verb. Shaykh ʾAḥmad, more than any major Islamic philosopher before or since, developed these processual ideas latent in the Arabic language.

Let us return to the last passage we quoted from the commentary. Shaykh ʾAḥmad claims that every created thing is a product of an act and of a

⁷See *Afnan 1963*.

becoming-through-yielding-to-that-act. The act is from the agent and the becoming is from the created thing itself. The point that may be easily missed here is that Shaykh 'Aḥmad is contending that the act of becoming constitutes the very essence of the thing; he is not saying that there is a preexistent thing which then becomes created. He makes this more explicit in other places. In the *Treatise in Response to Mirza Muhammad Ali al-Mudarris*, the author states: [3, Vol. 1, pt. 2, p. 242]

Existence is an acting and essence is a becoming-in-yielding-to-acting, analogous to [the acts] of breaking and becoming-broken. This is because when its agent of existentionation (الْمَوْجِدُ *al-mūğid*) existentionated existence, existence became-existentionated (إِنْوَجَدَ *inwağada*). The acting [that is existence] is from the Acting of Allah (Glorified is He!); becoming-in-yielding-to-acting is from the very acting [that is existence]. A given thing is a composite of both of them⁸.

Existence constitutes a secondary act which is a fulfillment or culmination of God's Acting which, in turn, is His Existential Motion. An act of existence *becomes* in compliance with and in yielding to God's Acting. That act of becoming constitutes the essence of the thing which subsists through that act of existence.

We can see here how Shaykh 'Aḥmad escapes Mulla Ṣadra's dilemma. According to the latter, since existence is a dynamic, unfolding reality, its

وَالْوُجُودُ فِعْلٌ وَ الْمَاهِيَّةُ إِنْفِعَالٌ - كَالْكَسْرِ وَ الْإِنْكَسَارِ - لِأَنَّهُ، لَمَّا أُوجِدَهُ مُوجِدُهُ، إِنْوَجَدَ. فَالْفِعْلُ مِنْ فِعْلِ اللَّهِ سُبْحَانَهُ؛ وَ الْإِنْفِعَالُ مِنْ نَفْسِ الْفِعْلِ؛ وَ الشَّيْءُ مُرَكَّبٌ مِنَ الْإِثْنَيْنِ.

constantly changing modes cannot be captured by static essences. By identifying the essences of those modes with acts of becoming, Shaykh 'Aḥmad can have essences which are both real and yet distinguishable *in re* from existence. As existence unfolds, the acts of becoming constitute the very acts of responding to, yielding to, and riding of the flow of existence.

Note that the word 'إِنْفِعَالٌ' *ʿinfiʿāl*, which we translate by 'becoming-in-yielding-to-acting', was used by the Muslim scholastics to denote the Aristotelian category of *passion*. Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī al-Qazwīnī [3, p. 225] defines 'إِنْفِعَالٌ' *ʿinfiʿāl* generally as "a given thing's receiving of another thing"⁹. Shaykh 'Aḥmad frequently speaks of 'إِنْفِعَالٌ' *ʿinfiʿāl* in terms of receiving (قَبُولٌ *qabūl*) or receptivity (قَابِلِيَّةٌ *qābiliyyat*). It must be pointed out that the original intension of the verb form 'إِنْفَعَلَ' *ʿinfaʿala* is not one of *receiving* (*qabūl*), but of *becoming-in-compliance* (*muṭāwaʿat*). That Shaykh 'Aḥmad's notion of *ʿinfiʿāl* is rooted in the concept of becoming-in-compliance is clear from his discussion of free will in the Twelfth Observation of the *Fawā'id*. There he makes *ʿinfiʿāl* the principle of freedom of choice. He tries to justify this, in part using the fact that the intension of 'ʿinfiʿāl' includes the notion of compliance, and that compliance is an effective act, not a passive occurrence. Shaykh 'Aḥmad thus unites the original signification of 'ʿinfiʿāl' with that of its scholastic usage. So Shaykh 'Aḥmad is suggesting that the effective becoming which constitutes the essence of an entity is its very "passion", its reception of the act of existence.

For Shaykh 'Aḥmad, existence and essence are polar entities. He illustrates this by the proposition "He-created it; so it-became-created". 'So'

قَبُولُ الشَّيْءِ لِلشَّيْءِ.⁹

translates the Arabic conjunction **فَ** *fa* . One of the functions of this conjunction is to signify that the second conjunct is immediately and coincidentally entailed by the first. In the *Treatise in Response to Some of the Brothers of Isfahan* the author asks a question which generates a dilemma: When God creates, does the created thing become-created or not? If one answers that it becomes created, then one can respond that the pronoun implicit in ‘it-became-created’ refers to the created thing. But the created thing cannot exist before it is created, so how can the pronoun refer to it when it is nothing? On the other hand, if one says that when God creates it, it did not become-created, then this makes no sense. The solution is given by the proposition, “He-created it; so it-became-created”. The conjunction *fa* signifies that the act of existence and the act of becoming are *coincident and coterminous to one another* (**مُتَسَاوِقَانِ** *mutasāwiqān*). Neither exists without the other. Furthermore, any given, existent thing, in order to be a thing, must be a composite of both of them.

We may interpret Shaykh ’Aḥmad’s view then as implying that a thing or quintessence is actually a *concrecence*, a process of dynamic interplay between the subprocesses of acting and becoming. We have adopted the term ‘concrecence’ from Whitehead’s philosophy. Whitehead [68, p. 210], following Locke, says that a concrecence is a “fluency” or process which is “the real internal constitution of a particular existent”. According to Sherburne [59, p.212], “*concrecence* is the name given to the process that *is* an actual entity”. Now there appears to be a difference between Whitehead’s actual entity and Shaykh ’Aḥmad’s quintessence in that an actual entity is atomic whereas a quintessence is bipolar (we will return to this point in the

sequel). Yet it seems that the word ‘concrecence’, the root of which means “growing together” (*MWCD*, under “concrecence”), is particularly suited for the expression of what Shaykh ‘Aḥmad considers to be the inner reality of a quintessence. This state of affairs is precisely analogous to the relationship between *yin* and *yang* in Chinese philosophy. *Yin* is the subprocess of yielding to *yang*, which in turn is the subprocess of acting. Neither can perdure without the other, and together they form a concrecence which is actually existent.

An objection to Shaykh ‘Aḥmad’s interpretation of the existence-essence distinction may be raised here, one which Shaykh ‘Aḥmad notes in his commentary [2, p. 143]. If one says that every contingent is a composite of existence and essence, the following problem arises. Existence is itself contingent, and so is a composite of existence (or matter) and essence (or form). Essence is itself a contingent, and so is also a composite of existence (or matter) and essence (or form). This leads to an infinite regress. Shaykh ‘Aḥmad immediately proceeds to answer this objection. He first reiterates that in a given thing, neither existence nor essence can subsist without the other, neither at the moment of the thing’s origination nor during its perdurance. The principle that the created thing must have two factors, one from its Lord or cause, and one from itself, always applies because any given created thing emanationally subsists through God’s Acting or Will. What this means is that the relation of an existent to the Will of God is like the relation of the Sun to its rays. The rays may only subsist as long as the sun subsists. This is emanational subsistence. For the duration of the created thing, the particular acts of existence and essence that constitute a given

thing are continuous.

The author then reminds us that what is *created* (مَخْلُوق *mahlūq*) cannot be absolutely simple because of the following: The existentionation of a given created entity entails two acts, one of acting and one of becoming-in-yielding-to-acting. These two acts are mutually contrary, because acting is from the actor and becoming-in-yielding-to-acting is from the outcome of acting; acting *qua* transitive *generation* (التَّكْوِين *at-takwīn*) of the created thing descends from the higher to the lower while the act of *becoming-generated* (التَّكْوُن *at-takawwun*) ascends from the lower to the higher¹⁰. Since these two contraries go into the make up of a thing, it is impossible that a given *originated thing* (شَيْءٌ مُّحْدَثٌ *šay' muḥdat*) subsist without that through which it is realized i.e., each of these two contraries. Simplicity is inconsistent with this state of affairs.

Finally, Shaykh 'Aḥmad has us reconsider the proposition that existence is composed of matter and form, and that essence is composed of matter and form. Although Shaykh 'Aḥmad considers existence to be identical to matter, and essence identical to form, he appears to be suggesting that there is a relative sense in which one can also speak of existence and essence as each being composed of matter and form. According to Shaykh 'Aḥmad, if

¹⁰Note that just as the seventh derivative verb pattern *إِنْفَعَلَ* *infa'ala* (with gerund given by *إِنْفِعَالٌ* *infi'āl*) is the *مُطَاوِعٌ* *muṭāwi'* or *compliant* form for the ground or base verb-pattern, the fifth verb pattern *تَفَعَّلَ* *tafa'ala* (with gerund given by *تَفَعُّلٌ* *tafa'ul*) is the *muṭāwi'* form for the second verb pattern *فَعَّلَ* *fa'ala* (with gerund given by *تَفْعِيلٌ* *tafi'il*). So the second derivative verb pattern *كَوَّنَ* *kawwana* (“he-generated”, with gerund given by *تَكْوِينٌ* *takwīn*) finds its *muṭāwi'* correlate in the fifth derivative verb pattern *تَكَوَّنَ* *takawwana* (“he-became-generated”, with gerund given by *تَكْوُنٌ* *takawwun*).

one considers the concept of existence, one notices that the very conception of it entails essence. The matter of this concept of existence is itself; its form is the becoming-conjoined of essence to it so that it can be conceived at all. If one considers an essence in one's mind, the very fact of it being in one's mind entails the existence, at least in the mind, of the concept. The matter of the concept is itself; its form is the attachment of existence to it in the mind so that it can be conceived at all. The point is that existence and essence are coincident and correlational. If one is nonexistent, then both are nonexistent. If one is existent, then both are existent. In a complete, composite thing, existence constitutes its matter and essence constitutes its form, but only for as long as they are conjoined. If we consider one factor alone, then its matter is itself and its form is its entailment of or attachment to the other. If one attempts to conceptualize one of them in total isolation of the other, then its matter is itself and its form is the configuration of the mind of the conceiver. The last case Shaykh 'Aḥmad compares to the image in a mirror. Neither can be separated from the other. The matter of the image is an emanation of the form of the one facing it. The form of the image in the mirror is the configuration of the mirror in the way of straightness or crookedness, tint, smoothness, and limpidity or opaqueness. Shaykh 'Aḥmad's theory of the mind *qua* mirror belongs to his epistemology and we cannot discuss it here, but the pertinent point for us is that there is no contingent entity that is not a composite of existence and essence, and that no infinite regress is entailed by this doctrine.

We see that Shaykh 'Aḥmad adheres to a version of Morris Cohen's principle of polarity. Cohen states in *A Preface to Logic*: [25, p74]

...the empirical facts are generally resultants of opposing and yet inseparable tendencies like the north and south poles. We must, therefore, be on our guard against the universal tendency to simplify situations and to analyze them in terms of only one of such contrary tendencies.

3.2.4 The First Creation and the Second Creation

There is an ambiguity in Shaykh 'Aḥmad's doctrine of the polarity of existence and essence that must be addressed here. Shaykh 'Aḥmad claims that the act of existence which is the fulfillment or culmination of God's Will entails an act of becoming. Is this act of becoming coterminous with the act of existence in its entirety or is it coterminous with the particular act of existence which constitutes an individual existent? Shaykh 'Aḥmad deals with this issue by making two divisions of existence and essence:

1. When the act of delimited existence first emanates as the culmination of the Will of God, then its global essence or act of becoming is coincidentally generated. Shaykh 'Aḥmad calls this composite of existence and essence *the first creation* (أَخْلَقَ الْأَوَّلَ *al-ḥalq al-awwal*) or *the first hylē* (الْهَيُولَى الْأُولَى *al-hayūlā 'l-ūlā*). The author compares it to the ink from which letters are drawn. The existence from which the first creation concretes is called "primary existence" (الْوُجُودُ الْأَوَّلُ *al-wuḡūd al-awwal*); the corresponding essence is called "primary essence" (الْمَاهِيَّةُ الْأُولَى *al-māhiyyat al-ūlā*). Note that the author frequently refers to the first creation as just "existence" or "delimited existence"

(الوجود المُقَيَّد *al-wuḡūd al-muqayyad*), inclusive of its global essence or form. This appears to be equivalent to the subdivision of delimited existence that Shaykh 'Aḥmad calls “existence *qua* negatively conditioned” (*al-wuḡūd bi-ṣarṭi lā*);

2. As this dynamic matter unfolds into the plethora of existents, quanta of that dynamic matter coincidentally generate other acts of becoming in what the author calls *the second creation* (الخلق الثاني *al-ḥalq at-tānī*). These acts of becoming constitute the essences of individuals and species. What the second creation consists of are, according to the author, like the letters drawn with the ink. Each act of existence from which a quintessence in the second creation concretes is called “secondary existence”; each corresponding essence is called a “secondary essence”. This appears to be equivalent to the subdivision of delimited existence that Shaykh 'Aḥmad calls “existence *qua* conditioned by something” (*al-wuḡūd bi-ṣarṭi šay*);

Important to Shaykh 'Aḥmad's arguments, especially in observations eleven and twelve, are the subsistence relationships that obtain between existence and essence in the second creation, delimited existence, and Absolute Existence or the Process of existentiation. We summarize the most important of them:

- The existence of an entity in the second creation subsists through Absolute Existence, variously called the *Quintessential Commanding of God* (أمر الله الذاتي *amr al-lāh ad-dātiyy*) and *the Commanding that is the Acting* (الأمر الفعلي *al-amr al-fi-liyy*), by means of emanational

subsistence;

- The existence of an entity in the second creation subsists through the act of existence which constitutes the first creation, variously called the *Accidental Commanding of God* (أَمْرُ اللَّهِ الْعَرَضِيّ *ʾamr al-lāh al-ʿaraḍiyy*) *Light of the Commanding* (نُورُ الْأَمْرِ *nūr al-ʾamr*) and the *Commanding that is the outcome of Acting* (الْأَمْرُ الْمَفْعُولِيّ *al-ʾamr al-mafʿūliyy*), through realizational or base subsistence;
- The essence of an entity in the second creation subsists through the act of existence which constitutes the first creation by means of emanational subsistence;
- The essence of an entity in the second creation subsists through the quantum of existence belonging to that very entity through realizational or base subsistence.

Based in part on these relationships, Shaykh ʾAḥmad works out his theory of good and evil as well as free will and predestination in the course of observations eleven and twelve.

Shaykh ʾAḥmad also extensively applies the concepts of first and second creation to anthropology and soteriology. According to Shaykh ʾAḥmad, the act of becoming-generated constitutes an act of choice on the part of the created entity in the second creation. In the inner reality of things, each of us chooses, at the very moment of our creation, whether we accept our existentiality or not. This accepting or rejecting is regarded as constituting an essential modality of a quintessence's act of becoming. In other words,

essences are in a sense acts of *self-creation*. The author considers the following enigmatic verse of the Qur'an as alluding to this state of affairs (7:172):

And when your Lord took, from the backs of the Children of Adam, their progeny, and made them testify concerning themselves [saying]: “Am I not your Lord?”, they replied: “Yes Indeed! We so testify!”

For Shaykh 'Aḥmad, God's question symbolizes the giving of existence. The affirmative reply symbolizes the receiving of this existence. The author builds his anthropology around this idea. Although we cannot go into the details of this, we must note that the importance of this anthropology to Shaykh 'Aḥmad's thought can hardly be overemphasized.

3.2.5 The Categories of Essence

With all of Shaykh 'Aḥmad's building upon the quintessence-actional quality distinction, one may wonder what happened to the rest of the traditional Aristotelian accidents. Shaykh 'Aḥmad replaces Aristotle's nine accidental categories with six *subsistence factors* (مُقَوِّمَاتٌ *muqawwimāt*) of essence. The author lists them at the beginning of the Seventh Observation and discusses them in his commentary [2, pgs. 135–139]. He gives some further discussion in the Eighth Observation. We cannot embark upon an investigation of his categorical scheme here; we will confine ourselves to just outlining it here for ontological completeness. The six subsistence factors of the essence of a given quintessence are as follows:

1. *Quantity* (الْكَمَّ *al-kamm*). In his commentary [2, pgs. 136], Shaykh

'Aḥmad says that this quantity is not the traditional accident, but is the amount of matter or *substantial measure* (قَدَر جَوْهَرِيّ *qadar ġawhariyy*) attached to a given essence;

2. *Quality* (الْكَيْف *al-kayf*, not to be confused with qualities or *ṣifāt* in general). The author says that all of the traditional divisions of quality (*al-kayf*) apply here;
3. *Durational mode* (الْوَقْتُ *al-waqt*). There are three primary modes of duration:
 - (a) Sempiternity (السَّرمَد *as-sarmad*). This is mode which applies to the Process of Existentiality, the Acting, and the realm of Possibility;
 - (b) Meta-time (الدَّهر *ad-dahr*). This mode applies to the *mundus intelligibilis* and its strata;
 - (c) Time (الزَّمان *az-zamān*). This mode applies to physical bodies, the heavens, and the *mundus imaginallis*;
4. *Space or Place* (الْمَكَان *al-makān*). This is the *envelope* (ظَرْف *ẓarf*) within which a given quintessence abides. An interesting feature of Shaykh 'Aḥmad's thought is that, as he explains in the course of his commentary on the Eighth Observation [2, pgs. 159], the view that space is preexistent with respect to body is incorrect; rather, both are coincident features of a given essence, coming into existence together. So the space of the physical universe is one of its essential features; without the material "body" (جِسْم *ġism*) that constitutes the physical

realm, space cannot be said to exist;

5. *Orientation or Aspect* (الْجِهَة *al-ġihat*). The definition of orientation given by the author is rather dense and abstract [2, pgs. 136–137]: “Orientation is the *face* (وَجْه *waġh*) of a given thing with respect to its *principle* (أَصْل *aṣl*) and with respect to its own *self-orienting* (تَوَجُّه *tawaġġuh*) with respect to it. It is also the *direction* [also *ġihat*] of *drawing support* (إِسْتِمْدَاد *istimdād*) from its *origin* (مَبْدَأ *mabdaʿ*)”¹¹. This appears to be some metaphysical generalization of the notions of dimension and direction, for when the author mentions these six in the course of his *Commentary on the Throne Wisdom* [4, p 94], he says that orientation pertains to the classic six directions: A given thing may be in front of, behind, to the right, to the left, above, or below another given thing. A full understanding of Shaykh 'Aḥmad's metaphysical generalization of the concept of orientation may need to await a study of his astronomical models of the dynamic interplay between the various strata of essence and existence. Here is a very tentative first step towards deciphering what Shaykh 'Aḥmad has in mind:

- *Orientation is the face of a given thing towards its principle.* Perhaps by ‘principle’ the author means that wherein a thing is firmly rooted. Consider a person standing. If the Earth is his principle, then with respect to the Earth, the head of the man is directed or

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الْجِهَةُ: وَهِيَ وَجْهُ الشَّيْءِ إِلَى أَصْلِهِ، وَإِلَى تَوَجُّهِهِ إِلَيْهِ. وَهِيَ جِهَةُ الْإِسْتِمْدَادِ مِنْ مَبْدِئِهِ.

oriented towards the sky and away from the Earth;

- *And with respect to its own self-orienting with respect to it.* Consider someone facing east who then turns south. Even before he actually faces south, south is the orientation and direction he is aiming at, and may thus be called his orientation;
- *It is also the direction of drawing support from its origin.* Note that the root of ‘إِسْتِمْدَادٌ’ *ʾistimdād* (“drawing support”) connotes the idea of extending, and the related word ‘إِمْتِدَادٌ’ *ʾimtidād* actually means “extension” in the geometrical sense. Earlier we mentioned Shaykh ʾAḥmad’s principle that existence is the *aspect* (another translation of ‘*ḡihat*’) of a quintessence that comes from its Lord, whereas essence is the aspect that comes from itself. That is, existence and essence constitute the two directions (yet another translation of ‘*ḡihat*’) of a quintessence through which it draws support for itself. Existence and essence are thus two metaphysical *orientations* of a given quintessence.

One of the problems in translating Shaykh ʾAḥmad is that it is difficult to translate the various shades of ‘*ḡihat*’ by a single word. If one uses a different word for each shade of meaning, then there is the problem of precisely determining which shade of meaning is intended within any given passage. In any case, Shaykh ʾAḥmad claims that orientation is one of the essential modalities of essence;

6. *Rank* (الرُّبَّةُ *ar-rutbat*). Given an impression of an agent, Shaykh ʾAḥmad says that its rank is its degree of proximity to the agent. What

he means is as follows: Everything is an impression of God. Now the Process of Existentiality is prior to the act of existence. Shaykh 'Aḥmad expresses this ontological priority by saying that the Process of Existentiality and the act of existence belong to different ranks. These ranks correspond to levels in the author's version of the Neoplatonic hierarchy of existents.

Although we cannot go much further at this time into an investigation of these categories — the author claims and tries to show that they subsume other categories such as the of the Aristotelian category of *position* (الوضع *al-waḍʿ*) and the religious category of *term* (أجل *ʾaǧal*)¹² — the point most important to our concerns in this chapter is the author's emphasis that these six subsistence factors are mutually subsistent, dependent, and coincident. That is, they are organically related: [2, p. 135]

Know that when the first water, called “delimited existence”, descended to the barren earth [of *receptivities* (القابليّات *al-qābiliyyāt*)], each thing became-generated in six “days” [i.e., modalities]: quantity, quality, durational mode, space, orientation, and rank; not one of these things self-manifests without the other. Any given “thing” is made up of these, along with its matter, which is a *quantum* of existence, and its form, which is a quantum of essence. All of them self-manifest at once because each one of these eight is a condition for the self-manifesting of each one of

¹²The religious category of *term* (*ʾaǧal*) refers to the appointed time God allots a given entity at any particular rank of existence. See, e.g., *al-ʾAḥsāʾ* 1856, p. 138.

them. An existent thing is a composite of existence and essence, and the six are subsistence factors and limits of essence.

The act of delimited existence has a form or essence which Shaykh 'Aḥmad calls the “barren earth” (الأرض الحيزن *al-ʿarḍ al-ḡaruz*) or the “earth of receptivities” (أرض القابليّات *ʿarḍ al-qābiliyyāt*). Through the dynamic interplay of the “water” of the original act of delimited existence with the “barren earth” of its own form, individual things come into existence when a given receptivity interacts with a given quantum or mode of the act of existence. The six modalities mentioned determine and individuate the essence — that is, distinguish it from other essences — and each necessarily entails the others. In addition, existence and essence each entails the other. This dialectical entailment is one of *coincidence and coterminousness* (مُساوَقَة *musāwaqat*) in *manifestation* (ظُهور *ẓuhūr*) [2, p. 137].

3.3 From Substance-Accident to Correlational Accidents

An implication of this approach to essence and existence is an undermining or subversion of the substance-accident distinction. Towards the end of the Eleventh Observation, the author states the following:

Know furthermore that the accidentality of each thing we have mentioned is the *aspect* (*ḡihat*) of its need of its contrary. So the accidentality of existence is the aspect of its need, with respect to *self-manifesting*, of essence. The accidentality of essence is the

aspect of its need, with respect to *realization*, of existence. Due to this the accidentality of each one follows the quintessentiality of the other¹³.

For Shaykh 'Aḥmad, a “quintessence (*dāt*)” is a thing considered *qua* cause or agent of motion or field of activity. Here, Shaykh 'Aḥmad is saying that existence depends on essence for its *manifestation*, but essence depends on existence for its *realization*. That is, existence subsists through essence by means of manifestational subsistence, whereas essence subsists through existence by means of realizational subsistence. Again, Shaykh 'Aḥmad is emphasizing the ontological polarity, inseparability, and codependent origination of existence and essence. In the Eleventh Observation, the author develops an intricate theory of the dynamic interplay of existence and essence to explain freedom of choice and the processes of creating, divine provision, living, and dying. Neither existence nor essence is an absolute principle; the forward motion of creation, the “creative advance into novelty” if you will, is driven by the revolution of existence about essence and of essence about existence.

While he does not mention it explicitly here, Shaykh 'Aḥmad's view that existence and essence each has a quintessential and an accidental aspect is a special case of the author's general view on substantiality. A “thing” or “quintessence”, that is, a composite of existence and essence, is a “substance”

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ثُمَّ اعْلَمْ أَنَّ عَرَضِيَّةَ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ مِمَّا ذَكَرْنَا هِيَ جِهَةٌ فَقَرِهَ إِلَى ضِدِّهِ. فَعَرَضِيَّةُ الْوُجُودِ جِهَةٌ فَقَرِهَ إِلَى الْمَاهِيَّةِ فِي الظُّهُورِ؛ وَعَرَضِيَّتُهَا جِهَةٌ فَقَرِهَهَا إِلَى الْوُجُودِ فِي التَّحَقُّقِ. فَلِهَذَا تَتَّبِعُ عَرَضِيَّةُ كُلِّ وَاحِدٍ ذَاتِيَّةَ الْآخَرِ.

in relation to its motions and its impressions, while it is a “correlational accident” with respect to its perfect cause. More generally, every substance or accident constitutes a correlational accident in some sense. Substantiality and accidentality are thus *correlational* features of real things, not *absolute* features. This needs some elaboration.

As we mentioned earlier, Shaykh 'Aḥmad considers essence and existence as constituting a *pair of mutual contraries* (ضِدَّان *ḍiddān*). At the level of God the Pure Quintessence, God's Existence is identical to his Essence. He is the *coincidentia oppositorum* of the Latin scholastics:

So from a single aspect (*ḡihat*) He is Lofty in His Proximity, Proximate in His Loftiness. From a single aspect He is the Manifest in his Occulting, the Occult in His Manifesting. From a single aspect He is the Near in His Farness, the Far in His Nearness. From a single aspect He is the First through His Lastness, the Last through His Firstness. This and what is similar does not apply to that which is besides Him; with respect to Him (Glorified is He!), however, it is necessarily the case. So in His simplicity He is singular in meaning. There is no abundance in His Quintessence, no multiplicity, no facets, and no aspects . [Twelfth Observation]

As soon as emanation takes place, these contrary qualities become distinct. The higher the ontological rank, the more fine and subtle the distinctness of a pair of contraries is. The lower the rank, the more hard and clear the distinctness of a pair of contraries is. So the first emanation, Absolute Existence, is utterly simple, and more so than existence at any other rank, but still infinitely less so than the Necessary Existent. The author points out

in the Third Observation that

The Preeternity of the Necessary [i.e., the durational mode particular to It] is its Quintessence; its “Space” is its Quintessence.

As for the possible that is *delimited existence*, which comprises all of the outcomes of Acting, its “space” is different from its “time” and they are both different from its quintessence.

As for Preponderating Permissibility [i.e., Absolute Existence], its own “space” and “time” in relation to it, in consideration of unity and difference, is in between. It is not to the limit of the Necessary in regards to unity, and not to the limit of the possible in regards to multiplicity; this is in relation to itself. In relation to its linkage to the possible, then mutual difference obtains, a difference simpler than the difference that obtains in the possible.

So understand!

Like any other entity, Absolute Existence is a composite of essence and existence. The difference between its existence and its essence is very subtle — nearly to the point of simplicity, but not quite. We mentioned above that Shaykh 'Aḥmad regards durational mode and space as two of the subsistence factors and limits of essence. The space of Absolute Existence is *Possibility* (الْإِمْكَانُ *al-ʾimkān*). Its durational mode is Sempiternity. The author also uses ‘Possibility’, as well as ‘Permissibility’ (الْجَوَازُ *al-ḡawāz*) and ‘the Great Abyss’ (الْعُمُقُ الْأَكْبَرُ *al-ʿumuq al-ʾakbar*), to denote the essence of Absolute Existence in general. Shaykh 'Aḥmad says that Possibility or Permissibility is both the *Eve* of the Acting, the first Adam, and its *configuration* (هَيْئَةٌ *ḥayyāʾ*).

hayat): “She does not surpass him, nor is she deficient with respect to him, as we alluded to previously. So understand! [Third Observation].” Absolute Existence thus has both an active aspect as well as a receptive, becoming aspect. It is *the Kāf that Revolves About Itself* (الكاف المستديرة على نفسها) *al-kāf al-mustadīratu ‘alā nafsihā*¹⁴.

When considered with respect to itself, Shaykh ‘Aḥmad calls Absolute Existence *Willing-in-Possibility* (المشيئة الإمكانية *al-mašīyyat al-‘imkāniyyat*). With respect to God it is a *quality* that subsists through Him by means of emanational subsistence. Yet it is also a *quintessence* or *substance*: “Allah created it through itself and made it subsist through itself”, that is, through base subsistence [2, p. 45]. It is the Acting *qua* Willing-in-Possibility that is the subject of the Third Observation.

When regarded with respect to its *attachment* (تعلق *ta‘alluq*) to the outcomes of Acting, Shaykh ‘Aḥmad calls Absolute Existence “Willing-in-Being” (المشيئة الكونية *al-mašīyyat al-kawniyyat*). Considered from this angle, the Willing or Acting as a whole entails an *impression* (اِطْأَار *‘aṭar*) which constitutes an act of receiving and of becoming-in-yielding-to-that-Acting. That act of becoming is delimited existence. This act of becoming is thus the *form* of Willing-in-Being. The act of existence is therefore a quality of Absolute Existence, since becoming-in-yielding-to-acting (انفِعال *‘infī‘āl*) is an actional quality. The Acting inheres in its quality, that is, the act of existence is Absolute Ex-

¹⁴The Arabic letter *kāf* (ك *k*) is the first letter of the imperative ‘كُنْ *kun*’ (*Become!*). The other letter is *nūn* (ن *n*). ‘*Kāf*’ symbolizes the Acting or *Willing* (المشيئة *al-mašīyyat*) of God when that Willing is considered independently of its culmination and its effects or impressions. The *Kāf* is created through itself; it is its own cause and its own effect: its activity revolves about its receptivity. See *al-‘Aḥsā’ī* 1856, pgs. 34–35.

istence's *locus of inhering* (مَحَلّ *maḥall*). This exemplifies Shaykh 'Aḥmad's doctrine that a given acting attributed to a given agent inheres, not in the agent itself, but in its own impressions, just as a beating inheres in the one beaten, not in the beater. This implies the interesting conclusion that actings subsist through their own qualities and impressions through affectional subsistence, as the author himself has stated on occasion [3, Vol. 1, pt. 3, p. 39].

We can illustrate this state of affairs through the following. Consider a quantity of water. Water has its own configuration, through its molecular structure etc. Now consider that water flowing through a riverbed. The riverbed may be considered as the form of the water. The water inheres in it and, from the geological perspective, defines and determines it over time. The riverbed receives the water and continually becomes through its very receiving of the water. Yet though the riverbed gives form to the water, it does not affect the water's configuration. Yet the configuration of the water determines all of the water's chemical and geological possibilities. It makes it *possible* for and determines the manner in which the water creates the riverbed. The water considered by itself is like Willing-in-Possibility. The water considered with regards to the riverbed is like Willing-in-Being.

As described in the Fourth Observation, there is a *mode* (رَأْس *ra's*) of Willing-in-Being which attaches and is specific to every quintessence and quality beneath it in rank. So each feature of each contingent entity derives from the features of the mode of Willing-in-Being specific to it. These modes, in turn, derive their features from the *Universal Acting* (أَفْعَلُ الْكُلِّيِّ *al-fi'l al-kullīyy*):

So in relation to whoever is below it, the Acting is a single quintessence. From its quintessence, each quintessence acquires its *quintessentialization* (تَدَوُّوت *tadawwut*). From its configurations, each quality acquires its *quintessentialization*; and from its qualities, each acquires *that which makes it a quality* (تَوْصِيف *tawṣīf*).

[Fourth Observation]

Just as Absolute Existence is a quintessence in itself, a quality with respect to the Agent, and a quintessence with respect to its outcomes, so also is any given impression of the Acting a quintessence in some sense and a quality in others, since “every impression resembles the actional quality of its agent”.

Moving down in rank, the act of existence of first creation, considered with respect to Willing-in-Being, is thus the form of Willing-in-Being and a quality of it. When considered by itself, however, it is a quintessence and a substance, as we discussed earlier. In resemblance of the actional quality of its agent, it is also an acting, albeit secondary and *in succession to* (بِتَبَعِيَّة *bi-tabaʿiyyat*) the Acting proper. It has a configuration and set of possibilities of its own, called “the barren earth” (الأَرْضُ الْجَرُزُ *al-ʿarḍu l-ġaruzu*), the “earth of receptivities” (*ʿarḍu l-qābiliyyāt*), “the first essence” (*al-māhiyyatu l-ʾūlā*), or the “species-form” (الصُّورَةُ النَّوْعِيَّة *aṣ-ṣūrat an-nawʿiyyat*). This configuration of the first creation contrasts with its active component of “species-matter” (المَادَّةُ النَّوْعِيَّة *al-māddat an-nawʿiyyat*). As the active and receptive aspects of the first creation interact, the first creation generates a diffraction which culminates in the second creation. Each individual in the second creation contains a quantum of existence from the first creation. These quanta are not actually discrete, but are modes and actional qualities

of the first creation. Each mode generates a receptivity which is a quality of the mode and its act of becoming. So the essence of every entity is a quality of its quantum of existence. When an actual entity, such as a person, acts, it is a quintessence, although with respect to the quantum of pure activity that is its matter and existence it is a quality.

This process also works the other way. According to Shaykh 'Aḥmad, just as essence may be regarded as a quality of existence, ontological intuition tells us that, on a deeper level, existence is also a quality of essence. Existence needs essence for its realization just as essence needs existence for its own:

Know that essence exists through the existence of existence as long as existence is existent. If essence did not exist, then existence would not exist because the former is the condition of the existentialization of existence and constitutes the completion of the receptivity of the existence to [the act of] existentializing; and conversely.

Now they [that is, Mulla Ṣadra and his followers] have said that essence is non-existence — “it smells not the fragrance of existence”¹⁵ — only because they mean to say that it does not ever exist primarily and quintessentially, not that it does not exist at all. Rather it exists through the surplus of [the act of the] existentializing of existence, as we have said in the foregoing. That surplus, when related to the existentializing of existence, is the relation of one part to seventy, as is the case for impressions and

¹⁵This quote is from Mulla Ṣadra. See, e.g., *Shirāzī* 1992, p. 43.

qualities [that is, accidents — see commentary]. This is [the case] with respect to the outward [analysis of things].

As for in the reality which corresponds to what actually occurs, essence is existent through another existence, one independent in itself, even if it is sequentially subordinate to the first. The relation of its existence to the first is like the relation of the existence of “becoming-broken” to the existence of “[transitive] breaking”. That is because the first is part of the completion of the receptivity of existentiating on the part of the existence of essence. [Eleventh Observation]

In other words, existence is also an act of receptivity with respect to essence. However, there is no doubt that the active aspect of existence far outweighs its receptive aspect, just as the receptive aspect of essence far outweighs its active aspect. Further on in the Eleventh Observation, Shaykh 'Aḥmad explains in detail how existence and essence *revolve* (يَدُورُ *yadūru*) about one another.

We note once again that this way of thinking about existence and essence is precisely analogous to the relation of *yin* and *yang* in Chinese philosophy. *Yang* is the active principle, yet contains a small element of receptivity. *Yin* is the receptive principle, yet contains a small element of activity. Finally, each revolves about the other and together they form a single concrescence, as symbolized in the very famous diagram of *yang* and *yin*.

The moral of the story is that existence needs essence and essence needs existence. We can now better appreciate Shaykh 'Aḥmad's definition of accidentality: “the accidentality of each thing ... is the aspect of its need of

its contrary.” A quintessence or substance needs its qualities and accidents; in that sense it is a quality or accident of its qualities. At any given rank, quality and qualified are coterminous and coincident; they are codependently generated. If one objects that the acting of an agent is a quality, yet is not coincident or coterminous with it, then the response is that quintessence and emanation are of different rank. With respect to its emanations, an entity is a quintessence; with respect to the cause from which it emanates, it is an accident: [3, Vol II, p. 315]

...it has been firmly established in metaphysics, through the proof of Wisdom, that all of the modes of existence, of both the invisible and visible realms, including [what are traditionally classified as] substances and accidents, are [actually] correlational accidents (أَعْرَاضٌ إِضَافِيَّةٌ *ʿaʿrāḍ ʾiḍāfiyyat*), meaning that a substance is an accident in relation to the cause from which it emanates, and its cause is an accident of its own cause, and so forth. Similarly, a given substance is a substance for its accident, and that accident is a substance for that accident that subsists through it¹⁶.

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تَقَرَّرَ فِي الْحِكْمَةِ الْإِلَهِيَّةِ، بِدَلِيلِ الْحِكْمَةِ، أَنَّ جَمِيعَ ذَرَاتِ الْوُجُودِ، مِنْ عَالَمِ الْغَيْبِ وَالشَّهَادَةِ، مِنَ الْجَوَاهِرِ وَالْأَعْرَاضِ، أَعْرَاضٌ إِضَافِيَّةٌ، بِمَعْنَى أَنَّ الْجَوْهَرَ عَرَضٌ بِالنِّسْبَةِ إِلَى عِلَّتِهِ الَّتِي صَدَرَ عَنْهَا، وَ هِيَ عَرَضٌ لِعِلَّتِهَا، وَ هَكَذَا. وَ كَذَلِكَ نَقُولُ أَنَّ هَذَا الْجَوْهَرَ جَوْهَرٌ لِعَرَضِهِ وَ هَذَا الْعَرَضُ جَوْهَرٌ لِنَا قَامَ بِهِ.

One may argue that Shaykh 'Aḥmad has, in effect, reduced qualities, accidents, and properties to processes. On the one hand, he has turned quintessential qualities, including many of the traditional Aristotelian accidents, into modalities or “subsistence-factors” of the acts of becoming he calls essences. Each modality has no independent reality of its own, but constitutes a necessary, coterminous, and coincident condition for the act of becoming or essence as a whole. One could perhaps say that the quintessential qualities and modalities of a given essence constitute a *subconrescence*. Given such a subconrescence, it exists and subsists through actional qualities such as existential motion and its culmination, each of which in itself constitutes a process. Existential motion is a process both because it is a conrescence of acting and possibility and because it is an unfolding in stages, as the author discusses in the third and fourth observations. Its culmination is a process because it is a conrescence of activity with respect to its effects and of receptivity with respect to its source. A given sub-act of existence in the second creation constitutes a subconrescence from which, conjoined with a given act of becoming or essence, the corresponding quintessence itself *conresces*.

One should note that, as the next-to-last quote from Shaykh 'Aḥmad suggests, Mulla Ṣadra had already intimated that essence, if it is anything at all, is actually an accident of existence and not the other way around. For example, in his *Metaphysical Penetrations* he says that [10, p. 47]

A given *made entity* (مَجْعُول *mağ'ūl*) is nothing but the existence of that thing as a simple making and without any essence, except

as an accident¹⁷.

In his commentary, Shaykh 'Aḥmad elaborates and expands on this statement. Rahman has also noticed this trend in Mulla Ṣadra: [52, p. 46]

...Ibn Sīnā had characterized existence as an accident of the essence, while for Ṣadra existence is the primary—indeed, the sole—reality and, if anything, essence may be an accident of existence.

In another place, Mulla Ṣadra also appears to foreshadow Shaykh 'Aḥmad's notions of substance and accident. Again, in the *Metaphysical Penetrations*:

The fact of the matter is that existence of a given substance is a substance through the very *substantiality* (جَوْهَرِيَّةٌ *ḡawhariyyat*) of that substance and not through another substantiality. And the existence of an accident is an accident through the very accidentality of that accident and not through another accidentality...¹⁸.

Shaykh 'Aḥmad then uses Mulla Ṣadra as a point of departure to develop his own theory of substance and accident. Here is a pertinent excerpt: [5, p. 95]

17

الْمَجْعُولُ لَيْسَ إِلَّا وَجُودُ الشَّيْءِ جَعْلًا بَسِيطًا دُونَ مَا هَيْتِهِ إِلَّا بِالْعَرَضِ.

18

وَالْحَقُّ أَنَّ وَجُودَ الْجَوْهَرِ جَوْهَرٌ بِعَيْنِ جَوْهَرِيَّةِ ذَلِكَ الْجَوْهَرِ، لَا بِجَوْهَرِيَّةِ أُخْرَى. وَوُجُودُ الْعَرَضِ عَرَضٌ بِعَيْنِ عَرَضِيَّةِ ذَلِكَ الْعَرَضِ، لَا بِعَرَضِيَّةِ أُخْرَى ...

Substance constitutes *existence qua qualified* (وُجُودٌ مَوْصُوفِيّ *wuḡūd mawṣūfiyy*); accident constitutes *existence qua quality* (وُجُودٌ صِفَتِيّ *wuḡūd ṣifatiyy*). Now there is, in the author's statement, that which appears to imply the apparent meaning of our statement, although he and I each mean something different from the other. When it is the case that each thing is generated, then it is a composite of two existences: one *qua* qualified, which we call "existence" and "matter", and one *qua* quality, which we call "essence", "becoming-in-yielding-to-acting", and "form"...¹⁹.

Shaykh 'Aḥmad proceeds to elaborate this theme in further detail. In accordance with our previous discussion, Shaykh 'Aḥmad appears to be saying that a substance is such insofar as it is qualified by a quality; an accident is such insofar as it is a quality. But when a given accident is qualified by another accident, it is a substance. When a given substance is a quality of another substance, it is an accident. We have brought in Mulla Ṣadra here to illustrate our view that there is a strong sense in which one may, despite the considerable differences between them, regard Shaykh 'Aḥmad's metaphysics as an outgrowth of that of Mulla Ṣadra. Needless to say, all of this is in dire need of further investigation.

19

الْجَوْهَرُ وَجُودٌ مَوْصُوفِيٌّ وَالْعَرَضُ وَجُودٌ صِفَتِيٌّ. وَ فِي كَلَامِ الْمُصَنِّفِ مَا يُفِيدُ بَعْضَ ظَاهِرِ كَلَامِنَا، وَ هُوَ قَوْلُهُ: «وَ الْحَقُّ أَنَّ وَجُودَ الْجَوْهَرِ جَوْهَرٌ بِعَيْنِ جَوْهَرِيَّةٍ ذَلِكَ الْجَوْهَرُ» إلخ، وَ إِنْ كَانَتْ الْإِرَادَتَانِ مُتَخِلِّفَتَيْنِ. وَ إِنْ كَانَ كُلُّ شَيْءٍ مُكَوَّنٍ فَهُوَ مُرَكَّبٌ مِنْ وَجُودَيْنِ: مَوْصُوفِيٍّ - نُسَمِّيهِ بِالْوُجُودِ وَ الْمَادَّةِ - وَ صِفَتِيٍّ - نُسَمِّيهِ بِالْمِهْيَةِ وَ الْإِنْفِعَالِ وَ الصُّورَةِ.

Shaykh 'Aḥmad's view of substance and accident is clearly an application of the ontological polarity principle: every created, contingent thing is a complex of acting and becoming-in-yielding-to-acting. This principle is in part inspired by the formula spoken by the Eighth Imam al-Riḍā:

*Allah definitely did not create any single thing subsisting through itself and without something else. [This is a point] for whoever desires an indication of Him and the affirmation of His existence.*²⁰.

Ultimately, there are no static substances. God is the only Constant, Unchanging, Atemporal and Immaterial being. This makes sense for the following reason. Process for Shaykh 'Aḥmad involves duality as an interaction of existence and essence. But God's Essence is His Existence and His Existence is His Essence. Since His Essence and Existence are utterly identical, God is utterly simple. Simplicity negates duality and, by extension, process. Shaykh 'Aḥmad argued above that one cannot even truly conceive of utter simplicity in the mind. So *true* atemporality and changelessness are only attributes of God. But since every true proposition about God *qua* God is a tautology, we have no way of knowing what this atemporality and changelessness means, except through the experience of Real Existence and the Logos. But ontologically, though not phenomenologically, even the Logos is not static. Hence Shaykh 'Aḥmad's ontology, which for him does not include God *qua* God as an object of investigation, does not consider any absolute atemporality or immateriality as truly obtaining in the world. Yes, Shaykh 'Aḥmad *does*

20

إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَمْ يَخْلُقْ شَيْئًا فَرْدًا قَائِمًا بِذَاتِهِ دُونَ غَيْرِهِ لِلَّذِي أَرَادَ مِنَ الدَّلَالَةِ عَلَيْهِ وَاثْبَاتِ وَجُودِهِ.

consider atemporality and immateriality in a relative sense. Materiality and atemporality are, for him, ontologically graded. The matter of the Acting is more subtle than that of the nous, whose matter in turn is more subtle than that of the soul, whose matter in turn is more subtle than that of the body.

Shaykh 'Aḥmad's view of the relation between existence and essence, and by extension, of the correlativity of substance and accident, is also an application of the topological principle. Shaykh 'Aḥmad's formula for this principle is a tradition of the Imam Ja'far al-Ṣādiq, the most famous sage and teacher of his day. His thought preceded the introduction of Greek thought into the Islamic world and he was, along with the other Shi'ī Imams, a major inspiration for Shaykh 'Aḥmad. This quote is highly indicative of the influence this early sage had on our author:

*Servitude is a jewel whose ultimate reality is lordship. So what is missing in servitude is found in lordship; what is hidden in lordship is attained in servitude*²¹.

To expand, *servitude* [i.e., becoming, yielding, *yin*, essence] is a jewel whose ultimate reality is *lordship* [i.e., acting, *yang*, existence]. So what is missing in servitude [i.e., that existence through which it is realized] is found in lordship; what is hidden in lordship [i.e., that essence which seeks manifestation] is attained in servitude.

21

الْعُبُودِيَّةُ جَوْهَرَةٌ، كُنْهَهَا الرُّبُوبِيَّةُ. فَمَا فُقِدَ فِي الْعُبُودِيَّةِ، وَجَدَ فِي الرُّبُوبِيَّةِ. وَمَا خَفِيَ فِي الرُّبُوبِيَّةِ، أُصِيبَ فِي الْعُبُودِيَّةِ.

3.4 Shaykh 'Aḥmad and Whitehead

I believe that the foregoing has shown the appropriateness of describing Shaykh 'Aḥmad's metaphysics of existence and essence as the application of a true process metaphysics. The world for Shaykh 'Aḥmad consists of macroprocesses or concrescences each constituting a dyad of two subprocesses: one of acting or existence and one of becoming-in-yielding-to-acting or essence. These dyads are irreducible: they constitute the ultimate realities of the world. Existence is a dynamic, all-pervasive matter field, each of whose modes attaches to an instance of becoming. Through its unity, it is the principle of connectivity between all contingent things. Through the plurality of acts of becoming, essence is the principle of multiplicity.

3.4.1 Essence, Actual Entity, and the Ultimate

At this juncture, I would like to make some brief comments about the relation of Shaykh 'Aḥmad's approach to the essence-existence distinction to modern process philosophy. Our comments are only exploratory, meant to serve as an initial basis for further and more extensive research. We begin by considering Whitehead's notion of an actual entity or occasion. For Whitehead, these constitute the final realities of which the world is made up. They are not unchanging subjects of change, but are rather units of becoming. Given an actual entity, its being is only in its becoming; once its becoming ceases, the actual entity evanesces. Actual entities are monadic individuals, thus entailing an atomistic ontology.

We believe that Whitehead's 'actual entity' is extensionally, though not

intensionally, quite similar to Shaykh 'Aḥmad's 'essence'. Shaykh 'Aḥmad's essences share with actual entities the feature of being units of becoming. In the Eleventh Observation of *Observations in Wisdom*, the author points out that a given individual essence is sustained by God's global delimited existence, which in turn is the culmination of God's Acting. For the essence to subsist, it must continue to become an outcome of acting. At no point does the essence finally become an independent substance, because then it would be free of the act of existence. If it became free of the act of existence, the essence would evanesce because it depends on existence for its realization. Either the essence is in the process of becoming or it loses its reality. Shaykh 'Aḥmad's ontology also calls for a multiplicity of essences; each essence is an individual act of becoming, related to but distinct from others. The key difference between Shaykh 'Aḥmad's essence and Whitehead's actual entity is that for Shaykh 'Aḥmad, a given thing is a concrescence of an individual act of becoming and an act of existence. This concrescence is sustained by primary existence and by God's Acting. This would appear to fit in quite well with Whitehead except that it appears to run afoul of what he calls the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. Let us consider this.

Whitehead conceives of an ultimate of creative activity as his version of Aristotle's prime matter. This field of creative activity appears identical to the "delimited existence" of Shaykh 'Aḥmad. However, this ultimate of Whitehead is only instantiated in actual entities, and has no existence in and of itself. Therefore actual entities are monadic and not dyadic. To say differently would be to run afoul of the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. This is the fallacy of mistaking an abstraction from actual entities for an

actual entity itself.

Shaykh 'Aḥmad would reject Whitehead's argument by saying that the ultimate is not an abstraction, but a real phenomenological category. Through the process of ousiological reduction, one can directly intuit this creative, dynamic ground of becoming. Once ousiological intuition is achieved, it is just a matter of identifying this phenomenological category with the ontological category of existence. *Ousiological reduction is not the same as ousiological abstraction.* Only the latter results in the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. Dynamic matter is real; it requires acts of becoming for its manifestation. But if the ultimate did not itself exist, then the acts of becoming which Whitehead calls actual entities could not be realized. Shaykh 'Aḥmad would perhaps suggest that, in denying the existence of the ultimate, Whitehead has committed a fallacy in his own right: that of identifying manifestation with realization. Actual entities in Whitehead's sense are manifest to us in their differentiation and multiplicity; their ground is not so manifest. But it does not follow that the latter is not real. On this point, Shaykh 'Aḥmad is in fundamental agreement with Inada's interpretation of the Taoist philosophy of *wu* or nonbeing [42, pgs. 5–8]. Inada points out that despite the fact that *wu*, the concept of which I have argued earlier is coextensive (though not cointensive) with that of the dynamic existence and matter of Shaykh 'Aḥmad, is “invisible”, it is quite real.

Once we accept that the category of the ultimate is also a category of existence—indeed, it is the “ultimate” category of existence—then we can conceive of it as an actual entity. Shaykh 'Aḥmad's reasoning leads to the thesis that existence, the ultimate itself, is in the process of becoming, a

point he actually makes on the last page of his vast *Commentary on the Metaphysical Penetrations*. In variance with Whitehead, Shaykh 'Aḥmad argues that there is, over and above the acts of becoming that constitute the essences of individual things, an “extensive continuity” of becoming. The becoming of delimited existence ascends towards Absolute Existence, which is the home of all possibilities. This gives new meaning to Whitehead’s dictum, “the universe is a creative advance into novelty” [68, p. 222].

3.4.2 God and Process

Finally, it is clear that Shaykh 'Aḥmad and Whitehead part ways on the issue of God’s Nature. For Whitehead, God is an actual entity with a “dipolar nature” [68, p. 345]; He has both a “primordial” component [68, p. 343] and a “consequent” component [68, p. 345]. God for Whitehead is not an exception to metaphysical principles, but “is their chief exemplification” [68, p. 343]. As is the case with the rest of the World, God is characterized by “fluency” [68, p. 343] and “novelty” [68, p. 349].

All of this, of course, is total anathema for Shaykh 'Aḥmad. According to him, God is utterly singular. Yes, He is the *coincidentia oppositorum*, but these opposites are identical to His Quintessence. He is the First and the Last, but His Firstness is identical to His Lastness. We know nothing about His Nature; we may only have cognizance of His Manifestations through His Existential Motion and its culmination. On the other hand, much of Whitehead’s doctrine of God may, to at least *some* degree, be accommodated in the metaphysics of Shaykh 'Aḥmad, but only if we replace Whitehead’s “God” with Shaykh 'Aḥmad’s “Absolute Existence”. For Absolute Existence

does have a primordial and consequent nature; it is the *Kāf that Revolves About Itself* (*al-kāf al-mustadīratu ‘alā nafsihā*), from which the cycle of existence initiates and towards which it returns. We say “towards which” because, as the author explains in the Ninth Observation of the *Fawā'id* and at the end of his commentary on Mulla Ṣadra’s *Metaphysical Penetrations*, the journey of becoming that is the cycle of existence ascends without end towards Absolute Existence and Possibility.

The main difference between Whitehead and Shaykh ‘Aḥmad may be as follows. Whitehead, on the one hand, believes that the nature of God is something that can be intelligibly spoken about, and that God is in the world and is thus an object of metaphysics. Shaykh ‘Aḥmad, on the other hand, holds that one can only speak intelligibly about the world and that God is not a part of it. God existentiates creation, but metaphysics can only legitimately investigate the Process of Existentialization (Absolute Existence), the culmination or outcome of that process (delimited existence), and the created Manifestation of God through His Acting (Real Existence). Put another way, the world investigated by metaphysics consists only of Absolute Existence, delimited existence, and Real Existence.

Unfortunately, a fair comparison of Whitehead’s theology with that of Shaykh ‘Aḥmad would require a major study in its own right. At this juncture, we will only say that we do not agree with Whitehead’s contention that it is a necessary condition of any true process metaphysics or philosophy of organism that God be considered as processual in nature²². Such a necessary condition, assuming that it actually has merit, may only apply to a meta-

²²See *Whitehead 1978*, pgs. 346–347.

physics that considers God as a legitimate object of investigation. In the case of Shaykh 'Aḥmad, Whitehead's contention would not apply because, for Shaykh 'Aḥmad, God is *not* a category of investigation. Propositions like "God is Atemporal" and "God is Unchanging" are tautologies *phenomenologically* grounded in the experience of Real Existence, which in turn is *ontologically* grounded in the Process of Existential Motion. Intellectually, these propositions tell us nothing positive about God *qua* Noumenon. Given the three categories of existence within which Shaykh 'Aḥmad situates his metaphysics and cosmology, we claim to have shown that they are fundamentally grounded in processes, and are not substances in the traditional sense. And this is sufficient to establish that Shaykh 'Aḥmad's is one of process metaphysics and cosmology.

Part III

Translation

Note on the Translation

The translations from the first twelve Observations are based on the critical edition that I have prepared based on an autograph manuscript of the text. The translations from Observations 13–19 are based on the Tabriz lithographed facsimile edition of 1858. They were written by the author a few years after the original *Fawā'id* were completed. While I have attempted to make the English as smooth as possible, I have tried to bring through what I consider to be the philosophical spirit of the author with as little filtering as possible. That includes, e.g., translating many Arabic gerunds as English gerunds when normal English would employ abstract nouns. Because Shaykh 'Aḥmad is an extreme realist with respect to processes, it may risk losing his point to do otherwise. The glossary, footnotes, and bracketed material should help smooth out some of the awkwardness of certain parts of the translation.

Also note the following:

- Italics e.g., “*existence*”, are used to introduce philosophical terms and certain principles that either Shaykh 'Aḥmad has invented or that are being used in a sense different from the standard scholastic usage of the scholars of his time and civilization. In addition, italics will be used to make some contrasts more conspicuous;
- Slanted text e.g., “*Know Allah through Allah*”, is used for known quotes from the Prophet Muhammad or one of the twelve Shī'ī Imams (there may be some that I am unaware of), as well as one quote from the Gospels (I do not know whether this is from an Arabic edition of the Gospels or whether it is quoted from one of the Imams). I have not

as yet indicated the precise sources for the quotes;

- Bold slanted text e.g., “***Allah has power over all things***”, is used strictly for quotes from the Qur’an, explicit or otherwise. Again, the exact references have as yet not been indicated;
- In accordance with standard usage, single quotation marks are used strictly for when an expression or term is *mentioned*; double quotes are used for other purposes inclusive of instances where the expression or term is *used*;
- Capital letters are used for names of God and for pronouns that refer back to God. For names of the divine acting, I have not yet come up with a satisfactory arrangement, and my use of capitals is somewhat inconsistent at present. This is because some of these names are philosophical, some are proper names from religious iconology, and many are both. When capitals are used, however, they are used only for proper names of the Acting itself and not for pronouns that refer back to it. ‘Wisdom’ is always capitalized; this is a matter of taste and is meant to reflect the fact that the Author uses the term ‘*أَلْحِكْمَةُ al-ḥikmatu*’ in the sense of *sophia*;
- Wherever a distinction is made between transitive acting and becoming — this distinction being perhaps the most important metaphysical distinction for our author — and that distinction is signified by the use of a pair of derivatives of a single Arabic root, then if more than one word is needed in English to signify the Arabic words involved, they will be connected by dashes. For example, consider the pair of gerunds

كَسْر *kasr* - اِنْكَسَار *ʾinkisār*. Both come from the same root, ك س ر *k s r*. *kasr* means “breaking”. *ʾinkisār* means “becoming-broken”. The dash in “becoming-broken” indicates that one Arabic word, indicative in this case of an act of becoming, is being translated. For more details on this distinction, see the Part II, Ch. 3, sec. 3.2.3. This device is used to help make the distinction nearly as obvious in English as it is in Arabic, even though this sometimes involves certain circumlocutions. I must confess though, that there are a number of instances where I could find no way to smoothly translate this sense of becoming. In those instances, I employ footnotes to try to make the point explicit. Dashes are also used in a few other instances where a single word in English is needed for a point to be better appreciated;

- When a word is translated in a sense other than the main sense as established in the glossary, then the Arabic word is placed in parentheses next to the translated term in question. Keep in mind that sometimes the expression corresponding to the Arabic term in question may include more than just one word. It may also be discontinuous e.g., “*he made him know (عَرَّفَ ʿarrafa) it*”. Here we have translated عَرَّفَ - *ʿarrafa*, which literally means “he occasioned cognizance of”, as “he made know”;
- Parentheses are used along with other types of punctuation to help organize the author’s sentences, which are frequently quite long, into manageable clauses. Square brackets contain material supplied by the translator to smooth out some of the difficulties of the translation.

This material is almost always based on information contained in the commentary and/or the Arabic context;

- As discussed in Part I, Ch. 3, the text is written in a very concise style. One result of this is that a lot of pronouns are used in place of substantives. To translate the pronouns only as pronouns in English would render the translation nearly unintelligible in many places. Because Arabic uses pronouns for both gender as well as number (singular, dual, and plural), in many cases it is relatively easy to know what the object of a pronoun is in the text. In addition, the author's commentary makes many of the objects of pronouns explicit. In cases where either the rules of syntax or the author's commentary makes the object of a given pronoun obvious, then I have not hesitated, wherever the interests of clarity would be better served, to translate the pronoun into English by the translation of its corresponding object. Where ambiguity in the Arabic is not trivially removable, I have generally translated the pronoun as its corresponding English pronoun. Of course, one must be very careful about declaring any given pronoun-object ambiguity as "trivial", and other scholars may disagree with some of my choices.

The purpose of the footnotes notes is primarily twofold:

1. to clarify some of the more obscure passages in cases where the use of brackets would be awkward or distracting; and
2. to point out the context of those discussions in cases where it would otherwise be lost upon most Western readers.

In both cases many of the comments are based on the commentary. Whenever the heading or a passage of a footnote begins with *Commentary*:, then there follows a translation of a passage from the author's own commentary of this text. These notes are in no way meant as a full-fledged commentary, a project that, while indispensable for a comprehensive appreciation of the text, is far beyond the scope of this study.

[Prologue]

In the Name of Allah, Al-Raḥmān, the Merciful

Praise belongs to Allah, the Lord of the worlds. May Allah Bless Muhammad and his pure household.

So says the destitute servant, Ahmad, the son of Zayn al-Dīn:

After I noticed many of the seekers penetrating deeply into the divine sciences, and supposing that they have penetrated deeply into the[ir] intended meaning [which they think is God Himself] — but which is only a deep penetration into semantics (*al-ʿalfāz*), nothing else — I saw that it was incumbent upon me to startle them with some wonders from amongst the problems [discussed in the divine sciences]. Now most of these problems have not been mentioned in any book, and the [explicit] mentioning (*dīkr*) of them has not occurred in any discourse. [We will accomplish] this [task] through the proof of *Wisdom*, because that through which they [i.e., the seekers] seek the goal is the proof of *argumentation through that which is best*. This proof only leads one to the world of images (*aṣ-ṣuwar*) or of meanings¹. It does not lead one to the cognizance of things as they are, as he (upon him and his family be the blessings of Allah and peace) said:

O Allah, make us see things as they are!

Only the proof of Wisdom leads one to that. In this, I hope Allah, by means of it, guide whomsoever seeks guidance by means of this proof to the middle of the path². Allah is sufficient for us and He is the best in whom to place trust.

First Observation³

Wherein an Elaboration (*tafṣīl*) of the Three Proofs
and the *Support*⁴ and *Condition*⁵ of Each of Them
Will Be Mentioned

Know, may Allah guide you, that there are three [kinds] of proof, as He (Glorified is He!) said to His Prophet (upon him and his family be the blessings of Allah and peace):

Call to the path of your Lord with Wisdom and good exhortation. And argue with them through that which is best.

Now the first is the proof of Wisdom. It is an instrument of the sciences pertaining to the real. By means of it one becomes cognizant of Allah as well as cognizant of that which is there besides Him. Its support is the *heart-flux*⁶ and tradition. Tradition consists of the Book [of Allah] and the Sunnah.

The heart-flux is the highest of all of man's loci of cognition. It is the light of Allah which he (upon whom be peace) mentioned in his dictum: *Beware of the penetration of the faithful; for he contemplates through the light of Allah.* It is *existence*⁷ because existence is the highest *orientation* of man, that is, his *direction* in orientation to his Lord, because existence does not contemplate itself at all but rather [it contemplates] its Lord; just as essence does not contemplate its Lord at all but rather [it contemplates] itself.

The condition of [the cogency of] the proof of Wisdom is that you give your Lord what is His due because, when you contemplate by the proof of Wisdom, you are summoning your Lord and He is summoning you to your heart-flux, as the Chief of the Executors⁸ (upon whom be peace) said: *Minds do not encompass him; rather He becomes-revealed to them through them, through them he is inaccessible to them, and He summons them to themselves.* Then your Lord contends with and overcomes you, so weigh ***with an even balance. That is better for you and best in respect of the outcomes [of your deeds].*** [Another condition is] that you pause with respect to your [personal] declarations [of faith], your investigations, and your explanations to others in accordance with His saying (Exalted is He!): ***Do not follow that of which you have no knowledge. Surely the hearing, seeing, and the heart-flux will all be asked about it.*** [Another condition is] that in all of those circumstance you contemplate with His eye (Exalted is He!), not with your own eye, in light of his saying (Exalted is He!): ***Do not walk exultantly upon the Earth. Surely you will never rend the Earth asunder; nor will you ever surpass the mountains in height.*** This is the manner of the proof of Wisdom.

The proof of good exhortation is an instrument for the sciences of the Way⁹, the cultivation of morals, the knowledge of certainty, and piety, although it is the case that these sciences can be acquired from other than this proof. Yet, without giving due regard to this proof, you will not reach certainty because it is the least of what Allah has apportioned to His servants. Its support is the *heart*¹⁰ and tradition. The condition of the cogency of the proof of good exhortation is giving your nous its due, meaning that

you not deny it what it has a right to and whatever right (*al-ḥaqq*) it wants from you. An example (*mitāl*) of it is His saying (Exalted is He!): **Say: Do you see that if it [the revelation] is from God, and yet you reject it, then who is more astray than one who sets himself far apart [i.e., creates dissension];** and His saying (Exalted is He!): **Say: Do you see that it [the revelation] is from God while you reject it; and a witness from the Children of Israel testifies to its similarity [to previous scriptures] and believes in it while you are arrogant? Surely Allah does not guide a community that is unjust;** and like the saying of al-Ṣādiq (upon whom be peace) to [the skeptic] ‘Abd al-Karīm ibn abi al-‘Awjā’: when he demonstrated disapproval of those circumbulating the Sacred House¹¹, he (upon whom be peace) said to the effect that: *If the matter is as you say — and it is not as you say — then you and they are the same. And if the matter is as they say — and it is as they say — then they attained deliverance and you have perished.* This is the manner of good exhortation.

The proof of argumentation through that which is best is an instrument for knowledge of the Law. Its support is knowledge and tradition. The condition of the cogency of the proof of argumentation through that which is best is giving your adversary his due. Otherwise the argumentation will not be through that which is best. It is like that which the logicians have established in the way of preliminaries and the methodology of proof, as well as what the philosophers of law and others have mentioned in the way of proofs and the methodology (*kayfiyyat*) of inference, in a fashion (*naḥw*) such that there can be no denial of a truth even if it be from your adversary

who is making a false claim in his issue [of disagreement]. And there is no drawing an inference of a truth through a falsehood, nor of the falsity of a falsehood. There is no need of giving examples because the books are full of them; indeed, you will hardly find anything else except rarely. This is due to the feableness of those drawing the inferences, of those for whom the inferences are drawn, and of that which is being inferred. Yet do not neglect using the proof of good exhortation for it is, with its condition of cogency, the way to security and comfort in the present world and to deliverance in the hereafter. This is when you are not granted the proof of Wisdom; otherwise take the proof of Wisdom and ***be among those who are thankful***. And there is no village beyond Abbādān¹². May Allah (Glorified is He!) protect you and your own.

Second Observation

On the Elucidation of the Cognizance of Existence

Know that that which is expressed by ‘existence’ comprises three divisions, upon seeking cognizance of it¹³.

The first division is *Real Existence*¹⁴. This Existence is grasped neither through generality nor specificity, absoluteness nor delimitation, whole nor part, universal nor particular, meaning nor expression, quantity nor quality (*kayf*)¹⁵, *rank* nor orientation, position, correlation, relation [in general], nor linkage. It is not [grasped as being] in any durational mode or place, nor upon anything, nor in anything, nor anything in It, nor from anything, nor due to anything, nor like anything, nor against anything. It is not [grasped, either] through subtlety or roughness, revolution or extension, motion or rest, illumination or darkness; and not through transition, duration, change, or commotion.

Nothing resembles It, and nothing is inconsonant with It; nothing corresponds with It and nothing equals It; It issues from nothing and nothing issues from It; Every quality, orientation, image (*ṣūrat*), *paradigm*, or anything else whose assumption, existence, discrimination, or concealment, is possible, is other than It.

It is not grasped through anything that has been mentioned or other than that, nor through its contrary. One cannot have cognizance, secretly or openly, of what It is¹⁶. There is no path in any direction that leads to cognizance of It, neither through negation nor confirmation, except *by*

*that through which It has characterized Itself*¹⁷. No one can grasp the ultimate reality of Its [Quintessential] Quality; one can only have cognizance through that through which It becomes-the-subject-of-cognizance for one. And It does not become-the-subject-of-cognizance for anyone in the manner It occasions-cognizance of other than Itself, otherwise that other would resemble It (Glorified is It!). So It is both the Known and the Unknown, the Found (*al-mawǧūd*) and the Missing (*al-mafqūd*)¹⁸. Thus the manner (*ǧihat*) of Its Knownness is itself (*nafs*) Its Unknownness; Its very (*nafs*) Being-witnessed is exactly (*ʿayn*) its Being-missing. Thus one does not have cognizance of It through other than It; and one has cognizance of other than It through It.

As for the proposition that It is grasped neither through generality nor specificity etc., it is so because these are aspects (*ǧihāt*) of creation and are its qualities. They *define nothing except* [what is like] *themselves* and nothing can be grasped by them except what is similar to them.

As for the proposition that It is not grasped through its contrary¹⁹, it is the case because the contrary of a possible is possible, since the Ancient has no contrary. Otherwise nothing could be [created] by It²⁰, It would resemble them [i.e., the creatures] in their mutual contrariness, and because, if it were ancient, there would entail a multiplicity of Ancients²¹. One may not assume that because the Preeternal is the Pure Simple Quintessence; there is no entrance into It because the Preeternal is Impenetrable (otherwise He would be a possibility²²). If the contrary [of Real Existence] is possible, then it is not proper to assume that the possible is contrary to the Necessary due to its originating²³ through It. We have only said that “the contrary of a possible

is possible” because the Ancient and the impossible are not suitable for any kind of contrariness (otherwise they would both be possibles).

With respect to the Necessary, it is because a contrary is an aspect (*ḡihat*) of mutual opposition and an extremity of it; and it is a possible²⁴. With respect to the impossible, it is because the contrary, if it is not a thing, then it is not a contrary; if it is a thing, then it is a possible. Due to this, non-existence is not suitable for being a contrary to existence, except metaphorically, because possible non-existence is existence in *Possibility*²⁵, not among entities²⁶.

Al-Sādiq (upon whom be peace) alluded to this [point] to someone who asked him about the dispute between Zurārah²⁷ and Hishām ibn al-Ḥakam²⁸, on the topic of negation: is it a thing or not? Zurārah said: “It is not a thing”. Hisham said: “Negation is a thing”. So al-Sādiq (upon whom be peace) said: “Go with the word of Hisham in this question”.

Now the impossible is not a thing and there is no expression *for* it. One seeks use of an expression only because of the aspect (*ḡihat*) of possibility of the impossible, like “He has no partner”, because negation stems from affirmation. This is because the mind conceptualizes a thing and names it ‘partner’ in respect of its either making it allowable or surmising its existence. And there is an allusion to this in His saying (Exalted is He!): **...and you all create a lie**. So one comes forth with this expression [“He has no partner”] as a broom to sweep away the dust of the mind. And it is an originating expression, connoting another originating thing²⁹ [called a “designation”].

Again, the impossible is not a thing and there is no expression derivable

from it. My expressing this expression is only for this surmised designation. It is originating; Allah created it through the requisites of their minds³⁰, [in a way similar to that which is discussed] under the heading of “rulings of convention” by the philosophers of law, because He (Glorified is He!) **gave everything its creation**. Now this expression, derived from this designation, is not like the expression derived from the Designation of the Necessary. Although the Necessary cannot be grasped in Its Quintessence, the Designation [of the Necessary] comprises His Loci of Manifestation and *Stations for which there is no divesting of them in any place*. Now the impossible has no loci of manifestation because loci of manifestation stem from affirmation. You are just calling an originating thing “impossible” in the same way as you call a man “absent” (*ma‘dūm*)³¹. [Ultimately,] there is nothing except Allah, His Qualities, and His Names.

As for the proposition that one may not have cognizance of It except through that by which It has characterized Itself (*naḥṣahū*), this is the case because the Preeternal is not a thing other than Itself (Exalted is He!). Whatever is besides It is in possibility³². Nothing exits from the Preeternal, nothing enters It, and nothing can reach it and then inform about what is there and characterize what is in It. Because It is like that, no one can have cognizance of It except through that by which It has characterized Itself.

It is as It Itself says: No one can grasp It but It. So no one can have cognizance of Its ultimate reality except It, because Its knowledge of Itself (*naḥṣihī*) is Its very (*‘aynu*) Self (*naḥṣihī*). So when It characterizes Itself, the Characterizing of the Real for the Real is Real. Its characterizing, with respect to us, applies to us as a creation. Now we are that [very] charac-

terizing which applies to us through us³³; so that It becomes-the-subject-of-cognizance for us through ourselves. So Its Real Characterizing reaches the creation as a creation, because the creation cannot grasp anything but a creation: *Implements only define themselves; and instruments point to their matches* So a thing cannot grasp except that which belongs to its own kind (*ġins*).

The meaning of the proposition that It does not become-the-subject-of-cognizance for anyone in the manner It occasions-cognizance of other than Itself is that It (Glorified is He!) makes the creation cognizant (‘*arrafa*) of creation, through their state of being a creation. [On the other hand], It makes Itself a subject of cognizance (‘*arrafa nafsahū*) [through the fact] that It is not a creation and that nothing from creation resembles It. So that through which It becomes-the-subject-of-cognizance for them [i.e., for created things] may not be grasped, neither through any of their visions nor their insights. It is subject to cognizance only through a [faculty of] vision from It³⁴. He (upon whom be peace) said: *Know Allah through Allah*. And the poet said:

When the one in passionate love with her seeks a glance
and is unable to do so, then it is due to her grace.

She loans him an eye, he sees her through it
so the one who beholds her is her own eye!

The meaning of “So It is the Known and the Unknown ...” is that It is Known through the outcomes of Its Fashioning, Unknown in Its Ultimate Reality; Found through Its signs, Missing in Its Quintessence. So It

self-manifests; there is nothing more manifest than It and everything self-manifests only through the impression of its manifesting. And It self-occults; nothing is more occult than It, because nothing is more manifest than It. It is hidden due to the intensity of Its manifesting; it is veiled due to the greatness of its light.

The meaning of “the manner (*ḡihat*) of Its Knownness is itself (*nafs*) Its Unknownness” is that a thing is not a subject of cognizance and is not known except through the state in which it is. So that which is long is a subject of cognizance through its length; that which is wide is known through its width; that which is short is a subject of cognizance through its shortness; that which is white through its whiteness; that which is black through its blackness; and that which has a configuration through its configuration. [On the other hand,] that for which there is no measure, no color, and no configuration is a subject of cognizance through just that. So the Necessary (Glorified is He!) is a subject of cognizance through the proposition that It has no [accidental] quality (*kayf*), has no comparison, and has no likeness; and through the proposition that Its Ultimate Reality cannot be grasped, Its [Quintessential] Quality may not be known, and no one’s knowledge may encompass It; and through the proposition that every grasped thing is other than It. It is a subject of cognizance through the proposition that there is no path to penetrating Its Ultimate Reality nor to grasping Its [Quintessential] Quality. It is a subject of cognizance through ignorance of It.

That is through which It becomes-the-subject-of-cognizance for us; we have cognizance of nothing except that which is like us. It is the Real Necessary, the Absolute Unknown.

This division [of existence] is expressed by ‘the Pure Quintessence’, ‘That whose Characteristic is Unknown’, ‘the Spring of Camphor’, ‘the Sun of Preeternity’, ‘That with Respect to Which all Indications are Cut Off’, ‘the Absolute Unknown’, ‘the Real Necessary’, ‘No-Particularization’, ‘the Hidden Treasure’, ‘That with Respect to Which all Prehensions are Cut Off’, ‘Sheer Quintessence’, ‘Quintessence without Factors’, and by [expressions] similar to these. They are all created expressions denoting *His Signposts and Stations for which there is no divesting of them in any place*. They are the subject of the *science of the declaration* (*‘ilm al-bayān*) [of God’s unity]. That which is discussed therein are the *Meanings*. And they are the pillars (*‘arkān*) of the profession of Unity³⁵.

Third Observation

Allusion to the Second Division

It is *Absolute Existence*³⁶, the First Particularization, Universal Mercy, the Universal Tree, the First Exhalation of the All-Merciful, the *Willing*, the *Kāf* that Revolves About Itself, the *Desiring*, the Word to which the Great Abyss Yields, the Inventing, the Muhammadi Reality, Absolute Intimacy, the Second Preeternity, the World of *I Loved that there be Cognizance of Me*, Love in Reality, *Motion* through Itself, and the Name which resides in His Shadow so that it does not Leave it for Something Else. It is the Treasure Guarded by Him, the Dawn of Preeternity, *Acting* through Itself, the World of Commanding, and [is denoted by names] similar to that.

As for its quality of genesis through itself: Allah seized from the moisture of His Mercy, through that very moisture itself, four parts through them; and from its dust one part through that part. Through these two parts He determined both of them in their joint digestive power's act of decomposition. They both deliquesce through each other; they both coagulate through each other; and they both accumulate through each other. This is the Willing; it is that which is named by those preceding names.

In the discernment of the heart-flux, this station [of the Willing] has four degrees:

- The first is Mercy, the Dot, the Secret which conceals Itself, and the Secret shrouded in secrecy;

- The second is the Winds, the First Exhalation of the All-Merciful, also called “the First Deliquescence”;
- The third is the Letters, also called “the First Coagulation”; it is the Stratus Cloud drawn from the Tree of the Sea;
- The fourth is the Cumulus Cloud, the Complete Word, the Word to which the Great Abyss Yields, and the *Kāf* that Circles Itself³⁷.

Now these degrees are multiple only with respect to the heart-flux-analysis in its *uncovering*. Otherwise it is one simple thing; nothing in possibility is more simple than it. Allah created it through itself, made it subsist through itself, and held it through His shadow. This [Willing] is in the Great Abyss up to its furthest extremity (*ḥadd*); it delimits the Great Abyss, the Great Abyss delimits it, and neither exceeds the other. This is the Acting of Allah.

It is known to be necessarily the case that *the configuration of an outcome of acting qua outcome of acting is [like] the configuration of the acting*. Consider a sample of writing: its configuration is [like] the configuration of the motion of the hand; in accordance with the configuration of the motion of the hand the writing comes to be. Given this, it is necessary that those aspects (*ḡihāt*) considered with respect to the Acting occur in a manner (*ḡihat*) of simplicity. By way of those aspects, unity obtains in the outcome of acting in a manner (*ḡihat*) of composition and multiplicity, even if the outcomes of acting diverge from one another in accordance with

- their respective degrees of strength, weakness, self-manifesting, hiddenness, abundance, and of composition;

- their respective degrees of abundance of multiplicity, scarcity of abundance, self-manifesting of multiplicity, and hiddenness of multiplicity.

This is because they occur in the Acting in a more sublime way; there is no way in possibility that is more sublime than it. Due to this, it is at the most perfect degree of simplicity-in-Possibility so that no manner of multiplicity may be considered in it except with respect to its attachment [to its outcomes]. This is Permissibility, That Whose Existence Preponderates; it is Absolute Existence, that is, existence totally unconditioned. It is the Willing; the resolution upon that [i.e., what is willed] is the Desiring.

The meaning of the proposition that it was created through itself is that it was created not with a willing other than itself. Similar to this is our father Adam (upon whom be peace); he did not come to be from a father or mother other than himself. He came to be through himself, while the rest of humanity came to be through marriage and procreation. Likewise is the Willing: it came to be through itself, without a father or mother other than itself; all things come forth from it through marriage and procreation.

The meaning of our saying, with respect to Adam (upon whom be peace), “without a father or mother other than himself”, is that he came to be from his *matter*, which is the *father* [i.e., the active principle], and from his *form*, which is the *mother* [i.e., the receptive principle]³⁸. Similar is the case for the Willing except that, in the Willing, both of them occur through themselves, that is, each one exists through itself and through the other.

The meaning of this is that the *received* exists through itself, and the *receiver* through the other. They have no existention³⁹ except through themselves. As for that which is other than the Willing, its received [factor]

is existentiated through the Acting; the receiving [factor is existentiated] in succession, as we shall elucidate later.

The meaning of the proposition that all things come from it through marriage and procreation is that matter is the father [the active principle] and form is the mother [the receptive principle], as we will elucidate for you later. So matter “married” form in accordance with the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of His Prophet⁴⁰; so form gave birth to the thing⁴¹. The Willing is the First Adam. His Eve is Permissibility and she is his equal; she does not surpass him, nor is she deficient with respect to him, as we alluded to previously. So understand! And this is the “fire” alluded to in His saying (may He be Exalted!): **...the oil well nigh shines, though no fire touches it!**

Its “space” is Possibility. Its durational mode is *Sempiternity*. It is to Sempiternity what the orb of the Devoid⁴² is to time. So just as its convexity is not to be found within space and time — rather, space and time terminate with it [i.e., with the convexity of the orb of the Devoid] — not one of these three falls short of the other. Everything which is close to its convexity, be it body, time, or space, becomes subtle and delicate. Whatever is distant from it is thick and rough. Likewise with this existence, that is, Preponderating Permissibility: everything which is close to Permissibility itself, in the way of Acting, Possibility, or Sempiternity, is subtle and delicate until it well nigh becomes hidden from itself and until it well nigh self-manifests in everything; and everything among them that is distant from Permissibility itself is rough, that is, it self-manifests in the outcomes of Acting until it is well nigh becomes lost to them. So Possibility and Sempiternity terminate with it [i.e., with the

Acting]. Just as the delimiting orb and space are in time, and the latter and the delimiting orb are in space, and space and time are in the delimiting orb, that is, each of these three comprehends the other two, likewise with Acting, Possibility, and Sempiternity: each one of them comprehends the other two, and each of them terminates in the other two.

[This is the case] except that the three existents are of three states:

The Preeternity of the Necessary is its Quintessence; its “Space” is its Quintessence.

As for the possible that is *delimited existence*, which comprises all of the outcomes of Acting, its “space” is different from its “time” and they are both different from its quintessence.

As for Preponderating Permissibility, its own “space” and “time” in relation to it, in consideration of unity and difference, is in between. It is not to the limit (*ḥadd*) of the Necessary in regards to unity, and not to the limit (*ḥadd*) of the possible in regards to multiplicity; this is to relation to itself. In relation to its linkage to the possible, then mutual difference obtains, a difference simpler than the difference that obtains in the possible. So understand!

Fourth Observation

Allusion to the Divisions of Acting In Summary

Know that Acting, considered with respect to its degrees, when it attaches to the outcomes of Acting, comprises a number of divisions.

First is the degree of the *willing*. It is the *first presence*, as al-Riḍā (upon whom be peace) told Yūnus. What is meant is that a thing, before the willing, has no presence in any of the degrees of possibility. The beginning of its presence is that it be known in its being⁴³. The paradigm of this is the appearance to you of something you would like to do. It is not a thing until you present it [to your mind]. When you present it [to your mind], your very presenting of it constitutes the first of the degrees of its existence: its being.

Second is the *desiring*. It is the resolution upon what He has willed. It is second in its presence, and is that it be known in its *entity*⁴⁴. It has no existence before it [i.e., its entity] except the first presence which is its being. It [i.e., its being] is the proceeding of existence before its entailing essence. It is through the desiring that essence is entailed by existence. And it is through the willing that the desiring comes to be, due to the latter's being a consequent of the former.

Third is the *determining*. It is *existentiational topography*. In it occurs the existentiation of the bounds [of a thing] including provisions [for sustaining its being]; terms of duration, continuance, and evanescence; regulation of measure; configurations of the temporal and meta-temporal durational modes; location, quantity, quality (*kayf*), rank, orientation, position, record,

permission⁴⁵, accidents, field measures, and all extremities (*nihāyāt*) up to the end of the degrees of its existence.

In this [degree of the Acting] is the start of the *second creation* and the beginning of felicity and misery. It is by the desiring that the determining comes to be, due to the latter's being a consequent of the former. Now the things [i.e., the bounds] just mentioned also occur in the *first creation*, but in a more sublime way. I have only mentioned them here because the former [i.e., the second creation] is the place (*maḥall*) of topography and the latter [i.e., the first creation] is the place (*maḥall*) of simplicity.

Fourth is the *accomplishing*. It is the completing of what He determined and composing it in accordance with its [proper] physical structure. The determining is like measuring the implements of a bed for length, width, and shape (*al-hayat*). The accomplishing corresponds to composing them into an actual bed.

Fifth is the *executing*. It is entailed by the accomplishing. It is [the act of] making the thing manifest [as a completed entity], its causes plain, and its reasons evident, due to the congregation within it of all the degrees needed to make one cognizant of the impressions of the Divine Active Qualities. So the first four degrees are the pillars (*al-arkān*) of the Acting; the fifth is their disclosure (*bayān*). It is through the determining that the accomplishing comes to be; it is through the accomplishing that the executing comes to be.

These four [degrees] constitute the *Dawn of Preternity*. The light which rises from the dawn of preternity consists of four lights. They comprise the *empyrean* upon which the All-Merciful has established Himself by His All-Mercifulness which in turn consists of these four degrees of the Acting.

The light which rises from the first degree is the higher right pillar (*ar-rukn*) of the empyrean; it is the *white light*. The light which rises from the second degree is the lower right pillar (*ar-rukn*) of the empyrean; it is the *yellow light*. The light which rises from the third degree is the higher left pillar (*ar-rukn*) of the empyrean; it is the *green light*. The light which rises from the fourth degree is the lower left pillar (*ar-rukn*) of the empyrean; it is the *red light*⁴⁶.

The whiteness comes from the willing due to the perfection of its simplicity. The yellowness comes from the desiring due to the increase of heat in the whiteness. The greenness comes from the determining due to the blending of the blackness of multiplicity, which comes from the impression of the determining, with the yellowness of the impression of desiring. The redness comes from the accomplishing due to the combination of the whiteness of the willing with the yellowness of the desiring in the heat of the move from accomplishing to executing.

Know that when the word, '*halaqa*' ('He created') is used, sometimes the entirety of the degrees of [Acting] are meant since, from the linguistic point of view, it can be so applied. Now when one says, '*halaqa wa bara'a wa sawwara* (He created, fashioned, and formed)', then "He created", meaning, "He willed", that is, "He existentiated being", that is, "[He existentiated] existence"; and "He fashioned", meaning, "He desired", that is, "He existentiated entity", that is, "[He existentiated] essence through existence"; and "He formed", meaning, "He determined", that is, "He existentiated the bounds".

Allah (Exalted is He!) has said: "[***Glorify your Lord on High;***]

who created then evened out (*sawwā*); and who determined then guided", that is, "He created its [i.e. the creation's] being", that is, "its existence"; "then evened out its entity", meaning, "By its existence He evened out its essence", that is, "He placed in it that by which, *when questioned, it will answer*". Note that the conjunction of "evening-out" [with "creating"] is by the letter *fā*, instead of *wāw*⁴⁷, because of the entailing between them, as we mentioned earlier. This is in the first creation; **...and who determined then guided**", that is, "He assigned its bounds", [i.e., those bounds] discussed earlier; this is in the second creation; **...then guided**", that is, "He showed the path to guidance". The conjunction is carried out with *fā* because felicity and misery are by means of the determining, within which He shows the way to guidance. They are both mutually coincident with one another in existence, although guidance is different and posterior in quintessence, so the conjunction is carried out with *fā*.

Furthermore, *innovating* and *inventing* also comprise the entirety of the degrees of the Acting. Sometimes, one of these two is applied to the other as in the case of 'willing' and 'desiring', 'indigent' and 'destitute' (under the discussion of "charities" [in jurisprudence]), and *al-ḡārr* and *al-maḡrūr*⁴⁸ as used by the grammarians.

If the two are separate [in expression], then they combine [in denotation]. So when it is said, "give the indigent five dinars", it is not obligatory for you to make a distinction [between the indigent and the destitute]; similarly for, "give the destitute [five dinars]". So it suffices to give to either of them. If you say, "Zayd is in the house", and then say, "'Zayd' is the subject and *al-ḡārr* is the predicate", you will be correct; or if you say, "*al-maḡrūr* is the

predicate”, you will be correct. Likewise, you may say, “He innovated”, that is, He “invented”, and conversely; and you may say, “He willed”, that is, “He desired”, and conversely.

And if the two combine [in expression], they are separate [in denotation]. You may say, “He innovated and invented”, that is, “He innovated, but not out of anything; and He invented, but not because of anything”, or, “He innovated being and invented entity”. You may also say, “He willed being and desired entity. So “He innovated”, meaning, “He willed, but not out of anything”. And “He invented”, meaning, “He desired, but not because of anything”. And when it is said, “Give the indigent five dinars and give the destitute four dinars”, it is obligatory for you to distinguish between them. The discussion of this is in jurisprudence (and in my opinion, the correct view is that the destitute is worse off). And when one says, “*al-ḡārr* and *al-maḡrūr*”, it is obvious (*zāhir*) that the two are distinguished.

Know that it is said⁴⁹ that the innovating is of two kinds and that the inventing is of two kinds. The first innovating is the willing. *It is a still creation, but cannot be perceived through stillness.* The second innovating is the letter *ʾali*⁵⁰. The first inventing is the desiring. *It is a still creation, but cannot be perceived through stillness.* The second inventing is the letter *bā*⁵¹.

This is because the Innovating or the Inventing is the first of what Allah created. He created it through itself; then He created the letters through the Inventing and made them to be an acting from it; for anything, He says, **Be** (*kun*⁵²)! **and so it is** (*fā-yakūnu*). By the letter *kāf*⁵³ He alludes to the first innovating, that is, the willing, which is the *Kāf* that circles itself, because it

is the source of being. By the letter *nūn*⁵⁴ He alludes to the First inventing, that is, the desiring, because it is the source of entity. Between these two letters is a letter dropped because it is phonetically weak⁵⁵. In order to allude to what is meant by that letter, it is outwardly (*zāhīran*) dropped, yet subsists inwardly (*bāṭinan*)⁵⁶. It is the *water* from which everything was made alive; it is existence; it is the signifying by an expression [of its signification]; it is the water from the clouds; it comprises the smoke particles which obtain their illumination from the fire, sustained by the thick oil that lies close to the smoke particles. That dropped letter is *wāw*; the original [verb], before dropping the weak letter, was *kūn*. It comprises the *six days* within which each thing was created.

The meaning of the proposition that *ʾalif*⁵⁷ is the second innovating is that it descended by its own repetition; thus did *bā*⁵⁸ derive from it. So *bā* is its *ratification* because its descending is its being spread out horizontally like this: “—”; while it was originally vertical like this: “|”. As *ʾalif* leans and inclines towards *bā*, *ḡīm*⁵⁹ originated like this: “ ”.

The meaning of the proposition that *bā* is the second innovating is that it gradually descended by its own repetition; thus did *dāl*⁶⁰ derive from it like this: “ ”; it inclined⁶¹ towards *ḡīm*, and hence *hā*⁶² came to be, like this: “ ”. Now the inclination of *bā* is different from that of *ʾalif* because *ʾalif* is vertical; that which is vertical inclines towards the horizontal. *bā* is horizontal; that which is horizontal inclines towards stillness.

Furthermore, know that these [cosmic] letters, for which these [script] letters are their manifestations, are of two divisions:

- The first of them is the third degree of Acting; it is the stratus cloud;

- The second comprises the singular [modes] of Acting involved in creating (*fi'l*) each thing. This is because the Acting of Allah (Glorified is He!), with respect to all things, is one Acting; in its oneness it gathers them in their multiplicity. He (Exalted is He!) said: ***Our Commanding is but one, like the blink of an eye!***; and: ***Your creation and resurrection are but as one soul!*** With respect to its attachment to every singular existent, whether that existent be a quintessence or a quality, it has a *mode* specific to that existent. That mode is the willing of Allah special to it, that is, to that singular existent.

When considered in relation to Absolute Acting, these modes are “letters”; each mode is correlated to a singular creation. And the creation, from the perspective of its singular objects, are “letters” in relation to the entirety. For every singular object, considered with respect to its reasons, conditions, and its subsistence factors, mentioned earlier, such as existence, essence, the six [days] already mentioned, position, term of duration, record, permission, and others, as well as the extremities (*niḥāyāt*) of these just-mentioned things, their accidents, and their fields, up to the end of the degrees of its existence; every one of these is attached to a specific direction of the mode, specific to that singular object, of the Universal Acting. The relation of each direction to each mode is like the relation of each mode to the Universal Acting.

These [directions] are the “letters” of this “word” [i.e., mode]. And these particular words [i.e., modes] are “letters” of the Universal Word. For every degree of Acting, this principle applies to every outcome of Acting, be that outcome *followed*, *follower*, coincident, or commensurate.

So in relation to whoever is below it, the Acting is a single quintessence. From its quintessence, each quintessence acquires its *quintessentialization*⁶³; from its configurations, each quality acquires its *quintessentialization*; and from its qualities, that which makes them qualities.

Furthermore, know that sometimes ‘making’⁶⁴ is used for the four degrees [of Acting]. It can be applied to each degree just as it can be used linguistically for them. The principle of ‘making’ applies to every degree in the way appropriate to it. It is also frequently used to express the existentiation of entailments. Allah (Exalted is He!) has said: “***Praise belongs to Allah who created the heavens and the earth and who made light and darkness***, referring to His existentiation of light from the light source and darkness from that very light itself. When used along with one of them, it may be distinguished from those degrees, as in the noble verse above. It is also used to signify the occasioning of becoming or the alteration of something into another thing. The principle governing its three uses is, word (*ḥarfan*) for word (*bi-ḥarfin*), the same as the principle governing the use of the previously discussed verbs (*al-ʾafʿāl*) with respect to the degrees corresponding to them.

Moreover, their [i.e., the traditional philosophers’] division of making into “simple” and “composite” is not free of deficiency⁶⁵. With respect to the composite, this is because composition is only realized in a thing to which something commensurate, disparate, or opposite to it is joined; that composite is one thing, i.e., a single action, in a single subject, may proceed from it. Now there is nothing unique to something other than its quintessence and its [actional] quality⁶⁶; however, a given thing is not, as a single thing,

composed out of its quintessence and its [actional] quality.

As for the example they give [of composite making], “I made the clay into pottery”: If what is meant is occasioning the clay’s changing as well as occasioning the changed clay’s becoming pottery, then that is two makings [and not one composite making]; each one is with respect to a particular matter and both are modes of the “universal making”.

If what is meant is transforming the clay into pottery without regard to any internal change on the part of the matter, then it is a single motion with a single orientation. Thus it is one making.

If it [i.e., composite making] is meant to be used to express the generation of the followed and the becoming-generated of the subordinate through the followed e.g., the “making” of existence and the “becoming-made” of essence through existence, then outwardly (*fī ’ẓ-ẓāhir*) this is one making for two different things. However, that through which essence becomes-made is not a making like the making of existence; although there are two orientations involved, it is not at variance with the making of existence nor does it clash with it. So “making” with respect to existence and essence is not composite because that by which essence is made is a quality and a impression of that by which existence is made. And any given thing is not a composite of its quintessence and its impression.

That making by which existence is made is like the sun with respect to light; that by which essence is made is like the light with respect to shadow. The sun’s making of its light is a single making; the making of shadow by the very light itself is a single making, different from the the first making. Just because the second making is a consequence of the first making and subsists

through it does not entail composition because the sun did not make the shadow due to itself. His saying (Exalted is He!), [***Look at your Lord, how He extends the shadow (and if He had willed, He could have made it still).***] ***Then We made the sun as its guide***, does not show that the sun is its maker. This is because if it made the shadow through its making light, then it would be light since there is no shadow in the sun. If it is the case that the sun made it through its making of the very light which is the principle by which shadow occurs, then that shows that the sun is the *sustainer* of the light that makes the shadow but not the latter's *maker*. So in reality no composition is obtained. There is an allusion to this in His saying (Exalted is He!): ***Our Commanding is but one, like the blink of an eye!***

If what is meant is that any making by which two or even more things are originated is [defined to be] composite, whether those two things are with respect to two quantities of matter, or two states [of the same quantity of matter], like making clay into pottery, or with respect to an entailer and its entailment, like existence and essence, then we say: if you are just making a technical definition, then there is no problem. However, in that case you will never find any simple making at all because Allah (Glorified is He!), as *an indication of Himself, did not create any single thing subsisting through itself*. He said (Exalted is He!): ***We created everything in pairs***.

In summary, there is no difference in this issue between making and any of the other degrees of Acting. In every case (*ḥāl*), the making is one; there is no multiplicity in it that is due to its quintessence. Allah has said: ***He made for you pairs from amongst yourselves and pairs from amongst***

your cattle; He multiplies you in it, that is, in the making. So He brought forth only one making, and made a plurality of outcomes of making; so understand! Yes, it has as many modes as there are outcomes of making, and every mode has as many directions as it has states. We have previously discussed this with respect to the Acting; so if need be, go back to it!

Sixth Observation

Allusion to the Third Division, Delimited Existence (Its First Degree is the Pearl⁶⁷; its Last is the Mote of Dust⁶⁸), and to the Manner of Its Genesis

Through His name *the Seizer*⁶⁹ Allah took, from the moisture of the air of Permissibility, four parts that ascended from the Earth of Possibility or the Barren Earth. From the dust of the Earth of Permissibility He took one part. These He determined in the digestive power of His name *the Inventor*⁷⁰. Thus the dryness became deliquesced in the moisture; through the dryness the moisture became coagulated. So due to their mutual homology they became united. From that [resulting] sea rose a stratus cloud. Under the Willing it accumulated. Through the heat of the Desiring, a water condensed from that cumulus cloud. Through His name *the Dipatcher*⁷¹ He propelled this water forth and so it fell upon the Dead Land and Barren Earth, the Earth of Permissibility and the Great Abyss. Then two parts of that water condensed with one part [of earth] from the Earth of that Great Abyss and which was homologous with the water. From the condensate He extracted those crops and fruits⁷² [mentioned in the Qur'an⁷³].

After the determination and irrigation of the condensate in three levels of darkness, He took, through His name *the Seizer*, that which was left over from the moisture of the condensate, along with a part (equivalent in measure to a fourth of the leftover condensate) of the dust of the Earth of Possibility, and operated upon it as discussed above. ***That is the act of determination***

of the Mighty, the Knowing. It is as He has said: ***And the Earth We have spread out and set thereon mountains firm. And We caused to sprout therein every kind of thing in due balance.***

This water that descends from the cumulus cloud is that which Allah (to Whom belong Might and Majesty!) has mentioned in His saying: ***And from Water did we make everything alive!***

It is delimited existence. It comes from the Willing and comes back to the Willing in a way that has no end. This existence which is called, in the way just mentioned, “water”, occurs in everything in a manner commensurate with it⁷⁴.

Its paradigm is as follows. When you desire to inform someone of, say, Zayd’s standing, then you take from the air, through that faculty [of breathing] which “seizes” and takes it to your abdomen (which is the dot of your heart, that is, its “direction” towards the air), a quantity of air which is comprised of four parts of moisture from the air and one part of dryness from the dust. After determining them through pressure, plucking, and ringing⁷⁵, you compose from them letters comprised of those five parts and which take on the qualities of the “matter” of your aim. From these letters you compose an expression whose “configuration” is like the configuration of your aim. You then propel that expression to the air, which is the “place” of its “possibility”. Then two parts of the moisture of your expression — that moisture being its “matter” which is conformable to the matter of your aim — and one part of its dryness — that dryness being its “configuration” conformable to the configuration of your aim — fall upon what is homologous to your aim in this “Earth of the Abyss” or “Barren Earth”, which is the air because

it preserves your expression and conveys it to the ear of your listner. From there, an image (*ṣūrat*) of the matter of your expression and an image (*ṣūrat*) of its configuration become depicted in his common sense⁷⁶. That common sense is to your expression what a mother is to her fetus, or what the Earth is to the water that descends from the clouds, so that, through that water, plants sprout. So from your expression falls “water” upon the “Earth” of that intention (*maʿnā*). This water is the “existence” for that intention. It is your expression’s signification through its matter and configuration, and which occurs in the common sense which is the “mother”. The intention (*maʿnā*) sprouts in the belly, which is the imaginal faculty⁷⁷, of that mother, through that water which is the signification of that expression; the intention (*maʿnā*)⁷⁸ lives through that signification. Before the act of signification, that intention (*maʿnā*) is not a thing. This is because a given thing⁷⁹ is named “thing” because it is “willed”⁸⁰. And the willing is the root of the desiring. So understand!

Seventh Observation

Know that when the first water, called “delimited existence”, descended to the barren earth, each thing became-generated in six “days”: quantity, quality, durational mode, space, orientation, and rank; not one of these things self-manifests without the other. Any given “thing” is made up of these, along with its matter, which is a *quantum* of existence, and its form, which is a quantum of essence. All of them self-manifest at once because each one of these eight is a condition for the self-manifesting of each one of them. An existent thing is a composite of existence and essence, and the six are subsistence factors and limits of essence.

We have only specifically mentioned these six limits because others, like [the various] kinds of position, permission to self-manifest, term of evanescence, the records (*qua* sustaining and *qua* sustained), which sustain all of the afore-mentioned; and like the executing, which is the act of making its causes and reasons evident, and others; all of them are reducible to the six. So we have confined ourselves to mentioning (*dikr*) these six in the discussion (*dikr*) of genesis because the various kinds of position are entailed by space, orientation, and rank; permission and term are entailed by the durational mode; the records are entailed by all six; the executing is entailed by that which precedes it and follows as a consequence of that because Wisdom dictates that the occurrence of these six to existence, essence, and their alluded-to entailments, itself entail the executing and that the executing follow as a consequence of it. The rest, Allah-willing, we will mention later.

Furthermore, know that there is very much disagreement about what a

“thing” is. These disagreements are reducible to four views, no regard being due to mentioning any others:

The first view is that a thing is [constituted by] existence, and essence is an accident inhering in existence;

The second is that a thing is [constituted by] essence, and existence is an accident of essence;

The third is that a thing is [constituted by] existence, and essence is only in succession to existence;

The fourth is that a thing is [constituted by] existence and essence⁸¹. It is thus a composite of both of them because the condition for existence’s generation, by way of emanating and perduring, is essence; the condition for essence’s becoming-generated, by way of becoming-emanated and perduring, is existence. As long as each is existent and conjoined with the other, then the thing is existent. There is no “thingness” to a thing with the absence of either one or the other of them. Existence is its own matter; its own (*nafs*) form is the attachment of essence to it. Essence is its own (*nafs*) matter; its own form is the connection of existence to it. Allah (Exalted is He!) has said: ***They [your wives] are a garment for you and you are a garment for them.*** So they both make up a given thing. Thus, it is forever a composite of both of them.

So existence is the aspect (*ḡihat*) of its need of Allah, and it is the aspect (*ḡihat*) of its freedom from need. And essence is the aspect (*ḡihat*) of its freedom from need, and it is the aspect (*ḡihat*) of its need. So its being in need is existence and freedom from need. Its freedom of need is need and privation (*‘adam*). So its contemplation through the heart-flux is real; through the

heart, a reality; through earth, false; and through the soul, a mirage. That is because existence becomes-subsistent through that existence which becomes-subsistent through the Real; essence becomes-subsistent through existence itself, unlike existence which becomes-subsistent through the Real. ***I found them and their community prostrating to the sun instead of Allah.***

This composite is Man's *hylē*⁸². It is of the status of that ink which is composed of gum, *sawād*, vitriol, gallnut, salt, aloe juice, herbs, and myrtle. So just as ink *qua* ink is suitable for [transcribing] e.g., both the name 'noble' and the name 'ignoble', the only thing distinguishing them being the second form, that is, the actual configurations of what is written, likewise this *hylē* composed of existence and essence is suitable to both the faithful and the denier; they are only distinguishable by the second form which is the second creation and the second essence.

So when they requested that He question them, He, in His knowledge of them, questioned them. So He said to them: ***Am I not your Lord,*** and Muhammad your Prophet, and Ali your Guardian? Then ***they said*** altogether, ***Yes indeed!***

Among them were those who, on the basis of their knowledge, each said it with his tongue and heart. As Allah (Exalted is He!) has said: ***... Except one who bears witness to the truth (al-ḥaqq) while knowing it.*** So He created them from the form of affirmation and cognizance. It is the human form and the temple of the profession of unity. It comes from the ecliptic orb. Those are the messengers, the prophets, the veracious, the martyrs, and the righteous.

And among them were those who each said it with his tongue while his

heart was denying and gainsaying, not receiving. So He created them from the form of gainsaying, denial, and disacknowledgement. It is the devilish satanic form. Those are the rejectors, the hypocrites, and their followers among those for whom the truth is made clear and yet they turn away from it. It is from the clay of ruination; it is *Sijjīn*. Their forms in this lower life are human only because of their [positive] answer with the tongue, which is the lowest level of response. In the hereafter their human forms will be stripped from them and their real forms, following their hearts, will self-manifest.

And among them were those who each said it with his tongue while his heart was hesitant; he neither acknowledged nor disacknowledged. Outwardly (*zāhiran*), Allah created them in human form due to their acknowledgement through their tongues. He does not create their inward natures (*bawāṭin*) until they acknowledge or disacknowledge. So He creates them from their state [of acknowledgement]. Now they are divergent. Some of them [acknowledge or disacknowledge] in the proximate life; some in the intermediary world; and some in the hereafter. Whomsoever's inward nature (*bāṭin*) is created in human form will enter the garden; whoever is created otherwise will enter the fire.

These forms created from either positive response or denial constitute the *clay*. It is the *mother* in whose belly the felicitous become felicitous, and the miserable become miserable. That is after He made them knowledgeable of the wholesome clay, the clay which constitutes positive response, and the odious clay which constitutes denial. Surely He (Glorified is He!) does not create them except according to that state in which they are. If He had created them according to other than that state in which they were, they

would not have been who they were; rather, they would have been other than themselves. If they did not receive [their existention] and He created them from denial, and if he also made for them what He made for those brought near to Him, then inconsistency would have occurred in their creation and in His creation of them because their creation as they are is inconsistent with making them like those who are obedient; making them like those who are obedient is inconsistent with His creating them as they are; and His creating them as they are is inconsistent with His creating them not as they are. ***And if the Real chose to follow their passions, the Heavens, the Earth, and whoever is in them would have been corrupted. Rather, we have presented them with their Presence; and from their presence do they turn away.***

So this is the second creation, under the green light, in the world of shadows, in the leaf of myrtle. Thus they were, in the world of motes⁸³. As He said (Glorified is He!) to the Garden: *I will not contend with them*; and to the fire: *I will not contend with them*. Then He differentiated them in the red light; this is the meaning of his saying (upon whom be peace): *Then He returned them to clay*, that is, the clay of nature.

Eighth Observation

Nothing transgresses its durational mode because it does not exist⁸⁴ except within it; it has no presence before that durational mode. For every thing that possesses a durational mode, its durational mode is coincident with its space and its being because durational mode, space, and being are all mutually coincident, since each one is a condition of the other. Such is the case for the rest of the agents of particularization and agents of individuation; all entail mutual correlation such as

- the Willing, Sempiternity⁸⁵, and all of Possibility⁸⁶;
- the first nous⁸⁷, meta-time⁸⁸, and all possibles⁸⁹;
- body, time, and space⁹⁰.

Now the degrees of the willing are four, as mentioned earlier, and Sempiternity and Possibility both occur in and are related to each of the four degrees:

- Through Sempiternity and Possibility, the degree of the Mercy has the rank of the quintessence of a tree;
- through both of them, the *Alif*⁹¹ has the rank of the root of the tree;
- through both of them, the Stratus Cloud, that is, the Letters, has the rank of the branches of the tree;
- and through both of them, the Cumulus Cloud, that is, the Word, has the rank of the whole of the tree.

So the relation of Possibility to the the Willing, in all of the latter's degrees, is parallel to the relation of space to the delimiter of the [six] orientations⁹². That is, the relation is of the utmost coincidence, with no comprehending [by one of another] other than that coincidence. This is because the coincidence is identical to their mutual comprehension, not because of the absence of any comprehending [by one of another] at all.

Through metatime and the possible, the first nous, in its four periods⁹³, has with respect to metatime and the possible that which the Willing has with respect to Sempiternity and Possibility, including coincidence and mutual comprehension.

The body, in its four cycles⁹⁴, with respect to time and space, have that which we have mentioned above, word for word; similarly for coincidence, that is, mutual comprehension. This means that the body comprehends time and space; neither of the latter two can exit it. Time comprehends body and space; neither of the latter two can exit it. And space comprehends the body and time; neither of the latter two can exit it. Word for word, that is like what we alluded to with respect to the Willing and the nous.

As for the first water, through which the nous and what comes after it has life, its direction is in Sempiternity and Possibility while it itself is in metatime and the possible⁹⁵.

As for the souls, they are in the midst of metatime and the possible; they are the shadows. Between them and the nous is the yellow light; it is the interworld between them. It comprises the spirits; it is in the upper regions of metatime. The lower regions of metatime comprise the red light and the substance of dust. Breakdown occurs in the red light; mixture occurs in the

substance of dust; synthesis (*al-ʿaqd*) occurs in the imaginal world.

The imaginal world⁹⁶ is between time and metatime. Its direction is in metatime. Its lower regions are in time; but in an accidental way because the body follows in succession to the imaginal. So it has two orientations, one quintessential and one accidental; its interworldness is realized through both of them⁹⁷.

Furthermore, know that the genesis of everything, whether it possesses a spirit or not, issues from the Acting of Allah in a true revolving manner; likewise does it return to Allah; likewise does it receive from Allah. The speed and slowness of its epicycle is in accordance with its being and its durational mode; they⁹⁸ are movements by which its durational mode is measured. Its speed that is due to itself does not exceed that which occurs in relation to its being and to its durational mode.

So when a thing occurs to it to advance [it beyond] its [natural] speed, that thing does not *force* its quintessence *qua* itself; hence, no [additional] change occurs in it. It only *assists* its quintessence through what is possible for it. This is because that which is possible for a thing is of two kinds (*ʿaqsām*): one kind (*qism*) which comprises that which is possible for its quintessence through its quintessence; and another kind (*qism*) that comprises that which is possible for it through something external to it (which is the *assisting factor*). If, through an external thing, the reverse of the requisites of its quintessence occurs, then it [i.e., the external thing] is also an assisting factor, and not a forcing agent, as long as the requisite of the quintessence has an acting; otherwise it is a forcing agent, in which case the thing is no longer that thing but is another. This is called a forcing agent with respect to the

transformation of the existent quintessence. Otherwise, then throughout all of existence, a thing does not become-transformed into that which is not possible in its quintessence. Rather, such is not a thing; power cannot attach to it because power does not attach except to a thing.

Given any possible thing, it has five stations:

- The first is in Possibility. It does not come to be at all; in the Willing its being is possible;
- The second is in Possibility. It will come to be; in the Willing it is possible that it not come to be;
- The third is that it was and always will be; in the Willing it is possible to erase it at some point, to establish it after erasing it, and so forth;
- The fourth is that it was and will become nonexistent, that is, it will return to that which is before its being; in the Willing it is possible that it not become nonexistent, that it become nonexistent and return, and so forth;
- The fifth is that its being came to be and its entity will not come to be; that its entity came to be and its determining will not come to be; that its determining came to be and its accomplishing will not come to be; that its accomplishing came to be and its execution is kept hidden; that its execution manifested and then it become nonexistent; and others as well.

All of these and what is similar to them are among those which are possible in its quintessence.

As for that which is not possible in its quintessence so that it is either

- something absurd (i.e., it is, from every consideration, not a thing);
- or that which is necessary due to itself (i.e., It is that Thing for which there is nothing besides It);

then it is absurd to assume possibility with respect to it. It is not possible to assume or conceptualize either one of them because both assuming and conceptualizing are from Possibility. Rather, nothing can be assumed or conceptualized except that which is existent in Possibility before that. The elucidation of this will come later⁹⁹.

So in reality, the forcing agent is not realized except through the transformation of a thing into something that, whether a quintessence or a quality, is other than that which it necessitates. It would be something possible for it and thus compliant. There is no transformation and no impossibility in Possibility; there is no possibility in the Necessary nor in the absurd. So the Thing for which there is nothing besides It, there is no possibility in it and no preponderance that does not prevent its contradictory¹⁰⁰; rather, It is Pure Necessity. As for the absurd which, from every consideration, is not a thing, there is no possibility in it. So understand these expressions which have been repeated and reiterated to help you understand!

Ninth Observation

Nothing may grasp what is beyond its origin because grasping:

- if it is through the heart-flux, then it is the highest degree of the thing's quintessence and the first, highest, and most sublime of its two parts¹⁰¹; beyond that, it has no presence in any state. So it will not find itself there, and nothing else will find it either, since its first faculty of prehension is that grasping [through the heart flux];
- if it is through the intellect, the soul, common sense, and the outer senses, then they are, with all of their graspings and subjects of grasping, below that.

Hence, any given thing may not grasp what is beyond its origin.

So when one grasps something with a faculty other than the heart-flux, the heart-flux grasps what is beyond it, that is, that there is something beyond it to grasp. Then when the heart-flux grasps that higher thing, one grasps that there is also something beyond that. In this manner, one never stops at a bound for which the heart flux will not find something beyond it.

These [degrees] are the “letters” and degrees of one's soul. Those letters and degrees do not come to an end for one's soul, that is, they do not stop at a bound. Do not suppose that there is not something prior to it. Throughout those degrees the soul itself is never lost.

Then when the soul sees its quintessence through its quintessence, that is, it sees with its heart-flux, its existence and being come to an end and

reach their highest degree. That is because it sees as though through the eye of a needle; thus it revolves about itself. The poet has said:

The point moves aimlessly about in the circle
In its quintessence it ceases not to be perplexed.
⋮

He [the first sage Imam Ali ibn Abi Talib] (upon whom be peace) has said: *Whosoever has cognizance of his soul, then surely he has cognizance of his Lord!* And he (upon whom be peace) said to Kumayl [as a part of his answer to the question, “What is reality?”]: *The effacing of the subjects of fancy; and the clearing of the subjects of knowledge.*

Every time a servant reaches a station wherein the Compeller¹⁰² self-manifests to him, this effacing and clearing occur to him. So there, through effacing and clearing, he has cognizance of his Lord because, through effacing and clearing, he knows his soul. So when he stands firm in that station — as He (Glorified is He) has said, ***Surely those who say, “Our Lord is Allah”, and then stand firm...*** — until the impression self-manifests to him, then the Compeller self-manifests to him in a station higher than the first. So through the principle of effacing and clearing, he has cognizance of his Lord at a higher process-state. Then it becomes evident to him that the first station is a station of creation. Both through and within it, He makes him cognizant of Himself; then He makes him cognizant of Himself in the higher station. He (upon whom be peace) said: *You journey at night ahead of the one from Your creation who journeys at night!*

Then when he has cognizance of his Lord in the higher station, through His self-manifesting to him both within and through it, and when he contem-

plates the lower station which self-manifests to him as a station of creation, **he finds Allah with him, and He renders to him his reckoning in full; and Allah is swift in reckoning.** In this manner he journeys forever without end. He (Exalted is He!) said in the holy hadith¹⁰³ *the Hadith of Secrets: Whenever I put them down on account of my knowledge of them, I raise them up on account of my forbearance; and there is no ultimate goal or end to my Love!*

These stations alluded to are the “Stations for which there is no divesting of them in any place”. Al-Hujjah (upon whom be peace) said [in the course of a supplication]: *...and by Your Stations for which there is no divesting of them in any place. Whoever has cognizance of You has cognizance of You through them. There is no difference between You and them except that they are Your servants and Your creation. The rending of them and sewing them up is in Your hands. Their genesis is from You; their returning is to You.* Al-Sādiq (upon whom be peace) said: *We have states with Allah. In them we are He, and He is we; and He is He, and we are we.* This is the Way to Allah; it has no end and no ultimate goal¹⁰⁴.

Know furthermore that each station in which Allah self-manifests to his servant is His locus of self-manifestation and His characteristic (*ṣifat*). They comprise the “letters” of the quintessence of the servant. The servant has no inner-reality other than that. This is because He (Glorified is He!) self-manifests to you through you; and through you He self-conceals from you. You have no path to cognizance of Him except by that through which He makes you cognizant of him. And He does not make you cognizant of Himself except from within you and through you. Ali (upon whom be peace) said:

Minds do not encompass him; rather He becomes-revealed to them through them, through them he is inaccessible to them, and He summons them to themselves.

Furthermore know that that which actually becomes-revealed is a point about which the becoming-revealed revolves. Becoming-revealed is a sphere hollowed out about the [act of] becoming-revealed. It is said in the Gospels: *Your outward being is for evanescence; your inward being is Me.*

So creation in its entirety has one spherical revolution about the Acting of Allah¹⁰⁵ All of creation is one hollowed out sphere that revolves about a point which is His Acting (Exalted is He!). In addition, the principles of creation are hollowed out spheres. Likewise, every principle is a complete sphere that revolves about a point that is the “face” (*waġh*) of that principle from the Willing. They do not revolve about an axis because revolution about an axis generates (*tuhditu*), from the parts of the sphere, circles, not spheres. Then the revolution would have some orientation and the cause would not encompass the effect. So those parts commensurate in rank would not be commensurate with the midpoint of the axis, which is the point with respect to them, because that which is from those parts which lie along the orientations of the two poles does not revolve about the point, and the “face” (*waġh*) of the sphere with respect to its cause is not [towards ?] an elongated axis, but rather a point.

The second principle revolves about the first because the first is a point with respect to the second; it also revolves about the first point. Thus it has two revolutions:

- one quintessential, revolving about the point of the first principle;

- and one accidental, revolving about the first when it follows as a consequence of it, otherwise, then about the orientation of its entailments such as position, correlation, and others.

With regards to the oneness of the circle, both [revolutions] are a single revolution. Due to this, the revolution of the second principle is slower than that of the first principle, like the revolution of a star or planet about the pole of its epicycle, and its revolution about the pole of the eccentric orb. Its revolution with respect to the epicycle is about itself; that revolution is accidental in relation to its realization and foundation. Its revolution about the eccentric orb is quintessential because it constitutes the face (*waġh*) of the star towards the principle of its realization because the latter is the principle for its revolution about its epicycle; it flows from it and is derived from it.

The revolution of the second principle is also slower because of the occurrence of multiplicity within it. Whatever has multiple intermediaries is faced with multiple revolutions and so is slower. The accidental revolutions are set in order of intensity and weakness. That which is closer to the circle is weaker. The quintessential revolution is always one.

Such is the rule for every principle. For the branches of each principle there is this rule:

Every branch is a single sphere. A branch has rotations:

- a rotation about its principle;
- and a rotation about every principle that precedes it;
- and likewise about the first pole.

Draw an analogy for every thing in relation to the state of its quintessence and the affections of that quintessence. So every world is a sphere, every species is a sphere, every genus is a sphere, every individual is a sphere, and every part is a sphere.

Similar rules apply with respect to positions and mutual relations. All relations are either relations of mutual equivalence, mutual acquaintance, or mutual avoidance. In mutual avoidance, they revolve in reverse of one another like this: $\supset \subset$; in mutual acquaintance they revolve facing one another like this: $\subset \supset$; in mutual equivalence they revolve in parallel fashion like this: $\supset \supset$; with respect to mutual difference in quintessence alone they revolve like this: $CAP : \cup$ and with respect to qualities alone, like this: $\subset \subset$
 $\subset \subset$ $\cup CAP :$
 and in both of them together it is just mutual avoidance as mentioned already. He (upon whom be peace) said: *The spirits are levied troops. Those who are acquainted with one another unite. Those who avoid one another diverge.*

The meaning of ‘to be acquainted with one another’ is that one of them looks into the face (*waġh*) of his companion. The meaning of ‘to avoid one another’ is that the back of one of them is towards the back of his companion. Equivalence follows as in succession to mutual acquaintance. Difference has many states. For examples, contemplate the [above] figures.

I saw a station for every one of them

Explaining it in this book would take a long time.

Know furthermore that if ‘the revolution of the sphere’ is taken as an expression for revolution along an arc of its circumference, then it revolves

about an axis and generates, from its parts, circles, not spheres. That is not the processional revolution deriving from the Simple Cause that is the Acting of Allah (glorified is He!) and His Willing. Rather, processional revolution is that every part of the sphere revolve about its pole. So the revolution of the sphere about its pole does not have any particular orientation because the latter is a particular characteristic of bodies with respect to their bodily motions. As for the processional existential motions, they are not bodily, even if they are from bodies. They are metatemporal and sempiternal motions. Otherwise, the cause could not encompass all aspects (*ḡihāt*) of the effect. Due to this we have said, “everything is a sphere”. So understand, may Allah help you understand!

And know that this process-stage of revolution cannot be grasped by the soul, and not by the intellect. Only the heartflux can grasp it because it is the orientation of proceeding. And it is the connection of metatime with Sempiternity. Peace!

Eleventh Observation

Elucidation of and Allusion to the Proceeding of Actings from Man

Know that man is a composite of existence and essence. For its continuance, any given subject of creating is always in need of reinforcement from one of two extremes: that of existence, and that of essence.

The reinforcement, existence, is from the quintessential Acting of Allah. Existence always subsists through His Commanding through *processional subsistence* and through existence's acting out of righteous deeds. So the sustainer is the Acting of Allah; reinforcement is from [righteous] deeds, from the Acting of Allah and from the acting of the servant. That which is through the Acting of Allah is received; that which is from the acting of the servant is the act of receiving.

The reinforcement essence, comes about through Allah's accidental Acting¹⁰⁶. Essence always subsists through His accidental Commanding through processional subsistence and through essence's acting out of odious deeds. So the sustainer is the acting of Allah that is the *follower* [of His quintessential Acting]; reinforcement is through odious deeds, through the Acting of Allah and from the acting of the servant. That which is through the Acting of Allah is the establishment factor and the subsistence factor; that which is from the servant is that which becomes-subsistent and becomes-generated¹⁰⁷.

A given man, in himself (*nafs*), is a composite of two contraries. Both are mutually hostile in quintessence, attribute, and *self-impelling*, both are

originating, and both are in need (in their becoming-subsistent) of reinforcement from both of them or from one of them. When such is the case, then if reinforcement is from both of them, then the weighing will occur to that man on the day of resurrection and reckoning¹⁰⁸. If reinforcement is from one of them, the other will weaken and nothing will remain of it except enough to sustain the other, and it will be considered the stronger¹⁰⁹.

If the strong is existence, then the soul becomes tranquil and comes to be the sister of the nous. Essence will become delicate and resemble existence, like iron heated in fire. There is no difference in acting between them, though that acting which comes to be through the fire is by accident, like the iron. The poet has said:

The glass became delicate and so did the wine
so they resembled each other and the matter became ambiguous.

Then as though there is wine and no wine glass
And as though there is wine glass and no wine.

If the strong is essence, then the matter is reversed. Each one of them seeks reinforcement and strength only from its kind (*ḡins*) since a given thing does not seek reinforcement from the direction of that which is its contrary. So light *qua* light does not seek reinforcement from darkness, and conversely. The inclination of one towards the other is only due to their mutual continuance.

So existence seeks reinforcement from various types (*ʿanwāʿ*) of goodness because they are from the species of existence. Essence seeks reinforcement from various types (*ʿanwāʿ*) of badness because they are from the species of

essence¹¹⁰. Since they are mutually hostile, the single composite does not seek reinforcement from both extremes at once, only successively. Since the existence of one of the two parts is a condition for the existence of the other, it is necessarily the case that the acting of that thing be one. If in a single state, existence did (*fa'ala*) good and essence did bad, then isolation [of each part] would be entailed, which would entail disjoining, which would entail the evanescence of the thing, because 'thing' is an expression for each of them conjoined with the other. Due to the dependence of each of them on its conjoining the other, each [when separate from the other] would evanesce also¹¹¹.

However, they oppose each other in the inclination that self-impels from the urge of each to seek reinforcement from its kind (*ġins*), because the inclination of one of them to something necessitates the inclination of the other to its contrary because the two of them are contraries with respect to everything. Due to this, one of them weakens through the acting of the other due to its becoming drawn with the actor to the opposite of that by which it becomes-strong. Hence they oppose one another. Due to the dependence of its doing (*fi'l*) what it desires upon its own realization within itself (*nafs*), each one seeks from the other that it share in that which the former loves. And when it separates from the other it is no longer realized.

As for mere (*muġarrad*) inclination, which is a directing of an urge towards that which is compatible to it, it is not like acting, through which occurs the obtainment of the reinforcement which quiets the urge. Quiet (*as-sukūn*) is not obtained through mere (*muġarrad*) inclination nor is the preponderance of one of the two inclinations. It is not possible that they both self-impel

together, neither in a combined way, unless one of the two be quintessential and the other accidental, nor in a divergent way, since that would entail separation (due to the absurdity of having two mutually contrary self-impellings from a single composite which does not exist except through being conjoined at once), which would entail the non-existence of both of them (due to the dependence of the realization of each of them upon being conjoined). So it is necessary that both inclinations occur successively.

So when existence inclines towards goodness, it inclines through essence. Essence inclines with it by accident and contrary to that which essence loves. When essence inclines towards badness, it inclines through existence. Existence inclines with it accidentally and contrary to that which existence loves. In this state, they successively follow one another; whoever's inclination preponderates, in such a way that it does not incline with the other, predominates. The other does (*fa'ala*) that which the first seeks accidentally; that which predominates does (*fa'ala*) that which it seeks quintessentially. So the [principal] actor strengthens and the subordinate (*tābi'*) one weakens in relation to that by which the principal (*matbū'*) strengthens. Quiet (*as-sukūn*) does not occur to the composite except through acting. This goes on until the inclination of the weak becomes obliterated into the inclination of the strong, to the point where nothing remains of the weak except that by which the strong becomes-subsistent and is realized, because the existence of the weak is a condition in the realization of the existence of the strong. For this, the equivalent of the point (*nuqtat*) at the apex of a cone suffices. We say, "apex of a cone", because, at every moment, the subordinate (*tābi'*) weakens and the [principal] actor strengthens.

The explanation of this state of affairs is that existence has a “face” (*wağh*) towards the wholesome objects it seeks. That “face” (*wağh*) is the nous; it is the vizier of existence. And essence has a “face” (*wağh*) towards its inclination and the odious objects it seeks. That “face” (*wağh*) is the “soul that commands to evil”¹¹²; it is the vizier of essence.

When it is the case that man is that composite of both of them, then within him self-manifests the form of oneness. So it is necessarily the case that he have one *ğism*, one *ğasad*¹¹³, one name, and one implement. So it is necessary that each of them be suitable for existence by itself (*al-ʾinfirāʾ*) to use, pursuant to its acting in the manner we have said, and suitable for essence to use pursuant to its own acting. The same goes for the attachments to the actings of each, such as food, drink, clothing, marriage, and others. Each of these things is suitable for the use of either existence by itself or essence by itself. They are sufficient for existence when existence uses them through the medium of the nous in such a way that, in all of its inclinations, it does not need anything not found among the various types of goodness necessitated by the nous; the same goes for essence. Rather, those matters are adequate, in every situation (*šayʾ*), for each of them.

Furthermore, know that in man, the nous and the commanding soul are two mirrors. The mirror of the nous is from the right of the heart; its “face” (*wağh*) is towards the firmament; within it is imprinted the image of the mode of the first nous specific to it. On the right ear of the heart, which is its door of revelation, there is an angel which gives support. Below it are multiple troops of angels whose number is that of the actings of the nous and the inclinations of existence; they assist it towards every goodness. The

mirror of the soul is from the left of the heart; its “face” (*waġh*) is towards the earth; within it is imprinted the image of the mode of the *first ignorance* specific to it. On the left ear of the heart, which is its door of revelation, there is an appointed devil. Below it are multiple troops of devils whose number is that of the actions of the commanding soul and the inclinations of essence; they assist it towards every badness.

Each angel is entrusted with one thing of goodness and no other. Contrary to it a devil is entrusted with one thing of badness and no other. When existence seeks after a thing of goodness from the nous, and when the nous, through its troops, seeks after it, essence seeks its contrary from the commanding soul through the troops of the latter. So war takes place between them. If the nous predominates, then that angel kills that devil which is specifically its contrary. This occurs with aid from Allah (Glorified is He!). If the commanding soul predominates, then that angel leaves that thing [i.e., that individual person] and takes its place in existence, serving Allah. Then that devil takes mastery of that thing. This occurs with the leave of Allah (Glorified is He!).

There is a paradigm and an elucidation for this by way (*sabīl*) of allusion. The first is as follows. Know that when the sun illumines a given wall, the face (*waġh*) of the wall shines through the rays of the sun and the shadow self-manifests from behind it. If there were no wall, the light of the sun would not self-manifest even though it comes from the sun. If there were no sun, the shadow would not self-manifest from the wall even though it is from the wall. Thus the shining is *from* the sun *through* the wall; the shadow is *from* the wall *through* the sun.

Know that by the “wall” we actually mean the light *qua* itself (*nafs*), not *qua* sun. So the shining becomes-subsistent through the light of the sun by processional subsistence, and through the wall by *realizational subsistence*. The shadow becomes-subsistent through the wall by processional subsistence, and through the sun by realizational subsistence. ***Then We made the sun a guide for it.*** The shining is the sign for the good [that self-manifests] *through* the acting of the servant, [but] comes *from* the Power of Allah; the shadow is the sign for disobedience that comes *from* the acting of the servant, [self-manifesting] *through* the Power of Allah.

Second: Allah (Exalted is He!) has said in a holy hadith: *I am more intimate with your good deeds than you are. And you are more intimate with your evil deeds than I am.* This is the meaning of, ***Whatever good befalls you, then it is from Allah*** — that is, “I am more intimate with it” — ***and whatever evil befalls you, then it is from yourself*** — that is, “you are more intimate with it”. Similarly, with respect to the paradigm, the sun says, “O wall! I am more intimate with the illumination than you are because it is from my light, even though it cannot be realized except through you. And you are more intimate with the shadow than I am because it is from you, even though it is not realized except through me”.

Thus good is primarily and quintessentially from Allah, meaning that there is a preponderance of the aspect (*ḡihat*) of existence in it due to its being traceable from the aspect (*ḡihat*) of the Power of Allah to the Acting of Allah. Good is secondarily and accidentally through the servant — and quintessentially also because the quintessence [of the servant] is from his existence through Allah. So good, with respect to the acting of the servant,

is traceable to his existence which is traceable to the Acting of Allah. Evil is primarily and quintessentially from the servant, meaning that there is a preponderance of his essence within it. It is through Allah secondarily and by accident, meaning it is coincident in existence and the realization of essence is through existence which becomes-subsistent through the Commanding of Allah (Exalted is He!).

So in the manner we have alluded to for you, the quintessential willing of the servant to do good is quintessentially from Allah's willing of it; the quintessential willing of the servant to do evil is accidentally from Allah's Willing. And in the manner which will follow, travel upon a way between these extremes (*al-ḥudūd*) that resolves them. This way that resolves them is the path of Allah (Exalted is He!). ***So humbly follow the paths of your Lord!***

The root (ʿaṣl) of the question is that you know that a thing is realized only through its existence and its essence. That is because it has no subsistence through itself, not in its solitary parts, not in its entirety. It only becomes-subsistent through the Commanding of Allah by processional subsistence. It subsists through it by processional subsistence and so is always fresh. To this there is an allusion in His saying (Exalted is He!): ***And among his signs is that the Firmament and the Earth subsist through His Commanding!*** And in the *Supplication for Saturday* — the author of the *Miṣbāḥ* has narrated it there — he (upon whom be peace) said: *Everything other than you subsists through your Commanding!* This is the case except that in every state it is like a river running in a truly revolving manner. Our saying that it is a “revolving river” does not mean that it is a circle; rather,

it is a hollowed sphere. From the same point of view from which its quintessence becomes-subsistent, actions also subsist through the Commanding of Allah by *successive subsistence*, in the manner we alluded to previously. What is meant by ‘successive’ is that the relation of that by which actions acquire their subsistence to that by which the quintessence becomes-subsistent is [proportional to] the relation of rays to the light-source, the relation of one [part] to seventy.

Thus the quintessence subsists through the Commanding of Allah; its actions subsist through the light of that Commanding; their divergence is in accordance with the divergence in its degrees from that Commanding. So the Commanding is that which sustains them, as we mentioned. The sustained acting relies upon the sustained actor; the sustaining of the act of reliance is also from that Commanding. To this effect (*maʿnā*) there is an allusion in the saying of al-Riḍā (upon whom be peace): *He is the Master of that over which He has given them mastery. He has power over that which He has given them power over.* The power of choosing which is in the servant issues from the requisites of the two contraries existence and essence, due in turn to the requisites of that which each of them has, as already discussed; from the creation of the implement appropriate to two mutual contraries; from the ability to act when [it wills] to act; and from the possibility of that ability before acting, that is, “soundness”, which is that by which the servant moves himself and is able to act. And because he is an impression of the Chooser, he comes to be a chooser. He (Exalted is He!) has said: ***Thus we made him a seer and a hearer!***

So when the choosing servant (who becomes-subsistent through the Com-

manding of Allah) does (*faʿala*) an acting (which becomes-subsistent through the light of the Commanding of Allah), while he has the power to leave it, then he actually does (*faʿala*) his acting alone through the Power of Allah because the sustained acting relies upon the sustained actor alone. So it is through the Power of Allah that the actor and the acting acquire their subsistence, and through which the reliance of the acting upon the actor becomes-subsistent. To this does the interpretation of His saying (Exalted is He!), ***Then we contract it towards us an easy contracting***, allude. Thus the power of Allah is the spirit of the acting of the servant and the acting of the servant is his body (*ġasada-hū*). The same goes for every motion and rest. This is the secret of *the position between the two positions*¹¹⁴.

The paradigm of that becoming-subsistent is the way the illumination in a given wall becomes-subsistent through the light of the sun. So the Commanding is [like] the “face” (*waġh*) of the sun; the light which is the water is [like] the radiated light of the sun; the illumination in the wall is [like] the existence of man; the wall, to which we alluded earlier — and it is the very (*nafs*) illumination *qua* illumination — is [like] his essence. His acting attributed to him is like the reflection of the illumination and it is of two types. That which is a reflection of it from the direction (*ġihat*) of the sun comprises goodness, light, good¹¹⁵, and obedience. That which is a reflection of it from the direction (*ġihat*) of itself (*nafs*) comprises badness, darkness, evil, and disobedience. The first type is the acting of the nous deriving from existence. The second is the acting of the soul deriving from essence. So understand well!

Know that essence exists through the existence of existence as long as

existence is existent. If essence did not exist, then existence would not exist because the former is the condition of the existentiating of existence and constitutes the completion of the receptivity of the existence to [the act of] existentiating; and conversely. Now[, on the other hand,] they¹¹⁶ have said that essence is non-existence — “it smells not the fragrance of existence”¹¹⁷ — only because they mean to say that it does not ever exist primarily and quintessentially, not that it does not exist at all. Rather it exists through the surplus of [the act of the] existentiating of existence, as we have said in the foregoing. That surplus, when related to the existentiating of existence, is the relation of one part to seventy, as is the case for impressions and qualities. This is [the case] with respect to the outward (*zāhir*) [analysis of things].

As for in the reality which corresponds to what actually occurs, essence is existent through another existence, one independent in itself (*nafs*), even if it is sequentially subordinate to the first. The relation of its existence to the first is like the relation of the existence of “becoming-broken” to the existence of “[transitive] breaking”. That is because the first is part of the completion of the receptivity of existentiating on the part of the existence of essence.

So in the first [instance], existence is existent through that existentiating which is the Acting. He existentiated it through itself (*nafs*), not through an existence different from itself (*nafs*), except that its existentiating through itself is its rotation about itself. It is a sphere which rotates about a sphere which rotates about a point which is the *generative motion* from the Acting. The outward (*zāhir*) sphere rotates in counter-sequence and the inward one, in sequence.

In the second [instance], essence is existent through the light of the Acting's existentiation of the first [i.e., existence]. It is a point about which essence revolves in counter-sequence. Essence rotates about itself counter to its own configuration and in counter-sequence; about existence it rotates with an orientation other than the orientation of existence.

So from existence and essence there result two spheres; their parts interpenetrate, their particles intermix, their surfaces face each other, and their rotations are both divergent. Their intermixing occurs without any of the parts or particles of one being exhausted by the other; and without being able to distinguish one from the other, except in subjective consideration, in their actings and in their inclinations due [in turn] to the divergence of their urges due to the mutual contention between their quintessences.

Everything that is close to the *generative point* is brighter due to the predominance of existence. Everything that is far is more intense in darkness due to the predominance of essence, until intensity [of brightness] and weakness [respectfully] end at the point of generative motion and at the convexity of the sphere. So darkness ends, in the direction (*ǧihat*) of generative motion, at a point along the face (*waǧh*) of generative motion. It grows further away, expanding into the shape (*hayat*) of a cone whose base is along the convexity of the outward sphere. Light ends, in the direction (*ǧihat*) of the convexity of the sphere, at a point, in the shape of a cone whose base lies along the face¹¹⁸ (*waǧh*) of generative motion¹¹⁹.

With respect to [the process of] “creating”, the two intermixing spheres rotate about the face (*waǧh*) of generative motion, under the *red veil*¹²⁰, through three perpetual motions:

- the quintessential motion of existence, in sequence;
- the quintessential motion of essence, in counter-sequence;
- and a third, accidental, motion.

In the state of obedience, essence rotates in sequence; through its quintessential motion, in counter-sequence. In the state of disobedience existence rotates, through its accidental motion, in counter-sequence; through its quintessential motion, in sequence. When acts of obedience follow one another consecutively, the quintessential motion of essence weakens and slows down, while its accidental motion speeds up. When acts of disobedience follow one another consecutively, the quintessential motion of existence weakens and slows down, while its accidental motion speeds up. Due to the fact that the quintessential motion of one never follows the quintessential motion of the other — it only follows through the accidental one — obedience and disobedience become heavy due to the occurrence of mutual inversion, until the consideration of one of them for its inclination evanesces, in which case the requisite of the [still] existent inclination lightens.

With respect to [the process of] “providing”, the two intermixing spheres rotate about the face (*waǧh*) of generative motion, under the *white veil*, through three motions:

- the quintessential motion of existence, for the reinforcement of providing, in sequence;
- the quintessential motion of essence for the reinforcement of privation, in counter-sequence;

- and a third, accidental, motion.

In the state of providing, essence, through its accidental motion, rotates in sequence; through its quintessential motion, conversely. In the state of privation, existence, through its accidental motion, rotates in counter-sequence; through its quintessential motion, conversely.

With respect to [the process of] “dying”, the two intermixing spheres rotate about the face (*wağh*) of generative motion, under the *green veil*, through three motions. The quintessential motion of existence is in counter-sequence; the quintessential motion of essence is in sequence; the two accidental motions, conversely.

With respect to [the process of] “living”, the two intermixing spheres rotate about the face (*wağh*) of generative motion, under the *yellow veil*, through three motions. Each motion, essential and accidental, is converse with respect to “dying”.

So with respect to the four degrees of existence — upon which the empyrean is raised and through which Al-Raḥmān self-revealed, through His actings, upon the empyrean; they are [the processes] of providing, dying, living, and dying, as Allah (Exalted is He!) has said: ***Allah Who created you, then provides for you, then occasioned your dying, then occasioned your living!*** — existence and essence have, in the world of meanings, the world of intelligences, twelve motions, eight quintessential and four accidental; likewise, they have twelve motions in the world of images (*aṣ-ṣuwar*), the world of souls; likewise, twelve motions in the world of bodies (*al-ağsām*), the corporeal world; likewise in the ethereal world, the world of shadows; likewise in the world of figures, the imaginal world; except that

in the world of intelligences, the two accidental motions are potential; in the world of shadows they are in readiness; and below that they are actual. These are the sixty motions of existence and essence; forty are quintessential; twenty are accidental.

Know furthermore that, with consideration to their particles, existence and essence have a metatemporal motion other than the motion of the whole. So every particle of existence rotates about its face (*waġh*), not having any particular orientation. Every particle of essence rotates about its face (*waġh*), not having any particular orientation; likewise for the ends of each of these. In relation to the entirety, each particle of existence and of essence follow, in fastness, slowness, elevation, and retrogradation, the rules applying to the epicyclic orb with respect to the deferent orb. With respect to the entirety, they follow, in need, seeking of reinforcement, and sphericity, the rules applying to the entirety. Each faces its origin (*mabdaʾ*), stands at the gate of its Lord in its requests, and with respect to its poverty, takes refuge in His wealth.

Know furthermore that the accidentality of each thing we have mentioned is the aspect (*ġihat*) of its need of its contrary. So the accidentality of existence is the aspect (*ġihat*) of its need, with respect to *self-manifesting*, of essence. The accidentality of essence is the aspect of its need, with respect to *realization*, of existence. Due to this the accidentality of each one follows the quintessentiality of the other¹²¹.

Twelfth Observation

Elucidation of the Subsistence of Choice

Know that choice arises from the inclination of existence to that which is conformable to it, and the inclination of essence to that which is conformable to it, as we have mentioned time and again. Inclination is [of two types:] quintessential and actional. The first is the revolution of a given thing, through the direction of its need, about the pole of its freedom from need, that is, that through which it seeks its freedom from need. We have alluded to this previously with regards to its motion about its pole. The second is its revolution, through an implement, due to its need of one of the two, about the orientation of its pole.

When it is the case that a given thing has two contrasting inclinations — it is sufficient that it be attached to one of them — choice is established. So “if it wills, it does (*fa‘ala*) it; and if it wills, it refrains from it”. This is with respect to actional inclination. As for quintessential inclination, then the thing is a chooser with regards to each of its counterparts, that is, a chooser with respect to the inclination of existence itself to that which it requires and with respect to the inclination of essence itself to that which it requires.

The elucidation of this is that existence does not have the yearning for anything but light. Existence does not have a yearning due to its essence for darkness although it may have such a yearning by accident and by that inuring which is accidental. In its quintessence, it is not possible, with respect to its emanating from the Acting of Allah, that it will darkness, because

darkness is an aspect (*ḡihat*) of essence derived from existence. So it is not possible that it will to not will what it wills because willing is one. So it cannot self-impel to not self-impel. The same goes for essence *qua* essence.

Do not suppose that this is inconsistent with what we are talking about to the effect that there is not a thing that is without choice. [Indeed,] with respect to all things, there is no compulsion; they are neither subjects nor agents of compulsion. This is because existence has no “thingness” except with respect to essence; essence has no “thingness” except through existence. It is not possible for that which, in its reality and from every consideration, has naught but a single aspect (*ḡihat*) to have a multiplicity of inclinations and a divergence of self-impellings. This is not compulsion because compulsion is that another thing occasion the inclination of a given thing counter to the requisites of the quintessence of the given thing or through other than the inclination of the quintessence of the given thing. What we are talking about is the [natural] inclination of its quintessence; so it is not compulsion. Thus it must be choice, since there is no intermediary [state] between choice and compulsion¹²². On the other hand, it can be said that it is only a part of choice because that which is generally understood from ‘choice’ is the inclination to two divergent orientations due to two different callings from the composite desiring of that composite thing. So this choice we are talking about here is defective choice. Equivalent to this is the meaning in a preposition; the meaning is complete when it is conjoined to something else.

Let it not be said that this defective choice is that by which the Necessary chooses — due to the simplicity of his quintessence; so He has naught but choice of a particular orientation; [this is] as so many of them [i.e., tradi-

tional philosophers] have said to the effect that the oneness of His Willing is inconsistent with [complete] choice; and that as for the matter of, “if it wills, it does (*fa‘ala*) it; and if it wills, it refrains from it”, it is a principle traceable only to the possible *qua* possible — because this is false. This is because the choice attributed to every possible such that “if it wills, it does (*fa‘ala*) it; and if it wills, it refrains from it” is such because *every impression resembles the [actional] quality of its agent*. So choice is that which is in the Willing itself (*nafs*), since everything that may be (*yumkinu*) attributed to a given possible, be it acting, becoming-in-yielding-to-acting, correlation, or any other such thing, is a quality of the quintessence of that possible. From every consideration, that which is not possible in its quintessence cannot possibly be from it or attributed to it. Now nothing is possible in its quintessence except what is possible in the Willing. And nothing is possible in the Willing except that which is possible in the Knowledge. And It is the Real Quintessence (Glorified and exalted is He!). So the choice of the possible is an impression due to the choice of the Willing. And the choice of the Willing is an impression due to the Choice of the Necessary.

If it is said: Does He know in Preternity that, say, Zayd, in the world of origination, is a rational animal or not? If He knows that, it is not permissible that He not create him at all or that he create him as, say, a horse. Otherwise, His knowledge will turn into ignorance. If He does not know, then that would entail that He is ignorant of what will be, and that is necessarily false. So it is necessarily the case that He know that he is a rational animal and anything else is not possible with respect to Him, even though change is possible with respect to Zayd in himself and *qua* Zayd;

Then we say: He (Glorified is He!) knows what will be as well as what He wishes to change into what He wishes. So every process-stage for which it is possible that a possible be in, He knows. With respect to what He wills, He knows every plausibility. He knows what will be from what is, when He wills, however He wills. So when He knows that Zayd will be a rational animal, then it is in His knowledge. And when He wills to change him into what He wills, then it is in His knowledge. Thus when He desires, He changes what He wills how He wills. Every change and establishment, effacing and confirmation, corresponds to its respective state in His knowledge. Hence his changing of that thing which He knows is the establishment of that which He knows because He wills that which He knows. So when He wills to change it, then He is willing what He knows (Glorified is He!). So glory be to Him with respect to Whom the describers fall short of describing (*wasf*) Him!

This is because all that is possible with respect to the possible is only from His Willing; what is in His Willing is in His knowledge. When He knows that Zayd will be in a specific time and place, and then Zayd makes a transition from that place, then, without any change, the first state is in His knowledge and the second state is in His knowledge — rather, permanence obtains — except that with respect to his being in the first place, in His knowledge he is in both places. So when he is in the first, his invisible reality links with his visible reality. When he makes a transition to the second, his visible reality separates from his [first] invisible reality without any change in His knowledge in either state. Only Zayd undergoes true change.

That is because when you know that Zayd is in a given place or time, and you know that he will make a transition to another, your knowledge does

not change when he makes a transition in accordance with what you know; rather, your knowledge continues to subsist. Your knowledge of him in the first instance does not change through the change of Zayd's state. Rather, you continue to know that he was in the first state. The knowledge-form from his first state remains with you. The second knowledge-form with which Zayd corresponds through his making his transition also remains with you and does not change. It just applies to and connects with the known object when he makes his transition. So understand! Furthermore, you profess the doctrine of novelty¹²³, and that Allah, ***He effaces . . . what He wills and confirms what He wills.***

This is the explanation of that which we hold to be the case. A detailed analysis of things would take too long. There is no benefit in that given the manifesting of our objective. So He (Glorified is He!) is a Chooser, meaning, "if He wills, He does (*fa'ala*) it; and if He wills, He refrains from it".

Let it not be said: The cause with respect to existence is such only due to its simplicity. Now the Quintessence of Allah is more intense in simplicity than anything. So that matter applies, with respect to Him, through the first way. So the meaning of the proposition that He is a Chooser is that he does (*yaf'alu*) what He wills through intention and contentment with what He does¹²⁴, not that "if He wills, He does (*fa'ala*) it; and if He wills, He refrains from it", because that is the requisite of composites of opposites, as you yourself have established previously;

Because we will say: We have also established that He (Glorified is He!) is characterized by both sides *ḡihatayn* in a pair of contradictory propositions, by the non-joint exhaustiveness of that pair, and by the aspect (*ḡihat*) of

a composite but with regards to His simplicity. This is because whatever is possible in other than Him is impossible with respect to Him; whatever is impossible in other than Him is necessary for Him¹²⁵. Due to this al-Riḍā (upon whom be peace) has said: *His ultimate reality is the separation between Him and His creation; His jealousy is the demarcation of that which is besides Him*. So the impressions of a composite may not emanate from the simple, with regards to its simplicity; this is in creation. With respect to His Quintessence (Glorified is He!), however, the matter is counter to that which is possible with respect to creation. So from a single aspect (*ḡihat*) He is Lofty in His Proximity, Proximate in His Loftiness. From a single aspect (*ḡihat*) He is the Manifest in his Occulting, the Occult in His Manifesting. From a single aspect (*ḡihat*) He is the Near in His Farness, the Far in His Nearness. From a single aspect (*ḡihat*) He is the First through His Lastness, the Last through His Firstness. This and what is similar does not apply to that which is besides Him; with respect to Him (Glorified is He!), however, it is necessarily the case. So in His simplicity He is singular in meaning. There is no abundance in His Quintessence, no multiplicity, no facets, and no aspects (*ḡihāt*). From every consideration, there is no divergence with respect to His Quintessence, not through possibility, assumption, supposition, and actuality. So *anything that you discriminate [through your minds], in its deepest meanings, is created like you, and is reverted to you*, that is, it comes from you and goes back to you. ***And Allah is the Wealthy while you all are poor.***

In addition, He is the uniter of enemies, the resolver of mutually contrary propositions¹²⁶; from Him [i.e., His Acting] emanate contrary actings. So between His Acting and that which is besides Him there is no agreement or

variance because His Acting is an impression of His Quintessence to which nothing is contrary and which nothing opposes. He is He; there is no god except He. *Any given thing comes only from His Willing.* So in relation to His Willing, doing (*fi'l*) something and refraining from it are the same. It is, through a single orientation and a single Willing, “if He wills, He does (*fa'ala*) it; and if He wills, He refrains from it”. Such is Allah my Lord! Such is my Lord¹²⁷!

From every consideration, drawing parallels with creation constitutes assimilation [of Allah with His creation]. A supplication reads: *Your Power has appeared, O my God! Yet no configuration has appeared so that they may assimilate You, O my Master! And they have made some of Your signs as lords, O my God! Hence they do not have cognizance of You, O my God!* This is the state of one who has cognizance of a configuration from his soul; through it he has cognizance of his Lord. And one cannot have cognizance of Allah [in His quintessence] through His creation. Rather, one has cognizance of creation through Him.

If you say: I am a knower and He is a knower; I am alive and He is alive; I am existent and He is existent. So no inference can be drawn about His characteristic through those qualities except through that which we find;

I say: this is the meaning of his saying, *Your Power has appeared, O my God! Yet no configuration has appeared . . .*: we only ascribe (*waṣafnā*) knowledge to Him because He created knowledge within us; with life due to His creating life within us; with existence due to our existentiatio; none of this is similar to the state wherein He is. He only accepts these characterizations from you, as well as your worship of Him through them, because they

constitute the full extent of your ability and the reality of your quintessences through which He becomes-the-subject-of-cognizance for you. So you characterize Him through that which is perfection for you. And the fire ant *ad-darrat* maintained that Allah has two antennas because perfection for the ant resided in the existence and possession of them. Due to this al-Riḍā (upon whom be peace) has said: *His Names are for expression; His qualities are to occasion understanding. **Glorified is your Lord, the Lord of Might, above that which they ascribe!***

Know furthermore that whatever you find in the way of complete choice is an impression of the choice of the Acting. The choice of the Acting is an impression of the Choice of His Quintessence. In the entirety of existence, there is no sheer coercion and no pure compulsion. Rather, everything is a chooser. Every mote of existence is a chooser because the impression of a chooser is a chooser. Everything created, from man to inanimate object, share in this reality, except that everything that is close to the Acting is stronger and more manifest in choice; everything which is far is weaker and more hidden in choice — like the light which radiates from a light source: everything closer to it is more intense in light and stronger in manifesting and in making manifest; everything further away is weaker and more hidden — until existence ends. So choice evanesces when existence evanesces regardless of whether that existence is quintessential or accidental; everything is in accordance with its degree.

As for the things you see that have a predisposition, like the descending of a stone which apparantly (*zāhīran*) has no power to ascend, then know that Allah (Glorified is He!) has entrusted an angel with it to place it in accor-

dance with what Allah has commanded, such as the possibility of the stone to descend. What you apparently (*zāhīran*) see in the way of compulsion, like a stone which an individual propels upwards — so it ascends although its property is to descend — then know that Allah (Glorified is He!) has entrusted an angel with the limb of the individual propeller; it is stronger than the angel entrusted with descending. Allah commands the angel entrusted with descending to follow the command of the angel entrusted with ascending until the end of the field of that angel. The yearning of the stone comes from the yearning of the angel entrusted with descending. When the field of the thrower ends, the agent occasioning descent yearns to descend and the stone yearns for that which the angel yearns. In reality, that yearning is not a forcing. It is a yearning in the sense of choice, like the yearning for food of someone hungry. Surely he eats. However, he is a chooser even though you see that someone hungry for whom food has been obtained, as long as he has the power to eat it and there is nothing preventing him, not from within or without himself in any way, then he must eat even though he is decidedly a chooser. Word-for-word, this is like the paradigm of the stone; there is no difference between them.

However, the other extremity of the choice of the stone i.e., the absence (-*adam*), through its own choice, of descending on its part, is extremely hidden because man does not have cognizance of the choice of inanimate objects and plants except through a mode (*tawr*) beyond the nous. That is due to his intimacy with the members of his species (*naw^c*) and genus (*ġins*). So he does not have cognizance of choice except as it occurs in his species (*naw^c*), like that of man, or his genus (*ġins*), like that of animal. When it is the case

that he has a mode, from amongst the loci of sensation, that is beyond the nous, then he has cognizance of the choice of plants and inanimate objects. And I will mention for you two things, in the way of a paradigm and an elucidation, by which you may infer the choice and sensation of plants and inanimate objects.

First: Know that the existence emanating from the Willing is like the light emanating from a lamp. It is known that of the parts of light, each which is close to the lamp is stronger in light, heat, and dryness than that which is farther from it. Such is the case up to the farthest parts of light which are weakest in light, intensity, and heat. When the light becomes non-existent, so does the heat and dryness. The existence of one of the three characteristics is not possible without the other two. Rather, when one exists, all three exist. If one is non-existent, all three are non-existent. Similarly for the existence emanating from the Willing: everything close to it is stronger in existence, sensation, and choice, like the first nous; for everything far from it, all three, up to inanimate objects, weaken to the same degree (*ḥadd*). So inanimate objects are weaker in existence, sensation, and choice, corresponding to what we said with respect to the light of lamp. This is because, for this issue (*al-maṭlab*), the light of the lamp is the sign of Allah in the horizons for whomsoever seeks to reach this drinking fountain. He (Exalted is He!) has said: ***We will show them our signs in the Horizons and in their own souls until it becomes clear to them that He is the Real.*** So understand!

Second: Know that a given inanimate thing, like a stone for example, when something comes and propels it upwards, it cannot become-propelled

unless becoming-propelled is possible for it. Now that which is not in its reality is not possible for it. Rather, it only becomes-propelled upwards because its quintessence is a receiver of that [propelling], just as its quintessence is a receiver of descending through a single relation. However, Allah made the cause, yearning, and choice of descending preponderant and an entailment through Allah's constraining on account of benefiting creation. And He distinguished the cause, yearning, and choice of ascending through the existence of that which necessitates it, just as the cause, yearning, and choice of descending abide through the existence of that which necessitates it. It is what the common call 'weight'.

So when a propelling agent propels it upwards, then it is not, in reality, a forcing agent. Rather it is an assisting factor consonant with what the quintessence of the thing necessitates. This is because a forcing agent is that which enters a given thing into what is not possible for its quintessence. Now this is absurd because when he propelled it, while becoming-propelled is not possible for its quintessence, then if it did not become-propelled, then forcing did not occur [to it]. If it did become-propelled, then it is not that [original thing]; rather the thing that becomes-propelled is other than it [i.e., the originally given thing] because if it were possible for it what is not possible for it, it could not be until its reality changes into what is possible for it. Then it could not be itself because it is not possible that that which is not possible for it be possible for it. So when he propels it and it becomes-propelled, then it is the case that becoming-propelled is possible for it. However, a subtlety of its existence falls short of that which is possible for it to be in itself (*nafsi-hi*). So this propelling agent is an assisting factor and a completing agent for

that which is possible to become-propelled. So through the agent, becoming-propelled is possible for the thing's quintessence due to the potentiality, in its quintessence, for yielding. The latter is *compliance*. And this will be recognized as choice by whosoever can understand.

Thus, choice is entailed by all of the motives of existence. However, the firm imperative (*ʿamr*) is that *a given thing be in accordance with the perfection of what ought to be*. The perfection of what ought to be is that a given follower, through its own choice, be a follower of the states of the followed with regards to its followedness. Otherwise the follower will not be a follower and the followed will not be followed. This is because followerness and followedness come about through a relation of linkage between the two of them and a resemblance in their quintessences that necessitates homogeneity, which in turn necessitates quintessential inclination [in each of them], which in turn necessitates choice by reason of the divergence of the orientation of quintessence of each of the two (as we alluded to earlier). Due to what we have said, if the follower were a follower without its own choice, then it would not be a follower. Now plant and inanimate object are both followers of animal with respect to existence because both of them come from a surplus of the clay of animal. So it is necessarily the case that each be follower with respect to the states of animal. Because all beings follow man¹²⁸, then for the sake of order in existence it is necessarily the case in Wisdom that there be a follower to carry him and lift him, like water and earth; a follower to shelter him, like fire and sky (*as-samāʾ*); and a follower to encompass him, like air. So the cause of ascending and descending is due to constraining by the Guardian of universal regulation because it is an aid from Him to them

with respect to that which He desires from them.

So the perfection of the follower is in accordance with that which ought to be. The perfection of what ought to be is that the followed choose and desire to be followed by the follower and that the follower choose and desire to follow the followed. This is what is meant by choice. Allah constrains each of them as an aid from Him for the sake of what each of them love. Otherwise each would not be what it is since, a thing cannot be what it is except through what is possible for it. So understand what we have repeated for you!

Now His constraining is not forcing; He only creates things according to the state in which they are [supposed to be]. They are not in that state except through that about which they are asked. He does not compel them in his questioning. Rather, He asks them through their own choosing. To this effect He said, by way of inquiry and affirmation (*taqrīran*): **Am I not your Lord?** So He **presented them with their presence** about which they enwrap themselves and with which they are pleased. Then after He presented them with their choice and gave them their options, the acknowledgers acknowledged and the disacknowledgers disacknowledged. If He had compelled them, then not one of them would have refused (*imtanaʿa*) [to acknowledge].

This elucidation and paradigm have been given through the outward (*ẓāhir*) tongue¹²⁹. As for the inward meaning, it is what we have mentioned to the effect that it involves angels. Due to the hidden obscurities involved in this matter (*maqām*), to complete the elucidation would prolong the discourse. However, what we have mentioned constitutes an intimation, analogy,

and allusion.

Know that all of this repetition and reiteration of expression is for the sake of occasioning understanding. If I had made the expression more concise and confined myself to allusion, then insight would have become dim and all roads to these problems would have been obstructed. Given this, if you attained cognizance, then you are you. And Allah is the Guardian of success.

Thirteenth Observation

Allusion to the Elucidation of the Manner Existents
Become-Generated and How They Descend through their
Degrees of Self-Manifesting

Know that Allah created the things not from anything, that is, not from any non-generated matter that was with Him. Otherwise, they would have been created from preeternal (*qadīm*) quanta, exalted is my Lord above that, a great exaltation! Rather, He created a matter for them which He invented, not from anything preceding. It is a *culmination* and an impression of His Acting, similar to the existentiation of “beating”, which is a given event, from “he-beat”¹³⁰. That is the *hylē* and existence of the things. It is the quintessence from which and from whose field He *quintessentializes*¹³¹ the quintessences. This is because a given substance, if it is a body, then it becomes-subsistent through its attributes and the accidents of its actings which are the source of its *receptivity* of generation and self-manifesting among the entities of its rank. If it is an abstract object, then it becomes-subsistent through what it clads itself in and through what is possible for it in the way of the attributes of its actings and the accidents of its rank of being. To this effect there is an allusion in the saying of the Commander of the Faithful (upon whom be peace): *As for that whose self-manifesting is through body, then it entails accident.*

What is meant is that any given abstract object does not exist except when it has received existentiation. It must be the case that its act of receiv-

ing be posterior in quintessence and rank to that which is received because “receiving” is an existent acting; and a given acting is an attribute of its actor. An attribute is posterior in quintessence and rank to the described object because the former is created from the latter. When it is the case that it is not existent prior to its act of receiving existentiation (due to its dependence on its act of receiving), and that *it is not intelligible to have the given attribute exist prior to the described object*, then it is necessarily the case that both of their self-manifestings occur simultaneously. This is due to the dependence of the *self-manifesting* of the received object upon the existence of the receiving agent; and the dependence of the *realization* of the receiving agent upon the existence of the received object because it is an attribute of the received object. That is like “breaking” and “becoming-broken”: hence “becoming-broken” is an acting that comes from “breaking” and is an attribute of it, except that the self-manifesting of “breaking” is dependent upon “becoming-broken”.

Hence, when Allah *created* the received object, that is, the *hylē*, *it-became-created*. So “it-became-created” is the “receiving”. It is an acting from the created object, that is, the received object. Through His Possibility and its readiness, Allah created it from that very (*nafs*) received object *qua* itself (*nafs*), that is, *qua* received object. This “receiving” is its form, essence, and self-manifesting aspect entailed by it. Now the entailed self-manifesting aspect of a given abstract object is the occulting aspect of its body. So when it descends, through its self-manifesting aspect, to the rank of that which is bodily, then its body self-manifests. It is also the matter of its body and its received object. Its self-manifesting aspect is its “receiving”, I mean, its

determining agents in the way of quantity, quality, durational mode, space, rank, orientation, and what those entail.

In this way, whatever descends to a rank is clad in that rank's accidents which constitute its receptivity to its descent to that rank. So the "receiving" obtaining in every rank from amongst the degrees of descending is a self-manifesting aspect, attribute, and composite which carries the received object. The receiving object, with respect to each and every stage of descent, remains in the rank it was in prior to the descending. It only descends through the bounds of its actional attributes.

Thus the heart-flux became-particularized through its heart-fluxual and intelligible reinforcements deriving from its acting; through them it descended to the rank of the nous;

The nous became-distinguished through its strengthenings deriving from its acting; through them it descended to the rank of the spirit, and then the soul;

The soul became-individuated through individuator deriving from itself and its acting; through them it descended to the rank of nature;

Nature applied itself and *flowed* through natural states deriving from its acting; through them it *coagulated* and descended to the rank of the substance of dust, and material quanta;

The impressions of the psychic substance-forms, which are the imaginal forms, particularize and transport the dust substances and material quanta through the degrees of their descents. Then those dust-substances descend, accompanying and clad in those impressions by which their actions are characterized in potentiality;

Then the regulatory angels receive them from the empyrean, which in turn receives them from the water which carries it. The angels throw them upon the winds, which in turn throw them upon the clouds, which in turn throw them upon the Earth in the form of water. The plants of the Earth intermingle with that water. From it two parts condense with one homogeneous part of earth. Then nutriment appeared in the plants and trees, becoming provisions for man and cattle;

Then [man] was a sperm-drop, then a blood-clot, then a flesh-lump, then bones. Then the bones became clothed in flesh; then was produced another creation. This is at the point of corporeal birth, when the *sensing, celestial, animal soul* self-manifests. Then, at the time of birth into the proximate world, the *holy, speaking soul* appears¹³². Its matter comes from the acts of strengthening deriving from the nous. Thus do the selves (*nufūs*) of, say, ‘Amr, Bakr, and Khālīd, come from the self of their father, say, Zayd. This comes about through the requisites of their individuations which come from the actings of their natures and their attributes, the latter of which are latent in them by reason of their differing and diverging from one another, just as the images (*ṣuwar*) reflected from a given image (*ṣurat*), impressed upon a given mirror, of Zayd become abundant when it is received by multiple mirrors.

Another paradigm of what we have alluded to is the similitude of a grain of wheat when sowed. The nature of the grain is like the abstract substance. The attributes, and attributes of attributes, of the grain are like the reinforcements, strengthenings, and descendings mentioned above in connection with the descent of the heart-flux, I mean, existence. Through the nature and

actings which comprise the receptivity, the grain splits open in each rank, in accordance with the character of that rank, until

- what is potential in its attributes self-manifests into actuality, in the form of a green stalk. Then the grain in the invisible reality of the green stalk is latent, like the semen in the loins of Zayd, from which his son 'Amr becomes-generated;
- and until from those attributes there becomes-generated an ear of wheat; it is to the [original] grain what the placenta and womb of a mother are to the fetus.

When those natural, actional attributes become multiple, then their impressions become multiple and diverge. So that ear of wheat comes to have multiple chambers. So that nature becomes spread over those chambers and they become multiple just as images (*ṣuwar*) in multiple mirrors multiply from a single face, and just as 'Amr, Bakr, and Khālīd multiply from the semen of their father Zayd.

From these actional attributes (from which the bodily and corporeal process-stages, and the intelligible, psychic, and natural particularizations come to be) there come to be, in every rank, accidental received objects in relation to them. From them are made receptivities as for the quintessential received objects. The realization of characterization by them is through the realization of their receiving objects, up to the end of the arc of descent corresponding to the end of the “going back” of the agent. When it is said to it, *come back!*, it comes back. It then comes back through its impressions. Its impressions come back through their aims.

So their occulting aspect is characterized by their self-manifesting aspect, and their self-manifesting aspect is described by their occulting aspect. Then the self-manifesting aims are obtained for their occulting aspect, as well as the occulting aims. And the occulting aims are obtained for their self-manifesting aspect, as well as the self-manifesting aims. So through their occulting aspect they perceive the occulting aspect and the self-manifesting aspect. And through their self-manifesting aspect they perceive the self-manifesting and the occulting aspect.

Now the principle underlying what we have alluded to is that the first *hylē*, I mean, existence in the first sense (*ma·nā*), is not subsistent except through its form, I mean, essence in the first sense (*ma·nā*). This is because the first *hylē* is a part of the essence of any given thing since every possible is a composite of matter and form. However, it is present in every rank according to its proper relation to that rank. So genera are particularized through genus-derived particularizations; species through species-derived particularizations; and single objects through individual particularizations. Now the particularizations, which are the bounds of form and receptivity, are created from the received object itself (*nafs*) — I mean, matter *qua* matter; Hence, the first *hylē* is a part of the essence of any given thing, although its self-manifesting aspect “carries” its occulting aspect — just as Eve was created from Adam (upon whom be peace). He has said (Exalted is He!): ***He created you all from a single soul; and from it He created its spouse***, because matter is the father [i.e., the active principle], as aforementioned, and form is the mother [i.e., the receptive principle], as the nous proves and the traditions relate¹³³.

So the grain, with which we have made comparison, corresponds to matter in its form. And the green stalk, which is its self-manifesting aspect, is invisible within it. The grain envelops it as a fold within its description and its form. Then when you sow it, the green stalk self-manifests — and the grain becomes latent in the occulting aspect of the green stalk, just as the latter was latent before its being sowed in its self-manifesting aspect — until, in the ear of wheat, grain self-manifests in multiplicity and abundance, within abundant calyxes and multiple loci, just as sperm is united in the loins of a given man but multiple with respect to receiving objects and abundant with respect to wombs. We have alluded to this before.

The proofs of what we have alluded to are in His saying (Exalted is He!):

We will show them our signs in the horizons and in their own souls until it becomes clear (ya-tabayyanu) to them that He is the Real;

and in the likes of the saying of the Imam Ja‘far ibn Muhammad al-Sādiq (upon both of them be peace):

Servitude is a jewel whose ultimate reality is lordship. So what is missing (fuqida) in servitude is found (wuğida) in lordship; what is hidden in lordship is attained in servitude;

and in the saying of Imam Riḍā (upon whom be peace):

Surely, those who possess the kernels of consciousness-awareness know that the way of guidance to what is there cannot be known except by what is here!;

and the likes of those, which the proof of Wisdom imparts.

Fifteenth Observation

[On Possibility]

Know that Allah (to Whom belong Might and Majesty) was alone in the might of His Majesty and the Holiness of His Perfection, having no partner and no one else with Him. And He is now in the state in which He was, I mean, alone, having no partner and no one else with Him. Then He originated *Willing-in-Possibility*¹³⁴ through itself (*nafsi-hā*). Then He originated Possibility through the Willing. Hence the possibilities of things came to be through His origination through His Willing, I mean, His Acting.

The meaning of the proposition that He originated the Willing through itself (*nafsi-hā*) is as follows: The meaning of ‘willing’, in outward (*ẓāhir*), explanatory expression, is *existentiational motion*. Now existentiational motion is originated, its origination being dependent upon some existentiational motion. Now it already is existentiational motion, so in its own existentiational motion it has no need of other than itself (*nafsi-hā*). When you hear us say, “Allah created the Willing through itself”, know that by that we mean that is a single, non-multiple thing; it is not multiple in its quintessence in the sense that “its self (*nafsi-hā*)” is one thing while “it” is something else, and it is not multiple, in its *qua*-ness, in the sense that itself (*nafsi-hā*) *qua* cause is different from itself *qua* effect. Now we mean this from the perspective (*ḥāl*) of giving definitions (*at-taʿrīf*) and explanations. The Willing is actually simple, in the highest degree of simplicity-in-Possibility, since whatever besides it that may be discriminated and perceived came to be through it

and emanated from it. It has no beginning in Possibility other than itself; its “space” comprises the possibilities of things through which they emanate; its mode of duration is sempiternity.

Through it He (Glorified is He!) originated the possibilities of things in a universal manner, one which does not end with respect to possibility. This means that for the possibility of, say, Zayd, it is possible that He be, say, ‘Amr or that ‘Amr come from Him; that he be a prophet or a devil or that a prophet or devil come from Him; that he be a firmament, an earth, a sea, a mountain, or an animal, or that a firmament, an earth, a sea, a mountain, or an animal come from him; and so on without end.

In short, a possible is possible due to [something] other than itself, not due to itself. This is in contrast with those who divide things as a whole into five [jointly exhaustive] divisions. So they speak of

- the necessary due to itself; It is Allah (to Whom belong Might and Majesty);
- the necessary due to [something] other than itself; it is the existence of the effect when the perfect cause exists;
- that whose existence is impossible due to its quintessence, like “the partner of Allah”;
- that whose existence is impossible due to [something] other than itself; it is the existence of the effect with the absence (‘*adam*) of the existence of the perfect cause;
- and that whose existence is possible due to its quintessence.

They say: “It is not allowable that there be something whose existence is possible due to [something] other than itself. This is since, if that is assumed, it would have, prior to that other, been either necessary or impossible since every thing belongs to at least one of these divisions. Then, through some other, it came to be possible. Then a subversion of these realities into one another would be entailed, which is impossible.”

The answer, through remonstrance¹³⁵, is that if it were possible due to itself, then it would be ancient. This is because if it were a thing prior to that which is other, then it was ancient; if it were not a thing except through the other, then it is possible due to the other. Through the proof of wisdom, we know that it is the case that He (Exalted is He!) was in Preternity and there was nothing with Him. Now Preternity is His Sacred Quintessence, meaning that whatever is denoted by the name of a thing, strictly (*ḥaqīqatan*) or metaphorically, is impossible at the rank of His Quintessence (Exalted is He!) except His Quintessence. That which is besides Him is fashioned due to Him (Exalted is He!). Hence, it is not due to its quintessence but rather to [something] other than itself. Given a possible, if it is a thing, then it is possible due to [something] other than itself. Otherwise there is no expression derivable from it. And the impossible is not a thing; hence there is no expression derivable from it. The elucidation of this has been aforementioned in the Second Observation.

When you have understood what we have alluded to, then know that Possibility is the source of beings¹³⁶. Since it is established in philosophy (*al-ḥikmat*) that the existence of a given quality stems from the existence of its corresponding qualified subject, then it is necessarily the case that

Possibility be a quintessence, not a quality, since it is not preceded by an qualified subject. It just self-manifests in things in the *form* of a quality because it is the principle of generated things. Their beings are created from it; their entities are created from their beings. The beings of things are their matters; their entities are the forms of their matters. Beings self-manifest in things through the form of qualities. So you say, “this is a generated thing¹³⁷”, just as you say, “this is a possible thing”. Now Possibility is to beings what semen is to man. This is because beings are a “coagulation” of the “fluid” of Possibility. So entities are created from beings just as beings are created from Possibility.

Now the stronger base of a given composite of matter and form is its matter. When it is the case that Possibility becomes-subsistent through the configuration of Acting-in-Possibility¹³⁸ — because the *configuration* of Acting-in-Possibility is the *matter* of Possibility, just as the “matter” of the image (*ṣūrat*) which abides in the mirror is the configuration of the one facing it, while its “form” is the configuration of the glass in the way of largeness, purity, straightness, whiteness, and their contraries — then it is self-manifest within that for which it is its principle through the form of the latter’s being characterized by it. Due to this we say that it is a quintessence, since there is no qualified subject prior to it. It self-manifests in the form of a quality in the thing for which it is its principle. Its matter is a quality of the Acting since quintessences are both accidents of their perfect causes and subjects of affection for both their qualities and their self-manifesting aspects.

Our saying that this body, for example, soul, or nous is possible does not mean that it is a thing qualified by possibility so that it has a rank prior to

possibility, that is, it is existent in that rank prior to its being qualified by possibility, as is the case for qualities. For qualities only come from either the acting of the qualified subject characterized by them or from the acting of the agent (*fā'il*) of that qualified subject, in which case they adhere to it after the generation of the qualified subject. In each case (*ḥāl*), it is existent prior to the existence of the quality. Hence, there entails a state wherein it is not possible.

This is counter to what actually occurs. Rather, the intent (*murād*) and meaning of our saying that it is possible is that it is generated from Possibility, that is, from possible existence whose ultimate reality is from Possibility. So due to this we have said that it is a *quintessence* in relation to what is created from it, and a quality of its perfect cause. Hence, it *self-manifests* as a characteristic of the thing. This is just like your saying, “it is existent”¹³⁹.

Moreover, the claim that possibility is only subjective, having no realization in external existence, is a patent (*zāhir*) error. This is because:

If they mean by the proposition that, say, Zayd is possible that he is characterised in the mind and not in external existence by possibility, then that is false because if he is not characterized by it in external existence then Zayd in external existence is ancient because if he is not possible then he is ancient. His being qualified (*waṣfu-hū*) by it in the mind does not make him actually possible, just as if he were qualified by “ancient” in the mind, that subjective characteristic would not actually be “ancient” [outside of the mind];

If they mean that possibility is not in itself (*naḥsiḥ*) *ancient* in external

existence, then that is not inconsistent with its being *realized* in external existence, like whiteness and blackness, and knowledge and power. For these do not subsist except in their loci. Nevertheless, they are incontrovertibly existent in external existence since it is not a condition of external existence — whether in the sense (*maʿnā*) of that which opposes mental existence or in the sense (*maʿnā*) of that whose impressions follow as a consequence of its qualities — that something be either a quintessence or an accident subsisting through its subject of affection by *affectional subsistence*. Rather, whatever occurs in minds, or to which a term (*lafẓ*) has been assigned in correspondence, is externally existent. Yes, its image (*ṣūratihī*), extracted from external existence by the mind, occurs in the mind because each thing is not subsistent except through the locus appropriate to it. This is what al-Sādiq (upon whom be peace) has alluded to in his saying: *anything that you discriminate through your minds, in its deepest meanings, is created like you, and is reverted to you*. This is also alluded to in the saying of al-Riḍā (upon whom be peace), according to what al-Sadūq (may Allah be pleased with him) has reported in his *ʿIlal al-Sharāʿiʿ*, with his chain of transmission reaching Ḥasan ibn ʿAlī ibn Faḍḍāl, who reports from ʿAbu al-Ḥasan al-Riḍā (upon whom be peace). He said:

I said: Why did Allah (to whom belongs Might and Majesty) create so many diverse kinds of things? Why did He not create just one kind of thing?

He said: So that it would not occur to anyone's mind that he is incapable of something. No image (*ṣūrat*) occurs in the mind of anyone that Allah (to whom belongs Might and Majesty) has not

already created;

And so that someone will not say: “is Allah capable of creating such and such an image?” He cannot say such a thing except that it is found (*mawǧūd*) in his creation (Magnified and exalted is He!). So it is known through the various kinds of His creation that He ***has power over everything***.

Moreover, “possibility” is among those things to which a term (*lafẓ*) has been assigned in correspondence. Now that term (*lafẓ*) is not senseless¹⁴⁰. If possibility were subjective, then its [corresponding] term (*lafẓ*) would be, according to the more likely-to-to-be-correct view, senseless because for the one who says that assigning is in correspondence to external meanings — which is the more likely-to-to-be-correct view — it will be senseless, without any problem.

As for the one who says that it is in correspondence to mental meanings, what he means by ‘meanings’ are the meanings extracted from externally existent matters. If he means only mentally existent matters, then the term (*lafẓ*) would be assigned in correspondence to them. Then an external or commensurate existence would agree with them but the term (*lafẓ*) would not denote it or discriminate it, and it would be necessary to assign another term (*lafẓ*) to the external object. Rather, another assigning is necessary in general (*mutlaqan*), that is, regardless of whether it conforms or not. In general (*mutlaqan*), it would come under the heading of expressional assigning, to the point where if the term (*lafẓ*) ‘Zayd’ were assigned only to the mental image of him, then the use of that term (*lafẓ*) for the external Zayd would not be anything but metaphorical. Rather, the requisite of the proof is that

if the term (*lafz*) is not used for the mental meaning and instead is used, after being assigned to the mental meaning, for the external meaning, then it would be metaphorical unless assigning an term (*lafz*) to a mental meaning is made a means for assigning to an external meaning. Hence, if possibility is realized externally, then the assigning and the usage [of the term ‘possibility’] are correct. Otherwise the term is senseless as we have established, if you have understood and contemplated it with the eye of justice.

Sixteenth Observation

[On the Preponderance of Actions]

Know that they [i.e., the philosophers and theologians] have said that *acting*, when it is from the Wise Chooser, does not attach to an *outcome of acting* except when the attachment to it is necessitated so that it is preponderant in the receiving of existentiation. That is, they have said that the occasioning of preponderance without an agent of preponderance is absurd¹⁴¹. What they mean is that, given an originated object, it is not possible that it to exist without an agent of existentiation. Here, we say that the occasioning of preponderance without an agent of preponderance necessarily occurs (*wāğib*). We mean that the occasioning of the preponderance of an acting without an agent of preponderance is allowed by wisdom¹⁴².

In addition, it is not permissible [when there *is* an agent of preponderance] that the agent of preponderance be the actor because that will be an occasioning of preponderance without an agent of preponderance. So it must be the case that the agent of preponderance of the acting come from the outcome-of-acting so that the latter's existentiation be an occasioning of preponderance *with* an agent of preponderance. Now He (Glorified is He!) has alluded to the fact that the occasioning of preponderance comes from the quintessence of the outcome-of-acting in His saying: **... the oil well nigh shines, though no fire touches it!**; meaning, "it well nigh exists without existentiation".

Now if it be said: How can a thing have preponderance before it is a thing?;

We will say: For this there are two answers, one of them outward (*ẓāhir*) and the second of them inward (*bāṭin*). As for the first, it is that the occasioning of the preponderance of a thing is a quintessential quality of it. Now *the existence of any given quality is neither intelligible nor conceptualizable, in the condition (ḥāl) of being a quality, before the existence of the qualified subject*. This is because a quintessential quality is a condition for the existence of the qualified subject, and Allah created it from the qualified subject. This is just as “becoming-broken” is a quality and condition for the existence of “breaking”; Allah created it from “breaking”. So “occasioning of preponderance” is created from the preponderating thing along with the creation of the thing. So they are coincident in existence and manifesting, just as “becoming-broken” is created from “breaking” in a coincident manner. So just as the possibility of a given thing and “breaking” are each respectfully characterized by the the possibility of the occasioning of the preponderance and “becoming-broken”, then likewise each of the latter is created from the the former because, from the persective (*ḡihat*) of its being characterized, any given quality is only created from its qualified subject.

Second: What is meant by the outcome-of-acting being preponderant in itself (*naḥs*), with respect to its existentiator, is as follows: He (Glorified is He!) does not miss anything, does not await anything, and does not look forward to anything. So for Him. nothing exists before something else. Hence nothing in the kingdom of Allah exists before its preponderance, and neither its preponderance before it. When it is the case that He (to Whom belong Might and Majesty) does not miss anything, does not await anything, and does not look forward to anything, rather, everything, be it

a quintessence or a quality, is present unto Him in the space of its bounds and the durational mode of its existence, with all of its conditions, agents of preponderance, and reasons, then His fashioning is completed in the most perfect way (*waġh*) Possibility will admit. And Acting will befall it in a manner (*ʿamr*) that necessitates the most perfect definition and elucidation. So His existentiating befalls His servants in conformity with equity, so that He gives them what they ask of Him through their own choice, and in conformity with Bounty, so that He treats them kindly through His Grace. He does not obligate them through compulsion with what they are unable to do since if His existentiating them had been without an agent of preponderance from themselves which necessitates what it has chosen from His Acting (Exalted is He!), then reward for obedience and punishment for disobedience would not befall them. This is because there is no discriminating between them except through their agents of preponderance, reasons, and individuators.

In short, the occasioning of preponderance without an agent of preponderance from the outcome-of-acting, when it comes from a given actor, regardless of whether the agent of preponderance is from the actor or whether there is no agent of preponderance at all, is forbidden (*mumtaniʿ*) by Wisdom since that would entail futility and compulsion in actings which are supposed to be voluntary. It is not forbidden in possibility; rather, it is up to Him (Exalted is He!) if He wills to do that and for futility and compulsion to not be entailed. However there would entail an absence (*ʿadam*) of becoming-the-subject-of-cognizance and of occasioning-cognizance since a thing does not grasp anything except something that matches it. That is because it is composed according to the requisites of Wisdom. If it were composed counter to

the requisites of wisdom so that it may grasp what opposes Wisdom, then it would be counter to the requisites of Wisdom. So it would not be capable of grasping since “grasping” an impression of symmetry and proportion *That is, the faculty of “grasping” presupposes and comes to be as a result of symmetry and proportion..* The latter is the case for that which has been composed according to the requisites of Wisdom.

If a thing were composed counter to Wisdom, then it would be in a state of chaos (*al-ihmāl*). If it is in a state of chaos, then it would not come under any general rule (*qā'idat*). Then the modes of occasioning-cognizance would be as multiple and diverse as the multiplicity and diversity of singular objects. Then it would necessarily be the case that for each thing, be it a quintessence or a quality, there be a separate mode of occasioning-cognizance different from the one for another. Then it will be impossible to have cognizance of possible things¹⁴³ as a whole because things are infinite. Hence it is not possible to manage the infinite modes of occasioning-cognizance of a given finite possible object except through universal principles. This is because universal principles may encompass an infinite number of singular objects. But if things are in a state of chaos, then universal principles could not encompass them. Hence, any mode of occasioning-cognizance [of them as a whole] would be impossible. Then cognizance would be impossible. Then the benefit (*fā'idat*) of existention will be vitiated. We have only said that the benefit (*fā'idat*) of existention depends on the cognizance of things as a whole because it depends on cognizance of the Fashioner (to Whom belong Might and Majesty). And cognizance of the Fashioner depends on the cognizance of things as a whole. This is in order that He be recognized as free

of any resemblance to things and of any partnership with them, with respect to quintessence, qualities, outcomes-of-acting, and expressions. Upon the assumption of chaos, no given obligated person¹⁴⁴ would be able to distinguish the difference (*farq*) between the Fashioner and the fashioned subjects except through the acquisition of all the discriminating factors of all individual things, which are infinite. So, in Wisdom, it is necessarily the case that the Fashioning be in conformity with the requisites of Wisdom.

As for becoming-preponderant without an agent of preponderance, in the meaning of “that which necessitates fashioning”, the latter comes from the quintessence of the outcome-of-acting at the moment it becomes-generated. This is just as has already been discussed. If it were from other than the outcome-of-acting, or if it did not exist in the first place, then the Acting would run counter to Wisdom. Then there would entail what we mentioned with regards to the occasioning of preponderance without an agent of preponderance. So understand!

Eighteenth Observation

[On the Requisites of Wisdom]

Know that, in the preceding Observations and in many of our treatises and replies, we have alluded to the fact that Allah (Glorified is He!), with regards to all of His creation, created what He created in accordance with the most perfect of what ought to be, in the way of that which is necessitated by Wisdom deriving from Possibility. He did this so that His Fashioning may be in conformity with the demands of sound intellects, disciplined in the morals deriving from the Law, schooled in the refinements of spiritual beings. This is due to what we have intimated to the effect that the final cause [of existence] lies in the fact that Allah created them so that they may have cognizance of Him through that characteristic by which He has enabled them to have cognizance of Him. This is the characteristic of which He *presented* them in His creation of them, as He (Exalted is He!) has said: ***But we have bestowed upon them their Presence.*** So He (to Whom belong Might and Majesty) bestowed upon each thing in His creation that through which He presents them [to themselves and to Him].

Now sound intellects indicate:

- that the agent of emanation is stronger than its emanating;
- that what is close to the agent of emanation is stronger than that which is far;

- that what is fashioned from the stronger is stronger than that which is fashioned from the weaker;
- that the above three matters are quintessential in their subjects, by reason (*bi-hukmi*) of the becoming-preponderant of things upon which depends, due to their quintessences, the Fashioning of their Fashioner.

If you say: From this is entailed the precedence of the existence of the self-preponderance of things, which is a quality of the fashioned subject, and a condition of the attachment of the Acting to it, over the existence of the qualified subject; and the precedence of the existence of the quality over the qualified subject is not intelligible;

I say: When it is the case that the Fashioner (to Whom belong Might and Majesty) is in the highest of all stations of abstraction and freedom (*al-jinā*), and even infinitely upon infinitely above that, it is necessarily the case that He not miss anything, not await anything, and not look forward to anything. Rather, in His rank of Preternity of Preternities, He is the Master of each thing which is other than His Holy Quintessence. For Him (Exalted is He!), it actualizes in the rank of its being and existence, and in the loci of its bounds. Nothing in His Kingdom is new for Him, meaning that it was not in His Kingdom and then it was. And nothing leaves His Kingdom for some existence or non-existence besides it. Rather, in the rank of His Quintessence, and His Preternity which *is* His Quintessence, each thing occurs in the durational modes of its existence and the loci of its bounds, both when that thing was before its being, and before its being a thing. Now a given thing and its self-preponderance are among His individual possessions, and we have alluded to the fact that, unto Him (Exalted is He!),

all of his individual possessions are the same in the sense that He is not closer to any one of them than to the other, and not a thing has precedence unto Him upon anything else in its actualizing for Him.

So when He desires to do a thing, He bestows upon it its empowerment, its self-preponderance due to its quintessence, and everything, in the way of that which its Quintessence necessitates at the moment it comes to be necessitated with respect to His generation of it, by which it is particularized and discriminated. This is because they are all among the factors of its receptivity of generation; hence, they are the bounds of its form. This is among what He has mentioned in His saying (Exalted is He!): ***But we have bestowed upon them their Presence.***

Again, when the proceeding of that which proceeds from a given thing, regardless of whether it proceeds from its acting or from its outcome-of-acting, occurs in the manner of an expansion so that it has degrees and its parts diverge from one another through the divergence of those degrees, then it must be the case that whatever is close to the point of origin (*al-mabda*) is stronger, and that whatever is far is weaker. This is the case when the proceeding and the expanding are in accordance with what Wisdom — the Wisdom with which intellects are both in agreement and in conformity (with respect to becoming-the-subject-of-cognizance and occasioning-cognizance) — necessitates. This is so because what is fashioned in accordance with the requisites of Wisdom may not be fashioned in a way not in accordance with the requisites of Wisdom. Any given thing, not in accordance with the requisites of Wisdom, would not be intelligible because intelligibility is one of the entailments of fashioning in conformity with the requisites of Wisdom.

Hence, when it is the case that *hylē* is made in accordance with the requisites of Wisdom, then the taking of quanta from it is in accordance with the requisites of Wisdom so that a quantum of it is proportioned so that its motes¹⁴⁵ do not outwardly (*zāhīran*) and obviously diverge along with the divergence of its degrees (a divergence which would necessitate, with regards to strength and weakness, the mutual discordance of those motes in quantity and quality). Otherwise, the taking of quanta would occur chaotically. Then this order which runs in perfect symmetry, would be nullified. So when it is the case that the taking of the quanta of the matter of things take place in the way just mentioned, then it is entailed that what is fashioned from the stronger be stronger than what is fashioned from the weaker. Otherwise the taking would not be in accordance with the requisites of Wisdom. Rather, the stronger would be due to the weaker and the weaker would be due to the stronger. Then the stronger would be the weaker and the weaker would be the stronger. Then the Fashioning would not be in accordance with the perfection of symmetry.

So when it is the case that the stronger is due to the stronger and the weaker is due to the weaker, as it ought to be, then it is necessarily the case that light sources be created from light sources, agents of darkness from darkness, wholesome from wholesome, odious from odious, strong from strong, and weak from weak. That which is counter to this is counter to what ought to be. That which is counter to what ought to be necessitates chaos and is inconsistent with the sought and intended purpose, that is, existentionation for occasioning-cognizance. Rather, the fashioned would have a case against its Fashioner when He bestows upon Him what He loves, and he could criticize

what has been bestowed upon him in the way of the objects of his desire (*al-maṭlūb*), by saying: “You have given me what I desired not of You, through the tongue of my condition, not through the tongue of my speech. So You do not deserve any thanks from me because you have given me [something] other than what I sought because You are incapable of [giving me] the object of my desire (*al-maṭlūb*) or ignorant of it”. This, although the fashioned would be lying in everything he says because when it is the case that the fashioning occurs chaotically, then truth, falsehood, telling the truth, and lying are all one to him and anyone else. The same goes for praise and blame. This is because each of these things is a requisite of chaos.

Now if you say: This which you have alluded to, even if it is the requisite of existention according to what ought to be, I mean, occurs in it according to the requisites of Wisdom, [is correct] except that He (Exalted is He!) is the one who *makes* the strong, strong, and the weak, weak. He *occasions* the nearness of the near and farness of the far. He *gives* the receiver the received and *makes* the receiver for the received. In consideration of these agreed upon matters, that which you were trying to avoid returns, and the original difficulty with respect to this issue comes back.

I would say: I also hold this. However, I do not say that He made the strong strong through the requisites of His Acting and His Originating it. Otherwise, in many instances injustice, inconsistent with justice, would be entailed. The same goes for the rest of the examples (*kalimāt*). I only say that He makes the strong strong through the requisites of the beginning of its situation in the knowledge of unseen reality. This means [the following:] The existention of its being, even its possibility, are dealt with through

what it inclines towards and what it necessitates due to its quintessence — which it does not turn away from except when it itself has been subdued by that which, at the moment it comes to be itself, it could deflect from itself or hinder from itself — in such a way that if it were dealt with in another way, then when it comes to be itself it would dislike it because it is not what its quintessence necessitates. That is at the moment of its generation, not prior to it and not after it because what we are alluding to is its receiving of existentiation; prior to it, it is not a thing; after it, it is free of need. When [the above] is the case, then it is [also] the case that He (Exalted is He!) makes the strong strong through that which is proper to it in the way of its necessitation of strength; He makes the weak weak through that which is proper to it in the way of its abstaining from the capacity of receiving strength from Him; He makes the close close through its hastening and precedence to receiving the occasioning of closeness, in such a way that it is well nigh close before the occasioning of closeness; He makes the far far through the absence (*al-ʿadam*) of its precedence to [receiving] the occasioning of closeness, in such a way that, through its own choice, it is not close. This is because He (Exalted is He!) gave the receiving its received through the necessitation, by the received, of receiving. Due to this He created the receiving from the very (*nafs*) received qua received because it only necessitates it due to itself, without any partnership from other than itself, although it may only necessitate [something] from itself when it is a thing. It is not a thing and its necessitation [of something] cannot be except through some other because the possible is not a thing through its quintessence without some other. So with respect to what it is able to do, due to absolutely all of the reasons

underlying its ability to do, nothing can derive from it without some other. However, at the moment it comes to be a thing, its thingness through some other necessitates what it necessitates — in the way of self-preponderance due to its quintessence, and others — *through* some other, not *with* some other, and not *without* some other.

My saying, “through some other, not with some other” etc., means that the thingness of a given thing comes from the Giving of the Generous (Exalted is He!) and His Bounty (To Him Belongs Might and Majesty!). Likewise, all of what the thing has due to its quintessence, and its qualities, outcomes-of-acting, and states, come from Him (To Whom Belongs Might and Majesty!). While He gave these bounties, He did not release them from His Hand. Rather, they are in His clutches just as they were before the giving since if He released them from His hand, none of them would have been a thing.

The sign and paradigm of that is the sun, at the moment it gives the light to a given wall which shines through the illumining of it by the sun. Its illumining is not released from its clutches. Rather, it is in the sun’s clutches just as it was prior to the illumining of the wall. So through His Bounties (Exalted is He!) it comes to be a thing. And *through* His Bounties it necessitates what it necessitates; not *with* Him, due to the absence (‘*adam*’) of partnership because *it* is the thing that necessitates; and not *without* Him (Exalted is He!), because any given thing is neither independent nor free of need, not it nor any of the things — and we have alluded to most of them¹⁴⁶ — upon which the existence of acting depends. Both it and each of them constitutes a thing through the Self-subsisting of Allah (Exalted is He!) and His preserving of it. And it is for Him to preserve them, so understand!

Notes

¹That is, it only leads to what can be imagined (“world of images”) or intellectually grasped and delimited (“world of meanings”).

²Middle of the path: a qur’anic metaphor meaning “the right road”.

³In this Observation, ‘Aḥsā’ī discusses what he considers to be the only methods of proof (دَلِيل *dalīl*). That is, given certain information that one has knowledge (عِلْم *ilm*) of, or things that one has cognizance (مَعْرِفَة *ma-rifat*) of, how does one reach knowledge or cognizance of other information or things? The highest method of proof is the “proof of Wisdom”. For a partial analysis of this chapter, including a discussion of what exactly is meant by “Wisdom” and its relation to the author’s conception of metaphysics, see Part II, Ch. 1.

⁴*Commentary:* [That is,] the source from which it is obtained.

⁵*Commentary:* [That is,] its condition through which it is realized according to the perfection of what ought to be [that is, that through which it is a cogent proof].

⁶‘Heart-flux’ translates فُؤَاد *fuād*, a word with no equivalent in English, although it is a common term in ancient Arabic. It comes from the root f’ d, whose “primary meaning [is said to be] “motion” or the “putting into motion” (*AEL*, under article فَاذ). See Part II, Ch. 1, sec. 1.5.1.

⁷When used without some qualifying or contextual indication, ‘existence’ always denotes the third sense of ‘existence’, “delimited existence”, also

called “being”, as discussed further on.

⁸‘Chief of the Executors’ translates سَيِّدُ الْوَصِيِّينَ *sayyid al-waṣiyyīn*, one of the titles of the First Imam ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib. As the principal heir to the Prophet (as all Muslims agree) and as his spiritual and political successor (as held by the Shī‘ī school in particular), he was called the وَصِيّ *waṣiyy* (“executor” or “heir”) of the Prophet.

⁹By ‘the Way’ (*aṭ-ṭarīqah*), the author is referring to path of moral and ethical discipline by means of which one becomes spiritually close to God and his elect. It is extensionally equivalent to *as-sayr wa ’s-sulūk*, or mystical wayfaring.

¹⁰In this case ‘heart’ is extensionally equivalent to ‘أَلْعَقْلُ’ *al-‘aql*, that is, the nous, intellect, or consciousness-awareness.

¹¹That is, the Kaabah in Mecca.

¹²An Arabic metaphor meaning in this case that there is no other method of proof.

¹³The basis of this division of existence (أَلْوُجُودُ *al-wuḡūd*) is the actual process of “acting” or “doing” (أَلْفِعْلُ *al-fi‘l*), which is the most fundamental object in al-’Aḥsā’ī’s system. Every object is either an actor/agent (فَاعِلٌ *fā‘il*), an acting (فِعْلٌ *fi‘l*), or an action or act (مَفْعُولٌ *maf‘ūl*) i.e., a result, outcome, or subject of acting. (We use ‘subject’ not in the sense of “actor”, but in the sense of “that of which a quality, attribute, or relation may be affirmed or in which it may inhere” (*Merriam Webster*).) The terms *fā‘il*, *fi-*

ل, and *maf'ul* also respectively correspond to the basic grammatical divisions of active participle, gerund, and passive participle. This triad is generally applied much more consistently in Arabic than in English. For example, the passive participle of the verb 'to act' requires two words, viz., 'acted upon'. In many instances this is awkward and instead one substitutes the abstract noun 'act' or 'action'. In Arabic one speaks of the world as constituting a *maf'ul* of God i.e., a result or outcome of His *fi'l*. In English it would be awkward to call the world an "acted upon" or a "done" of God. This is an important point because Shaykh 'Aḥmad makes frequent use of the triadic paradigm of *fā'il*, *fi'l*, and *maf'ul* for other processes and verbs; it is frequently difficult to find a natural triad in English that is in one-to-one correspondence with the Arabic one.

Applied to the cosmological scale, the three divisions correspond to God, His Acting, and His creation. As discussed in the introduction and glossary, '(*al-fi'l*)' is a gerund, not an abstract noun, and has thus been translated as 'acting' as opposed to 'action' or 'act'. We have reserved the last two for rendering the notion of the result or outcome of acting, and never the process of acting, although the latter sense correponds to one of the usages in English of each 'action' and 'act'. Using the gerund 'acting', I believe, is more in keeping with the philosophical spirit of the author. This division has its roots in a tradition of the Sixth Sage Imam al-Sādiq: *Allah created the Willing through itself. Then He created the things through the Willing.*

¹⁴'Real Existence' (*al-wuḡūd al-ḥaqq*) is a name corresponding to the division of Actor in the cosmological scheme. It is important to realize that

while this division may be looked at in purely ontological terms, this is *not* what Shaykh 'Aḥmad has in mind. With this division, the Shaykh is talking about a category of existence which is essentially a category of experience, actually a category of mystical experience, a state of meditative awareness where, with respect to the experience, awareness of any and all identifiable corporeal, psychological, and/or intelligible factors or considerations are gone. The main philosophical and metamystical point that Shaykh 'Aḥmad wants to make is that this experience or state must not in way whatsoever be confused with God Himself which was a common mistake of many of those Muslim mystics, like Ibn al-'Arabī, who spoke of union with God or the doctrine of oneness of Existence. Rather, this state witnessed by the heart-flux is the “Designation” (‘*unwān*) by which God is known. It is God’s own and created “characteristic” or “description” (*waṣf*) of Himself to His creation

¹⁵The traditional Peripatetic category of quality is signified by the term كَيْف *kayf*. We have also translated صِفَة *ṣifat* (pl. صِفَات *ṣifāt*) as “quality” in general. To avoid confusion with qualities or attributes in general, we place ‘*kayf*’ in parentheses after ‘quality’ whenever the Aristotelian accidental category of quality is meant.

¹⁶*Commentary:* That is, It is the subject of cognizance neither through [e.g., poetic and mystical] allusions, intimations, and hints, nor through [e.g., philosophical and theological] clarifications and elucidations.

¹⁷ This last phrase is taken from a famous tradition narrated by the Prophet and the Imams to the effect that:

إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَا يُوصَفُ إِلَّا بِمَا وَصَفَ بِهِ نَفْسَهُ.

God is is not characterized except by that which He has characterized Himself.

¹⁸Note what appears to be a play on words here: ‘الموجود’ *al-mawǧūd* and ‘المفقود’ *al-mafqūd* are technical terms meaning “existent” and “nonexistent” respectfully. In their original usages they mean “found” and “missing” respectfully. Al-’Aḥsā’ī is appealing to the original imports of these terms in making his point. This is not the only place that we see his notions of “existence” and “existent” carrying more of the original, including the epistemic and phenomenological, import of the Arabic terms used to express these notions. These and other usages point to a real difficulty in separating epistemology from ontology in Shaykh ’Aḥmad’s metaphysics.

¹⁹I.e., the contrary of any of the afore-mentioned qualities.

²⁰In the commentary, al-’Aḥsā’ī defines two contraries as belonging to the same ontological rank and at the same time having opposing quintessential qualities (see glossary). If the Necessary had a contrary, whenever the Necessary wills in a certain direction, the Anti-Necessary wills in the opposite direction. Since they have the same ontological rank, the two willings would cancel each other out. Since everything proceeds from a Divine Willing, its cancellation would mean that nothing would ever proceed from either the Necessary or the Anti-Necessary. Note that, for al-’Aḥsā’ī, the expression ‘proceeding from the Necessary’ is always elliptical for ‘proceeding from the Necessary’s Willing’, because nothing “exits” from the Necessary.

²¹In the traditional philosophy and theology of Muslim civilization, one generally refers to a situation where a multiplication of the Divine is entailed as (تَعَدُّدُ الْقَدَمَاءِ *taʿaddud al-qudamā*), or a multiplicity of Ancients. See the glossary, under تَعَدُّدُ الْقَدَمَاءِ *taʿaddud al-qudamā*.

²²That is, if there were an entrance to the Necessary, then It would be a receptacle like other receptacles and possible for It to contain something other than Itself. Whatever has an entrance into itself is a composite, and since every composite is contingent, it would be a possibility and not a necessity.

²³‘Originating’ translates اَلْحُدُوثُ *al-ḥudūt*, one of the most fundamental terms in Islamic philosophy and theology. It means simply “existence-after-non-existence”. An object which originates is called اَلْحَادِثُ *al-ḥādith*, an “occurrence” or an “originating thing”. See the glossary.

²⁴ That is, mutual opposition comes under the heading of multiplicity. The Necessary may not be known through multiplicity because that is an aspect (*ḡihat*) of possible existence. If the Necessary had a contrary, It would be possible, not necessary.

²⁵For Shaykh ‘Aḥmad, ‘Possibility’ is coextensive with the Divine Act. While the Divine Act is simple, one can consider it from the point of view of its containing, in a latent manner, all of the possible outcomes of the Act. When considered from this point of view, it is called “Possibility”.

²⁶Al-ʿAḥsāʾī points out in the commentary that اَلْوُجُودُ *al-wuḡūd* in the sense of the copula — which does not really exist in Arabic but which does in Persian (هست *hast* or “is”) — i.e., the “being” of predication, may

be suitable to the non-being (عَدَمُ الْكَوْنِ *‘adam al-kawn*) of predication as a contrary because this non-being is a possible. Most likely, al-’Aḥsā’ī’s assumption of the reality of the copula and its negation stems from his extreme realism, including relational realism. So one kind of contrariness that obtains between being and non-being is that of a relation between relations.

Al-’Aḥsā’ī then goes on to say that, on the other hand, “existence” in “the most general sense” (مَفْهُومٌ مُطْلَقٌ *mafḥūm muṭlaq*) only has a contrary in a metaphorical sense (مَجَازٍ *maǧāz*) because non-being has “existence in the world of Possibility” but not in the “world of entities (أَعْيَانٌ *a‘yān*, sing. عَيْن *‘ayn*)”.

It appears that there are premonitions of a Meinongian theory of objects at work here. Al-’Aḥsā’ī, as we shall see further on, distinguishes between objects in the world of Possibility (latent in the Divine Willing) and objects in the world of concrete entities (emanated from the Divine Willing). The former world contains, among other things, the denotations of terms that one would list as belonging to the category of impossibility or negation. The latter world contains all actualized entities, be they bodies, souls, or abstract and intelligible objects. The Shaykh rejects impossibility as a mode of existence distinct from necessity and possibility; he will argue that it is a subcategory of possible existence. We shall also see that Shaykh ’Aḥmad adheres to a version of the Meinongian slogan, “to every thought there is an object”.

A key problem in comprehending what’s going on here is that, for al-’Aḥsā’ī, the relative importance of being with respect to existence is reversed in relation to Western philosophy. For example, post-Fregean analytic phi-

losophy considers ‘being’ to be ambiguous and existence as one of its four meanings (along side the being of predication, the being of identity, and the being of class-inclusion). For al-’Aḥsā’ī, existence (الْوُجُود *al-wuǧūd*) is ambiguous and being (both in the sense of the copula and in the sense of “generated existence”) is one of its meanings. This reversal is by no means accidental; it reflects the nature of Arabic (which has no copula) as well as al-’Aḥsā’ī’s own naturalist commitments. So where Meinong speaks of objects with “being but not existence”, Shaykh ’Aḥmad would speak of objects with existence (الْوُجُود *al-wuǧūd*) in the Divine Will but not “generated being” (الْكَوْن *al-kawn*) and “entity” (الْعَيْن *al-‘ayn*) posterior to the Divine Will.

²⁷ Zurārah ibn ’A’yan (c. 8th century): a famous jurist, theologian, and companion of al-Sādiq.

²⁸ Hishām ibn al-Ḥakam (c. 8th century): a young disciple of al-Sādiq and his most brilliant student in theology.

²⁹ *Commentary*: Because a given expression may be assigned only in correspondence to a given meaning that is either externally or mentally existent. It is not correct that an expression be assigned to nothing because were the expression assigned and there is not a thing to which it is assigned, then the expression would not be assigned to a thing. Then it would not indicate anything. This is a contradiction.

³⁰ That is, the minds of those who posit the existence of a “partner of God”. What God created in correspondence to the positing of the mind is called a “designation” (*‘unwān*). But this designation has no reference.

This is in contrast to positing God's existence. There is also a designation, through which one may have cognizance of God, but this latter designation has reference.

³¹Variant translation: . . . in the same way as you call a man nonexistent.

³²Al-'Aḥsā'ī uses the term 'possibility' (إِمكَّانٌ *imkān*) in two senses:

- the configuration (الْهَيْئَةُ *al-hay'at*) of the Divine Act wherein lies dormant the potentiality of each thing prior to its generated-being (كَوْنٌ *kawn*) or existence (وُجُودٌ *wuǧūd*) and its entity (عَيْنٌ *ayn*) or essence (مَاهِيَّةٌ *māhiyyat*);
- the world of all created things, inclusive of the Acting of God.

To distinguish the two senses, the first is capitalized.

³³Shaykh 'Aḥmad is saying one or both of the following:

- that God's very act of characterizing Himself constitutes the inner reality of Man;
- that Man's inner reality (the *fu'ād*) constitutes His characteristic by which He is the subject of cognizance.

While the word 'وصف' *wasf* originally means "characterizing", it can also mean "characteristic".

³⁴ That is, through the heart-flux.

³⁵What Shaykh 'Aḥmad is saying is that the science of Divinity has as its subject matter this Designation of God denoted by 'Real Existence'. It is not God Himself, as the philosophers and theologians claim. This is because, by common assent, the subject matter (مَوْضُوع *mawḍūʿ*) is defined to be "that whose quintessential affections (الْعَوَارِضُ الذَّاتِيَّةُ *al-ʿawāriḍ ad-dātiyyat*) [i.e., essential aspects] are discussed in that science". (This definition is not an invention of the author's. See the glossary, under (*al-mawḍūʿ*).

By now one realizes that, for Shaykh 'Aḥmad, God *qua* God is not really a subject or problem of metaphysics at all. Rather, this category of Real Existence is a proper subject or problem of metaphysics. This is because

- God *qua* God is unknowable and beyond the grasp and comprehension of any thing besides Him;
- Real Existence is the greatest name, sign, designation, and impression (ʿaṭar, Latin *impressio*) of God.

Cognizance of God is equivalent to cognizance and experience of this impression. All propositions about God *qua* God are tautologies; they give us no information whatsoever about His Quintessence. Yet, even saying that God is characterized by a given tautology posits a relation between the Unknowable and a created thing, namely, the tautology. However, that relation *does* obtain between the tautology and Real Existence *qua* our experience of It. This is illustrative of Shaykh 'Aḥmad's point further on that cognizance of God consists in the cognizance of that existence, that "characteristic", that He has created and through which we may know him.

Note that ‘the Designation’ denotes Real Existence whereas ‘the Meanings’ denotes the immediate outcomes of God’s Acting from which the manifestation of the phenomenon of Real Existence derives. See Part II, Ch. 2, sec. 2.5.5, and the glossary, under *bayān*. In any case, this “science of the declaration” is a subbranch of Wisdom. It involves the discussion of one of the most important and discussed topics in later Islamic philosophy, that of the Perfect Man or Logos. This “science of the declaration” is the topic of Shaykh ‘Aḥmad’s longest and by far most famous work, the *Commentary on the Grand Comprehensive Visitation*.

Commentary: The Quintessence of Allah cannot be grasped, so how can its quintessential affections be discussed when He (Exalted is He!) has no affections other than qualities which are, from every consideration, including the propositions pertaining to those Stations which comprise His Designation, His very own (‘*ayn*) Quintessence? If one is truly one of the people of cognizance and faith, then after reflecting upon all of the expressions and true beliefs [about God], one will realize that they denote the Designation, and that what the cognizant discusses with respect to the Stations are the Meanings, that is, the pillars of the profession of Unity... because the quintessential affections of those Stations are the Meanings, that is, the pillars of the profession of Unity.

³⁶As discussed in detail in Part II, Ch. 4, this Observation contains what is perhaps the metaphysical core of Shaykh ‘Aḥmad’s thought. In the first Observation, we learn that God *qua* God cannot be a subject or object of metaphysics and ontology. This leads to the question: what is the ultimate

object of metaphysics? In Aristotle's words, we must ask, "what is substance (*ousia*)?". Shaykh 'Aḥmad's answer is that the ultimate *ousia* is the Acting of God or Absolute Existence. The nature of this entity, as discussed throughout the rest of this Observation and which is clearly processual, then determines the nature of the third division of existence, delimited existence, which I claim constitutes a *second ousia* for Shaykh 'Aḥmad. Note that this first *ousia* may be considered in two ways: *qua* itself (as discussed in this Observation) and *qua* its attachment to the outcomes of Acting (as discussed in the fourth Observation).

The reader should keep in mind that for Shaykh 'Aḥmad, God is not the "cause" of the universe except in a metaphorical sense. Rather, the "cause" of the universe is the Acting. For details, see Part II, Ch. 4.

³⁷Shaykh 'Aḥmad left out of the main text that the second item is also known as "the '*Alif*'". So the four stations referred to here correspond to the stages in the writing of a word. When a pen first touches a paper, the first trace it leaves is a dot. A word needs letters, and the first letter is '*alif*' (ا in Arabic script). A word is composed of letters; a word is complete once its enunciation ceases. The "complete word" is "composed" of all of the "letters" of existence.

Note also that the quaternity of "Mercy", "Winds", "Stratus Cloud", and "Cumulus Cloud", is drawn from the following verse of the Qur'an:

***It is He who sends the winds, between the hands of His
Mercy, bearing good tidings; to the point where, when***

***they raise up a heavy cloud, We impel it to a dead land.
So through it We send down water. Then do We extract
with it all kinds of fruit. [7:57]***

The “water” that descends from the Cumulus Cloud is delimited existence. See the Sixth Observation.

³⁸Here Shaykh 'Aḥmad makes a philosophical commitment that is, as far as I know, unique in the history of philosophy of Muslim civilization as well as neoplatonism in general. Reversing traditional hylomorphism, Shaykh 'Aḥmad asserts that *matter* is the active principle while *form* is the receptive principle. Reverse hylomorphism is one of the fundamental principles underlying Shaykh 'Aḥmad's entire metaphysics and cosmology, which is, in large part, an application of this principle. This commitment is intimately connected with his contention that matter is coextensive, though not cointensive, with existence, that form is coextensive, though not cointensive, with essence, and that the essence-existence distinction is an ontological, and not epistemic, distinction. See Part II, Ch. 3.

³⁹‘Existentialisation’ translates **الْإِبْجَادُ** *al-īḡād*, which literally means “the occasioning-of-existence”. Given the importance of this term (which was common in Muslim scholasticism), and the fact that translating some of its derivatives by some circumlocution of “occasioning-of-existence” would be very awkward, I have assigned the neologism ‘existentialisation’ to this concept.

⁴⁰By “the Book of Allah and the example of His Prophet”, Shaykh 'Aḥmad means the cosmic “Book” and the cosmic “Sunnah” that are coextensive, in

this case, with the wisdom immanent in the Willing itself. The Qur‘an and Sunnah of the “world of religious obligation” (الْعَالَمُ التَّشْرِيعِيّ *al-‘ālamu ’t-tašrī‘iyy*) are manifestations of that Qur‘an and Sunnah in the “world of cosmic generation” (الْعَالَمُ التَّكْوِينِيّ *al-‘ālamu ’t-takwīniyy*).

⁴¹That is, form or essence is the principle of individuation. See Part II, Ch. 3.

⁴²The orb of the Devoid: the ninth and highest orb or sphere of traditional astronomy. It is called the Devoid (*al-‘atlasu*) because it was considered to be devoid of stars.

⁴³‘Being’ translates ‘كَوْنٌ *kawn*’. While ‘being’ or ‘coming-to-be is the literal translation of ‘*kawn*’, it was never used to translate the Greek copula. Rather, the translators from Hellenic texts used ‘*kawn*’ to translate “generation”, as in Aristotle’s concept of “generation and corruption” (الْكَوْنُ وَالْفَسَادُ *al-kawn wa ’l-fasād*). Later Muslim philosophers extended its use to include “existence after nonexistence”. One must not confuse *kawn* or “generated-being” with “being” in Western philosophy. *kawn* or “generated-being” is really only a sense of “existence”. While we use the term ‘being’, in this sense it is just elliptical for ‘generated-being’. See the glossary, under “*kawn*”.

⁴⁴Just as ‘*kawn*’ or “generated-being” means “generated existence”, ‘*ayn*’ or “entity” means “generated-essence”.

⁴⁵‘Record’ and ‘permission’ are terms used by the Imams. According to the sixth Imam Ja‘far ibn Muhammad al-Ṣādiq [15, Vol. I, pg. 149],

Nothing on the Earth or in the Firmament comes to be except with seven dispositions (خِصَالٌ ḥiṣāl): a willing, a desiring, a determining, an accomplishing, permission, a record, and a term of duration.

‘Permission’ is elliptical for “God’s permission for a thing to self-manifest. By “record”, the Imam is referring what is “written” in the Divine Tablet about a given thing.

⁴⁶In the cosmology of Shaykh ’Aḥmad, Absolute Existence gives birth to delimited existence (the “Dawn of Preeternity”). The highest rank of delimited existence is the *mundus intelligibilis*, or the “empyrean” (*al-‘arṣ*). The *mundus intelligibilis* is a graded reality composed of subranks, the first four of which correspond to these four lights. The following table, based on the commentary, may help make some of the correspondences with his version of the Neoplatonic hierarchy clear:

	<i>Esse Absolutum (Possibility)</i>	<i>Mundus Intelligibilis (Empyrean)</i>			<i>Mundus Sensibilis (Throne)</i>
<i>Sub- rank</i>	<i>Degrees of The Acting</i>	<i>Neoplatonic Hierarchy</i>	<i>Hierarchy of Lights</i>	<i>Governing Angels</i>	<i>Governed Processes</i>
<i>1st</i>	the willing	Nous	the white light	Michael	providing
<i>2nd</i>	the desiring	Soul	the green light	Ezrael	dying
<i>3rd</i>	the determining	Spirit	the yellow light	Raphael	living
<i>4th</i>	the accomplishing	Nature	the red light	Gabriel	creating

For Shaykh ’Aḥmad, “light” is coextensive with existence, which he considers to be an active principle. So the degrees of light corresponding to the

degrees of his version of the neoplatonic hierarchy are also active principles.

⁴⁷From the letter *fā* ف we have the conjunction ف *fa* meaning, approximately, *then* or *so*. One of the functions of this conjunction is to signify that the second conjunct is in some sense entailed by the first. This is in contrast to the conjunction derived from the letter *wāw*, و *wa*, which simply means *and*. The entailing signified by ف *fa* is obviously quite difficult to translate.

⁴⁸الْجَارِ *al-ġārr* and الْمَجْرُورِ *al-maġrūr* are technical terms in Arabic. *al-ġārr*, when used alone, and *al-maġrūr* each may denote a genitive clause. When used together, *al-ġārr* denotes the governing word due to which a given noun is in the genitive case, while *al-maġrūr* denotes the genitive noun.

⁴⁹That is, it is said by the those who, like the author, are specialists in the Islamic counterpart to the Hebrew Cabala, the *science of letters* called *ʿilm al-ġafr* or *ʿilmu ʿl-ḥurūf*. The Hebrew and Islamic versions are related, and it is a matter of scholarly debate on the nature of the mutual influence of the Cabala and al-Jafr of the Middle Ages. For example, Corbin [26, p. 276] believes that the later Cabala derives from al-Jafr. In any case, the Shīʿī Imams were also widely known, even by Sunnis, to have been experts in this field.

⁵⁰ا *a*.

⁵¹ب *b*.

⁵²كُنْ *kun*.

⁵³ك *k*.

⁵⁴ ن *n*.

⁵⁵In Arabic there are three *hurūfu 'l-ʿillati* or weak letters, *ʾalif* ا *a*, *wāw* و *w*, and *yā* ي *y*. Given a weak letter belonging to the root of a word, it may be dropped, or exchanged for another weak letter, in certain conjugations of that root. For example, the root letters in Arabic that roughly correspond to “being” are ك *k*, و *w*, and ن *n*. When placed in the second person singular imperative, one originally obtains كُونْ *kūn*. Because the و is a weak letter, it is dropped and the verb becomes كُنْ (*be!*).

⁵⁶If one asks, “what are the root letters of كُنْ”, one would still answer, “ن, و, and ك”, although one only sees ن and ك. Where is the و? It is still there; مُقَدَّرًا *muqaddaran* or virtually, as the grammarians would say, and بَاطِنًا *bāṭinan* or inwardly, as the Shaykh, most likely following the Arabic cabalists, would say.

⁵⁷ ا *a*.

⁵⁸ ب *b*.

⁵⁹ ج *ġ*.

⁶⁰ د *d*

⁶¹‘Inclining’, ‘descending’, etc. are technical, cabalistic terms. According to the commentary, they are meant to describe the process of the unfolding of the hierarchy of existence.

⁶² ه *h*.

⁶³‘Quintessentialization’ translates the gerund form of تَذَوَّتَ *tadawwata*, a neologism of the author which is the reflexive form of another neologism, ذَوَّتَ *dawwata*, which means “to quintessentialize”, i.e., to bring a quintessence into existence (See the Thirteenth Observation). “Quintessentialization” or, more literally, “becoming-quintessentialized”, means “becoming brought into existence as a quintessence”. In the commentary on this passage, the author suggests that ‘quintessentialization’ is coextensive with both ‘individuation’ (تَشَخُّصٌ *tašahḥuṣ*; literally, “becoming-individuated”) and ‘particularization’ (تَعَيُّنٌ *taʿayyun*; literally, “becoming-particularized”).

⁶⁴أَجْعَلُ *al-ğaʿl*.

⁶⁵“Making”, and its division into “simple” and “composite” was an important discussion in post-Ṭūsī scholasticism. For a traditional discussion of the standard schools of thought (Peripatetic, Suhrawardian, and Ṣadrian) on this issue, see *The Metaphysics of Sabzavārī*, translated by Mohaqqeq and Izutsu, Ch. 17. Despite differences between these schools with respect to what it is exactly that is “made”, all appear to have accepted this division. In challenging this division, Shaykh ʿAḥmad is taking issue with all of these three schools.

⁶⁶One of Shaykh ʿAḥmad’s main metaphysical distinctions is that between the “quintessence” of a given thing and the actions or “actional qualities” of that thing. On many occasions in his writings, such as this one, ‘quality’ is elliptical for ‘actional quality’. See Part II, Ch. 2.

⁶⁷According to the commentary, the “Pearl” (الْدُرَّةُ *ad-durrat*) is coexten-

sive with what is denoted by the terms ‘universal nous’, the ‘nous of the whole’, or the ‘first nous’.

⁶⁸By the “Mote of Dust”, Shaykh ‘Aḥmad is referring to the ontological opposite of “nous”, which is “ignorance”. In the Shaykh’s cosmology, every ontological rank of delimited existence or sub-rank has an ontological opposite. The opposite of any given ontological rank *above* the *mundus sensibilis* may be considered to be “below” the *mundus sensibilis*, and by the same degree. This is analogous to the relation between positive and negative numbers, with the *mundus sensibilis* situated at point zero. If we identify e.g., Frege’s “the True” i.e., the denotation of every sentence which express a true proposition, with some object in the *mundus intelligibilis*, then Frege’s “the False” i.e., the denotation of every sentence which expresses a false proposition, will be found, not in the *mundus intelligibilis*, but in its ontological opposite, the ‘world of ignorance’.

⁶⁹الْقَابِضُ *al-qābiḍ*. This “name” is a mode or “face” (وَجْهٌ *wağh*) of the Willing.

⁷⁰الْبَدِيعُ *al-badī‘*.

⁷¹الْبَاعِثُ *al-bā‘it*.

⁷²That is, the objects of delimited existence.

⁷³This refers to the following two verses:

Do they not see that we impel the water into the barren earth; and so through it, we extract crops (زَرْعًا *zar‘an*)

of which their cattle and they themselves eat? Will they not see? [32:27]

It is He who sends the winds, between the hands of His Mercy, bearing good tidings; to the point where, when they raise up a heavy cloud, We impel it to a dead land. So through it We send down water. Then do We extract with it all kinds of fruit. [7:57]

⁷⁴This principle may be constructively contrasted with the so-called “golden rule” of Neoplatonism (stated by Proclus): Everything is in everything but in a manner appropriate to each [62, p. 51]. Shaykh ‘Aḥmad would probably have not accepted this principle without serious modification and qualification.

⁷⁵“Compression”, “plucking”, and “ringing” describe phonetic acts of pronunciation.

⁷⁶‘Common sense’ is the literal translation of (الْحِسُّ الْمَشْتَرَكُ) *al-ḥiss al-muštarak*). It is a Muslim scholastic term connoting the physiological faculty of an individual upon which is depicted the images of things grasped through one of the five senses. According to Shaykh ‘Aḥmad, it is located in the lower regions of the *mundus imaginalis*.

⁷⁷The imaginal faculty *al-ḥayāl* of an individual is that faculty which preserves the images depicted in the common sense, so that the individual can recall the image whenever he wants to. It belongs to the *mundus imaginalis*.

⁷⁸In the commentary, Shaykh 'Aḥmad points out that in this case, by مَعْنَى *ma'nā* he means that sense of an expression which is “engraved” in the soul. It belongs to the *mundus intelligibilis*, at the sub-rank of the soul. The term ‘*ma'nā*’ in this sense appears to correspond to the Latin *intentio*, a translation of *ma'nā*.

⁷⁹الشَّيْءُ *al-šay'u*.

⁸⁰مُشَاءَ *mušā'*. Both شَيْءٍ *šay'* and مُشَاءَ *mušā'* have the same root, ش *š*, ي *y*, and أ *a*. *mušā'* is the past participle of شَاءَ *šā'a* (*to will*). Many Arabic lexicographers, as well as the Shi'ī Imams, consider the word *šay'* as actually playing the role of a past participle. According to Lane (*AEL*, under شَيْءٍ *šay'*), *šay'* in this sense signifies, “what is willed, and meant, *or* intended...”.

⁸¹See Part II, Ch. 3 for a detailed discussion of this passage and Shaykh 'Aḥmad's interpretation of the essence-existence distinction.

⁸²There is an ambiguity here. If one considers what is denoted by ‘delimited existence’ as a whole and as a single thing, then it is a composite of existence and essence. If one considers some given thing in delimited existence, it is a composite of its own existence and essence. This first sense of “composite” is called “the first creation”. It occurs in all things, both good and evil. The second sense refers to the quantum of existence (or matter) and essence (or form) particular to a given thing in delimited existence. This second sense of “composite” is called “the second creation”. In the statement, “This composite is Man's *hylē*”, it is the first creation that is meant.

⁸³“The world of motes” (عَالَمُ الدَّرِّ *ālam ad-darr*) is the universe in which

the question, “**Am I not your Lord?**” is asked at the moment of the creation of each individual soul. This world, for Shaykh ‘Aḥmad, lies in the lower regions of the *mundus intelligibilis*, where the oneness of the “universal soul” (النَّفْسُ الْكُلِّيَّةُ *an-nafs al-kullīyyat*, in the “green light”), gives way to the diversity of individual souls in the world of “nature” (الطَّبِيعَةُ *aṭ-ṭabī‘at*, in the red light).

⁸⁴One should keep in mind here that in Arabic, ‘it exists’ literally means “it is found”.

⁸⁵‘Sempiternity’ translates السَّرْمَدُ *as-sarmad*. The theologians and many philosophers like Mir Dāmād used this term to represent the duration between God *qua* Preeternity (الْأَزَلُ *al-ʾazal*) and God *qua* Posteternity (الْأَبَدُ *al-ʾabad*). Shaykh ‘Aḥmad considered this misguided because there is no difference between Preeternity and Posteternity; both are identical. He applies the term *as-sarmad* instead to the Acting of God.

⁸⁶By “all of Possibility”, the author is emphasizing that he means both realized and unrealized possibilities.

⁸⁷In the commentary, the author reminds his reader that, while he uses the term ‘first nous’, he does not believe in the ten nous of traditional Muslim Peripatetic Neoplatonism. Rather, just as all of delimited existence constitutes a single individual, it has only one nous.

⁸⁸‘Metatime’ translates الدَّهْرُ *ad-dahr*, the durational mode appropriate to the contents of the *mundus intelligibilis*. While the concept of metatime was discussed by Ibn Sina, it was Mir Dāmād who, drawing from Ibn Sina, gave

the most extensive elaboration of this concept along Peripatetic lines. See *Rahman 1980*.

⁸⁹*Commentary*: [That is,] the entirety of *generated* [as opposed to unrealized] possibles constitute the locus of the [universal] nous, and they become-subsistent through it.

⁹⁰Shaykh 'Aḥmad points out that some will complain that space and time must exist before body. In the commentary he argues that such a view of space and time is misguided. This is significant because it exemplifies some of the author's naturalist commitments, in contrast to the idealist commitments of most Neoplatonists. For him, body, space, and time are coincident and coterminous; there is no space-time continuum that is preexistent with respect to material bodies.

⁹¹Here the Shaykh mentions the *Alif* which he left out during the course of the discussion of these four degrees in the Third Observation.

⁹²The “six orientations” are right, left, up, down, before, and behind. The “delimiter of the [six] orientations” is, for Shaykh 'Aḥmad, is equivalent to the convexity of orb of the Devoid (*falak al-ʾaṭlas*).

⁹³The “four periods (الأَکْوَارِ *al-ʾakwār*) of the nous” refer to the generation of the intelligible versions of element, mineral, plant, and animal natures.

⁹⁴Analogous to the “four periods of the nous”, the “four cycles (الأَدْوَارِ *al-ʾadwār*) of the body” refer to the generation of the sensible versions of element, mineral, plant, and animal natures.

⁹⁵If someone asks, “Where is delimited existence *qua* delimited existence? Is it in metatime and the *mundus intelligibilis* or is it in Sempiternity and the world of the Acting?” Shaykh ‘Aḥmad says that it can be looked at either way and that in either case, it is an *interworld* between the *mundus intelligibilis* and the Divine Acting. This is an application of the principle of تَشْكِيك taškīk or “ontological gradation”, analogous to Proclus’ “principle of plenitude”. There are no jumps or leaps (طَفَرَات tafrāt) in existence. Between the Acting and the *mundus intelligibilis* there is an interworld (بَرْزَخ barzakh) which is “the first water” or delimited existence *qua* delimited existence. Metatime proper really begins with the universal nous.

⁹⁶Just as there is an interworld between the Acting and the *mundus intelligibilis*, there is also an interworld between the *mundus intelligibilis* and the *mundus sensibilis*. This is the *mundus imaginabilis* (عَالَمُ الْمِثَالِ ‘ālam al-mitāl), or the *imaginal* world. The term ‘imaginal’ is due to Corbin. It has also been adopted from Corbin by followers of C.G. Jung and other archetypal psychologists. Corbin devoted a major portion of his scholarly output to the study of this world as expounded by many Muslim philosophers, especially Suhrawardi, Ibn ‘Arabi, and Shaykh ‘Aḥmad, the last of whom did the most to develop this concept. Recently, the term has entered process philosophy, via archetypal psychologist James Hillman, as exemplified by D. R. Griffin’s (ed.) *Archetypal Process*.

⁹⁷The following diagram may help clarify the ontological scheme presented in this observation:

<i>Rank</i>	<i>Spatial Mode</i>	<i>Durational Mode</i>	<i>Horizontal Process</i>	<i>Vertical Hierarchy</i>
Absolute Existence/ The Acting	Possibility/ Permissibility/ The Great Abyss	Sempiternity	The Dot The 'Alif The Letters The Word	The willing The desiring The accomplishing The executing
Delimited Existence	Interworld (First Water; heartflux; Station of Real Existence)			
Intelligible World	generated possibles (in their entirety)	metatime	elements mineral plant animal	nous spirit soul nature substance of dust
Imaginal World	Interworld (higher regions: <i>Hūrqulyā</i> ; lower regions: <i>Jābalqā and Jābarsā</i>)			
Sensible World	space	time	elements mineral plant animal	devoid orb ecliptic orb spheres ⋮

⁹⁸That is, these motions (حَرَكَات *ḥarakāt*) and processes (تَطَوُّرَات *taṭawwurāt*).

⁹⁹I believe he is referring to the Tenth Observation, which we have not translated.

¹⁰⁰For the Shaykh 'Aḥmad's discussion of God *qua coincidentia oppositorum*, see the Twelfth Observation.

¹⁰¹I assume that by the “two parts” of a quintessence the author means its

essence and its existence.

¹⁰²‘The Compellor’ translates الْجَبَّار *al-ğabbār*, a name of God.

¹⁰³A “holy hadith” (حَدِيثٌ قُدْسِيٌّ *ḥadīṭ qudsiyy*) is a hadith or tradition of the Prophet in which God speaks in the first person. It is called “holy hadith” to distinguish it from the Qur’an.

¹⁰⁴Compare the above passages with the Second Observation. From the point of view of the *experience and cognizance* of God, these stations correspond to the phenomenological category of *Real Existence*. Upon completing the process of ontological reduction (see Part II), one experiences a state which is the ultimate sign and designation of God. Yet this *phenomenological* category of Real Existence is closely related to the *ontological* category of delimited existence *qua* delimited existence, which is the very first outcome and impression of the Acting (as discussed in the Sixth Observation).

Without explicitly saying it, Shaykh ‘Aḥmad has shown us his version of the four journeys of spiritual wayfaring:

1. The journey from creation to the Real or, more precisely, to delimited existence *qua* delimited existence. This is the subject of the Second Observation. The heart-flux’s cognizance of God is precisely the cognizance of itself. Many mystics make the mistake of assuming that this phenomenological category of Real Existence is actually God Himself, and that they have united with Him;
2. The journey from the Real to the Real or, more precisely, from delim-

ited existence to delimited existence (ontologically speaking), or from Real Existence to Real Existence (phenomenologically speaking). As the author says in this Observation, one recognizes that the state of Real Existence is actually “a station of *creation*”. Now he can go on, traveling along the borders of Absolute Existence and Possibility, and discern its four degrees, as discussed in the Third Observation;

3. The journey from the Real to creation or, more precisely, from the borders of Absolute Existence to delimited existence. Here one experiences the sempiternal event of the storm of the Cumulus Cloud impelling the water of existence towards the “dry earth of Possibility”, giving birth to the nous and the *mundus intelligibilis*, as discussed in the Fourth and Sixth Observations.
4. The journey from creation to creation through the Real. The servant is now one of God’s missionaries, has cognizance of the realities of things, and is qualified to guide and teach others, which is what the Shaykh is doing in this book. Although he does not say this explicitly, it is clear that for Shaykh ’Aḥmad, the journeys do not end here, but the process of absorption and reversion go on indefinitely, without end. There is no ultimate perfection, but only continual becoming. This is in contrast to most Neoplatonists, like Ibn Sina and even Mulla Ṣadra, who believed that the journey ends with absorption into the active nous or intellect. For Shaykh ’Aḥmad, even the nous and delimited existence itself are moving and developing.

¹⁰⁵At this point Shaykh ’Aḥmad begins a very difficult excursion into the

nature of becoming, which he models upon traditional Ptolemaic astronomy and to which he applies Aristotle's theory of four causes. In the commentary he calls the becoming of a thing "its motion in the sense of becoming and receptivity (حَرَكَتِهِ الْقَابِلِيَّةُ الْإِنْفِعَالِيَّةُ *ḥarakatihi 'l-qābiliyyat al-ʾinfiʿāliyyat*)". In the commentary on Mulla Ṣadra's *Arshiyyah* [4, p. 99-100], the Shaykh compares this with the Ṣadra's concept of substantial motion. For Shaykh 'Aḥmad, becoming (الْإِنْفِعَالُ *al-ʾinfiʿāl*) and receptivity (الْقَابِلِيَّةُ *al-qābiliyyat*) are coextensive with essence and form. Since the principle of individuation is essence/form, and since that which a becoming essence/form "receives" is active existence/matter, then what we have in Shaykh 'Aḥmad is an early version of Whitehead's distinction between actual entity (becoming) and creativity (active ousia). See Part II, Ch. 3. Shaykh 'Aḥmad takes up this theme again in the Eleventh Observation.

Like the passages based on alchemy, physical science, and/or cabalistics, passages like these based on astronomy are among the most difficult to follow, even with the commentary.

¹⁰⁶By the "quintessential Acting of Allah", Shaykh 'Aḥmad means Absolute Existence. By the "accidental Acting of Allah", he means the delimited existence *qua* delimited existence i.e., the most immediate outcome of Allah's Willing, the active matter out of which everything is made, and that which sustains all essences or acts of becoming and receiving. In this observation he also calls it the "light of Allah's Commanding". In the commentary, the Shaykh introduces two more terms for this pair: الْأَمْرُ الْفِعْلِيُّ *al-ʾamr al-fiʿliyy* and الْأَمْرُ الْمَفْعُولِيُّ *al-ʾamr al-mafʿūliyy*. *al-ʾamr al-fiʿliyy* means "the

Active Commanding”. This corresponds to Absolute Existence or the Acting proper. *al-ʿamr al-mafʿūliyy* means “the Commanding that is the outcome of the Acting”. This corresponds to delimited existence *qua* delimited existence, the accidental Acting, or the light of the Commanding. Shaykh ʿAḥmad’s theory of subsistence is built on this distinction. All things in delimited existence depend on both commandings. However, they depend on the *ʿamr fiʿliyy* in an *emanational or processional* manner, while they depend on the *ʿamr mafʿūliyy* in a *material or realizational* manner. See Part II, Ch. 2.

¹⁰⁷Note that Shaykh ʿAḥmad identifies the ipséité of the servant with his essence and becoming, not with his existence. This is because essence/form is the principle of individuation. Since the codependence of existence and essence is continuous, it follows that, for a quintessence to subsist, the becoming must also be continuous and never cease.

¹⁰⁸That is, the good acts of a given individual *through* his existence will be weighed against the acts of the individual *through* his essence.

¹⁰⁹Lit., “its rule will be the rule of the strong”.

¹¹⁰Some process philosophers may object, saying that this view of Shaykh ʿAḥmad commits one to the view that becoming is bad (since essence is, for him, the individual’s act of becoming). This is not quite the case. Becoming, by its very nature, implies imperfection. If a thing were perfect, then there would be no need of becoming. Badness and evil are imperfections. In order to *become* good, one must start from the point of being not good. So becoming constitutes the journey to goodness. If one does not grow and

develop but remains static, then one loses the *presence* which constitutes one's essence, as the author alludes to in the Eighteenth Observation. When one stops becoming, one loses one's realization. And this losing of one's realization is one sense of Hell.

Someone may object that, once the soul becomes "tranquil", it is now "good" and may stop becoming. This is also not the case. In the context of becoming, good and bad are relative in the sense that, at every stage of goodness or existence reached by an actual entity, there are higher stages of goodness and existence to be attained. And Shaykh 'Aḥmad pointed out in the Ninth Observation that the journey towards God never ends. This reinforces my contention that Whitehead's "actual entity", which exists only as a becoming and not as a being, and Shaykh 'Aḥmad's "essence" are coextensive.

¹¹¹This is an application of a polarity principle. Existence and essence are *not* separable parts. Rather, they constitute the two polar dimensions of a given thing. For Shaykh 'Aḥmad, any given thing constitutes a unity and identity of contraries.

¹¹²The Qur'an mentions three kinds of soul:

1. The "soul that commands to evil" (النَّفْسُ الْأَمَّارَةُ بِالسَّوِّءِ *an-nafs al-ammāratu bi-'s-sū*). This soul does evil and shows no remorse for its actions; rather, it persists in evil;
2. The "self-blaming soul" (النَّفْسُ اللَّوَّامَةُ *an-nafsu 'l-lawwāmat*). This soul does evil, but feels remorse; it chastises itself for continuing to do

wrong and for feeling the urge to do wrong;

3. The “tranquil soul” (النَّفْسُ الْمُطْمَئِنَّةُ *an-nafsu 'l-muṭma'innat*). This soul is at peace with itself and with its Lord. It obeys God and loves doing so.

For Shaykh 'Aḥmad, as well as other moral philosophers, these souls represent stages in the a single soul's journey towards proximity to God. As the Shaykh mentioned earlier, when the soul becomes tranquil, it becomes the *sister* of the nous. No longer commanding to evil, it now commands to good, and continues on its eternal journey towards God.

¹¹³‘*Jism*’ and ‘*ḡasad*’ are synonyms which are both translatable by ‘body’. Shaykh 'Aḥmad developed an elaborate scheme of four “bodies”, two *ḡasad* and two *ḡism*, which make up a single individual. A large part of the monograph *Corbin 1977* is devoted to this theory, which Corbin positively compares to that of the two *okhēma* of Proclus.

¹¹⁴When the sixth Imam Ja‘far al-Ṣādiq was asked about whether the actions of man were characterized by free will or predestination, he responded, in a famous tradition, that the matter was one of neither absolute free will nor one of absolute predestination, but rather a *position between the two positions*.

¹¹⁵We translate الْخَيْرَ *al-ḥayr* as “goodness”, and الْحَسَنَةُ *al-ḥasanat* as “good”. We also translate الشَّرَّ *al-šarr* as “badness” and السُّوءَ *al-sū* “as evil”. *al-ḥayr* is the opposite of *al-šarr*, and *al-ḥasanat* is the opposite of *al-sū*.


¹¹⁶That is, Mulla Ṣadra and his followers like Mulla Muḥsin.

¹¹⁷This quote is from Mulla Ṣadra. See, e.g., *Shirāzī* 1992, p. 43.

¹¹⁸In traditional astronomy, the outward-facing surface of a celestial body was called its “face” (وَجْه *wagh*).

¹¹⁹Let us map the “face” or “surface” of the “generative point” into a straight line. Let us also map the “convexity of the outward spere” into a straight line. Finally, using the length and diameter of the cones, we map the cones into two-dimensional triangles. The length of the base of one triangle represents the intensity of light, the other of darkness. We now obtain the following figure:

Face of Generative Motion



Convexity of the Outward Sphere

On the convexity of the outward sphere, represented by the bottom triangle base, the intensity of light goes towards zero, while darkness is at its most intense. Yet, for Shaykh 'Aḥmad, the intensity of darkness is never exactly zero, for there must be just enough light for darkness to be realized.

On the face of generative motion, light is at its most intense, while darkness is reduced to just enough of a speck for light to be manifested. This relationship between light and darkness symbolizes the relationship between existence and essence, acting and becoming, matter and form, servitude (*al-ʿubūdiyyat*) and lordship (*ar-rubūbiyyat*), and other essential polarities. It is symbolic of the topological principle as discussed in Part II, Ch. 1.

¹²⁰‘Red veil’, ‘white veil’, ‘green veil’, and ‘yellow veil’ are coextensive with ‘red light’, ‘white light’, ‘green light’, and ‘yellow light’ respectively. See the diagram in the footnotes to the Fourth Observation.

¹²¹That is, existence depends on essence for its *manifestation*, but essence depends on existence for its *realization*. Again, Shaykh ’Aḥmad is emphasizing the ontological polarity, inseparability, and codependent origination of existence and essence. While he does not mention it explicitly here, the author holds a similar view with respect to substantiality. A “thing”, that is, a composite of existence and essence, is a “substance” in relation to its motions and its impressions, while it is a “correlational accident” with respect to its perfect cause. More generally, every substance or accident constitutes a correlational accident in some sense. Substantiality and accidentality are thus *correlational* features of real things, not *essential* features. See Part II, Ch. 2.

¹²²That is, choice and compulsion form a jointly exhaustive set of qualities with respect to the universe of discourse of actions; there is no action not characterized by either choice or compulsion. Although choice and compulsion are also mutually exclusive, I have not found out yet whether it is also

the case that “no intermediary between”, by definition, also signifies mutual exclusivity.

¹²³‘The doctrine of novelty’ translates **الْبَدَاءُ** *al-badā*, which literally means “the appearing of something”, especially an opinion after a previous opinion. The Shī‘ī Imams used this term to signify a most controversial doctrine, to the effect that propositions about the future, as contained in the Preserved Tablet (**اللَّوْحُ الْمَحْفُوظُ** *al-lawḥ al-maḥfūz*) and accessible to the prophets and angels, can be changed as God sees fit. This led to the accusation that Shī‘ī’s believed that God changes His mind, with the implication that His knowledge is imperfect. Many Shī‘ī theologians, finding this issue perplexing, chose to either ignore it or explain it away. Unfortunately, we cannot at this time embark upon Shaykh ‘Aḥmad’s original approach to this difficult issue. We can only point out that he does not believe that the contents of the *mundus intelligibilis*, including the nous, are immune from change. The author’s *Risālah fi al-‘Ilm*, more than twice as long as the original twelve *fawā'id*, is entirely devoted to the problem of God’s knowledge. His commentaries on Mulla Ṣadra also contain quite extensive discussions of this topic.

¹²⁴This is Mulla Ṣadra’s doctrine. As we discussed in Part I, Ch. 3, it appears that Shaykh ‘Aḥmad himself also held this view at an earlier point in his career.

¹²⁵The author points out that the two propositions expressed by this sentence are *not* to be taken as converses of one other. This is because “describing through converses is a rule that applies to originating things [and not to Allah]”.

¹²⁶This is a pun, since مُتَعَانِدَات *muta‘ānidāt* literally means “opposing forces”, and is compared with مُتَعَادِيَات *muta‘ādiyāt* or “enemies”. The pun itself is in poetic prose, wherein the two above-mentioned words have the same rythm and rhyme.

¹²⁷This way of considering God’s nature bears a remarkable resemblance to Nicholas of Cusa’s doctrine of God *qua coincidentia oppositorum*. Shaykh ‘Aḥmad’s claim, mentioned in the previous footnote, that “describing through converses is a rule that applies to originating things [and not to Allah]” may be related to Nicholas of Cusa’s critique of Aristotle’s principle of non-contradiction with respect to its application to God. A detailed comparative analysis, which we cannot embark upon here, would probably be quite interesting.

¹²⁸Since sensation and choice are stronger in man than in animal, plant, and mineral, so is the intensity of his existence. Thus man, in his quintessence, is ontologically prior to animal, whose quintessence in turn is ontologically prior to plant, whose quintessence in turn is ontologically prior to mineral. So in this sense, mineral, plant, and animal all follow man.

¹²⁹*Commentary:* [By] “this elucidation and paradigm have been given through the outward tongue”, I mean the way of the Peripatetics, because they only have cognizance of those meanings which outward (*ẓāhir*) and common expressions signify.

¹³⁰For a discussion of this analysis, see Part II, Ch. 2.

¹³¹For this term, see our note to the term *quintessentialization* in the Fourth

Observation.

¹³²According to the first Imam, ‘Alī ibn ‘Abī Ṭālib, there are actually four souls attached to the human being:

1. The *growing, vegetative soul*;
2. The *sensing, celestial, animal soul*;
3. The holy, speaking soul. This is the soul that says “I”, and which corresponds to man *qua* rational being;
4. The universal, divine soul. According to Shaykh ‘Aḥmad [8, pgs. 86–87], this latter soul corresponds to the rank of “soul” in the Neoplatonic hierarchy, and the rank of the “green light” in the hierarchy of lights.

Shaykh ‘Aḥmad has recorded and commented upon two brief lectures by Imam ‘Alī on this topic in the former’s *Sharḥ al-Mashā‘ir* (See pgs. 235–240).

¹³³That is, as may be proved through both intellection and through revelation and the dicta of the Prophet and the Imams.

¹³⁴Willing-in-Possibility translates *المشيئة الإمكانية* *al-mašīyyat al-’imkāniyyat*. It means “the Willing considered with respect to Possibility”. In this case, ‘Willing’ refers to the active, and “received”, aspect of the ontological rank of Acting as a whole, whereas ‘Possibility’ refers to the “receiving” aspect of that rank. This term contrasts with Willing-in-Being,

المَشِيَّة الكَوْنِيَّة *al-mašīyyat al-kawniyyat*, or “the Willing considered with respect to generated-being”. In this latter case, the Willing is considered as a whole, inclusive of Possibility, from whence one can relate it to the rank of being, which is below that of the Willing.

¹³⁵‘Through remonstrance’ translates بِالْمُعَارَضَةِ *bi-l-mu‘āradat*, a term belonging to that division of traditional logic that deals with disputations (الْجَدَل *al-ġadal*), a division that derives from Aristotle’s *Topics*. It signifies a technique whereby one uses the proof of one’s opponent to show something other than what the opponent intends.

¹³⁶Note that ‘being’ translates كَوْن *kawn* (pl. أَكْوَان *akwān*). As we discussed in note 43, ‘being’ is elliptical for ‘generated-being’.

¹³⁷‘Generated’ translates مُكَوَّن *mukawwan*, which literally means “one whose generated-being is occasioned”. So “occasioning-of-generated-being” appears in the form of a quality of the object in question.

¹³⁸See the earlier note on Willing-in-Possibility.

¹³⁹That is, just as existence is not a quality or accident of generated things, despite its being expressed as a predicate, possibility is also not a quality or accident of generated things.

¹⁴⁰A *senseless* (مُهْمَل *muhmal*) word, expression, or term is one which has not been assigned to correspond to a meaning. In post-Avicennan philosophy of language, a meaningful *word, expression, or term* (لَفْظ *lafẓ*) is one which has been *assigned* (وُضِعَ *wuḍi‘a*), by the *assigner* (الوَاضِع *al-wāḍi‘u*)

(the identity of whom was continually a major subject of controversy), to correspond to a *meaning* (معنى *maʿnan*) (the nature of which was also a subject of debate).

¹⁴¹The problem of تَرْجِيحٌ بِلَا مُرَجِّحٍ *targhīḥ bi-lā murağğīḥ*, or “the occasioning of preponderance without an agent of preponderance” originally arose in the context of the problem of creation *ex nihilo*. For example, according to Ibn Sina, if the world were created in time, and at the same time proceeded from God by necessity, then there must have been a مُرَجِّحٌ *murağğīḥ*, an agent of preponderance (*preponderans*), to give weight to the proceeding of existence, at a particular time, over its not proceeding. Times in preexistence being all the same, what could possibly give weight to proceeding over non-proceeding? If one cannot rationally specify a مُرَجِّحٌ *murağğīḥ*, then one must concur that the world is eternal. For details, see *Walzer 76*, pgs. 444–452, as well as *Craig 79*, pgs. 10–15, or *Craig 80*, pgs. 54–58.

Craig has constructively compared and contrasted the principle of preponderance with Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason.

¹⁴²As an example, consider a thirsty man facing two equidistant and equivalent bodies of water. It is absurd to think that, without a *preponderans*, the man will do nothing and die of thirst.

¹⁴³“Possible” here is meant in the sense of “contingent”.

¹⁴⁴An “obligated person” (مُكَلَّفٌ *mukallaf*) is someone who is obligated to obey the Law. In jurisprudence, minors and the insane are not *mukallaf*. Shaykh ‘Aḥmad uses the term more generally, and considers every single

thing as *mukallaf* in some sense and to some degree.

¹⁴⁵That is, individual things formed from the *hylē*. Shaykh 'Aḥmad also speaks of the “motes” (ذَرَّاتٌ *ḍarrāt*, s. ذَرَّةٌ *ḍarrat*) or “particles” of existence i.e., individual existents in delimited existence.

¹⁴⁶Much of this is “alluded to” in the Seventeenth Observation, which we have not translated.

Part IV

Critical Edition

[المقدمة]

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

الْحَمْدُ لِلَّهِ رَبِّ الْعَالَمِينَ، وَ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَى مُحَمَّدٍ وَ آلِهِ الطَّاهِرِينَ.

أَمَّا بَعْدُ: فَيَقُولُ الْعَبْدُ الْمُسْكِينُ أَحْمَدُ بْنُ زَيْنِ الدِّينِ:

إِنِّي لَمَّا رَأَيْتُ كَثِيرًا مِنَ الطَّلَبَةِ يَتَعَمَّقُونَ فِي الْمَعَارِفِ الْإِلَهِيَّةِ وَ يَتَوَهَّمُونَ أَنَّهُمْ
تَعَمَّقُوا فِي الْمَعْنَى الْمُقْصُودِ - وَ هُوَ تَعَمُّقٌ فِي الْأَلْفَاظِ لَا غَيْرِ - رَأَيْتُ أَنَّهُ يَجِبُ عَلَيَّ⁵

أَنْ أُرَوِّعَهُمْ بِعَجَائِبِ مِنَ الْمَطَالِبِ لَمْ يُذَكِّرُوا أَكْثَرُهَا فِي كِتَابٍ؛ وَ لَمْ يَجْرِ ذِكْرُهَا فِي
خَطَابٍ. وَ يَكُونُ ذَلِكَ بِدَلِيلِ الْحِكْمَةِ لِأَنَّ الَّذِي كَانُوا طَلَبُوا بِهِ الْعَايَةَ دَلِيلُ الْمُجَادَلَةِ
بِالَّتِي هِيَ أَحْسَنُ. وَ ذَلِكَ لَا يُوصِلُ إِلَّا إِلَى عَالَمِ الصُّورِ أَوْ الْمَعَانِي؛ وَ لَا يُوصِلُ إِلَى

مَعْرِفَةِ الْأَشْيَاءِ كَمَا هِيَ كَمَا قَالَ (ص): «اللَّهُمَّ ارْزُقْنَا الْأَشْيَاءَ كَمَا هِيَ!» وَ لَا يُوصِلُ إِلَى
ذَلِكَ إِلَّا دَلِيلُ الْحِكْمَةِ. وَ أَرْجُوا اللَّهَ فِي ذَلِكَ أَنْ يَهْدِيَ بِهِ مَنْ أَلْتَمَسَ الْهُدَى بِهَذَا¹⁰
الدَّلِيلِ سِوَاءِ السَّبِيلِ. وَ حَسْبُنَا اللَّهُ وَ نِعْمَ الْوَكِيلُ.

الفائدة الأولى

في ذكر تفصيل الأدلة الثلاثة

و ذكر مستندها و شرطها

إِعلم، هَذَا اللهُ، أَنَّ الْأَدِلَّةَ ثَلَاثَةً كَمَا قَالَ سُبْحَانَهُ لِنَبِيِّهِ (ص): «أَدْعُ إِلَى سَبِيلِ رَبِّكَ بِالْحِكْمَةِ وَالْمَوْعِظَةِ الْحَسَنَةِ؛ وَ جَادِلْهُمْ بِالَّتِي هِيَ أَحْسَنُ» .⁵

فَالأَوَّلُ دَلِيلُ الْحِكْمَةِ . وَ هُوَ اللَّهُ لِلْمَعَارِفِ الْحَقِّيقَةِ، وَ بِهِ يُعْرَفُ اللهُ وَ يُعْرَفُ مَا سِوَاهُ . وَ مُسْتَنَدُهُ الْفُؤَادُ وَ النَّقْلُ . أَمَّا النَّقْلُ فَهُوَ الْكِتَابُ وَ السُّنَّةُ . وَ أَمَّا الْفُؤَادُ فَهُوَ أَعْلَى مَشَاعِرِ الْإِنْسَانِ . وَ هُوَ نُورُ اللَّهِ الَّذِي ذَكَرَهُ (ع) فِي قَوْلِهِ: «إِتَّقُوا فِرَاسَةَ الْمُؤْمِنِ؛ فَإِنَّهُ يَنْظُرُ بِنُورِ اللَّهِ» . وَ هُوَ الْوُجُودُ لِأَنَّ الْوُجُودَ هُوَ أَجْهَةٌ الْعُلْيَا مِنَ الْإِنْسَانِ، يَغْنِي، وَجْهَهُ مِنْ جِهَةِ رَبِّهِ، لِأَنَّ الْوُجُودَ لَا يَنْظُرُ إِلَى نَفْسِهِ أَبَدًا بَلْ إِلَى رَبِّهِ؛ كَمَا أَنَّ الْمَاهِيَّةَ لَا تَنْظُرُ إِلَى رَبِّهَا أَبَدًا بَلْ إِلَى نَفْسِهَا . وَ أَمَّا شَرْطُهُ فَأَنَّ تُنْصِفَ رَبَّكَ لِأَنَّكَ، حِينَ تَنْظُرُ بِدَلِيلِ الْحِكْمَةِ، أَنْتَ تُحَاكِمُ رَبَّكَ وَ هُوَ يُحَاكِمُكَ إِلَى فُؤَادِكَ كَمَا قَالَ سَيِّدُ الْوَصِيِّينَ (ع): «لَا تُحِيطُ بِهِ الْأَوْهَامُ بَلْ تَجَلَّى لَهَا بِهَا، وَ بِهَا أَمْتَعَ مِنْهَا، وَ إِلَيْهَا حَاكَمَهَا» . فَرَبُّكَ يُخَاصِمُكَ عِنْدَكَ فَرِنْ «بِالْقِسْطِ الْمُسْتَقِيمِ؛ ذَلِكَ خَيْرٌ وَ أَحْسَنُ [١٧٢] تَأْوِيلًا» . وَ أَنَّ تَقِفَ عِنْدَ بَيَانِكَ وَ تَبَيِّنِكَ وَ تَبْيِينِكَ عَلَى قَوْلِهِ (تع):¹⁵

«وَ لَا تَقِفْ مَا لَيْسَ لَكَ بِهِ عِلْمٌ . إِنَّ السَّمْعَ وَ الْبَصَرَ وَ الْفُؤَادَ كُلُّ أُولَئِكَ كَانَ عَنْهُ

10. T., p. 10. مِنَ الْإِنْسَانِ، لِأَنَّ الْوُجُودَ [مِنَ الْإِنْسَانِ، يَغْنِي، وَجْهَهُ مِنْ جِهَةِ رَبِّهِ، لِأَنَّ الْوُجُودَ 9-10

مَسْئُولًا، . وَ تَنْظُرُ فِي تِلْكَ الْأَحْوَالِ كُلِّهَا بِعَيْنِهِ (تع)، لَا بِعَيْنِكَ، لِقَوْلِهِ (تع): «و لَا تَمُشْ فِي الْأَرْضِ مَرَحًا، إِنَّكَ لَنْ تَخْرِقَ الْأَرْضَ وَ لَنْ تَبْلُغَ الْجِبَالَ طُولًا». فَهَذَا نَمَطُ دَلِيلِ الْحِكْمَةِ.

20 وَ أَمَّا دَلِيلُ الْمَوْعِظَةِ الْحَسَنَةِ فَهُوَ اللَّهُ لِعِلْمِ الطَّرِيقَةِ وَ تَهْذِيبِ الْأَخْلَاقِ وَ عِلْمِ الْيَقِينِ وَ التَّقْوَى وَ إِنْ كَانَتْ تِلْكَ الْعُلُومُ تُسْتَفَادُ مِنْ غَيْرِهِ. وَ لَكِنْ بِدُونِ مِلَاحَظَةِ هَذَا الدَّلِيلِ لَا تَقِفُ عَلَى الْيَقِينِ لِأَنَّهُ أَقَلُّ مَا قَسَمَ اللَّهُ بَيْنَ الْعِبَادِ. وَ مُسْتَنَدُهُ الْقَلْبُ وَ النَّقْلُ. وَ شَرْطُهُ إِنْصَافُ عَقْلِكَ، بِمَعْنَى أَلَّا تَظْلِمَ مَا يَسْتَحِقُّهُ وَ مَا يُرِيدُ مِنْكَ مِنَ الْحَقِّ. وَ مِثَالُهُ قَوْلُهُ (تع): «قُلْ أَرَأَيْتُمْ إِنْ كَانَ مِنْ عِنْدِ اللَّهِ نِعْمٌ كَفَرْتُمْ بِهِ؛ مَنْ أَضَلُّ بِمَنْ هُوَ فِي شِقَاقٍ بَعِيدٍ؟» وَ قَوْلُهُ (تع): «قُلْ أَرَأَيْتُمْ إِنْ كَانَ مِنْ عِنْدِ اللَّهِ وَ كَفَرْتُمْ بِهِ وَ شَهِدَ شَاهِدٌ مِنْ بَنِي إِسْرَائِيلَ عَلَى مِثْلِهِ فَأَمَنْ وَ اسْتَكْبَرْتُمْ؟ إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَا يَهْدِي الْقَوْمَ الظَّالِمِينَ». وَ كَقَوْلِ الصَّادِقِ (ع) لِعَبْدِ الْكَرِيمِ بْنِ أَبِي الْعَوْجَاءِ: حِينَ أَنْكَرَ عَلَى الطَّائِفِينَ بِالْبَيْتِ الْحَرَامِ، قَالَ (ع) مَا مَعْنَاهُ: إِنْ كَانَ الْأَمْرُ كَمَا تَقُولُونَ - وَ لَيْسَ كَمَا تَقُولُونَ - فَأَنْتُمْ وَ هُمْ سَوَاءٌ. وَ إِنْ كَانَ الْأَمْرُ كَمَا يَقُولُونَ - وَ هُوَ كَمَا يَقُولُونَ - فَقَدْ نَجَوَا وَ هَلَكْتُمْ. وَ هَذَا نَمَطُ دَلِيلِ الْمَوْعِظَةِ الْحَسَنَةِ.

30 وَ أَمَّا دَلِيلُ الْمُجَادَلَةِ بِالَّتِي هِيَ أَحْسَنُ فَهُوَ اللَّهُ لِعِلْمِ الشَّرِيعَةِ وَ مُسْتَنَدُهُ الْعِلْمُ وَ النَّقْلُ. وَ شَرْطُهُ إِنْصَافُ الْخَصْمِ. وَ إِلَّا لَمْ تَكُنِ الْمُجَادَلَةُ بِالَّتِي هِيَ أَحْسَنُ. وَ هُوَ مِثْلُ مَا قَرَّرَهُ أَهْلُ الْمَنْطِقِ مِنَ الْمُقَدَّمَاتِ وَ كَيْفِيَّةِ الدَّلِيلِ وَ مَا ذَكَرَهُ أَهْلُ الْأُصُولِ وَ

21 هذه العلوم [تلك العلوم] T., p. 12.

22 على [بين] T., p. 12.

23 تظلمه [تظلم] T., p. 13.

غَيْرُهُمْ مِنَ الْآدِلَّةِ وَ كَيْفِيَّةِ الْإِسْتِدْلَالِ عَلَى نَحْوٍ لَا يَكُونُ فِيهِ إِنْكَارُ حَقٍّ، وَإِنْ كَانَ
 35 مِنْ خَصْمِكَ الْمُبْطِلِ فِي مَطْلَبِهِ. وَ لَا اسْتِدْلَالٌ بِبَاطِلٍ عَلَى حَقٍّ وَ لَا عَلَى إِبْطَالِ
 بَاطِلٍ. وَ لَا يَحْتَاجُ هَذَا إِلَى تَمَثُّلٍ لِأَنَّ الْكُتُبَ مَشْحُونَةً بِهِ؛ بَلْ لَا تَكَادُ تَجِدُ غَيْرَهُ
 إِلَّا نَادِرًا. وَ ذَلِكَ لِضَعْفِ الْمُسْتَدِلِّينَ وَ الْمُسْتَدَلِّ لَهُمْ وَ عَلَيْهِمْ. وَ لَكِنْ لَا تَغْفُلْ عَنْ
 أَخَذِ حَظٍّ مِنْ دَلِيلِ الْمَوْعِظَةِ الْحَسَنَةِ، فَإِنَّهُ بِشَرْطِهِ طَرِيقُ السَّلَامَةِ وَ الرَّاحَةِ فِي
 الدُّنْيَا [١٧٣] وَ النَّجَاةِ فِي الْآخِرَةِ. وَ هَذَا إِذَا لَمْ تُنَلِّ دَلِيلَ الْحِكْمَةِ، وَ إِلَّا فَخُذْهُ وَ
 40 كُنْ مِنَ الشَّاكِرِينَ. فَلَيْسَ وَرَاءَ عَبَادَانِ قَرْيَةٍ. وَ اللَّهُ سُبْحَانَهُ يَحْفَظُ لَكَ وَ عَلَيْكَ.

الفائدة الثانية

في بيان معرفة الوجود

إِغْلَمْ أَنَّ الَّذِي يُعَبَّرُ عَنْهُ بِالْوُجُودِ عِنْدَ طَلَبِ مَعْرِفَتِهِ ثَلَاثَةُ أَقْسَامٍ.
 5 الْقِسْمُ الْأَوَّلُ الْوُجُودُ الْحَقُّ. وَ هَذَا الْوُجُودُ لَا يُدْرِكُ بِعُمُومٍ وَلَا خُصُوصٍ؛ وَلَا
 إِطْلَاقٍ وَلَا تَقْيِيدٍ؛ وَلَا كُلٍّ وَلَا جُزْءٍ؛ وَلَا كُلِّيٍّ وَلَا جُزْئِيٍّ؛ وَلَا بِمَعْنَى وَلَا
 بِلَفْظٍ؛ وَلَا كَمٍّ وَلَا كَيْفٍ؛ وَلَا رُتْبَةٍ وَلَا جِهَةٍ؛ وَلَا وَضْعٍ وَلَا إِضَافَةٍ؛ وَلَا
 نِسْبَةٍ وَلَا آرْتِبَاطٍ؛ وَلَا فِي وَفْتٍ وَلَا مَكَانٍ؛ وَلَا عَلَى شَيْءٍ؛ وَلَا فِي شَيْءٍ؛ وَلَا
 فِيهِ شَيْءٌ؛ وَلَا مِنْ شَيْءٍ؛ وَلَا لِشَيْءٍ؛ وَلَا كَشَيْءٍ؛ وَلَا عَنْ شَيْءٍ؛ وَلَا بِلُطْفٍ وَلَا
 10 لَا بِغَلْظٍ؛ وَلَا بِاسْتِدَارَةٍ وَلَا أَمْتِدَادٍ؛ وَلَا حَرَكَةٍ وَلَا سُكُونٍ؛ وَلَا اسْتِضَاءَةٍ وَلَا
 ظُلْمَةٍ؛ وَلَا بِانْتِقَالٍ وَلَا بِمَكُثٍ وَلَا تَغْيِيرٍ وَلَا زَوَالٍ.
 وَ لَا يُشَبِّهُهُ شَيْءٌ وَلَا يُخَالِفُهُ شَيْءٌ؛ وَلَا يُوَافِقُهُ شَيْءٌ وَلَا يُعَادِلُهُ شَيْءٌ؛ وَلَا
 يَنْزُرُ مِنْ شَيْءٍ وَلَا يَنْزُرُ مِنْهُ شَيْءٌ؛ وَلَا كُلُّ صِفَةٍ، أَوْ جِهَةٍ، أَوْ صُورَةٍ، أَوْ مِثَالٍ، أَوْ
 غَيْرِ ذَلِكَ مِمَّا يُمَكِّنُ فَرْضَهُ، أَوْ وُجُودَهُ، أَوْ تَمَيُّزَهُ، أَوْ إِهْبَامَهُ، فَهُوَ غَيْرُهُ.
 15 وَ لَا يُدْرِكُ بِشَيْءٍ مِمَّا ذَكَرَ أَوْ غَيْرِهِ وَلَا بِضِدِّهِ؛ وَلَا يُعْرِفُ مَا هُوَ فِي سِرٍّ وَ
 لَا عَلَانِيَةٍ؛ وَلَا طَرِيقَ إِلَى مَعْرِفَتِهِ بِوَجْهِهِ، لَا بِنَفْيٍ وَلَا إِثْبَاتٍ، إِلَّا بِمَا

T., p. 16. وَ لَا كُلٍّ وَلَا كُلِّيٍّ؛ وَلَا جُزْءٍ وَلَا جُزْئِيٍّ إِلَّا كُلٍّ وَلَا جُزْءٍ؛ وَلَا كُلِّيٍّ وَلَا جُزْئِيٍّ⁶

T., p. 18. تَمَيُّزُهُ [تَمَيُّزُهُ¹⁴

T., p. 18. بِمَا¹⁵

وَصَفَ نَفْسَهُ؛ وَ لَا يُدْرِكُ أَحَدٌ كُنْهَ صِفَتِهِ، وَ إِنَّمَا يَعْرِفُهُ بِمَا تَعَرَّفَ لَهُ بِهِ، وَ لَمْ
يَتَعَرَّفْ لِأَحَدٍ بِنَحْوِ مَا عَرَفَهُ مِنْ غَيْرِهِ، وَ إِلَّا لَشَابَهَةِ سُبْحَانَهُ. فَهُوَ الْمَعْلُومُ وَ
الْمَجْهُولُ، وَ الوجودُ وَ الْمَفْقُودُ؛ فَجِهَةٌ مَعْلُومِيَّتِهِ نَفْسُ مَجْهُولِيَّتِهِ؛ وَ نَفْسُ مَشْهُودِيَّتِهِ
عَيْنُ مَفْقُودِيَّتِهِ. فَهُوَ لَا يَعْرِفُ بغيرِهِ، وَ غَيْرُهُ يَعْرِفُ بِهِ. 20

أَمَّا أَنَّهُ لَا يُدْرِكُ بِعُمُومٍ وَ لَا خُصُوصٍ إلْحَ فَلِأَنَّهَا جِهَاتُ الْخَلْقِ وَ صِفَاتِهِمْ. وَ
هِيَ لَا تَحْدُ إِلَّا أَنْفُسَهَا وَ لَا يُدْرِكُ بِهَا إِلَّا مِثْلَهَا.

وَ أَمَّا أَنَّهُ لَا يُدْرِكُ بِضِدِّهِ فَلِأَنَّ ضِدَّ الْمُمَكِّنِ مُمَكِّنٌ، إِذِ الْقَدِيمُ لَا ضِدَّ لَهُ. وَ إِلَّا
لَمْ يَكُنْ عَنْهُ شَيْءٌ وَ لَشَابَهَتَا فِي تَضَادَّاهُمَا؛ وَ لِأَنَّهُ، إِنْ كَانَ قَدِيمًا، لَزِمَ تَعَدُّو الْقَدَمَاءُ.
وَ لَا يُمَكِّنُ فَرَضُ ذَلِكَ، لِأَنَّ الْأَزَلَ هُوَ الذَّاتُ الْبَسِيطُ الْبَحْتُ، وَ لَا مَدْخَلَ فِيهِ، 25
لِأَنَّ الْأَزَلَ صَمَدٌ؛ وَ إِلَّا فَهُوَ إِمْكَانٌ. وَ إِنْ كَانَ الضِدُّ مُمَكِّنًا، لَمْ يَصِحَّ فَرَضُ كَوْنِ
الْمُمَكِّنِ ضِدًّا لِلْوَاجِبِ لِحُدُوثِهِ بِهِ. وَ إِنَّمَا قُلْنَا أَنَّ ضِدَّ الْمُمَكِّنِ مُمَكِّنٌ لِأَنَّ الْقَدِيمَ وَ
الْمُتَمَتِّعَ لَا يَصْلَحَانِ لِطُلُقِ الضِدِّيَّةِ. وَ إِلَّا لَكُنَا مُمَكِّنَيْنِ.

أَمَّا فِي الْوَاجِبِ فَلِأَنَّ الضِدَّ جِهَةٌ الْمُقَابَلَةِ وَ طَرَفُهَا؛ وَ هُوَ مُمَكِّنٌ.
وَ أَمَّا فِي الْمُتَمَتِّعِ فَلِأَنَّ الضِدَّ، إِنْ لَمْ يَكُنْ شَيْئًا، لَمْ يَكُنْ ضِدًّا. وَ إِنْ كَانَ شَيْئًا، 30
كَانَ مُمَكِّنًا. وَ لِهَذَا لَا يَصْلَحُ الْعَدَمُ لِضِدِّيَّةِ الوجودِ إِلَّا بِحَاجَرًا لِأَنَّ الْعَدَمَ الْمُمَكِّنَ
وُجُودٌ فِي الْإِمْكَانِ لَا فِي الْأَعْيَانِ.

وَ إِلَى هَذَا أَشَارَ الصَّادِقُ (ع) لِمَنْ سَأَلَهُ عَنِ اخْتِلَافِ زُرَّارَةَ وَ هِشَامِ بْنِ الْحَكَمِ

17. وَصَفَ بِهِ نَفْسَهُ [وَصَفَ نَفْسَهُ] T., p. 18.

23. بِضِدٍّ [بِضِدٍّ] T., p. 20.

25. فَرَضُ ذَلِكَ فِي الْأَزَلِ، لِأَنَّ الْأَزَلَ [فَرَضُ ذَلِكَ] T., p. 20.

فِي النَّفْيِ: هَلْ هُوَ شَيْءٌ أَمْ لَا؟ فَقَالَ زُرَّارَةُ: «لَيْسَ بِشَيْءٍ»؛ وَ قَالَ هِشَامٌ: [١٧٤]

«النَّفْيُ شَيْءٌ». فَقَالَ الصَّادِقُ (ع): «قُلْ يَقُولُ هِشَامٌ فِي هَذِهِ الْمَسْأَلَةِ».

35

وَأَمَّا الْمُتَمَنِّعُ فَلَيْسَ بِشَيْءٍ وَ لَا عِبَارَةٌ لَهُ. وَ إِنَّمَا اسْتُعْمِلَتِ الْعِبَارَةُ لِجِهَةِ إِمْكَانِهِ،
مِثْلُ «لَا شَرِيكَ لَهُ»، لِأَنَّ النَّفْيَ فَرْعُ الثَّبُوتِ. وَ ذَلِكَ لِأَنَّ الْأَوْهَامَ تُصَوِّرُ شَيْئًا وَ
تُسَمِّيهِ شَرِيكًا مِّنْ جِهَةِ تَجْوِيزِهَا ذَلِكَ أَوْ تَوَهُيمِ وَجُودِهِ. وَ إِلَيْهِ الْإِشَارَةُ بِقَوْلِهِ (تَع):
«وَ تَخْلُقُونَ إِفْكًَا»، فَأَتَى بِهِذِهِ الْعِبَارَةَ مِكنَسَةً لِّغُبَارِ الْأَوْهَامِ. وَ هِيَ عِبَارَةٌ حَادِثَةٌ
وَ ارْدَةٌ عَلَى حَدِيثٍ.

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وَأَمَّا الْمُتَمَنِّعُ فَلَيْسَ شَيْئًا وَ لَا عِبَارَةٌ عَنْهُ. وَ تَعْبِيرِي بِالْعِبَارَةِ لِهَذَا الْعُنْوَانِ
الْمَتَوَهِّمِ. وَ هُوَ حَدِيثٌ؛ خَلَقَهُ اللَّهُ بِمُقْتَضَى أَوْهَامِهِمْ، مِنْ بَابِ الْحُكْمِ الْوَضْعِيِّ عِنْدَ
أَهْلِ الْأَصُولِ، لِأَنَّهُ سُبْحَانَهُ أَعْطَى كُلَّ شَيْءٍ خَلْقَهُ. وَ لَيْسَ لَهُذِهِ الْعِبَارَةُ عَنْ هَذَا
الْعُنْوَانِ كَالْعِبَارَةِ عَنْ عُنْوَانِ حُكْمِ الْوُجُوبِ، وَ إِنْ كَانَ لَا يُدْرِكُ لِدَاتِهِ، إِلَّا أَنَّ
الْعُنْوَانَ لِمَظَاهِرِهِ وَ مَقَامَاتِهِ الَّتِي لَا تَعْطِيلَ لَهَا فِي كُلِّ مَكَانٍ. وَ لَيْسَ لِلْمُتَمَنِّعِ مَظَاهِرُ
لِأَنَّ الْمَظَاهِرَ فَرْعُ الثَّبُوتِ. وَ إِنَّمَا سَمَّيْتُمْ مُمَكِّنًا بِمُتَمَنِّعٍ كَمَا لَوْ سَمَّيْتَ رَجُلًا
بِمَعْدُومٍ. وَ لَيْسَ شَيْءٌ إِلَّا اللَّهُ وَ صِفَتُهُ وَ أَشْمَاؤُهُ.

45

وَ أَمَّا أَنَّهُ لَا يُعْرَفُ إِلَّا بِمَا وَصَفَ بِهِ نَفْسَهُ فَلِأَنَّ الْأَزَلَ لَيْسَ شَيْئًا غَيْرُهُ (تَع).
فَمَا سِوَاهُ فَهُوَ فِي الْإِمْكَانِ. وَ الْأَزَلَ لَا يَخْرُجُ مِنْهُ شَيْءٌ، وَ لَا يَدْخُلُهُ شَيْءٌ، وَ لَا

34 T., p. 21. شَيْءٌ مَخْلُوقٌ [شَيْءٌ]

37 T., p. 23. أَنَّ الْأَوْهَامَ [لِأَنَّ الْأَوْهَامَ]

41 T., p. 23. تَعْبِيرِي عَنْهُ بِالْعِبَارَةِ [تَعْبِيرِي بِالْعِبَارَةِ]

47 T., p. 25. صِفَاتُهُ [صِفَتُهُ]

يَصِلُ إِلَيْهِ شَيْءٌ فَيُخْبِرُ عَمَّا هُنَاكَ وَ يَصِفُ مَا فِيهِ. وَ إِذَا كَانَ كَذَلِكَ، لَا يَعْرِفُهُ أَحَدٌ إِلَّا
بِمَا وَصَفَ بِهِ نَفْسَهُ. 50

وَ هُوَ كَمَا يَقُولُ: لَا يُدْرِكُهُ غَيْرُهُ. فَلَا يَعْرِفُ كُنْهَهُ إِلَّا هُوَ لِأَنَّ عِلْمَهُ بِنَفْسِهِ عَيْنُ
نَفْسِهِ. فَإِذَا وَصَفَ نَفْسَهُ كَانَ وَصْفُ الْحَقِّ لِلْحَقِّ حَقًّا. وَ يَقَعُ عَلَيْنَا وَصْفُهُ خَلْقًا. وَ
نَحْنُ ذَلِكَ الْوَصْفُ الْوَاقِعُ عَلَيْنَا بِنَا، فَقَدْ تَعَرَّفَ لَنَا بِنَا. فَكَانَ وَصْفُهُ الْحَقُّ لِلْخَلْقِ خَلْقًا
لِأَنَّ الْخَلْقَ لَا يُدْرِكُ إِلَّا خَلْقًا: «إِنَّمَا تَحْدُ الْأَدَوَاتُ أَنْفُسَهَا، وَ تُشِيرُ [الْآلَاتُ] إِلَى
نَظَائِرِهَا» فَلَا يُدْرِكُ شَيْءٌ إِلَّا مَا كَانَ مِنْ جِنْسِهِ. 55

وَ مَعْنَى أَنَّهُ لَا يَتَعَرَّفُ لِأَحَدٍ بِنَحْوِ مَا عَرَفَهُ مِنْ غَيْرِهِ أَنَّهُ سُبْحَانَهُ عَرَفَ الْخَلْقَ
لِلْخَلْقِ بِمَا هُمْ عَلَيْهِ أَتَاهُمْ خَلْقٌ. وَ هُوَ عَرَفَ نَفْسَهُ أَنَّهُ لَيْسَ بِخَلْقٍ؛ وَ لَا يُشَبِّهُهُ شَيْئًا
مِنَ الْخَلْقِ. فَلَا يُدْرِكُ مَا تَعَرَّفَ لَهُمْ بِهِ بِشَيْءٍ مِنْ بَصَائِرِهِمْ وَ لَا أَبْصَارِهِمْ. وَ إِنَّمَا
يُعْرِفُ بِبَصَرٍ مِنْهُ. قَالَ (ع): «إِعْرِفُوا اللَّهَ بِاللَّهِ» وَ قَالَ الشَّاعِرُ: 60

إِذَا رَامَ عَاشِقُهَا نَظْرَةً وَ لَمْ يَسْتَطِعْهَا فَمِنْ لُطْفِهَا [175]

أَعَارَتْهُ طَرْفًا رَأَاهَا بِهِ فَكَانَ الْبَصِيرُ بِهَا طَرْفَهَا
وَ مَعْنَى «فَهُوَ الْمَعْلُومُ وَ الْمَجْهُولُ» إِنْخَ أَنَّهُ الْمَعْلُومُ بِصُنْعِهِ، الْمَجْهُولُ بِكُنْهِهِ؛
الْمَوْجُودُ بِآيَاتِهِ، الْمَفْقُودُ بِذَاتِهِ. فَظَهَرَ فَلَا شَيْءٌ أَظْهَرَ مِنْهُ؛ وَ إِنَّمَا ظَهَرَ كُلُّ شَيْءٍ بِأَثَرِ
ظُهُورِهِ. وَ بَطْنٌ فَلَا شَيْءٌ أَبْطَنَ مِنْهُ لِأَنَّهُ لَا شَيْءٌ أَظْهَرَ مِنْهُ. وَ إِنَّمَا خَفِيَ لِشِدَّةِ 65

52-53 ذاتِهِ [نَفْسِهِ] T., p. 26.

54 لِلْخَلْقِ خَلْقًا [الْحَقُّ لِلْخَلْقِ خَلْقًا] T., p. 26.

55 وَ تُشِيرُ [الْآلَاتُ] وَ تُشِيرُ T., p. 26.

59 وَ لَا مِنْ [وَ لَا] T., p. 27.

63 وَ الْمَجْهُولُ [الْمَجْهُولُ] T., p. 28.

ظُهُورِهِ؛ وَ اسْتَتَرَ لِعَظِيمِ نُورِهِ.

وَ مَعْنَى «جِهَةٌ مَعْلُومَتِيهِ نَفْسُ مَجْهُولِيَّتِهِ» أَنَّ الشَّيْءَ لَا يُعْرَفُ وَ لَا يُعْلَمُ إِلَّا بِمَا هُوَ عَلَيْهِ. فَالطَّوِيلُ يُعْرَفُ بِطُولِهِ؛ وَ الْعَرِيزُ يُعْلَمُ بِعَرْضِهِ؛ وَ الْقَصِيرُ يُعْرَفُ بِقِصَرِهِ؛ وَ الْأَبْيَضُ بِبَيَاضِهِ؛ وَ الْأَسْوَدُ بِسَوَادِهِ؛ وَ ذُو الْهَيْئَةِ بِهَيْئَتِهِ. وَ مَا لَا مِقْدَارَ لَهُ، وَ لَا لَوْنَ، وَ لَا هَيْئَةَ، يُعْرَفُ بِذَلِكَ. فَالْوَاجِبُ سُبْحَانَهُ يُعْرَفُ بِأَنَّهُ لَا كَيْفَ لَهُ، 70 وَ لَا شِبْهَ لَهُ، وَ لَا مِثْلَ لَهُ؛ وَ أَنَّهُ لَا يُدْرِكُ كُنْهَهُ، وَ لَا تُعْلَمُ صِفَتُهُ، وَ لَا يُحَاطُ بِهِ عِلْمًا؛ وَ أَنَّ كُلَّ مُدْرِكٍ فَهُوَ غَيْرُهُ. فَيُعْرَفُ بِأَنَّهُ لَا سَبِيلَ إِلَى اكْتِنَاهِهِ، وَ لَا إِدْرَاكِ صِفَتِهِ؛ فَهُوَ يُعْرَفُ بِالْجَهْلِ بِهِ. وَ ذَلِكَ مَا تَعَرَّفَ لَنَا بِهِ؛ فَإِنَّا لَا نَعْرِفُ إِلَّا مِثْلَنَا. فَهُوَ الْوَاجِبُ الْحَقُّ وَ الْمَجْهُولُ الْمُطْلَقُ.

وَ هَذَا الْقِسْمُ يُعَبَّرُ عَنْهُ بِالذَّاتِ الْبَحْتِ، وَ مَجْهُولِ النَّعْتِ، وَ عَيْنِ الْكَافُورِ، وَ 75 شَمْسِ الْأَزَلِّ، وَ مُنْقَطِعِ الْإِشَارَاتِ، وَ الْمَجْهُولِ الْمُطْلَقِ، وَ الْوَاجِبِ الْحَقِّ، وَ اللَّاتَعَيَّنِّ، وَ الْكَنْزِ الْمَخْفِيِّ، وَ الْمُنْقَطِعِ الْوِجْدَانِيِّ، وَ ذَاتِ سَادِجٍ، وَ ذَاتِ بِلَا آغْتِبَارٍ، وَ مَا أَشْبَهَ ذَلِكَ. وَ كُلُّهَا عِبَارَاتٌ مَخْلُوقَةٌ تَقَعُ عَلَى «مَقَامَاتِهِ وَ عِلَامَاتِهِ الَّتِي لَا تَعْطِيلُ لَهَا فِي كُلِّ مَكَانٍ». وَ هِيَ مَوْضُوعُ عِلْمِ الْبَيَانِ. وَ الَّذِي يُبْحَثُ فِيهِ عَنْهُ هُوَ الْمَعْنَانِي. وَ 80 هِيَ أَرْكَانُ التَّوْحِيدِ.

72 لَا إِلَى إِدْرَاكِ إِلَّا إِدْرَاكِ T., p. 30.

73 فَذَلِكَ [و ذَلِكَ T., p. 30.

73 بِهَ لَنَا [لَنَا بِهَ T., p. 30.

الفائدة الثالثة

في الإشارة إلى القسم الثاني

وَهُوَ الوجودُ المطلقُ، وَالتَّعْيُنُ الأولُ، وَالرَّحْمَةُ الكُلِّيَّةُ، وَالشَّجَرَةُ الكُلِّيَّةُ، وَ
 5 النَّفْسُ الرَّحْمَانِي الْأَوَّلِي، وَالمَشِيَّةُ، وَالكَافُ المُستَدِيرَةُ عَلَى نَفْسِهَا، وَالإِرَادَةُ، وَ
 الكَلِمَةُ الَّتِي أَنْزَجَرَ لَهَا الْعُمُقُ الْأَكْبَرُ، وَالإِبْدَاعُ، وَالحَقِيقَةُ المَحْمَدِيَّةُ، وَالْوَلَايَةُ
 المَطْلَقَةُ، وَالأَزَلِيَّةُ الثَّانِيَّةُ، وَعَالَمُ «فَأُخْبِثْتُ أَنْ أُعْرِفَ»، وَالمَحَبَّةُ الحَقِيقِيَّةُ، وَ
 حَرَكَةُ بِنَفْسِهَا، وَالْإِسْمُ الَّذِي اسْتَقَرَّ فِي طِلْهِ فَلَا يَخْرُجُ مِنْهُ إِلَى غَيْرِهِ. وَهُوَ
 الْمَكُونُ الْمَخْرُوعُ عِنْدَهُ، وَصُبْحُ الْأَزَلِ، وَفِعْلٌ بِنَفْسِهِ، وَعَالَمُ الْأَمْرِ، وَمَا أَشْبَهَ
 10 ذَلِكَ.

وَ صِفَةُ بَدْئِهِ بِنَفْسِهِ أَنَّ اللَّهَ سُبْحَانَهُ قَبَضَ مِنْ رَطُوبَةِ الرَّحْمَةِ، يَتْلِكَ الرُّطُوبَةَ
 نَفْسِهَا [١٧٦] بِهَا، أَرْبَعَةَ أَجْزَاءٍ بِهَا؛ وَ مِنْ هَبَاءِهَا بِهِ جُزْءًا بِهِ. فَقَدَّرَهُمَا بِهِمَا فِي
 تَغْفِينِ هَا ضِمَّتَهُمَا. فَأَنْحَلَّا بِهِمَا؛ وَ أَنْعَقَدَا بِهِمَا؛ وَ تَرَاكَمَا بِهِمَا. وَ هَذَا هُوَ الْمَشِيَّةُ؛ وَ
 هُوَ الْمُسَمَّى يَتْلِكَ الْأَسْمَاءِ الْمُتَقَدِّمَةِ.

15 وَ لِهَذَا الْمَقَامِ، فِي تَرْيِيلِ الْفُؤَادِ، أَرْبَعُ مَرَاتِبٍ:

فَالْأُولَى الرَّحْمَةُ، وَ النُّقْطَةُ، وَ السِّرُّ الْمُسْتَسِرُّ، وَ السِّرُّ الْمَجْلَلُ بِالسَّرِّ؛

6 T., p. 35. [المَحْمَدِيَّةُ ص. ع.]

T., p. 40. وَ أَنْحَلَّا [فَأَنْحَلَّا] 13

وَالثَّانِيَةُ الرِّيَّاحُ، وَالنَّفْسُ الرَّخْمَانِي الْأَوَّلِي - يَفْتَحُ الْفَاءُ - الْمَشَارُ إِلَيْهِ بِالْإِنْحِلَالِ؛
وَالثَّلَاثَةُ الْحُرُوفُ الْمَشَارُ إِلَيْهَا بِالْإِنْعِقَادِ الْأَوَّلِ؛ وَهُوَ السَّحَابُ الْمَرْجِي الْمَشَارُ
مِنْ شَجَرِ الْبَحْرِ؛

وَالرَّابِعَةُ السَّحَابُ الْمَتْرَاكِمُ، وَالْكَلِمَةُ الثَّامَّةُ، وَالْكَلِمَةُ الَّتِي أَنْزَجَرَ لَهَا الْعُمُقُ
الْأَكْبَرُ، وَالْكَافُ الْمُسْتَدِيرَةُ عَلَى نَفْسِهَا. 20

وَهَذِهِ الْمَرَاتِبُ إِنَّمَا تَعَدَّدَتْ بِإِغْتِبَارِ التَّفْصِيلِ الْفُؤَادِيِّ فِي كَشْفِهِ. وَإِلَّا فَهِيَ
شَيْءٌ وَاحِدٌ بَسِيطٌ؛ لَيْسَ فِي الْإِمْكَانِ أَبْسَطُ مِنْهُ. خَلَقَهُ اللَّهُ بِنَفْسِهِ، فَأَقَامَهُ بِنَفْسِهِ، وَ
أَمْسَكَهُ بِظِلِّهِ. وَذَلِكَ فِي الْعُمُقِ الْأَكْبَرِ عَلَى حَدِّهِ الْأَعْلَى. فَهُوَ الْمَحْدَدُ لِلْعُمُقِ الْأَكْبَرِ؛
وَالْعُمُقُ الْأَكْبَرُ مُحَدَّدٌ لَهُ. لَا يَفْضُلُ أَحَدُهُمَا عَنِ الْآخَرِ. وَهَذَا هُوَ فِعْلُ اللَّهِ. 25

وَ حَيْثُ عُلِمَ بِالضَّرُورَةِ أَنَّ هَيْئَةَ الْمَفْعُولِ، مِنْ حَيْثُ هُوَ مَفْعُولٌ، هَيْئَةُ الْفِعْلِ -
كَالْكِتَابَةِ: فَإِنَّ هَيْئَتَهَا هَيْئَةُ حَرَكَةِ آيِدٍ؛ فَعَلَى حَسَبِ هَيْئَةِ حَرَكَةِ يَدِ الْكَاتِبِ تَكُونُ
كِتَابَتُهُ - وَجَبَ أَنْ تَكُونَ تِلْكَ الْجِهَاتُ الْمُعْتَبَرَةُ فِي الْفِعْلِ عَلَى جِهَةِ الْبَسَاطَةِ. وَ
الْإِتِّحَادُ تَكُونُ بِنَحْوِهَا فِي الْمَفْعُولِ عَلَى جِهَةِ التَّرْكِيبِ وَالتَّعَدُّدِ، وَإِنْ اخْتَلَفَتْ
الْمَفْعُولَاتُ بِحَسَبِ مَرَاتِبِهَا فِي قُوَّةِ التَّرْكِيبِ، وَضَعْفِهِ، وَظُهُورِهِ، وَخِفَائِهِ، وَ 30
كَثْرَتِهِ، وَقِلَّتِهِ، وَفِي كَثْرَةِ التَّعَدُّدِ، وَقِلَّتِهَا، وَظُهُورِهِ، وَخِفَائِهِ، لِأَنَّهَا فِي الْفِعْلِ
عَلَى نَحْوِ أَشْرَفٍ، لَيْسَ فِي الْإِمْكَانِ نَحْوُ أَشْرَفٍ مِنْهُ. وَهَذَا كَانَ فِي أَكْمَلِ مَرَاتِبِ

17 بِالْإِنْحِلَالِ الْأَوَّلِ [بِالْإِنْحِلَالِ] T., p. 42.

22 فَهُوَ [فَهِيَ] T., p. 45.

23 أَقَامَهُ [فَأَقَامَهُ] T., p. 45.

25 وَ هَذَا فِعْلُ اللَّهِ [وَهَذَا هُوَ فِعْلُ اللَّهِ] T., p. 46.

الْبَسَاطَةِ الْإِمْكَانِيَّةِ، بِحَيْثُ لَا يَكَادُ تُعْتَبَرُ فِيهِ جِهَةٌ تَعَدُّدٌ، إِلَّا مِنْ جِهَةِ التَّلَقُّقِ. وَ هَذَا
هُوَ الْجَوَازُ الرَّاجِحُ الْوُجُودُ؛ وَ هُوَ الْوُجُودُ الْمَطْلُوقُ، أَيْ، الْوُجُودُ لَا بِشَرْطٍ؛ وَ هُوَ
الْمَشِيَّةُ؛ وَ الْعَزْمُ عَلَى ذَلِكَ هُوَ الْإِرَادَةُ. 35

وَ مَعْنَى أَنَّهَا خُلِقَتْ بِنَفْسِهَا أَنَّهَا خُلِقَتْ لَا بِمَشِيَّةٍ غَيْرِهَا. وَ نَظِيرُهَا أَبُونَا آدَمُ عَلَيْهِ
السَّلَامُ؛ فَإِنَّهُ لَمْ يَكُنْ مِنْ أَبِي وَ أُمِّ غَيْرِهِ. وَ إِنَّمَا كَانَ بِنَفْسِهِ وَ كَانَ الْبَشَرُ مِنْهُ بِالتَّنَاسُخِ
وَ التَّنَاسُلِ. فَكَذَلِكَ الْمَشِيَّةُ كَانَتْ بِنَفْسِهَا مِنْ غَيْرِ أَبِي وَ أُمِّ غَيْرِهَا؛ وَ كَانَتْ الْأَشْيَاءُ
مِنْهَا بِالتَّنَاسُخِ وَ التَّنَاسُلِ.

وَ مَعْنَى قَوْلِنَا، «مِنْ غَيْرِ أَبِي وَ أُمِّ غَيْرِهِ»، فِي آدَمَ (ع)، أَنَّهُ كَانَ مِنْ مَادَّتِهِ، وَ
هُوَ الْأَبُ، وَ مِنْ صُورَتِهِ، [١٧٧] وَ هِيَ آلَامُ. وَ كَذَا فِي الْمَشِيَّةِ إِلَّا أَنََّّهُمَا فِي الْمَشِيَّةِ
وُجِدَا بِأَنْفُسِهِمَا، أَيْ، وَجِدَ كُلُّ وَاحِدٍ بِنَفْسِهِ وَ بِالْآخَرِ.

وَ مَعْنَى ذَلِكَ أَنَّهُ وَجِدَ مَقْبُولُهُ بِنَفْسِهِ، وَ قَابِلُهُ بِالْآخَرِ؛ وَ لَا إِيجَادَ لَهُمَا إِلَّا
بِأَنْفُسِهِمَا. وَ مَا سِوَاهَا أَوْجِدَ مَقْبُولُهُ بِالْفِعْلِ وَ قَابِلُهُ بِالتَّبَعِيَّةِ عَلَى مَا نُبَيِّنُهُ.
وَ مَعْنَى أَنَّ الْأَشْيَاءَ كَانَتْ مِنْهَا بِالتَّنَاسُخِ وَ التَّنَاسُلِ أَنَّ الْمَادَّةَ هِيَ الْأَبُ وَ الصُّورَةُ
هِيَ الْأُمُّ عَلَى مَا نُبَيِّنُ لَكَ. فَتَكَحَّتِ الْمَادَّةُ الصُّورَةُ عَلَى كِتَابِ اللَّهِ وَ سُنَّةِ نَبِيِّهِ (ص)؛ 45

33 T., p. 48. [بِحَيْثُ لَا تَكَادُ] بِحَيْثُ لَا يَكَادُ

38 T., p. 49. [فَكَذَلِكَ الْمَشِيَّةُ مِنْ] فَكَذَلِكَ الْمَشِيَّةُ كَانَتْ بِنَفْسِهَا مِنْ

44 T., p. 50. [وُجِدَ] أَوْجِدَ

45 T., p. 50. [كَانَتْ بِالتَّنَاسُخِ] كَانَتْ مِنْهَا بِالتَّنَاسُخِ

46 T., p. 50. [رَسُولِهِ] نَبِيِّهِ

فَوَلَدَتِ الصُّورَةُ الشَّيْءَ. وَ الْمَشِيَّةُ هِيَ أَدَمُ الْأَوَّلُ. وَ حَوَاهُ هِيَ الْجَوَارُ وَ هِيَ كُفُوهُ؛
لَا تَزِيدُ عَلَيْهِ وَ لَا تَنْقُصُ عَنْهُ، كَمَا أَشْرْنَا إِلَيْهِ سَابِقًا فَافْهَمُ. وَ هَذَا هُوَ النَّارُ الْمَشَارُ
إِلَيْهَا فِي قَوْلِهِ تَعَالَى: «وَلَوْ لَمْ تَمْسَسْهُ نَارٌ».

50 فَمَكَانُهُ الْإِمْكَانُ. وَ وَقْتُهُ السَّرْمَدُ. فَهُوَ لِلْسَّرْمَدِ كَالْأَطْلَسِ لِلزَّمَانِ. فَكَمَا أَنَّهُ لَيْسَ
مُحَدَّدًا فِي مَكَانٍ وَ لَا زَمَانٍ، وَ إِنَّمَا الْمَكَانُ وَ الزَّمَانُ أَنْتَهِيَا بِهِ، لَمْ يَتَخَلَّفْ أَحَدٌ مِنْ
هَذِهِ الثَّلَاثَةِ عَنِ الْآخِرِ. وَ كُلُّمَا قَرُبَ مِنْ مُحَدِّدِهِ مِنَ الْجِسْمِ، وَ الزَّمَانِ، وَ الْمَكَانِ لَطْفَ
وَ رَقٍّ. وَ كُلُّمَا بَعُدَ مِنْهُ كَثُفَ وَ غَلَطَ. كَذَلِكَ هَذَا الْوُجُودُ، أَيْ، الْجَوَارُ الرَّاجِعُ: كُلُّمَا
قَرُبَ مِنْ نَفْسِهِ، مِنَ الْفِعْلِ، وَ الْإِمْكَانِ، وَ السَّرْمَدِ، لَطْفَ وَ رَقٍّ، حَتَّى يَكَادُ يَخْفَى
55 عَنْ نَفْسِهِ، وَ حَتَّى يَكَادُ يَظْهَرُ فِي كُلِّ شَيْءٍ؛ وَ كُلُّمَا بَعُدَ عَنْ نَفْسِهِ مِنْهَا غَلَطَ، أَيْ،
ظَهَرَ حَتَّى يَكَادُ يَظْهَرُ فِي الْمَفْعُولَاتِ وَ حَتَّى يَكَادُ يَفْقَدُ مِنْهَا. فَالْإِمْكَانُ وَ السَّرْمَدُ
أَنْتَهِيَا بِهِ. وَ كَمَا أَنَّ الْمَحَدَّ وَ الْمَكَانَ فِي الزَّمَانِ، وَ هُوَ وَ الْمَحَدُّ فِي الْمَكَانِ، وَ
الزَّمَانُ وَ الْمَكَانُ فِي الْمَحَدِّ، أَيْ، كُلُّ وَاحِدٍ مِنَ الثَّلَاثَةِ حَاوٍ لِلِاثْنَيْنِ، كَذَلِكَ الْفِعْلُ وَ
الْإِمْكَانُ وَ السَّرْمَدُ: كُلُّ وَاحِدٍ مِنْهَا حَاوٍ لِلِاثْنَيْنِ الْآخَرَيْنِ.

60 وَ كُلُّ وَاحِدٍ مُنْتَهٍ فِي الْآخِرِ مِنَ الثَّلَاثَةِ إِلَّا أَنَّ الْمَوْجُودَاتِ الثَّلَاثَةَ عَلَى أَوْضَاعٍ
ثَلَاثَةٍ. فَالْوَاجِبُ: أَرْزُلُهُ ذَاتُهُ، وَ مَكَانُهُ ذَاتُهُ. وَ الْمُمْكِنُ الَّذِي هُوَ الْوُجُودُ الْمَقَيَّدُ، وَ
هُوَ جَمِيعُ الْمَفْعُولَاتِ: مَكَانُهُ غَيْرُ زَمَانِهِ، وَ هُمَا غَيْرُ ذَاتِهِ. وَ أَمَّا الْجَوَارُ الرَّاجِعُ:
فَمَكَانُهُ وَ زَمَانُهُ بِالنِّسْبَةِ إِلَيْهِ، بِإِعْتِبَارِ الْإِتِّحَادِ وَ الْمُغَايَرَةِ، بَيْنَ بَيْنٍ؛ لَيْسَ عَلَى حَدِّ
الْوُجُوبِ فِي الْإِتِّحَادِ، وَ لَا عَلَى حَدِّ الْمُمْكِنِ فِي التَّعَدُّدِ. هَذَا بِالنِّسْبَةِ إِلَى نَفْسِهِ، وَ

47 كُفُوهُ [كُفُوهُ] T., p. 51.

64-65 أَمَّا بِالنِّسْبَةِ [وَأَمَّا بِالنِّسْبَةِ] T., p. 54.

65 بِالنَّسْبَةِ إِلَى اِرْتِبَاطِهِ بِالْمُمْكِنِ، فَمُتَّعَايِرَةٌ، مُعَايِرَةٌ أَبْسَطُ مِنْ مُعَايِرَةِ الْمُمْكِنِ فَافْهَمُ.
[١٧٨]

الفائدة الرابعة

في الإشارة إلى تقسيم الفعل في الجملة

[المراتب الأربعة الفعلية]

إِغْلَمْ أَنَّ الْفِعْلَ، بِاعْتِبَارِ مَرَاتِبِهِ عِنْدَ تَعْلُقِهِ بِالْمَفْعُولَاتِ، يَنْقَسِمُ إِلَى أَقْسَامٍ:
 فَأَوَّلُ مَرْتَبَةِ الْمَشِيَّةِ؛ وَهِيَ الذِّكْرُ الْأَوَّلُ، كَمَا قَالَ الرَّصَا (ع) لِيُونُسَ. وَ الْمُرَادُ
 5 أَنَّ الشَّيْءَ، قَبْلَ الْمَشِيَّةِ، لَمْ يَكُنْ لَهُ ذِكْرٌ فِي جَمِيعِ مَرَاتِبِ الْإِمْكَانِ. فَأَوَّلُ ذِكْرِهِ
 مَعْلُومِيَّتُهُ فِي كَوْنِهِ. وَ مِثَالُهُ، فِيمَا يَبْدُو لَكَ، أَنْ تَفْعَلَهُ؛ فَإِنَّهُ لَمْ يَكُنْ شَيْئًا قَبْلَ أَنْ
 تَذْكُرَهُ. فَإِذَا ذَكَرْتَهُ، كَانَ ذِكْرُكَ لَهُ أَوَّلَ مَرَاتِبِ وَجُودَاتِهِ؛ وَ هِيَ كَوْنُهُ. وَ الثَّانِي
 الْإِرَادَةُ؛ وَ هِيَ الْعَزِيمَةُ عَلَى مَا شَاءَ. وَ هِيَ ثَانِي ذِكْرِهِ وَ مَعْلُومِيَّتُهُ فِي عَيْنِهِ. وَ لَمْ
 يَكُنْ لَهُ وَجُودٌ قَبْلَهُ إِلَّا الذِّكْرُ الْأَوَّلُ الَّذِي هُوَ كَوْنُهُ. وَ هُوَ صُدُورُ الْوُجُودِ قَبْلَ
 10 لُزُومِ الْمَاهِيَةِ لَهُ. وَ بِهَا تَلَزَمَتْ الْمَاهِيَةُ؛ وَ بِالْمَشِيَّةِ كَانَتْ الْإِرَادَةُ لِتَرْتُبَهَا عَلَيْهَا.
 وَ الثَّلَاثُ الْقَدْرُ؛ وَ هُوَ الْمُنْدَسَةُ الْإِبْجَادِيَّةُ. وَ فِيهِ إِجَادِ الْخُدُودِ مِنَ الْأَرْزَاقِ، وَ
 الْأَجَالِ، وَ الْبَقَاءِ، وَ الْفَنَاءِ، وَ ضَبْطِ الْمَقَادِيرِ، وَ الْهَيْئَاتِ الدَّهْرِيَّةِ وَ الزَّمَانِيَّةِ مِنَ
 الْوَقْتِ، وَ الْمَحَلِّ، وَ الْكَمِّ، وَ الْكَيْفِ، وَ الرُّتْبَةِ، وَ الْجِهَةِ، وَ الْوَضْعِ، وَ الْكِتَابِ، وَ
 الْأَذْنِ، وَ الْأَعْرَاضِ، وَ مَقَادِيرِ الْأَشْغَةِ، وَ جَمِيعِ النَّهَايَاتِ إِلَى انْقِطَاعِ وَجُودَاتِهِ. وَ فِي

4 قَالَ [قَالَ] T., p. 55.

7 وَ هُوَ [وَ هِيَ] T., p. 56.

8 يَشَاءُ [يَشَاءُ] T., p. 56.

15 هَذَا أَوَّلُ الْخَلْقِ الثَّانِي وَ بَدَأُ السَّعَادَةَ وَ الشَّقَاوَةَ وَ بِالإِِرَادَةِ كَانَ الْقَدَرُ لِتَرْبُّهِ عَلَيْهَا.
وَ هَذِهِ الْأَشْيَاءُ الْمَذْكُورَةُ تَجْرِي فِي الْخَلْقِ الْآوَّلِ عَلَى نَحْوِ أَشْرَفٍ وَ إِنَّمَا ذُكِرَتْ هُنَا
لِأَنَّهُ مَحَلُّ الْمَهْنَدَسَةِ؛ وَ هُنَاكَ مَحَلُّ بِسَاطَةِ.

وَ الرَّابِعُ الْقَضَاءُ؛ وَ هُوَ إِتْمَامُ مَا قَدَّرَ وَ تَرْكِيبُهُ عَلَى التَّنْظِيمِ الطَّبِيعِيِّ. فَالْقَدَرُ
كَتَقْدِيرِ آلَاتِ السَّرِيرِ لِلطُّولِ وَ الْعَرَضِ، وَ الْهَيْئَةِ؛ وَ الْقَضَاءُ تَرْكِيبُهَا سَرِيرًا.
20 وَ الْخَامِسُ الْإِمْضَاءُ؛ وَ هُوَ لَازِمٌ لِلْقَضَاءِ. وَ هُوَ إِظْهَارُهُ، مُبَيِّنُ الْعِلَلِ، مَشْرُوحُ
الْأَسْبَابِ، لِاجْتِمَاعِ مَرَاتِبِ التَّعْرِيفِ لِأَثَارِ الصِّفَاتِ الْفِعْلِيَّةِ الْإِلَهِيَّةِ فِيهِ. فَالْأَرْبَعُ
الْمَرَاتِبِ الْآوَلُ هِيَ أَرْكَانُ لِلْفِعْلِ؛ وَ الْخَامِسُ بَيَانُهَا. وَ بِالْقَدَرِ كَانَ الْقَضَاءُ، وَ بِالْقَضَاءِ
كَانَ الْإِمْضَاءُ.

فَهَذِهِ الْأَرْبَعَةُ هِيَ صُبْحُ الْأَزَلِ. وَ النُّورُ الَّذِي أَشْرَقَ مِنْ صُبْحِ الْأَزَلِ أَرْبَعَةُ أَنْوَارٍ؛
25 هِيَ الْعَرْشُ الَّذِي أَسْتَوَى عَلَيْهِ الرَّحْمَنُ بِرَحْمَانِيَّتِهِ الَّتِي هِيَ هَذِهِ الْأَرْبَعَةُ الْمَرَاتِبِ مِنَ
الْفِعْلِ.

فَالنُّورُ الْمُشْرِقُ عَنِ الْمُرْتَبَةِ الْأُولَى هُوَ رُكْنُ الْعَرْشِ الْأَيْمَنِ الْأَعْلَى؛ وَ هُوَ النُّورُ
الْأَبْيَضُ.

وَ النُّورُ الْمُشْرِقُ عَنِ الْمُرْتَبَةِ الثَّانِيَةِ هُوَ رُكْنُ الْعَرْشِ الْأَيْمَنِ الْأَسْفَلِ؛ وَ هُوَ
30 النُّورُ الْأَصْفَرُ.

وَ النُّورُ الْمُشْرِقُ عَنِ الْمُرْتَبَةِ الثَّالِثَةِ هُوَ رُكْنُ الْعَرْشِ الْأَيْسَرِ الْأَعْلَى؛ وَ هُوَ النُّورُ
الْأَخْضَرُ. [١٧٩]

وَ النُّورُ الْمُشْرِقُ عَنِ الْمُرْتَبَةِ الرَّابِعَةِ هُوَ رُكْنُ الْعَرْشِ الْأَيْسَرِ الْأَسْفَلِ؛ وَ هُوَ
النُّورُ الْأَحْمَرُ.

35 قَالْبَيَاضُ مِنَ الْمَشِيَّةِ لِكَمَالِ الْبَسَاطَةِ. وَ الصُّفْرَةُ مِنَ الْإِرَادَةِ لِرِيَادَةِ الْحَرَارَةِ فِي
الْبَيَاضِ. وَ الْخَضِرَةُ مِنَ الْقَدْرِ لِاخْتِلَاطِ سَوَادِ الْكَثَرَةِ مِنْ أَثَرِ الْقَدْرِ بِصُفْرَةِ أَثَرِ
الْإِرَادَةِ. وَ الْحُمْرَةُ مِنَ الْقَضَاءِ لِاجْتِمَاعِ بَيَاضِ الْمَشِيَّةِ بِصُفْرَةِ الْإِرَادَةِ فِي حَرَارَةِ حُكْمِ
الْقَضَاءِ بِالْإِمْضَاءِ.

40 ثُمَّ أَعْلَمَ أَنَّهُ إِذَا أُطْلِقَ خَلَقَ ، قَدْ يُرَادُ بِهِ جَمِيعُ الْمَرَاتِبِ لِصِدْقِهِ عَلَيْهَا لَعَنَهُ. وَ إِذَا
قِيلَ «خَلَقَ وَ بَرَأَ وَ صَوَّرَ»، فَ «خَلَقَ» بِمَعْنَى «شَاءَ»، أَيْ، «أَوْجَدَ الْكَوْنَ»، أَيْ،
«[أَوْجَدَ] الْوُجُودَ»؛ وَ «بَرَأَ» بِمَعْنَى «أَرَادَ»، أَيْ، «أَوْجَدَ الْعَيْنَ»، أَيْ، «[أَوْجَدَ]
الْمَاهِيَةَ بِالْوُجُودِ»؛ وَ «صَوَّرَ» بِمَعْنَى «قَدَّرَ»، أَيْ، «أَوْجَدَ الْخُدُودَ».

وَ قَالَ اللَّهُ (تع): «الَّذِي خَلَقَ فَسَوَّى، وَ الَّذِي قَدَّرَ فَهَدَى» ، أَيْ، «خَلَقَ
كَوْنَهُ»، أَيْ، «[خَلَقَ] وَجُودَهُ»؛ «فَسَوَّى عَيْنَهُ» بِمَعْنَى «سَوَّى مَاهِيَّتَهُ بِوُجُودِهِ»،
45 أَيْ، «جَعَلَ فِيهِ مَا إِذَا سُئِلَ أَجَابَ» وَ إِنَّمَا جِيءَ بِِ الْفَاءِ - فِي عَطْفِ التَّنْوِيَةِ -
دُونَ الْوَاوِ لِمَا بَيْنَهُمَا مِنَ الْمِلَازِمَةِ، كَمَا مَرَّ ذِكْرُهُ. وَ هَذَا فِي الْخَلْقِ الْأَوَّلِ. «وَ الَّذِي
قَدَّرَ فَهَدَى» ، أَيْ، «وَضَعَ حُدُودَهُ» الْمُنْقَدِّمُ ذِكْرَهَا. وَ هُوَ الْخَلْقُ الثَّانِي. «فَهَدَى» ،
أَيْ، «دَلَّ عَلَى سَبِيلِ الْهُدَى»، وَ عُطِفَ بِِ الْفَاءِ لِأَنَّ الْقَدْرَ بِهِ السَّعَادَةُ وَ الشَّقَاوَةُ.
فَفِيهِ دَلٌّ عَلَى الْهُدَى. فَهُمَا مُتَسَاوِقَانِ فِي الْوُجُودِ، وَ إِنْ كَانَتِ الْهُدَايَةُ مُغَايِرَةً وَ
50 مُتَأَخِّرَةً فِي الذَّاتِ، فَعُطِفَ بِِ الْفَاءِ .

[الِإِخْتِرَاعُ وَ الْإِبْدَاعُ]

ثُمَّ إِنَّ مَرَاتِبَ الْفِعْلِ بِجَمِيعِهَا اخْتِرَاعٌ وَ آتِبْدَاعٌ. وَ قَدْ يُطْلَقُ أَحَدُهُمَا عَلَى الْآخَرِ
كَالْمَشِيَّةِ وَ الْإِرَادَةِ، وَ كَالْفَقِيرِ وَ الْمُسْكِينِ فِي بَابِ الصَّدَقَاتِ، وَ كَالْجَارِ وَ الْمَجْرُورِ

41 T., p. 64. «بَرَأَ» وَ «بَرَأَ»

43 T., p. 65. تَعَالَى [تع]

عِنْدَ النَّحَاةِ.

فَإِنْ افْتَرَقَا اجْتَمَعَا. فَإِذَا قِيلَ لَكَ: «أَعْطِ الْفَقِيرَ خَمْسَةَ دَنَانِيرَ»، لَمْ تَجِبْ عَلَيْكَ
 55 التَّفْرِقَةَ؛ وَكَذَا «أَعْطِ الْمِسْكِينَ [خَمْسَةَ دَنَانِيرَ]». فَفِي الْحَالَيْنِ أُيِّهَمَا أُعْطِيَ كِفَاكَ. وَ
 إِذَا قُلْتَ: «زَيْدٌ فِي الدَّارِ»، فَإِنْ قُلْتَ «زَيْدٌ مُبْتَدَأٌ وَ الْجَارُ خَبْرٌ»، صَحَّ؛ أَوْ «[زَيْدٌ
 مُبْتَدَأٌ وَ] الْمَجْرُورُ خَبْرٌ»، صَحَّ. وَ تَقُولُ: «إِخْتَرَعَ»، أَيْ، «إِبْتَدَعَ»، وَ بِالْعَكْسِ. وَ
 [تَقُولُ]: «شَاءَ»، أَيْ، «أَرَادَ»، وَ بِالْعَكْسِ.

وَ إِذَا اجْتَمَعَا افْتَرَقَا. تَقُولُ «إِخْتَرَعَ وَ ابْتَدَعَ»، أَيْ، «إِخْتَرَعَ لَا مِنْ شَيْءٍ وَ ابْتَدَعَ
 60 لَا لِشَيْءٍ»؛ وَ «إِخْتَرَعَ الْكَوْنَ وَ ابْتَدَعَ الْعَيْنَ». وَ تَقُولُ: «شَاءَ الْكَوْنَ وَ أَرَادَ الْعَيْنَ».
 فَ «إِخْتَرَعَ» بِمَعْنَى «شَاءَ لَا مِنْ شَيْءٍ» وَ «إِبْتَدَعَ» بِمَعْنَى «أَرَادَ لَا لِشَيْءٍ»؛ وَ إِذَا
 قِيلَ: «أَعْطِ الْفَقِيرَ خَمْسَةَ دَنَانِيرَ، وَ الْمِسْكِينَ أَرْبَعَةَ دَنَانِيرَ»، وَجِبَ التَّفْرِقَةُ. وَ بَيَانُ
 ذَلِكَ [١٨٠] فِي الْفِيهِ، وَ الْأَصَحُّ عِنْدِي أَنَّ الْمِسْكِينَ أَسْوَأُ حَالًا. وَ إِذَا قِيلَ: «الْجَارُ وَ
 الْمَجْرُورُ»، فُرِّقَ بَيْنَهُمَا، وَ هُوَ ظَاهِرٌ.

[الِإِخْتِرَاعَانِ وَ الْإِبْدَاعَانِ]

وَ أَعْلَمُ أَنَّهُ قِيلَ أَنَّ الْإِخْتِرَاعَ اخْتِرَاعَانِ، وَ الْإِبْدَاعَ إِبْدَاعَانِ
 65 فَالِإِخْتِرَاعُ الْأَوَّلُ الْمَشِيئَةُ. وَ هُوَ خَلْقُ سَاكِنٍ لَا يُدْرِكُ بِالسُّكُونِ. وَ الْإِخْتِرَاعُ
 الثَّانِي الْأَلْفُ مِنَ الْحُرُوفِ.
 وَ الْإِبْدَاعُ الْأَوَّلُ الْإِرَادَةُ. وَ هُوَ خَلْقُ سَاكِنٍ لَا يُدْرِكُ بِالسُّكُونِ. وَ الْإِبْدَاعُ الثَّانِي
 الْبَاءُ مِنَ الْحُرُوفِ.

54 T., p. 66. [أَعْطَى]

64 T., p. 66. [فُرِّقَ بَيْنَهُمَا وَ فُرِّقَ بَيْنَهُمَا، وَ هُوَ ظَاهِرٌ]

70 وَ ذَلِكَ لِأَنَّ الْإِبْدَاعَ أَوْ الْإِخْتِرَاعَ أَوَّلُ مَا خَلَقَ اللَّهُ. خَلَقَهُ بِنَفْسِهِ؛ ثُمَّ خَلَقَ
 الْخُرُوفَ بِالْإِبْدَاعِ وَ جَعَلَهَا فِعْلاً مِنْهُ؛ يَقُولُ لِلشَّيْءِ: «كُنْ فَيَكُونُ». فَيُشَارُ بِهِ أَلْكَافُ
 إِلَى الْإِخْتِرَاعِ، أَيْ، الْمَشِيَّةِ، وَ هِيَ أَلْكَافُ الْمُسْتَدِيرَةُ عَلَى نَفْسِهَا لِأَنَّهَا مَنْشَأُ الْكَوْنِ؛
 وَ بَالْتَوْنِ إِلَى الْإِبْدَاعِ، أَيْ، الْإِرَادَةِ، لِأَنَّهَا هِيَ مَنْشَأُ الْعَيْنِ. وَ بَيْنَ هَذَيْنِ الْخُرُوفَيْنِ
 حَرْفٌ حُذِفَ لِلإِغْلَالِ. فَهُوَ ثَابِتٌ بَاطِنًا، وَ إِنْ حُذِفَ ظَاهِرًا، لِلإِشَارَةِ إِلَى بَيَانِ
 75 الْمُرَادِ مِنْهُ؛ وَ هُوَ الْمَاءُ الَّذِي جُعِلَ مِنْهُ كُلُّ شَيْءٍ حَيٍّ؛ وَ هُوَ الْوُجُودُ؛ وَ هُوَ
 الدَّلَالَةُ مِنَ اللَّفْظِ؛ وَ هُوَ الْمَاءُ مِنَ السَّحَابِ؛ وَ هُوَ الْأَجْزَاءُ الدُّخَانِيَّةُ الْمُسْتَضِيئَةُ عَنِ
 النَّارِ بِحِفْظِ الْكَثَافَةِ الدُّهْنِيَّةِ الْمُقَارِبَةِ لِلدُّخَانِيَّةِ. وَ ذَلِكَ الْحَرْفُ هُوَ أَلْوَاوُ - وَ الْأَصْلُ
 قَبْلَ حَذْفِ الْإِغْلَالِ كَوْنٌ - وَ هُوَ السَّتَّةُ الْأَيَّامُ الَّتِي خُلِقَ فِيهَا الشَّيْءُ.
 وَ مَعْنَى أَنَّ أَلَّيْفَ هِيَ الْإِخْتِرَاعُ الثَّانِي أَنَّهَا نَزَلَتْ بِتَكَرُّرِهَا؛ فَكَانَتْ عَنْهَا أَلْبَاءُ.
 80 فَالْبَاءُ تُكَيِّدُهَا لِأَنَّ نَزْوَهَا إِنْبِسَاطُهَا هَكَذَا: «—»؛ وَ قَدْ كَانَتْ قَائِمَةً هَكَذَا: «ا»؛ وَ
 أَنْعَطَفَتْ عَلَى أَلْبَاءٍ وَ مَالَتْ وَ حَدَّثَتْ أَجْلِيمُ هَكَذَا: “ ” .
 وَ مَعْنَى أَنَّ أَلْبَاءَ [هِيَ] الْإِبْدَاعُ الثَّانِي أَنَّهَا نَزَلَتْ بِتَكَرُّرِهَا فَكَانَتْ عَنْهَا الدَّلَالُ
 هَكَذَا: “ ” ؛ وَ مَالَتْ عَلَى أَجْلِيمٍ فَكَانَتْ أَلْهَاءُ هَكَذَا: “ ” . وَ إِثْمًا
 كَانَ مِثْلُ أَلْبَاءٍ مُخَالِفًا لِمِثْلِ أَلَّيْفٍ لِأَنَّ أَلَّيْفَ قَائِمٌ؛ وَ مِثْلُ الْقَائِمِ إِلَى الْإِنْبِسَاطِ. وَ
 85 أَلْبَاءُ مَبْسُوطٌ؛ وَ مِثْلُ الْمَبْسُوطِ إِلَى الرُّكُودَةِ.
 [قسما الحروف المعنوية]

70. T., p. 70. وَ [أَوْ] 70

70. T., p. 70. لِأَنَّهَا مَنْشَأُ [لِأَنَّهَا هِيَ مَنْشَأُ] 73

70. T., p. 70. [إِنْ حُذِفَ] 74

70. T., p. 70. [عَنِ النَّارِ] 76-77

ثُمَّ أَعْلَمَ أَنَّ هَذِهِ الْحُرُوفَ الَّتِي هَذِهِ الْحُرُوفُ اللَّفْظِيَّةُ مَظَاهِرُهَا قِسْمَانِ:
أَحَدُهَا الْمُرْتَبَةُ الثَّلَاثَةُ مِنْ مَرَاتِبِ الْفِعْلِ؛ وَهُوَ السَّحَابُ الْمُرْجِي.

وَالثَّانِي أَفْرَادُ الْفِعْلِ فِي فِعْلِ الشَّيْءِ. وَذَلِكَ لِأَنَّ فِعْلَ اللَّهِ سُبْحَانَهُ، لَجَمِيعِ
الْأَشْيَاءِ، فِعْلٌ وَاحِدٌ؛ يَجْمَعُهَا عَلَى كَثَرَتِهَا فِي وَحْدَتِهِ. قَالَ (تَع): «وَمَا أَمْرُنَا إِلَّا
وَاحِدَةٌ كَلَمْحٍ بِالْبَصَرِ»؛ وَ [قَالَ]: «مَا خَلَقَكُمْ وَ لَا نَعُثُكُمْ إِلَّا كَنَفْسٍ وَاحِدَةٍ». وَ 90
لَهُ بِاعْتِبَارِ تَعَلُّقِهِ بِكُلِّ فَرْدٍ مِنْ أَفْرَادِ الْمَوْجُودَاتِ، ذَاتٍ أَوْ صِفَةٍ، رَأْسٍ يَخْتَصُّ بِهِ
[١٨١] هُوَ مَشِيَّةُ اللَّهِ الْخَاصَّةُ بِهِ، أَيْ، بِالْفَرْدِ.

فَهَذِهِ الرُّؤُوسُ حُرُوفٌ بِإِضَافَةِ كُلِّ رَأْسٍ إِلَى فَرْدٍ مِنَ الْخَلْقِ إِذَا نُسِبَتْ إِلَى الْفِعْلِ
الْمُطْلَقِ. وَ الْخَلْقُ، مِنْ جِهَةِ الْأَفْرَادِ، حُرُوفٌ بِالنِّسْبَةِ إِلَى الْمَجْمُوعِ. وَ كُلُّ فَرْدٍ مِنْهَا
بِاعْتِبَارِ أَسْبَابِهِ، وَ شُرُوطِهِ، وَ مَقَوِّمَاتِهِ الْمَذْكُورَةِ، مِنَ الْوُجُودِ، وَ الْمَاهِيَةِ، وَ السَّتَةِ 95
الْمَذْكُورَةِ، وَ الْوَضْعِ، وَ الْأَجْلِ، وَ الْكِتَابِ، وَ الْإِذْنِ، وَ غَيْرِ ذَلِكَ، وَ نِهَايَاتِ هَذِهِ

86 T., p. 75. [الْحُرُوفُ الْمَعْنَوِيَّةُ] الْحُرُوفُ

91 T., p. 76. مِنْ ذَاتٍ [ذَاتٍ]

92 T., p. 76. [الْخَاصَّةُ بِهِ. الْخَاصَّةُ بِهِ، أَيْ، بِالْفَرْدِ]

93 T., p. 76. حُرُوفُ حُرُوفِ [فَهَذِهِ الرُّؤُوسُ حُرُوفٌ]

93 T., p. 76. مِنْ أَفْرَادِ الْخَلْقِ [مِنْ الْخَلْقِ]

92 [الْخَاصَّةُ بِهِ، أَيْ، بِالْفَرْدِ] The phrase أَيْ بِالْفَرْدِ occurs in the margin of A. but it is not clear that this
is really a correction made by the author since there is no “صح” occurring immediately after the phrase
to signify such a correction.

الْأَشْيَاءِ الْمَذْكُورَةِ، وَ أَعْرَاضِهَا وَ أَشْعَتِهَا، إِلَى انْقِطَاعِ وُجُودَاتِهِ، كُلُّ وَاحِدٍ مُتَعَلِّقٌ
بِوَجْهِ مُخْتَصٍّ بِهِ مِنْ ذَلِكَ الرَّأْسِ الْمُخْتَصِّ بِذَلِكَ الْفَرْدِ مِنَ الْفِعْلِ الْكُلِّيِّ نِسْبَةً كُلِّ
وَجْهِ إِلَى ذَلِكَ الرَّأْسِ، كَنِسْبَةِ ذَلِكَ الرَّأْسِ إِلَى الْفِعْلِ الْكُلِّيِّ.

فَهَذِهِ حُرُوفٌ لِهَذِهِ الْكَلِمَةِ، وَ الْكَلِمَاتُ أَجْزِيئُهُ حُرُوفٌ لِلْكَلِمَةِ الْكُلِّيَّةِ. فَهَذَا الْحُكْمُ
جَارٍ لِكُلِّ مَرْتَبَةٍ مِنْ مَرَاتِبِ الْفِعْلِ، فِي كُلِّ مَفْعُولٍ مَبْنُوعٍ أَوْ تَابِعٍ، أَوْ مُسَاوٍ أَوْ
مُسَاوٍ. فَالْفِعْلُ، بِالنِّسْبَةِ إِلَى مَنْ دُونَهُ، ذَاتٌ وَاحِدَةٌ، اسْتِفَادَتِ الذَّوَاتِ مِنْ ذَاتِهَا
تَذَوُّنَاتِهَا، وَ [اسْتِفَادَتِ] الصِّفَاتِ مِنْ هَيْئَاتِهَا تَذَوُّنَاتِهَا، وَ [اسْتِفَادَتِ] الصِّفَاتِ مِنْ
صِفَاتِهَا تَوْصِيفَاتِهَا. وَ رُؤُوسُ تِلْكَ الذَّوَاتِ الشَّرِيفَةِ الْمُقَدَّسَةِ كَثِيرَةٌ؛ وَ كُلُّ رَأْسٍ، فَلَهُ
وُجُوهٌ كَثِيرَةٌ.

[تقسيم الجعل]

ثُمَّ أَعْلَمَ أَنَّ الْجَعْلَ قَدْ يُسْتَعْمَلُ فِي الْمَرَاتِبِ الْأَرْبَعَةِ. فَيُطْلَقُ عَلَى كُلِّ مَرْتَبَةٍ
اسْتِعْمَالٌ فِيهَا لُغَةً؛ وَ يَجْرِي حُكْمُهُ فِي كُلِّ مَرْتَبَةٍ بِمَا لَهَا. وَ كَثِيرًا مَا يُسْتَعْمَلُ فِي
إِيجَادِ اللَّوَارِمِ لِلزُّوْمَاتِهَا. قَالَ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى: «الْحَمْدُ لِلَّهِ الَّذِي خَلَقَ السَّمَاوَاتِ وَ الْأَرْضَ
وَ جَعَلَ الظُّلُمَاتِ وَ النُّورَ»، لِإِيجَادِهِ النُّورِ مِنَ الْمُنِيرِ وَ الظُّلْمَةِ مِنَ نَفْسِ النُّورِ مِنْ
حَيْثُ هُوَ. وَ يَتَمَيَّزُ عَنْ تِلْكَ الْمَرَاتِبِ إِذَا اسْتُعْمِلَ مَعَ أَحَدِهَا، كَمَا فِي الْآيَةِ الشَّرِيفَةِ.
وَ يُسْتَعْمَلُ لِلتَّصْيِيرِ وَالْقَلْبِ لِشَيْءٍ إِلَى شَيْءٍ آخَرَ. وَ حُكْمُهُ فِي اسْتِعْمَالَاتِهِ الثَّلَاثَةِ
حُكْمٌ مَا تَقَدَّمَ مِنَ الْأَفْعَالِ فِي مَرَاتِبِهَا حَرْفًا بِحَرْفٍ.

فَقَوْلُهُمْ، «الْجَعْلُ الْبَسِيطُ وَ الْجَعْلُ الْمُرَكَّبُ»، لَيْسَ بِنَتَاءٍ فِي الْمُرَكَّبِ لِأَنَّ التَّرْكِيبَ

97-98 T., p. 76. وَاحِدٍ مُتَعَلِّقٍ بِوَجْهِ [وَاحِدٍ بِوَجْهِ 97-98

104 T., p. 79. الذَّوَاتِ [الذَّوَاتِ 104

113 T., p. 82-83. نَتَاءٍ [نَتَاءٍ فِي الْمُرَكَّبِ لِأَنَّ 113

إِنَّمَا يَتَحَقَّقُ فِي شَيْءٍ صَمٌّ إِلَيْهِ مُسَاوٍ لَهُ، أَوْ مُخَالَفٌ، أَوْ مُبَايِنٌ. وَ يَكُونُ ذَلِكَ الْمَرْكَبُ شَيْئًا وَاحِدًا، أَيْ، يَصْدُرُ عَنْهُ فِعْلٌ وَاحِدٌ فِي مَوْضُوعٍ وَاحِدٍ. وَ لَيْسَ شَيْءٌ مُمَثِّلٌ غَيْرُ ذَاتِهِ أَوْ صِفَتِهِ، وَ الشَّيْءُ لَا يَتَرَكَّبُ مِنْ ذَاتِهِ وَ صِفَتِهِ فِي شَيْءٍ وَاحِدٍ.

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وَ تَمَثُّلُهُمْ بِقَوْلِهِمْ: «جَعَلْتُ الطَّيْنَ خَرْفًا»: فَإِنْ أُرِيدَ تَغْيِيرُ الطَّيْنِ وَ تَصْيِيرُ الْمُتَغَيَّرِ خَرْفًا، فَهُوَ جَعْلَانٍ، كُلُّ وَاحِدٍ [١٨٢] فِي مَادَّةٍ، وَ هُمَا رَأْسَانِ مِنَ الْجَعْلِ الْكَلْبِيِّ. وَ إِنْ أُرِيدَ قَلْبُ الطَّيْنِ خَرْفًا مِنْ غَيْرِ اعْتِبَارِ تَغْيِيرِهِ، وَ إِنَّمَا هُوَ حَرَكَةٌ وَاحِدَةٌ فِي جِهَةٍ وَاحِدَةٍ، فَهُوَ جَعْلٌ وَاحِدٌ.

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وَ إِنْ أُرِيدَ بِهِ مَا يُسْتَعْمَلُ فِي تَكْوِينِ الْمُسْبُوعِ وَ تَكُونِ التَّابِعِ بِهِ، جَعْلُ الْوُجُودِ وَ انْجِعَالِ الْمَاهِيَةِ بِجَعْلِ الْوُجُودِ، فَهَذَا فِي الظَّاهِرِ جَعْلٌ وَاحِدٌ لِشَيْئَيْنِ مُخْتَلِفَيْنِ؛ لَكِنَّ مَا انْجَعَلَتْ بِهِ الْمَاهِيَةُ لَيْسَ بِجَعْلٍ كَجَعْلِ الْوُجُودِ، وَ لَا مُخَالَفٌ لَهُ، وَ لَا مُعَانِدٌ لَهُ، وَ إِنْ كَانَ فِي جِهَتَيْنِ. فَلَا يَكُونُ الْجَعْلُ مِنْهُمَا مُرَكَّبًا لِأَنَّ مَا جُعِلَتْ بِهِ الْمَاهِيَةُ صِفَةً لِمَا جُعِلَ بِهِ الْوُجُودُ وَ أَثَرٌ لَهُ؛ وَ لَا يَكُونُ الشَّيْءُ مُرَكَّبًا مِنْ ذَاتِهِ وَ أَثَرِهِ. فَإِنَّ مَا جُعِلَ بِهِ الْوُجُودُ كَالشَّمْسِ لِلنُّورِ، وَ مَا جُعِلَ بِهِ الْمَاهِيَةُ كَنَفْسِ النَّورِ لِلظِّلِّ. فَإِنَّ جَعْلَ الشَّمْسِ لِلنُّورِ جَعْلٌ وَاحِدٌ؛ وَ جَعْلُ نَفْسِ النَّورِ مِنْ حَيْثُ نَفْسِهِ، لِلظِّلِّ جَعْلٌ وَاحِدٌ، مُغَايِرٌ لِلْجَعْلِ الْأَوَّلِ. وَ كَوْنُهُ مُتَرَتِّبًا عَلَيْهِ وَ مُتَقَوِّمًا بِهِ لَا يُلْزَمُ مِنْهُ التَّرَكُّيبُ لِأَنَّ الشَّمْسَ لَمْ تَجْعَلْ لِنَفْسِهَا الظِّلَّ. وَ قَوْلُهُ (تَع): «ثُمَّ جَعَلْنَا الشَّمْسَ عَلَيْهِ دَلِيلًا»، لَا يَدُلُّ عَلَى أَنَّهَا جَاعِلَةٌ لَهُ إِذْ لَوْ جَعَلْتُهُ بِجَعْلِ النَّورِ، لَكَانَ نُورًا، إِذْ لَيْسَ فِيهَا ظِلٌّ؛ وَ إِنْ جَعَلْتُهُ بِجَعْلِ نَفْسِ النَّورِ الَّتِي هِيَ أَصْلُ الظِّلِّ وَاقِعًا، دَلَّ عَلَى أَنَّهَا حَافِظَةٌ

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لِلنُّورِ الْجَاعِلِ لِلظَّلِّ، لَا جَاعِلَةٌ. فَلَا يُحْصَلُ التَّرَكِيبُ حَقِيقَةً. وَ إِلَى ذَلِكَ الْإِشَارَةُ
بِقَوْلِهِ (تع): «وَمَا أَمَرْنَا إِلَّا وَاحِدَةً كَلَمَحٍ بِالْبَصْرِ».

وَأِنْ أُريدَ أَنَّ الْجَعْلَ الَّذِي يُحَدِّثُ عَنْهُ شَيْئَانِ فَصَاعِدًا، فَهُوَ مُرَكَّبٌ، سَوَاءً كَانَا
فِي مَادَّتَيْنِ، أَمْ فِي حَالَيْنِ كَجَعْلِ الطِّينِ خَزَفًا، أَمْ فِي الْمَلْزُومِ وَاللَّازِمِ كَالْوُجُودِ وَ 135
الْمَاهِيَةِ، قُلْنَا: إِذَا أَصْطَلَحْتُمْ عَلَى ذَلِكَ فَلَا بَأْسَ، وَ لَكِنْ لَا تَجِدُونَ الْجَعْلَ الْبَسِيطَ
قَطُّ، لِأَنَّ اللَّهَ سُبْحَانَهُ «لَمْ يَخْلُقْ شَيْئًا فَرْدًا قَائِمًا بِذَاتِهِ لِلدَّلَالَةِ عَلَيْهِ». قَالَ (تع): «وَمَا
مِنْ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ خَلَقْنَا زَوْجَيْنِ».

وَبِالْجُمْلَةِ لَا فَرْقَ فِي هَذِهِ الْمَسْأَلَةِ بَيْنَ الْجَعْلِ وَ غَيْرِهِ مِنْ مَرَاتِبِ الْفِعْلِ. وَ عَلَى
كُلِّ حَالٍ فَالْجَعْلُ وَاحِدٌ لَا تَعَدَّدُ فِيهِ لِذَاتِهِ. قَالَ اللَّهُ (تع): جَعَلَ لَكُمْ مِنْ أَنْفُسِكُمْ 140
أَزْوَاجًا وَ مِنَ الْأَنْعَامِ أَزْوَاجًا، يَذَرُّوكُمْ فِيهِ، أَيُّ، فِي الْجَعْلِ، فَأَفْرَدَهُ وَ جَمَعَ
الْمَجْعُولَاتِ، فَأَفْهَمَ. نَعَمْ، لَهُ رُؤُوسٌ بَعْدَ الْمَجْعُولَاتِ، وَ لِكُلِّ رَأْسٍ وَجُوهٌ بَعْدَ
أَحْوَالِهِ كَمَا تَقَدَّمَ فِي الْفِعْلِ، فَرَأَجِعْ.

132 جَاعِلَةٌ لَهُ [جَاعِلَةٌ T., p. 87.

132 إِلَيْهِ [إِلَى ذَلِكَ T., p. 87.

135 حَالَتَيْنِ [حَالَيْنِ T., p. 89.

الْفَائِدَةُ الْخَامِسَةُ

فِي تَبَيُّنِ الْمُلْحَقَاتِ

[مراتب العوالم و تعددها]

إِعْلَمُ أَنَّه قَدْ وَرِدَ فِي الْأَحَادِيثِ عَنْهُمْ، عَلَيْهِمُ السَّلَامُ، تَعَدُّدُ الْعَوَالِمِ وَالْأَدَمِيِّينَ. وَ أَكْثَرُ مَا ذَكَرَ أَنَّهَا أَلْفُ أَلْفِ عَالَمٍ وَ أَلْفُ أَلْفِ آدَمٍ؛ نَحْنُ فِي آخِرِ الْعَوَالِمِ وَ أَوْلَايْكَ 5
الْأَدَمِيِّينَ. وَ مَرَاتِبُ الْعَوَالِمِ إِنَّمَا اخْتَلَفَتْ فِي الرِّوَايَاتِ لِاخْتِلَافِ الْمَقَامَاتِ كَر: عَالَمِ الْغَيْبِ وَ الشَّهَادَةِ؛

أَوِ الْعَوَالِمِ الثَّلَاثَةِ: عَالَمِ الْوُجُوبِ، [١٨٣] وَ هُوَ الْأَرْزَاقِيُّ تَعَالَى؛ وَ عَالَمِ الرَّجْحَانِ، وَ هُوَ عَالَمُ الْمَشِيَّةِ وَ الْإِرَادَةِ وَ الْإِبْدَاعِ؛ وَ عَالَمِ الْجَوَارِ، وَ هُوَ الْوُجُودُ الْمُقَيَّدُ، الْمَعْبَرُ عَنْهُ بِأَنَّهُ وَجُودٌ بِشَرَطٍ لَا وَ بِشَرَطِ شَيْءٍ؛ أَوَّلُهُ الدَّرَّةُ؛ وَ آخِرُهُ الذَّرَّةُ؛ 10
وَ أَرْبَعَةُ عَوَالِمٍ: هِيَ عَالَمُ الْخَلْقِ، وَ عَالَمُ الرِّزْقِ، وَ عَالَمُ الْحَيَوَةِ، وَ عَالَمُ الْمَوْتِ؛

4 T., p. 90. أَتَتْ [نَحْنُ]

4 T., p. 90. تِلْكَ الْعَوَالِمِ [الْعَوَالِمِ]

7 T., p. 90. وَ [أَوْ]

10 T., p. 91. عَوَالِمٍ: وَ هِيَ [عَوَالِمٍ: هِيَ]

10 T., p. 91. وَ عَالَمُ الْمَوْتِ، وَ عَالَمُ الْحَيَوَةِ [وَ عَالَمُ الْحَيَوَةِ، وَ عَالَمُ الْمَوْتِ]

وَ خَمْسَةَ عَوَالِمَ: عَالَمِ الْأَزَلِ تَعَالَى، وَ عَالَمِ السَّرْمَدِ (وَ هُوَ عَالَمُ الرَّجْحَانِ)، وَ عَالَمِ
الْجَبْرُوتِ (وَ هُوَ عَالَمُ الْمَعَانِي الْمَجْرَدَةِ عَنِ الْمَادَّةِ وَ الصُّورَةِ وَ الْمَدَّةِ)، وَ عَالَمِ
الْمَلَكُوتِ (وَ هُوَ عَالَمُ الصُّورِ الْمَجْرَدَةِ عَنِ الْمَادَّةِ وَ الْمَدَّةِ)، وَ عَالَمِ الْمَلِكِ (أَوَّلُهُ
مُحَدَّدُ الْجِهَاتِ وَ آخِرُهُ الْأَرْضُ)؛

15 وَ سِتَّةَ عَوَالِمَ: عَالَمِ الْعُقُولِ، وَ عَالَمِ النُّفُوسِ، وَ عَالَمِ الطَّبَائِعِ، وَ عَالَمِ آهْبَاءِ، وَ عَالَمِ
الْمِثَالِ، وَ عَالَمِ الْأَجْسَامِ؛

وَ سَبْعَةَ عَوَالِمَ: عَالَمِ النَّارِ، وَ عَالَمِ الْهَوَاءِ، وَ عَالَمِ الْمَاءِ، وَ عَالَمِ التُّرَابِ، وَ عَالَمِ
الْجِسْمِ، وَ عَالَمِ النَّفْسِ، وَ عَالَمِ الرُّوحِ. وَ هَذَا مَعْنَى قَوْلِهِمْ: كُلُّ شَيْءٍ مِنَ الْخَوَادِثِ
مُثَلَّثُ الْكَيَانِ، مُرَبَّعُ الْكَيْفِيَّةِ؛

20 وَ ثَمَانِيَةَ عَوَالِمَ: وَإِذَا أُطْلِقَتْ، يُرَادُ بِهَا أَحَدُ وُجُوهِ كَثِيرَةٍ؛ نَذَكُرُ مِنْهَا وَاحِدًا
عَلَى سَبِيلِ التَّمْثِيلِ: عَالَمِ الْخَلْقِ فِي الدُّنْيَا، عَالَمِ الْخَلْقِ فِي الْآخِرَةِ، عَالَمِ الرِّزْقِ فِي
الدُّنْيَا، عَالَمِ الرِّزْقِ فِي الْآخِرَةِ، عَالَمِ الْمَوْتِ فِي الدُّنْيَا، عَالَمِ الْمَوْتِ فِي الْآخِرَةِ - وَ

11 T., p. 92. تع [تَعَالَى]

20 T., p. 96. عَوَالِمَ: إِذَا [عَوَالِمَ: وَ إِذَا]

21 T., p. 96. وَ عَالَمِ [عَالَمِ]

21 T., p. 96. وَ عَالَمِ [عَالَمِ]

22 T., p. 96. وَ عَالَمِ [عَالَمِ]

22 T., p. 96. وَ عَالَمِ [عَالَمِ]

22 T., p. 96. وَ عَالَمِ [عَالَمِ]

هُوَ أَهْلَاكُ الْأَكْبَرُ، نَعُوذُ بِاللَّهِ مِنْ سَخَطِ اللَّهِ - عَالَمُ الْحَيَاةِ فِي الدُّنْيَا، عَالَمُ الْحَيَاةِ فِي
الْآخِرَةِ؛ وَإِلَيْهِ الْإِشَارَةُ يَقُولُهُ (تع) فِي التَّأْوِيلِ: «وَيَحْمِلُ عَرْشَ رَبِّكَ فَوْقَهُمْ يَوْمَئِذٍ
ثَمَانِيَةً» 25

وَتِسْعَةَ عَوَالِمٍ وَهِيَ عَالَمُ مُحَدَّدِ الْجِهَاتِ، وَ عَالَمُ فُلُكِ الثَّوَابِ، وَ عَوَالِمُ الْأَفْلَاكِ
السَّبْعَةِ؛ وَ هِيَ عَالَمُ الْقُلُوبِ، وَ عَالَمُ النَّفُوسِ، وَ عَالَمُ الْعُقُولِ، وَ عَالَمُ الْعُلُومِ، وَ عَالَمُ
الْأَوْهَامِ، وَ عَالَمُ الْوُجُودَاتِ الثَّانِيَةِ، وَ عَالَمِ الْخَيَالَاتِ، وَ عَالَمِ الْأَفْكَارِ، وَ عَالَمِ الْحَيَاةِ،
وَ عَشْرَةَ عَوَالِمٍ، وَ هِيَ: هَذِهِ التَّسْعَةُ وَ عَالَمُ الْأَجْسَامِ؛

وَ أَحَدُ عَشْرَ عَالَمًا: وَ هِيَ مَيَادِينُ التَّوْحِيدِ؛ سِتَّةٌ مِنْهَا كَثِيرَةُ الْحَيَاتِ وَ الْعَقَارِبِ،
مُظْلِمَةٌ، ذَاتُ أَهْوَالٍ مُنْكَرَةٍ، هَلَكَ فِيهَا خَلْقٌ كَثِيرٌ، وَ إِلَيْهِ الْإِشَارَةُ بِتَأْوِيلِ قَوْلِهِ (تع):
«وَلَقَدْ ذَرَأْنَا لِجَهَنَّمَ كَثِيرًا مِّنَ الْجِنِّ وَ الْإِنسِ، لَمَّا قُلُوْبٌ لَا يَفْقَهُوْنَ بِهَا وَ لَمَّا أُغْنِيَ
لَا يَنْصَرُونَ بِهَا، وَ لَمَّا أَدَانُ لَا يَسْمَعُونَ بِهَا. أُولَٰئِكَ كَالْأَنْعَامِ [١٨٤] بَلْ هُمْ أَضَلُّ.
أُولَٰئِكَ هُمُ الْغَافِلُونَ». فَأَدْنَى الْمَرَاتِبِ السَّتَّةُ وَ أَحْسَنُهَا الْأَجْسَامُ؛ فَمِنْ النَّاسِ يَعْْبُدُ
جِسْمًا؛ وَ الثَّانِي [يَعْْبُدُ] الْمِثَالُ؛ وَ مِنْهُمْ مَن يَعْْبُدُ شَيْئًا؛ وَ مِنْهُمْ مَن يَعْتَقِدُ أَنَّهُ [أَيُّ
مَعْبُودُهُ] مَادَّةٌ؛ وَ مِنْهُمْ مَن يَعْتَقِدُ أَنَّ مَعْبُودَهُ طَبِيعَةٌ؛ وَ مِنْهُمْ مَن يَعْتَقِدُ أَنَّهُ نَفْسٌ وَ
صُورَةٌ مُجَرَّدَةٌ؛ وَ هَذِهِ الْخَمْسَةُ دَرَكَاتُ أَهَالِكِينَ. وَ أَمَّا السَّادِسُ، وَ هُوَ مَن يَعْتَقِدُ أَنَّ

23 T., p. 96. وَ عَالَمُ [عَالَمِ]

34 T., p. 100. مَرَاتِبِ السَّتَّةِ [الْمَرَاتِبِ السَّتَّةِ]

34 T., p. 100. النَّاسِ مَن يَعْْبُدُ [النَّاسِ يَعْْبُدُ]

36 T., p. 100. نَفْسٌ [نَفْسِ]

37 T., p. 102. أَمَّا [وَأَمَّا]

مَعْبُودُهُ مَعْنَى كَمَا هُوَ مُعْتَقَدُ كَثِيرٍ مِنْ أَهْلِ الْعُقُولِ، فَإِنْ عَنَى مَا يُشِيرُ إِلَيْهِ عَقْلُهُ، فَقَدْ
 أَبْطَلَ لِأَنَّ الْإِشَارَةَ الْعَقْلِيَّ لَا تَقَعُ إِلَّا عَلَى مَحْصُورٍ دَهْرِيٍّ، وَ ذَلِكَ حَدِيثٌ؛ وَ إِنْ
 40 أَعْتَقَدَهُ بِدُونِ تَخْصِيصِ إِشَارَةِ عَقْلِيَّةٍ، فَذَلِكَ مُوَحَّدٌ إِلَّا أَنَّ تَوْحِيدَهُ أَسْفَلُ مَرَاتِبِ
 التَّوْحِيدِ. وَ الْخَمْسَةُ الْآخَرَى: فَهِيَ مَرَاتِبُ الْفِعْلِ الْأَرْبَعِ الْأَوَّلِ وَ الدَّوَاةِ الْأَوَّلَى
 خَامِسَةً، الَّتِي هِيَ مَعْرِفَةُ النَّفْسِ الَّتِي هِيَ مَعْرِفَةُ الرَّبِّ. فَأَعْلَاهَا فِي التَّوْحِيدِ أَنْ يَظْهَرَ
 لِعَبْدِهِ فِي الرَّحْمَةِ، ثُمَّ فِي الرِّيحِ، ثُمَّ السَّحَابِ الْمُزْجِي، ثُمَّ فِي السَّحَابِ الْمُتَرَاكِمِ، ثُمَّ
 فِي الْمَدَادِ الْأَوَّلِ الْمُسَمَّى بِالدَّوَاةِ الْأَوَّلَى. فَالْأَوَّلَى مَعْرِفَةُ الْبَاطِنِ بِالنُّقْطَةِ. وَ الثَّانِيَّةُ
 45 مَعْرِفَةُ الْبَاطِنِ، مِنْ حَيْثُ هُوَ بَاطِنٌ، بِالنَّفْسِ الرَّحْمَانِيَّةِ. وَ الثَّلَاثَةُ مَعْرِفَةُ الظَّاهِرِ
 بِالسَّحَابِ الْمُزْجِي. وَ الرَّابِعَةُ: مَعْرِفَةُ الظَّاهِرِ، مِنْ حَيْثُ هُوَ ظَاهِرٌ، بِالسَّحَابِ
 الْمُتَرَاكِمِ. وَ الْخَامِسَةُ مَعْرِفَةُ الظُّهُورِ بِالمَاءِ، وَ هِيَ الْمَقَامَاتُ الْمَشَارُ إِلَيْهَا سَابِقًا. فَهَذِهِ
 أَحَدُ عَشَرَ عَالَمًا. خَمْسَةُ نُورٍ وَ نَجَاةٍ؛ وَ خَمْسَةُ ظُلْمَةٍ وَ هَلَاكِ؛ وَ وَاحِدٌ فِيهِ ظُلُمَاتٌ
 وَ رَعْدٌ وَ بَرْقٌ ... يَكَادُ ... يَخْطَفُ أَبْصَارَهُمْ كُلَّمَا أَضَاءَ لَهُمْ مَشَوْا فِيهِ وَ إِذَا أَظْلَمَ
 50 عَلَيْهِمْ قَامُوا. يَا نُورَ النُّورِ! إِهْدِنَا مِنْ عِنْدِكَ، وَ أَفْضِ عَلَيْنَا مِنْ فَضْلِكَ، وَ أَنْشُرْ عَلَيْنَا
 مِنْ رَحْمَتِكَ، وَ أَنْزِلْ عَلَيْنَا مِنْ بَرَكَاتِكَ؛
 وَ آتِنِي عَشَرَ عَالَمًا: مِنْ نَارٍ وَ تُرَابٍ وَ هَوَاءٍ وَ مَاءٍ فِي الْجَبَرُوتِ؛ وَ نَارٍ وَ تُرَابٍ
 وَ هَوَاءٍ وَ مَاءٍ فِي الْمَلَكُوتِ؛ وَ نَارٍ وَ تُرَابٍ وَ هَوَاءٍ وَ مَاءٍ فِي الْمُلْكِ.
 وَ هَكَذَا كُلُّ عِبَارَةٍ فِي الرِّوَايَاتِ وَ كَلَامِ الْعُلَمَاءِ مِنْ ذِكْرِ الْعَوَالِمِ، فَتُصَرَّفُ إِلَى
 55 أَعْتِبَارٍ.

[أَبْوِيَةُ الْمَادَّةِ وَ أُمِّيَةِ الصُّورَةِ]

ثُمَّ آعَلِمَ أَنَّ آدَمَ (ع) أَبُو الْعَالَمِ فِي كُلِّ عَالَمٍ، إِلَى أَلْفِ أَلْفِ عَالَمٍ. وَ أَوَّلُ آدَمَ وَجَدَ هُوَ الْمَشِيَّةُ، وَ هُوَ آدَمُ الْكَبِيرُ، وَ فَلَكَ الْوَلَايَةُ الْمُطْلَقَةُ، وَ الْحَقِيقَةُ الْمُحَمَّدِيَّةُ، وَ مَقَامُ «أَوَّلِ أَذْنَى»، وَ عَالَمُ «فَأَحْبَبْتُ أَنْ أُعْرِفُ». وَ كُلُّ آدَمَ فَهُوَ لَمْ يُخْلَقْ مِنْ أَبِي وَ أُمِّ إِلَّا الْآبِ وَ الْأُمِّ الْمُعْنَوِيَّيْنِ الَّذِينَ ذَاتُهُ تَرَكَّبَتْ مِنْهُمَا عَلَى نَحْوِ مَا سَبَقَ. وَ هُمَا الْوُجُودُ وَ الْمَاهِيَّةُ، أَيْ، الْمَادَّةُ وَ الصُّورَةُ. قَالَابُ هُوَ الْمَادَّةُ؛ وَ الْأُمُّ هِيَ الصُّورَةُ. وَ هَذَا هُوَ الْمُسْتَفَادُ مِنْ كَلَامِ أَهْلِ الْعِصْمَةِ عَلَيْهِمُ السَّلَامُ. [١٨٥]

وَ أَمَّا مَا أَصْطَلَحَ عَلَيْهِ الْمُتَقَدِّمُونَ وَ الْحُكَمَاءُ مِنْ أَنَّ الْآبَ هُوَ الصُّورَةُ، وَ الْأُمُّ هِيَ الْمَادَّةُ، وَ أَنَّ الصُّورَةَ إِذَا نَكَحَتِ الْمَادَّةَ تَوَلَّدَ عَنْهُمَا الشَّيْءُ - تَوَهَّمَا مِنْهُمْ أَنَّ الْإِنْسَانَ وَ التَّخْلُقَ فِي بَطْنِ الْمَادَّةِ، فَهِيَ الْأُمُّ - فَبَعِيدٌ مِنْ جِهَةِ الْمُنَاسَبَةِ. وَ أَمَّا مِنْ جِهَةِ مُجَرَّدِ الْإِصْطِلَاحِ وَ التَّسْمِيَةِ، مَعَ قَطْعِ النَّظَرِ عَنِ الْمُنَاسَبَةِ، فَلَا مَحْذُورَ. وَ لَكِنَّهُ لَا يَنْفَتِحُ بِهِ كُلُّ بَابٍ إِلَّا إِذَا أُريدَ بِهِ هَذَا الْإِصْطِلَاحُ الصَّوَابُ؛ بَلْ رُبَّمَا يُقَالُ أَنَّ لَيْسَ ذَلِكَ بِإِصْطِلَاحٍ، وَ إِنَّمَا الْوَاضِعُ لِلُّغَةِ الْعَرَبِيَّةِ - وَ هُوَ اللَّهُ سُبْحَانَهُ وَ تَعَالَى - وَضَعَ ذَلِكَ كَذَلِكَ. فَإِذَا ظَهَرَ لَكَ مَا قَرَرْنَا سَابِقًا وَ مَا نُقَرِّرُ لَاحِقًا، ظَهَرَ الْحَالُ مِنْ غَيْرِ حَاجَةٍ إِلَى اسْتِدْلَالٍ. وَ لَوْ سَلَّمْنَا أَنَّ ذَلِكَ لَيْسَ مِنْ أَصْلِ وَضْعِ اللُّغَةِ، قُلْنَا أَنَّ الْإِصْطِلَاحَ الْمُنَاسِبَ لِلْأَمْرِ الْوَاقِعِ أَوَّلَى بِالْمَصِيرِ إِلَيْهِ.

وَ بَيَانُ الْإِشَارَةِ إِلَى الْمُنَاسَبَةِ أَنَّ الْأَصْلَ فِي الْمَوْلُودِ هُوَ الْآبُ؛ وَ التَّخْلُقُ وَ التَّقْدِيرُ، ظَاهِرًا وَ بَاطِنًا، إِنَّمَا هُوَ فِي بَطْنِ الْأُمِّ، وَ إِنْ كَانَ الْمَوْلُودُ مُرَكَّبًا مِنْهُمَا، كَمَا رَوَى عَنْ الْحَسَنِ بْنِ عَلِيٍّ بْنِ أَبِي طَالِبٍ (ع) مَا مَعْنَاهُ: أَنَّ الْإِنْسَانَ خُلِقَ مِنْ أَرْبَعَةِ

63 T., p. 108. تَوَهَّمَا [تَوَهَّمَا]

66-67 T., p. 109. ذَلِكَ لَيْسَ [لَيْسَ ذَلِكَ]

عَشْرَ شَيْئًا: أَرْبَعَةٌ مِنْ أَبِيهِ، وَ أَرْبَعَةٌ مِنْ أُمِّهِ، وَ سِتَّةٌ مِنْ اللَّهِ. فَالَّتِي مِنَ الْآبِ الْعَظْمُ،
 75 وَ الْمَخُ، وَ الْعَصَبُ، وَ الْعُرُوقُ؛ وَ الَّتِي مِنَ الْأُمِّ اللَّحْمُ، وَ الدَّمُ، وَ الْجِلْدُ، وَ الشَّعْرُ،
 وَ الَّتِي مِنَ اللَّهِ الْخَوَاسُ الْخَمْسَةُ وَ النَّفْسُ. فَإِذَا نَظَرْتَ مَا مِنَ الْآبِ، رَأَيْتَهُ هُوَ أَصْلُ
 الْإِنْسَانِ، لِأَنَّهُ هُوَ الْقِسْمُ الْأَقْوَى. وَ لِهَذَا كَانَ جَانِبُ الْآبِ أَقْوَى وَ أُدْخِلَ فِي أَمْرِ
 الْمِيرَاثِ وَ فِي الْوِلَايَةِ وَ غَيْرِ ذَلِكَ كَالْمَادَّةِ لِأَنَّهَا هِيَ الْجَانِبُ الْأَقْوَى فِي الشَّيْءِ. وَ
 الصُّورَةُ هِيَ الْجَانِبُ الْأَضْعَفُ فِيهِ كَالْأُمِّ؛ فَإِنَّ مَا مِنْهَا ظَاهِرُ الْمَوْلُودِ وَ قَشْرِهِ كَاللَّحْمِ،
 80 وَ الدَّمُ، وَ الْجِلْدُ، وَ الشَّعْرُ، يَتَعَلَّقُ بِمَا مِنَ الْآبِ كَالصُّورَةِ تَتَعَلَّقُ بِمَا مِنَ الْمَادَّةِ
 بِحُلُولِهَا فِيهَا. لَكِنْ لَمَّا كَانَ التَّخَلُّقُ الَّذِي هُوَ التَّصْوِيرُ إِنَّمَا يَكُونُ فِي بَطْنِ الْأُمِّ، وَ
 الْأَحْكَامُ لَا تَتَعَلَّقُ لَهَا بِنَفْسِ الْمَادَّةِ - وَ إِلَّا لَتَسَاوَتْ جَمِيعُ أَشْخَاصِ النَّوعِ فِي الْأَحْكَامِ؛
 وَ إِنَّمَا تَتَعَلَّقُ بِالصُّورِ لِتَخْتَصُ كُلَّ صُورَةٍ بِمَا يُنَاسِبُ لَهَا مِنَ الْحُكْمِ - كَانَتْ الْأَحْكَامُ
 مُنَوَّطَةً بِالصُّورَةِ، كَمَا أَنَّ حُكْمَ الْمَوْلُودِ مُنَوَّطٌ بِصُورَتِهِ، وَ لَا تَكُونُ إِلَّا فِي بَطْنِ أُمِّهِ.
 85 وَ مِنْ هُنَا قَالَ (ع): [١٨٦] «السَّعِيدُ مَنْ سَعِدَ فِي بَطْنِ أُمِّهِ، وَ الشَّقِيُّ مَنْ شَقِيَ فِي
 بَطْنِ أُمِّهِ»، لِأَنَّ بَطْنَ الْأُمِّ هُوَ مَحَلُّ التَّخَلُّقِ وَ التَّصَوُّرِ، وَ ذَلِكَ هُوَ مَنَاطُ الْأَحْكَامِ.
 فَإِذَا ثَبَتَ أَنَّ الصُّورَةَ مَنَاطُ الْأَحْكَامِ، ثَبَتَ أَنَّهَا هِيَ الْأُمُّ لَا الْمَادَّةُ. وَ إِلَّا لَتَسَاوَتْ
 أَفْرَادُ النَّوعِ فِي الْحُكْمِ لَتَسَاوَاهَا فِي الْمَادَّةِ كَمَا مَرَّ. وَ نَظِيرُ ذَلِكَ الْخَشَبُ: فَإِنَّهُ مَادَّةٌ
 لِلْسَّرِيرِ وَ لِلصَّنَمِ. فَإِنْ عَمِلَ صَنَمًا، كَانَ فِعْلُهُ حَرَامًا وَ يَجِبُ كَسْرُهُ؛ وَ إِنْ عَمِلَ سَرِيرًا،

76 T., p. 110. نَظَرْتُ إِلَى مَا [نَظَرْتُ مَا

84 T., p. 110. بِالصُّورِ [بِالصُّورَةِ

88 T., p. 111. لَتَسَاوِيَهَا [لَتَسَاوَاهَا

90 كَانَ جَائِزًا. فَالْحُكْمُ عَلَيْهِ بِالْحُرْمَةِ وَ الْجَوَازِ إِنَّمَا هُوَ فِي الصُّورَةِ. فَصَارَتْ السَّعَادَةُ،
 مَثَلًا، كَالسَّرِيرِ وَ الشَّقَاوَةِ كَالصَّنَمِ. إِنَّمَا هُوَ فِي بَطْنِ الصُّورَةِ، لَا فِي بَطْنِ الْمَادَّةِ. وَ
 ذَكَرَ الْأَصْحَابُ فِي الْكَلْبِ، إِذَا نَزَا عَلَى شَاةٍ فَأَتَتْ بِوَلَدٍ: فَإِنْ كَانَ كَلْبًا، فَهُوَ حَرَامٌ وَ
 نَجِسٌ أَلْعَيْنِ؛ وَ إِنْ كَانَ شَاةً، كَانَ حَلَالًا وَ طَاهِرٌ أَلْعَيْنِ. وَ الْمَادَّةُ وَاحِدَةٌ، وَ إِنَّمَا
 الْخَلْلُ وَ الْحُرْمَةُ فِي بَطْنِ الصُّورَةِ وَ هِيَ الْأُمُّ. وَ هَذَا ظَاهِرٌ لِمَنْ كَانَ لَهُ قَلْبٌ أَوْ أَلْقَى
 95 السَّمْعَ وَ هُوَ شَهِيدٌ.

وَ إِلَى مَا ذَكَرْنَا وَرَدَ التَّصْرِيحُ عَنِ الصَّادِقِ (ع) فِي قَوْلِهِ (ع): «إِنَّ اللَّهَ خَلَقَ
 الْمُؤْمِنِينَ مِنْ نُورِهِ وَ صَبَّغَهُمْ فِي رَحْمَتِهِ؛ فَالْمُؤْمِنُ أَخُو الْمُؤْمِنِ لِأَبِيهِ وَ أُمِّهِ: أَبُوهُ
 النُّورُ وَ أُمُّهُ الرَّحْمَةُ» فَانْظُرْ إِلَى صِرَاحَةِ هَذَا الْحَدِيثِ فِي الْمَدْعَى لِأَنَّ النُّورَ هُوَ
 الْمَادَّةُ. وَ الْمُرَادُ بِهِ الْوُجُودُ لِقَوْلِ الصَّادِقِ (ع) فِي تَفْسِيرِ قَوْلِهِ (ع): «إِتَّقُوا فِرَاسَةَ
 100 الْمُؤْمِنِ، فَإِنَّهُ يَنْظُرُ بِنُورِ اللَّهِ». قَالَ (ع): «يَعْنِي، بِنُورِهِ الَّذِي خَلَقَ مِنْهُ». وَ الرَّحْمَةُ
 هِيَ الصُّورَةُ لِأَنَّ الصُّورَةَ هِيَ صَبْغٌ لِلْمَادَّةِ؛ فَالرَّحْمَةُ صَبْغُ الْوُجُودِ. وَ هِيَ الْمَاهِيَّةُ
 الثَّانِيَّةُ لِأَنَّ الْمَاهِيَّةَ الْأُولَى شَرَطٌ لِتَحَقُّقِ الْوُجُودِ فِي الْخَلْقِ الْأَوَّلِ قَبْلَ التَّكْلِيفِ. وَ أَمَّا
 فِي الْخَلْقِ الثَّانِي، حِينَ قَالَ لَهُمْ «أَلَسْتُ بِرَبِّكُمْ»، فَمَنْ أَجَابَ بِلِسَانِهِ وَ قَلْبِهِ خُلِقَ مِنْ
 صُورَةٍ الْإِجَابَةِ، وَ هِيَ الصُّورَةُ الْإِنْسَانِيَّةُ حَقِيقَةً، وَ هِيَ الصَّبْغُ فِي الرَّحْمَةِ، فَافْهَمْ. وَ
 105 مَنْ عَصَى بِقَلْبِهِ خُلِقَ مِنَ الصُّورَةِ الشَّيْطَانِيَّةِ، وَ هِيَ الصَّبْغُ فِي الْغَضَبِ. فَالسَّعِيدُ مَنْ
 سَعِدَ فِي صَبْغِ الرَّحْمَةِ؛ قَالَ (ع) وَ هِيَ الْأُمُّ. وَ الشَّقِيُّ مَنْ شَقِيَ فِي صَبْغِ الْغَضَبِ.

وَ نَظِيرُهُ، مِنْ الْمَعْرُوفِ عِنْدَ النَّاسِ، فِي الْإِنْسَانِ أَنَّهُ حَيَوَانٌ نَاطِقٌ. فَالْحَيَوَانُ مَادَّةٌ
 تَصْلُحُ لِلْإِنْسَانِ وَ الْكَلْبِ. وَ الصُّورَةُ لِمَادَّةِ الْإِنْسَانِ النَّاطِقِيَّةُ. [١٨٧] فَالْنُّطْقُ هُوَ

90 T., p. 111. وَ الْحُكْمُ [فَالْحُكْمُ 90

T., p. 113. وَ الصُّورَةُ فَهِيَ النَّاطِقِيَّةُ [وَ الصُّورَةُ لِمَادَّةِ الْإِنْسَانِ النَّاطِقِيَّةُ 108

الصُّورَةُ وَ هِيَ الَّتِي يَتَمَيَّزُ فِيهَا الْإِنْسَانُ مِنَ الْكَلْبِ؛ فَهِيَ الْأُمُّ الَّتِي يَشْقَى فِي بَطْنِهَا
الشَّقِيُّ، وَ يَسْعَدُ فِيهَا السَّعِيدُ. 110

ثُمَّ أَعْلَمُ أَنَّ الْحِصَّةَ الَّتِي فِي الْإِنْسَانِ مِنَ الْحَيَوَانِ الَّتِي هِيَ الْمَادَّةُ وَ الْحِصَّةُ الَّتِي
فِي الْكَلْبِ مِنَ الْحَيَوَانِ الَّتِي هِيَ مَادَّتُهُ تَجْمَعُهُمَا حَقِيقَةٌ وَاحِدَةٌ فِي الظَّاهِرِ، بِلِحَاطِ أَنْ
الْحَيَوَانَ هُوَ الْمُتَحَرِّكُ بِالْإِرَادَةِ الْمَعْرُوفَةِ عِنْدَ الْعَوَامِّ؛ وَ عَلَيْهِ جَرَى إِصْطِلَاحَاتُ
الْعُلَمَاءِ فِي أَكْثَرِ كُتُبِهِمْ وَ مُحَاوِرَاتِهِمْ.

وَ أَمَّا فِي الْحَقِيقَةِ: فَهَلْ هُمَا كَذَلِكَ، وَ إِنَّمَا اخْتَلَفَا بِإِضَافَةِ الصُّورَةِ مِنْ جِهَةِ قَابِلِيَّةِ
كُلِّ مَنَّهُمَا وَ اسْتِعْدَادِهَا، أَمْ لَا، بَلْ كُلُّ حِصَّةٍ مِنْ حَقِيقَةٍ لِأَنَّ مَرَاتِبَ الوجودِ
مُتَفَاوِتَةٌ، وَ لَا يَنْحَصِرُ تَفَاوُتُهَا فِي مَرَاتِبِ الْمَشَكِّ بِالْقُوَّةِ وَ الضَّعْفِ، لِيُقَالُ أَنَّ مَا
اخْتَلَفَ مِنَ الْمَشَكِّ تَجْمَعُهُ حَقِيقَةٌ وَاحِدَةٌ، بَلْ مِنْهُ الْمَشَكُّ وَ مِنْهُ الْأَعْرَاضُ
كَالْأَضْوَاءِ وَ الْأَنْوَارِ وَ الصِّفَاتِ وَ الْأَفْعَالِ وَ النَّسَبِ، وَ ذَلِكَ لَا تَجْمَعُهُ مَعَ مَعْرُوضِهِ
حَقِيقَةٌ وَاحِدَةٌ؛ وَ إِنْ قُلْنَا أَنَّ كُلَّ أَثَرٍ يُشَابِهُ صِفَةً مُؤَثِّرَهُ لِأَنَّ جِهَةَ الْمَشَابَهَةِ هِيَ أَهْمِيَّةُ
فِي الصِّفَةِ وَ الْأَثَرِ؛ 115

أَمْ هُمَا مِنْ شَيْءٍ وَاحِدٍ، وَ تَتَفَاوَتُ الْخِصَصُ بِمَا تَكْتَسِبُ مِنَ الصُّورِ، لَا بِقَابِلِيَّتِهَا
وَ اسْتِعْدَادِهَا؟

وَ الْحَقُّ فِي الْمَسْأَلَةِ أَنَّ مَا كَانَ مِنْ شَيْءٍ وَاحِدٍ مِنْهَا، كَالْخِصَصِ الْمُسْتَحْدَةِ مِنْ
الذَّاتِ الْوَاحِدَةِ أَوْ مِنَ الْعَرَضِ، فَهِيَ فِي الْحَقِيقَةِ وَاحِدَةٌ. وَ اخْتِلَافُ الْخِصَصِ، إِذَا 125

113 T., p. 115. [العوالم] [العوام]

116 T., p. 115. [استعدادهما] [استعدادها]

122 T., p. 116. [تفاوتت] [تفاوت]

124 T., p. 117. [كلما] [ما]

كَانَتْ مِنْ شَيْءٍ وَاحِدٍ، إِنَّمَا هُوَ بِاخْتِلَافِ اكْتِسَابِهَا مِنَ الصُّورِ مِنَ الْأَعْمَالِ الظَّاهِرَةِ وَ
الْبَاطِنَةِ النَّاشِئَةِ عَنْ اخْتِلَافِ مَرَاتِبِ الْإِجَابَةِ فِي عَالَمِ الذَّرِّ، وَ اخْتِلَافِ الصُّورِ فِي
الْقَابِلِيَّةِ وَ الْأِسْتِعْدَادِ، بِسَبَبِ اخْتِلَافِ أَنْفِعَالِهِ مِنَ الْخِصَصِ، بِسَبَبِ تَفَاوُتِ مَرَاتِبِهَا وَ
مُشَخَّصَاتِهَا. فَتَتَفَاضَلُ إِذَا اجْتَمَعَتْ فِي الدَّرَجَاتِ لِكُنْهَ لَا تَتَجَاوَزُ الْحَقِيقَةَ الْجَامِعَةَ
لِتِلْكَ الْخِصَصِ.

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وَ مَا كَانَ مِنْ شَيْئَيْنِ، مَعَ مَا كَانَ مِنْ شَيْءٍ وَاحِدٍ، اجْتَمَعَا فِي الرُّتْبَةِ الْجَامِعَةِ
كَالْإِنْسَانِ وَ الْفَرَسِ يَجْتَمِعَانِ فِي الْخِصَّةِ الْحَيَوَانِيَّةِ الْفُلُكِيَّةِ الْحَسَّاسَةِ، وَ يَتَفَارِقَانِ فِيمَا
فَوْقَهَا. قَالَ إِنْسَانٌ: فِيهِ مِنَ الْحَيَوَانِيَّةِ حِصَّتَانِ: ذَاتِيَّةٌ وَ عَرَضِيَّةٌ. وَ فِي الْفَرَسِ: حِصَّةٌ
وَاحِدَةٌ ذَاتِيَّةٌ لَهَا؛ هِيَ عَرَضِيَّةُ الْإِنْسَانِ. وَ الْخِصَّةُ الذَّاتِيَّةُ لِلْإِنْسَانِ هِيَ حِصَّةٌ مِّنْ
النَّاطِقِيَّةِ الْقُدْسِيَّةِ.

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فَالْحَيَوَانِيَّةُ الْفُلُكِيَّةُ الْحَسَّاسَةُ لَا تَقْبَلُ الصُّورَةَ الْإِنْسَانِيَّةَ، وَ تَقْبَلُ صُورَ جَمِيعِ
الْحَيَوَانَاتِ. وَ يَلْزَمُ حُكْمَ الصُّورَةِ تِلْكَ الْخِصَّةُ سَوَاءً قَرَّتْ، كَمَا فِي سَائِرِ الْحَيَوَانَاتِ إِلَّا
نَادِرًا، [١٨٨] أَمْ تَغَيَّرَتْ، كَمَا فِي الْإِنْسَانِ. فَإِنَّهَا إِذَا لَمْ تَكُنْ نَفْسُهُ مُطْمَئِنَّةً تَكُونُ تِلْكَ
الْخِصَّةُ الْحَيَوَانِيَّةُ الْفُلُكِيَّةُ الْحَسَّاسَةُ أَبَدًا تَلْبِسُ صُورَ الْحَيَوَانَاتِ. فَتَلْبِسُ فِي الْعَصَبِ
صُورَةَ سَبْعٍ، وَ فِي الشَّهْوَةِ، صُورَةَ خَنْزِيرٍ، وَ فِي النَّمِيمَةِ، صُورَةَ عَقْرَبٍ، وَ هَكَذَا.

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وَ الْخِصَّةُ النَّاطِقَةُ الْقُدْسِيَّةُ لَا تَقْبَلُ شَيْئًا مِّنْ صُورِ الْحَيَوَانَاتِ وَ إِنَّمَا تَقْبَلُ
الصُّورَةَ الْإِنْسَانِيَّةَ فَقَطْ؛ وَ لَا تَقْبَلُ الصُّورَةَ الْجَامِعِيَّةَ الْكُلِّيَّةَ. وَ الْمَعْصُومُ عَلَيْهِ
السَّلَامُ، فِيهِ ثَلَاثُ حِصَصٍ: عَرَضِيَّتَانِ، وَ هُمَا مَا فِي الْإِنْسَانِ، وَ لِكُنْهُمَا فِيهِ قَرَّتَا وَ

134 T., p. 119. لَهَا؛ وَ هِيَ [لَهَا؛ هِيَ

134 T., p. 119. عَرَضِيَّةُ الْإِنْسَانِ [عَرَضِيَّةُ الْإِنْسَانِ

أَطْمَأْنَنَّا، فَلَا يَخْرُجَانِ عَنْ حُكْمِ الثَّلَاثَةِ أَبَدًا وَ هِيَ الْحِصَّةُ الْمَلَكُوتِيَّةُ الْإِلَهِيَّةُ: تَقْبَلُ
 صُورَةَ التَّوْحِيدِ، وَ هِيَ الْعِصْمَةُ، وَ مَرْتَبَةُ الْقُطْبِيَّةِ لِلْوُجُودِ، وَ الصُّورَةُ الْجَامِعِيَّةُ
 الْكُلِّيَّةُ. 145

فَالْحِصَّةُ الْحَيَوَانِيَّةُ الْفُلْكَِيَّةُ مُرَكَّبٌ لِلنَّاطِقَةِ الْقُدْسِيَّةِ وَ أَثَرُ لَهَا؛ خُلِقَتْ مِنْ فَاضِلِهَا.
 وَ النَّاطِقَةُ الْقُدْسِيَّةُ أَثَرٌ لِلْمَلَكُوتِيَّةِ الْإِلَهِيَّةِ؛ خُلِقَتْ مِنْ فَاضِلِهَا. فَلَا تَجْمَعُ هَذِهِ الثَّلَاثُ
 حَقِيقَةً وَاحِدَةً. نَعَمْ، إِذَا نَظَرْنَا بِنَظَرٍ آخَرَ، بِأَنَّ الْكُلَّ مِنْ مَرَاتِبِ الْوُجُودِ، وَ أَنَّهُ
 حَيَوَةٌ وَ شُعُورٌ، وَ إِنَّمَا يَخْتَلِفُ بِحَسَبِ مَظَاهِرِهِ، جَارَ عَلَى هَذَا إِطْلَاقُ الْإِتِّحَادِ فِي
 الْجُمْلَةِ إِلَّا أَنَّكَ إِذَا عَرَفْتَ مَا ذَكَرْنَا لَكَ مِنْ اخْتِلَافِ الْحَقَائِقِ، ظَهَرَ لَكَ التَّغَايُرُ. 150

الْفَائِدَةُ السَّادِسَةُ

فِي الْإِشَارَةِ إِلَى الْقِسْمِ الثَّلَاثِ

وَهُوَ الوجودُ الْمُقَيَّدُ. أَوَّلُهُ الدَّرَّةُ؛ وَ آخِرُهُ الدَّرَّةُ

وَ كَيْفِيَّةُ بَدْئِهِ

5 وَ هِيَ أَنَّهُ قَدْ أَخَذَ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى بِضِعْلِهِ، بِأَسْمِهِ الْقَابِضِ ، مِنْ رَطُوبَةِ هَوَاءِ الْجَوَازِ
أَرْبَعَةَ أَجْزَاءٍ قَدْ صَعَدَتْ مِنْ أَرْضِ الْإِمْكَانِ، أَرْضِ الْجُرْزِ، وَ مِنْ هَبَاءِ أَرْضِ الْجَوَازِ
جُزْءًا؛ فَقَدَّرَهُمَا فِي هَاضِمَةِ أَسْمِهِ الْبَدِيعِ . فَأَنْحَلَّتِ الْيُبُوسَةُ فِي الرِّطُوبَةِ، وَ أَنْعَقَدَتْ
الرِّطُوبَةُ بِالْيُبُوسَةِ، فَاتَّحَدَا؛ وَ ذَلِكَ لِمَا بَيْنَهُمَا مِنَ الْمَشَاكَلَةِ. فَارْتَفَعَ مِنْ ذَلِكَ الْبَحْرُ
سَحَابًا مُزَجَّجِي. فَتَرَاكَمَ تَحْتَ الْمَشِيَّةِ، فَأَنْحَلَّ مِنْ ذَلِكَ السَّحَابِ الْمُتَرَاكَمِ، بِحَرَارَةِ
10 الْإِرَادَةِ، مَاءً، فَدَفَعَهُ بِأَسْمِهِ الْبَاعِثِ ، فَوَقَعَ عَلَى الْبَلَدِ الْمَيِّتِ وَ الْأَرْضِ الْجُرْزِ، وَ هِيَ
الْأَرْضُ الْجَوَازِ وَ الْعُمُقُ الْأَكْبَرُ. فَأَنْحَلَّ مِنْهُ جُزْآنِ بِمَا يُشَاكِلُهُ مِنْ أَرْضِ ذَلِكَ الْعُمُقِ
الْأَكْبَرِ بِجُزْءٍ. فَأَخْرَجَ مِنْهُمَا تِلْكَ الزُّرُوعَ وَ الثَّمَرَاتِ.

وَ مَا فَضَلَ مِنْ رَطُوبَتِهِ، بَعْدَ تَقْدِيرِهِ وَ سُفْيِهِ فِي ظُلُمَاتٍ ثَلَاثٍ، يَأْخُذُهُ بِأَسْمِهِ
الْقَابِضِ ، مَعَ قَدْرِ رُبْعِهِ مِنْ لَطِيفِ هَبَاءِ أَرْضِ الْإِمْكَانِ، [١٨٩] وَ يَعْمَلُ فِيهِ كَمَا مَرَّ؛
15 ذَلِكَ تَقْدِيرُ الْعَزِيزِ الْعَلِيمِ . وَ هُوَ قَوْلُهُ (تَع): «وَ الْأَرْضُ مَدَدْنَاهَا وَ أَلْقَيْنَا فِيهَا
رَوَابِي وَ أَنْبَتْنَا فِيهَا مِنْ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ مُزْرُونٍ» .

وَ هَذَا الْمَاءُ النَّازِلُ مِنَ السَّحَابِ الْمُتَرَاكَمِ هُوَ الَّذِي ذَكَرَهُ اللَّهُ عَزَّ وَ جَلَّ فِي

قَوْلِهِ (تع): «وَجَعَلْنَا مِنَ الْمَاءِ كُلَّ شَيْءٍ حَيٍّ» .

وَهُوَ الوجودُ الْمَقَيَّدُ؛ وَهُوَ مِنْ بَعْدِ الْمَشِيَّةِ إِلَى مَا لَا نِهَايَةَ لَهُ مِنَ الْمَشِيَّةِ. وَ هَذَا الوجودُ الْمَسْمِيُّ بِالْمَاءِ، عَلَى هَذَا النَّحْوِ الْمَذْكُورِ، يَكُونُ فِي كُلِّ شَيْءٍ بِحَسَبِهِ. 20

وَمِثَالُهُ: إِذَا أَرَدْتَ أَنْ تُخَيِّرَ مَنْ تُخَاطِبُهُ بِقِيَامِ زَيْدٍ، أَخَذْتَ مِنَ أَهْوَاءِ الَّذِي هُوَ إِمْكَانُ اللَّفْظِ، هَوَاءٌ، وَهُوَ مُشْتَمِلٌ عَلَى أَرْبَعَةِ أَجْزَاءٍ: مِنَ الرُّطُوبَةِ أَهْوَائِيَّةٍ؛ وَ عَلَى جُزْءٍ مِنَ الْيُبُوسَةِ أَهْبَائِيَّةٍ، بِالقُوَّةِ الْقَابِضَةِ إِلَى جَوْفِكَ الَّذِي هُوَ نُقْطَةُ قَلْبِكَ، أَيْ، وَجْهُهُ فِي أَهْوَاءٍ؛ فَتَوَلَّفَ مِنْهُمَا، بَعْدَ التَّقْدِيرِ بِالضَّغْطِ وَ الْقَلْعِ وَ الْقَرَعِ، حُرُوفًا مُشْتَمِلَةً عَلَى الْأَجْزَاءِ الْخَمْسَةِ مُتَّصِفَةً بِصِفَاتِ مَادَّةٍ مَقْصُودِكَ؛ فَتَوَلَّفَ مِنْهَا لَفْظًا، 25

هَيْئَتُهُ كَهَيْئَةِ مَقْصُودِكَ. فَتَدَفَّعَهُ إِلَى أَهْوَاءِ الَّذِي هُوَ مَكَانُ إِمْكَانِهِ، فَيَقَعُ جُزْآنِ مِنْ رَطُوبَةٍ لَفْظِكَ، وَ هِيَ مَادَّتُهُ الْمُنَاسِبَةُ لِمَادَّةِ مَقْصُودِكَ؛ وَ جُزْءٌ مِنَ يَبُوسَتِهِ، وَ هِيَ هَيْئَتُهُ الْمُنَاسِبَةُ لِهَيْئَةِ مَقْصُودِكَ، عَلَى مَا يُشَاكِلُهُ مِنْ أَرْضٍ هَذَا الْعُمُقِ وَ الْجَرَزِ. وَ هُوَ أَهْوَاءٌ لِأَنَّهُ هُوَ الَّذِي يَحْفَظُ لَفْظَكَ وَ يُوَصِّلُهُ إِلَى أُذُنِ مُخَاطَبِكَ لِيَرْتَسِمَ فِي الْحِسِّ 30

الْمُشْتَرَكِ مِنْهُ صُورَةُ مَادَّةِ لَفْظِكَ وَ صُورَةُ هَيْئَتِهِ. فَإِنَّهُ لِلْفَظِّ كَالْأَمِّ لِلْجِنِّينَ، وَ كَالْأَرْضِ لِلْمَاءِ الَّذِي يَنْزِلُ مِنَ السَّحَابِ فَيَنْبُتُ بِهِ النَّبَاتُ. فَوَقَعَ مِنْ لَفْظِكَ مَاءٌ عَلَى أَرْضٍ ذَلِكَ الْمَعْنَى. وَ هَذَا الْمَاءُ هُوَ الوجودُ لِذَلِكَ الْمَعْنَى. وَ هُوَ دَلَالَةٌ لَفْظِكَ بِمَادَّتِهِ وَ هَيْئَتِهِ الْوَاقِعَةُ فِي الْحِسِّ الْمُشْتَرَكِ الَّذِي هُوَ الْأُمُّ؛ فَيَنْبُتُ الْمَعْنَى فِي بَطْنِ تِلْكَ الْأُمِّ، وَ هُوَ الْخَيَالُ، بِذَلِكَ الْمَاءِ الَّذِي هُوَ الدَّلَالَةُ وَ يُخَيِّي بِهَا. وَ لَمْ يَكْ ذَلِكَ الْمَعْنَى قَبْلَ

31 T., p. 134. مِنْهُ النَّبَاتُ [بِهِ النَّبَاتُ]

34 T., p. 134. لَمْ يَكُنْ لَمْ يَكْ

26 [فَيَقَعُ] In A. we find فَيَقَعُ. This is an obvious accidental error on the writer's part; note that in the manuscript 'فَيَقَعُ' occurs at the end of line 9 and again at the beginning of line 10.

35 تِلْكَ الدَّلَالَةُ شَيْئًا، لِأَنَّ الشَّيْءَ، إِنَّمَا سُمِّيَ [١٩٠] شَيْئًا لِأَنَّهُ مُشَاءٌ. وَ الْمَشِيَّةُ هِيَ أَصْلُ
الْإِرَادَةِ، فَافْهَمُ.

الْفَائِدَةُ السَّابِعَةُ

[في الإشارة إلى الخلق الثاني]

و تقسيم الوجود المقيّد

إِعْلَمَ أَنَّهُ لَمَّا نَزَلَ الْمَاءُ الْأَوَّلُ الْمُسَمَّى بِالْوُجُودِ الْمَقْيَدِ عَلَى أَرْضٍ أَجْرَزٍ تَكُونُ مِنْهُ الشَّيْءُ فِي سِتَّةِ أَيَّامٍ: الْكَمُّ، وَ الْكَيْفُ، وَ الْوَقْتُ، وَ الْمَكَانُ، وَ الْجِهَةُ، وَ الرُّتْبَةُ، لَيْسَ شَيْءٌ مِنْهَا فِي الظُّهُورِ قَبْلَ الْآخِرِ. وَإِنَّمَا هَذِهِ، مَعَ الْمَادَّةِ الَّتِي هِيَ حِصَّةُ الْوُجُودِ،⁵ وَ مَعَ الصُّورَةِ الَّتِي هِيَ حِصَّةُ الْمَاهِيَةِ، هِيَ الشَّيْءُ. ظَهَرَ الْجَمِيعُ دَفْعَةً لِأَنَّ كُلَّ وَاحِدٍ مِنْ هَذِهِ الثَّمَانِيَةِ شَرْطٌ لِكُلِّهَا فِي الظُّهُورِ. وَ الشَّيْءُ الْمَوْجُودُ مُرَكَّبٌ مِنَ الْوُجُودِ وَ الْمَاهِيَةِ، وَ السِّتَّةُ قِيُودٌ مُقَوِّمَاتٌ لَهَا.

وَ إِنَّمَا ذَكَرْنَا السِّتَّةَ خَاصَّةً لِأَنَّ غَيْرَهَا، كَالْأَوْضَاعِ، وَ الْإِذْنِ فِي الظُّهُورِ، وَ أَجَلِ الْفَنَاءِ، وَ الْكُتُبِ الْخَافِظَةِ لَهُدِهِ الْمَذْكُورَةِ، مِنْ حَيْثُ هِيَ حَافِظَةٌ وَ مِنْ حَيْثُ هِيَ مُحْفُوظَةٌ،¹⁰ وَ كَالْإِمْضَاءِ الَّذِي هُوَ شَرْحُ الْعِلَلِ وَ الْأَسْبَابِ، وَ غَيْرِ ذَلِكَ، كُلُّهَا رَاجِعَةٌ إِلَى السِّتَّةِ. فَلِهَذَا اقْتَصَرْنَا عَلَى ذِكْرِهَا فِي ذِكْرِ الْبَدْءِ لِأَنَّ الْأَوْضَاعَ لَازِمَةً لِلْمَكَانِ وَ الْجِهَةِ وَ الرُّتْبَةِ، وَ الْإِذْنَ وَ الْأَجَلَ لَازِمَانِ لِلْوَقْتِ، وَ الْكُتُبَ لَازِمَةً لِلْسِّتَّةِ، وَ الْإِمْضَاءَ لَازِمًا لَمَّا سَبَقَ وَ مُتَفَرِّعٌ عَلَيْهِ لِأَنَّ حُصُولَ هَذِهِ السِّتَّةِ لِلْمَاهِيَةِ وَ الْوُجُودِ وَ لَوَازِمِهَا

⁸ T., p. 137. [الْإِذْنِ لَهَا فِي]

⁹ T., p. 137. [الْمَذْكُورَاتِ الْمَذْكُورَةِ،

الْمُشَارُ إِلَيْهَا يَلْزَمُ مِنْهُ الْإِمْضَاءُ فِي الْحِكْمَةِ وَ يَتَفَرَّغُ عَلَيْهَا. وَ الْبَاقِي، إِنْ شَاءَ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى ، نَذْكُرُهُ فِيمَا بَعْدُ. 15

[أصالة الوجود و الماهية معا]

ثُمَّ أَعْلَمَ أَنَّهُ قَدْ اخْتَلَفَ فِي الشَّيْءِ اخْتِلَافًا كَثِيرًا. وَ يَرْجِعُ ذَلِكَ إِلَى أَرْبَعَةِ أَقْوَالٍ؛ وَ لَا عِبْرَةَ بِذِكْرِ غَيْرِهَا:

الْأَوَّلُ أَنَّ الشَّيْءَ هُوَ الوجودُ وَ الماهيةُ عَرَضٌ حَالٌ بِالوجودِ؛

الثَّانِي أَنَّ الشَّيْءَ هُوَ الماهيةُ وَ الوجودُ عَرَضٌ عَلَى الماهيةِ؛ 20

الثَّالِثُ أَنَّ الشَّيْءَ هُوَ الوجودُ وَ الماهيةُ إِنَّمَا هِيَ بِتَبَعِيَّةِ الوجودِ؛

الرَّابِعُ أَنَّ الشَّيْءَ هُوَ الوجودُ وَ الماهيةُ، فَهُوَ مُرَكَّبٌ مِنْهُمَا لِأَنَّ الوجودَ شَرْطُ كَوْنِهِ صُورًا وَ اسْتِمْرَارًا لَماهيةً؛ وَ الماهيةُ شَرْطُ تَكُونِهَا انْصِدَارًا وَ اسْتِمْرَارًا لَوجودٍ. فَمَا دَامَا مَوْجُودَيْنِ مُنْصَمَيْنِ، فَالشَّيْءُ مَوْجُودٌ. فَلَا شَيْئَةَ لِلشَّيْءِ مَعَ فَقْدِ أَحَدِهِمَا وَ لَا لِلْآخِرِ وَ الوجودُ مَادَّةٌ لِنَفْسِهِ؛ وَ صُورَتُهُ لِنَفْسِهِ إِرْتِبَاطُ الماهيةِ لِنَفْسِهِ. 25

وَ الماهيةُ مَادَّةٌ لِنَفْسِهَا؛ وَ صُورَتُهَا رِبْطُ الوجودِ بِهَا. قَالَ اللَّهُ (تَع): «هُنَّ لِبَاسٌ لَكُمْ وَ أَنْتُمْ لِبَاسٌ لِهِنَّ»؛ فَهُمَا الشَّيْءُ. فَهُوَ مُرَكَّبٌ مِنْهُمَا أَبَدًا.

فَالْوجودُ جِهَةٌ فَقَرِهِ إِلَى اللَّهِ؛ وَ هُوَ جِهَةٌ اسْتِغْنَائِيَّةٌ. وَ الماهيةُ جِهَةٌ اسْتِغْنَائِيَّةٌ؛ وَ

14-15 T., p. 138. وَ الْبَاقِي، نَذْكُرُهُ إِنْ شَاءَ اللَّهُ فِيمَا بَعْدُ [وَ الْبَاقِي، إِنْ شَاءَ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى ، نَذْكُرُهُ فِيمَا بَعْدُ 15]

17 T., p. 139. قَدْ اخْتَلَفَتْ الْأَرْأَاءُ [قَدْ اخْتَلَفَ 17]

20 T., p. 139. عَارِضٌ [عَرَضٌ 20]

25 T., p. 143. مَادَّتُهُ نَفْسُهُ [مَادَّةٌ لِنَفْسِهِ 25]

26 T., p. 143. مَادَّتُهَا نَفْسُهَا [مَادَّةٌ لِنَفْسِهَا 26]

28-29 T., p. 145. هُوَ [هُوَ 28-29]

هُوَ جِهَةٌ فَقَرِهِ. فَافْتِقَارُهُ اسْتِغْنَاءٌ وَ وُجُودُهُ. وَ اسْتِغْنَاؤُهُ فَقْرٌ وَ عَدَمٌ. فَظَرُّهُ بِالْفَوَادِ حَقٌّ، وَ بِالْقَلْبِ حَقِيقَةٌ، وَ بِاللُّرَابِ بَاطِلٌ، وَ بِالنَّفْسِ سَرَابٌ. وَ ذَلِكَ لِأَنَّ الْوُجُودَ مُتَقَوِّمٌ بِالْوُجُودِ الْمُتَقَوِّمِ بِالْحَقِّ؛ وَ الْمَاهِيَّةُ مُتَقَوِّمَةٌ بِالْوُجُودِ نَفْسُهُ مِنْ دُونِ الْوُجُودِ الْمُتَقَوِّمِ بِالْحَقِّ؛ وَ جَدُّهَا وَ قَوْمُهَا يَسْجُدُونَ لِلشَّمْسِ مِنْ دُونِ اللَّهِ .

30

وَ هَذَا هُوَ أَهْيُولِي لِلْإِنْسَانِ، وَ هُوَ بِمَنْزِلَةِ أَلِدَادِ الْمُرَكَّبِ مِنْ صَمَخٍ، وَ سَوَادٍ، وَ رَاجٍ، وَ عَفْصٍ، وَ مِلْحٍ، وَ صَبِرٍ، وَ نَبَاتٍ، وَ اسٍ. فَكَمَا أَنَّ أَلِدَادَ، مِنْ حَيْثُ هُوَ، [١٩١] صَالِحٌ لِلْإِسْمِ الشَّرِيفِ وَ الْإِسْمِ الْوَضِيعِ ، وَ إِنَّمَا تُمَيِّزُ بَيْنَهُمَا الصُّورَةُ الثَّانِيَّةُ، أَيْ، الْكِتَابَةُ بِهَيْئَاتِهَا - وَ هِيَ الْمَاهِيَّةُ الثَّانِيَّةُ) - كَذَلِكَ هَذِهِ أَهْيُولِي الْمُرَكَّبَةُ مِنْ الْوُجُودِ وَ الْمَاهِيَّةِ صَالِحَةٌ لِلْمُؤْمِنِ وَ الْكَافِرِ، وَ لَا يَتَمَيِّزُ إِلَّا بِالصُّورَةِ الثَّانِيَّةِ الَّتِي هِيَ الْخَلْقُ الثَّانِي وَ هِيَ الْمَاهِيَّةُ الثَّانِيَّةُ.

35

[في الهامش: عَلَى الْخَلْقِ الثَّانِي]

فَسَأَلَهُمْ لِعِلْمِهِ بِهِمْ حِينَ سَأَلُوهُ أَنْ يَسْأَلَهُمْ. فَقَالَ لَهُمْ: «أَلَسْتُ بِرَبِّكُمْ، وَ مُحَمَّدٌ نَبِيُّكُمْ، وَ عَلَيَّ وَ لِيُكُمْ؟ فَ قَالُوا بِأَجْمَعِهِمْ بَلَى» :

40

مِنْهُمْ مَنْ قَالَهَا مُصَدَّقًا بِلِسَانِهِ وَ قَلْبِهِ عَنْ عِلْمٍ كَمَا قَالَ (تع): «إِلَّا مَنْ شَهِدَ بِالْحَقِّ وَ هُمْ يَعْلَمُونَ». فَخَلَقَهُمْ مِنْ صُورَةِ التَّصْدِيقِ وَ الْمَعْرِفَةِ، وَ هِيَ الصُّورَةُ الْإِنْسَانِيَّةُ، وَ هِيَ هَيْكَلُ التَّوْحِيدِ، وَ هِيَ مِنْ فَلَكَ الْبُرُوجِ، وَ هُمْ الْمُرْسَلُونَ، وَ الْأَنْبِيَاءُ، وَ الصَّادِقُونَ، وَ الشُّهَدَاءُ، وَ الصَّالِحُونَ؛

45

29 T., p. . وَ افْتِقَارُهُ [فَافْتِقَارُهُ]

36 T., p. 148. بِهَيْئَاتِهَا

40 T., p. 149. فَقَالَ: [فَقَالَ لَهُمْ:]

وَمِنْهُمْ مَنْ قَالَهَا بِلِسَانِهِ؛ وَ قَلْبُهُ مُنْكَرٌ مُكَذِّبٌ غَيْرُ قَابِلٍ. فَخَلَقَهُمْ مِنْ صُورَةٍ
 التَّكْذِيبِ وَ الْإِنْكَارِ وَ الْجُحُودِ؛ وَ هِيَ الصُّورَةُ الْحَيَوَانِيَّةُ وَ الشَّيْطَانِيَّةُ؛ وَ هُمْ
 الْكَافِرُونَ، وَ الْمُنَافِقُونَ، وَ أَتْبَاعُهُمْ مِمَّنْ تَبَيَّنَ لَهُ الْهُدَى فَأَعْرَضَ عَنْهُ. وَ هِيَ مِنْ طِينَةِ
 خَبَالٍ، وَ هِيَ سَجِّينٌ. وَ إِنَّمَا كَانَتْ فِي الدُّنْيَا صُورُهُمْ صُورَ الْإِنْسَانِ لِإِجَابَتِهِمْ
 بِاللِّسَانِ الَّذِي هُوَ الْأَذْلَى؛ وَ فِي الْآخِرَةِ تُسَلَّبُ مِنْهُمْ وَ تَظْهَرُ صُورُهُمْ الْحَقِيقِيَّةُ
 50 التَّائِبَةُ لِلْقَلْبِ؛

وَمِنْهُمْ مَنْ قَالَهَا بِلِسَانِهِ وَ قَلْبُهُ وَاقِفٌ؛ لَمْ يَقْرَأْ وَ لَمْ يَحْجِدْ. وَ هَؤُلَاءِ خَلَقَهُمُ اللَّهُ
 (تَع) مِنْ الصُّورَةِ الْإِنْسَانِيَّةِ ظَاهِرًا، لِإِقْرَارِ أَلْسِنَتِهِمْ، وَ لَمْ يَخْلُقْ بَوَاطِنَهُمْ حَتَّى يَقْرَأُوا
 أَوْ يَحْجِدُوا. فَيَخْلُقُهُمْ مِنْ حَالِهِمْ وَ هُمْ مُحْتَلِفُونَ؛ فَمِنْهُمْ فِي الدُّنْيَا، وَ مِنْهُمْ فِي الْبَرْزَخِ،
 55 وَ مِنْهُمْ فِي الْآخِرَةِ. فَمَنْ خُلِقَ بَاطِنُهُ إِنْسَانًا دَخَلَ الْجَنَّةَ، وَ مَنْ خُلِقَ غَيْرَ ذَلِكَ دَخَلَ
 النَّارَ.

فَهَذِهِ الصُّورُ الَّتِي خُلِقَتْ مِنْ الْإِجَابَةِ أَوْ الْإِنْكَارِ هِيَ الطَّيِّبَةُ، وَ هِيَ الْأُمُّ الَّتِي
 يَسْعَدُ فِي بَطْنِهَا مَنْ سَعِدَ، وَ يَشْقَى فِي بَطْنِهَا مَنْ شَقِيَ. وَ ذَلِكَ بَعْدَ أَنْ أَعْلَمَهُمْ
 بِالطَّيِّبَةِ الطَّيِّبَةِ الَّتِي هِيَ الْإِجَابَةُ وَ الطَّيِّبَةِ الْخَبِيثَةِ الَّتِي هِيَ الْإِنْكَارُ. وَ إِنَّهُ سُبْحَانَهُ لَا
 60 يَخْلُقُهُمْ إِلَّا [١٩٢] عَلَى مَا هُمْ عَلَيْهِ. وَ لَوْ خَلَقَهُمْ عَلَى غَيْرِ مَا هُمْ عَلَيْهِ لَمْ يَكُونُوا

46 qAbiliN] قَابِلٍ T., p. 151.

47 الْحَيَوَانِيَّةُ الشَّيْطَانِيَّةُ [الْحَيَوَانِيَّةُ وَ الشَّيْطَانِيَّةُ] T., p. 151.

54 فَخَلَقَهُمْ] فَخَلَقَهُمْ T., p. 153.

54 وَ مُحْتَلِفُونَ] وَ هُمْ مُحْتَلِفُونَ T., p. 153.

54 مِنْهُمْ] مِنْهُمْ T., p. 153.

55-56 دَخَلَ فِي النَّارِ] دَخَلَ النَّارِ T., p. 153.

إِيَّاهُمْ، بَلْ كَانُوا غَيْرُهُمْ. وَ لَوْ لَمْ يَقْبَلُوا، وَ خَلَقَهُمْ مِنَ الْإِنْكَارِ، وَ جَعَلَ لَهُمْ مَا جَعَلَ
لِلْمُقَرَّرِينَ، لَوَقَعَ الثَّانِي فِي خَلْقِهِمْ وَ خَلَقَهُ إِيَّاهُمْ لِأَنَّ خَلْقَهُمْ كَمَا هُمْ مُنَافٍ لِجَعْلِهِمْ
كَالطَّيْعِينَ؛ وَ جَعْلُهُمْ كَالطَّيْعِينَ مُنَافٍ لِخَلْقِهِ كَمَا هُمْ؛ وَ خَلْقُهُ كَمَا هُمْ مُنَافٍ لِخَلْقِهِ
هُمْ لَيْسَ كَمَا هُمْ؛ «وَلَوْ اتَّبَعَ الْخَلْقُ أَهْوَاءَهُمْ، لَفَسَدَتِ السَّمُوتُ وَ الْأَرْضُ وَ مَنْ
فِيهِنَّ، بَلْ أَتَيْنَاهُمْ بِذِكْرِهِمْ فَهُمْ عَنْ ذِكْرِهِمْ مُعْرِضُونَ».

65

فَهَذَا هُوَ الْخَلْقُ الثَّانِي تَحْتَ النُّورِ الْأَخْضَرِ، فِي عَالَمِ الْأُطْلَلَةِ، فِي وَرَقِ الْأَسِ
فَكَانُوا فِي الذَّرِّ، كَمَا قَالَ سُبْحَانَهُ لِلْجَنَّةِ: «وَلَا أُبَالِي»، وَ لِلنَّارِ: «وَلَا أُبَالِي». ثُمَّ
كَسَرَهُمْ فِي النُّورِ الْأَحْمَرِ، وَ هُوَ مَعْنَى قَوْلِهِ (ع): «ثُمَّ رَجَعَهُمْ إِلَى الطَّيْنِ»، أَيْ، طِينِ
الطَّبِيعَةِ.

الفائدة الثامنة

[في الإشارة إلى أجزاء المحدث في الجملة]

كُلُّ شَيْءٍ لَا يُجَاوِزُ وَقْتَهُ لِأَنَّهُ لَا يُوجَدُ إِلَّا فِيهِ؛ وَلَا ذِكْرَ لَهُ قَبْلَ ذَلِكَ. وَكُلُّ
ذِي وَقْتٍ، فَوقَهُ مُسَاوِقٌ لِمَكَانِهِ وَكَوْنِهِ لِأَنَّ الْوَقْتَ وَالْمَكَانَ وَالْكَوْنَ مُتَسَاوِقَةٌ
إِذْ كُلُّ وَاحِدٍ شَرْطٌ لِلْآخَرِ وَكَذَا بَاقِي الْمَعْنَيَاتِ وَالْمُشَخَّصَاتِ؛ فَيَلْزَمُهَا التَّضَايُفُ،
كَر: 5

الْمَشِيَّةُ، وَالسَّرْمَدُ، وَكُلُّ الْإِمْكَانِ؛
وَكَالْعَقْلِ الْأَوَّلِ، وَالذَّهْرِ، وَكُلُّ الْمُمْكِنِ؛
وَكَالْجِسْمِ وَالزَّمَانِ وَالْمَكَانِ.
وَمَرَاتِبُ الْمَشِيَّةِ، كَمَا مَرَّ، أَرْبَعٌ: وَالسَّرْمَدُ وَالْإِمْكَانُ، يَكُونُ كُلُّ وَاحِدٍ مِّنْهُمَا
فِي كُلِّ مَرْتَبَةٍ مِنَ الْأَرْبَعِ بِنِسْبَتِهَا: 10
فَلِلرَّحْمَةِ، بِالسَّرْمَدِ وَالْإِمْكَانِ، رُتْبَةُ الذَّاتِ مِنَ الشَّجَرَةِ؛
وَلِلْأَلِفِ، بِهِمَا، رُتْبَةُ الْأَصْلِ مِنَ الشَّجَرَةِ؛
وَلِلسَّحَابِ الْمُزْجِي، أَيْ، الْحُرُوفِ، بِهِمَا، رُتْبَةُ الْفَرْعِ مِنَ الشَّجَرَةِ؛
وَلِلسَّحَابِ الْمُتَرَاكِمِ، أَيْ، الْكَلِمَةِ، بِهِمَا، رُتْبَةُ الْكُلِّ مِنَ الشَّجَرَةِ.

2 لم يُوجَدُ [لا يُوجَدُ] T., p. 158.

15 فَنِسْبَةُ الْإِمْكَانِ إِلَى الْمَشِيَّةِ، بِجَمِيعِ مَرَاتِبِهَا، نِسْبَةُ الْمَكَانِ إِلَى مُحَدِّبِ مُحَدِّدِ الْجِهَاتِ،
يَعْنِي، نِهَايَةُ الْمَسَاقَةِ، بِلا حَوَايَةِ غَيْرِ الْمَسَاقَةِ إِذِ الْمَسَاقَةُ هِيَ التَّحَاوِي، لَا عَدَمُ
مُطْلَقِ الْحَوَايَةِ.

وَ لِلْعَقْلِ الْأَوَّلِ، فِي أَكْوَارِهِ الْأَرْبَعَةِ، بِالذَّهْرِ وَ الْمُمْكِنِ مَا لِلْمَشِيَّةِ بِالسَّرْمَدِ
[١٩٣] وَ الْإِمْكَانِ وَ مَا لَهَا مِنَ الْمَسَاقَةِ وَ التَّحَاوِي.

20 وَ لِلْجِسْمِ، فِي أَذْوَارِهِ الْأَرْبَعَةِ، بِالزَّمَانِ وَ الْمَكَانِ مَا ذَكَرْنَا سَابِقًا حَرْفًا بِحَرْفٍ، وَ
كَذَا فِي الْمَسَاقَةِ، أَيْ، التَّحَاوِي. يَعْنِي أَنَّ الْجِسْمَ حَاوٍ لِلزَّمَانِ وَ الْمَكَانِ؛ لَا يَخْرُجُ
مِنْهُمَا عَنْهُ شَيْءٌ. وَ الزَّمَانُ حَاوٍ لِلْجِسْمِ وَ الْمَكَانِ؛ لَا يَخْرُجُ مِنْهُمَا عَنْهُ شَيْءٌ. وَ الْمَكَانُ
حَاوٍ لِلْجِسْمِ وَ الزَّمَانِ؛ لَا يَخْرُجُ مِنْهُمَا عَنْهُ شَيْءٌ. وَ ذَلِكَ كَمَا أَشْرْنَا إِلَيْهِ فِي الْمَشِيَّةِ وَ
فِي الْعَقْلِ حَرْفًا بِحَرْفٍ

25 وَ أَمَّا الْمَاءُ الْأَوَّلُ الَّذِي بِهِ حَيَوَةُ الْعَقْلِ وَ مَا بَعْدَهُ، فَوَجْهُهُ فِي السَّرْمَدِ وَ
الْإِمْكَانِ وَ هُوَ فِي الذَّهْرِ وَ الْمُمْكِنِ.

وَ أَمَّا النُّفُوسُ، فَإِنَّهَا فِي وَسْطِ الذَّهْرِ وَ الْمُمْكِنِ؛ وَ هُوَ الْأَظْلَةُ وَ بَيْنَهَا وَ بَيْنَ
الْعَقْلِ النُّورُ الْأَصْفَرُ. وَ هُوَ الْبَرْزَخُ بَيْنَهُمَا، وَ هُوَ الْأَرْوَاحُ، وَ هُوَ مِنَ الطَّرَفِ
الْأَعْلَى. وَ آخِرُهُ النُّورُ الْأَحْمَرُ وَ جَوْهَرُ آهْبَاءٍ. فَالْكُسْرُ فِي النُّورِ الْأَحْمَرِ؛ وَ الْإِمْتِزَاجُ
30 مِنْ جَوْهَرِ آهْبَاءٍ؛ وَ الْعَقْدُ فِي الْمِثَالِ.

وَ الْمِثَالُ بَيْنَ الزَّمَانِ وَ الذَّهْرِ. فَوَجْهُهُ فِي الذَّهْرِ وَ أَسْفَلُهُ فِي الزَّمَانِ، أَيْ،

15 T., p. 160. وَالسَّرْمَدِ وَ الْإِمْكَانِ [الْإِمْكَانِ 15

15 T., p. 160. كَنِسْبَةِ الزَّمَانِ وَ الْمَكَانِ [نِسْبَةُ الْمَكَانِ 15

16-17 T., p. 160. لَا مُطْلَقَ [لَا عَدَمُ مُطْلَقِ 16-17

20 T., p. 160. [الْإِمْكَانِ 20

بِالْعَرَضِ، لِتَبَعِيَّةِ الْجِسْمِ. فَلَهُ الْجِهَتَانِ الذَّائِيَّةُ وَالْعَرَضِيَّةُ؛ وَبِهِمَا مَعًا تَحَقَّقَتْ بَرُوزُ حَيْثِيَّةٍ.
[الاستدارة على فعل الله]

ثُمَّ آغَلَمَ أَنَّ كُلَّ شَيْءٍ، مِنْ ذِي رُوحٍ أَوْ غَيْرِهِ، قَدْ بَدَأَ عَنْ فِعْلِ اللَّهِ عَلَى
الِاسْتِدَارَةِ الصَّحِيحَةِ، وَ يَعُودُ إِلَى اللَّهِ كَذَلِكَ، وَ يَقْبَلُ مِنَ اللَّهِ كَذَلِكَ. وَ سُرْعَةُ
تَذْوِيرِهِ وَ بَطْؤُهُ عَلَى حَسَبِ كَوْنِهِ وَ وَقْتِهِ. وَ هِيَ تَنَقُّلَاتٌ تَعُدُّ وَقْتَهُ، وَ لَا يُسْرِعُ
لِذَاتِهِ أَرْزِيدٌ مِنْ نِسْبَةِ كَوْنِهِ وَ وَقْتِهِ. 35

فَإِذَا حَصَلَ لَهُ شَيْءٌ أَسْرَعَ بِهِ، فَلَيْسَ قَاسِرًا لِذَاتِهِ مِنْ حَيْثُ هِيَ فَلَا يَحْدُثُ لَهَا
تَغْيِيرٌ. وَ إِنَّمَا يُعَيَّنُ ذَاتُهُ بِمَا يُمَكِّنُ لَهَا إِذْ مَا يُمَكِّنُ لِلشَّيْءِ عَلَى قِسْمَيْنِ: قِسْمٌ يُمَكِّنُ
لِذَاتِهِ بِذَاتِهِ، وَ قِسْمٌ يُمَكِّنُ لَهَا بِخَارِجِ عَنْهَا، وَ هُوَ الْمُعَيَّنُ. وَ لَوْ حَصَلَ بِالْخَارِجِ
عَكْسٌ مُفْتَضًى ذَاتِهِ فَهُوَ مُعَيَّنٌ أَيْضًا، لَا قَاسِرٌ مَا دَامَ لِمُقْتَضَاهَا فِعْلٌ؛ وَ إِلَّا فَهُوَ قَاسِرٌ. 40
وَ حِينَئِذٍ لَا يَكُونُ الشَّيْءُ ذَلِكَ الشَّيْءِ، بَلْ هُوَ غَيْرُهُ. وَ هَذَا يُسَمَّى قَاسِرًا، بِاعْتِبَارِ
قَلْبِ الذَّاتِ الْمَوْجُودَةِ. وَ إِلَّا فَفِي الْحَقِيقَةِ إِنَّ الشَّيْءَ لَا يَنْقَلِبُ إِلَى مَا لَا يُمَكِّنُ فِي
ذَاتِهِ فِي جَمِيعِ الْوُجُودِ. بَلْ لَيْسَ ذَلِكَ شَيْئًا؛ فَلَا تَتَعَلَّقُ بِهِ قُدْرَةٌ لِأَنَّ الْقُدْرَةَ لَا يَتَعَلَّقُ
إِلَّا بِالشَّيْءِ.

33 وَ [أَوْ] T., p. 165.

33-34 عَلَى الِاسْتِدَارَةِ، وَ [عَلَى الِاسْتِدَارَةِ الصَّحِيحَةِ] T., p. 165.

37-38 تَغْيِيرٌ [تَغْيِيرٌ] T., p. 166.

38 يُعَيَّنُ [يُعَيَّنُ] is an alternative vowelization.

39 الْمُعَيَّنُ [الْمُعَيَّنُ] is an alternative vowelization.

40 مُعَيَّنٌ [مُعَيَّنٌ] is an alternative vowelization.

41 حِينَئِذٍ [حِينَئِذٍ] In A. we find the abbreviation ح. In agreement with T., I take this to signify حِينَئِذٍ.

وَالشَّيْءُ الْمُمْكِنُ، لَهُ [١٩٤] خَمْسَةُ مَقَامَاتٍ:

45

الْأَوَّلُ فِي الْإِمْكَانِ وَ لَا يَكُونُ أَبَدًا؛ وَ هُوَ فِي الْمَشِيَّةِ مُمَكِّنُ الْكَوْنِ؛
وَالثَّانِي فِي الْإِمْكَانِ وَ سَيَكُونُ؛ وَ فِي الْمَشِيَّةِ يُمَكِّنُ إِلَّا يَكُونُ؛
وَالثَّلَاثُ أَنَّهُ كَانَ وَ لَا يَزَالُ أَبَدًا؛ وَ فِي الْمَشِيَّةِ يُمَكِّنُ مَحْوُهُ فِيمَا بَعْدَ، وَ إِثْبَاتُهُ
وَ مَحْوُهُ، وَ هَكَذَا؛

وَالرَّابِعُ أَنَّهُ كَانَ وَ سَوْفَ يَعْدَمُ، أَيْ، يَرْجِعُ إِلَى مَا قَبْلَ كَوْنِهِ؛ وَ فِي الْمَشِيَّةِ
يُمَكِّنُ إِلَّا يَعْدَمُ، وَ أَنْ يَعْدَمَ وَ يُعَادَ، وَ هَكَذَا؛

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وَالْخَامِسُ أَنَّهُ قَدْ كَانَ كَوْنُهُ وَ لَا تَكُونُ عَيْنُهُ؛ وَ كَانَتْ عَيْنُهُ وَ لَا يَكُونُ قَدْرُهُ؛
وَ كَانَ قَدْرُهُ وَ لَا يَكُونُ قَضَاؤُهُ؛ وَ كَانَ قَضَاؤُهُ وَ يَسْتَرُ إِمْضَاؤُهُ؛ وَ ظَهَرَ إِمْضَاؤُهُ وَ
يَعْدَمُ مِنْهُ مَا كَانَ؛ إِلَى غَيْرِ ذَلِكَ. وَ كُلُّ ذَلِكَ وَ مَا أَشَبَّهَا ذَلِكَ مِمَّا يُمَكِّنُ فِي ذَاتِهِ.

وَأَمَّا مَا لَا يُمَكِّنُ فِي ذَاتِهِ بِأَنْ يَكُونُ مُسْتَحِيلًا، أَيْ، لَا شَيْءَ بِكُلِّ اعْتِبَارٍ، أَوْ
يَكُونُ وَاجِبًا لِدَاتِهِ، أَيْ، هُوَ الشَّيْءُ لَا سِوَاهُ، فَيَسْتَحِيلُ عَلَيْهِ فَرَضُ الْإِمْكَانِ. فَلَا
يُمَكِّنُ فَرَضَ وَاحِدٍ مِنْهُمَا وَ لَا تَصَوُّرَهُ لِأَنَّ التَّصَوُّرَ وَ الْفَرَضَ مِنَ الْإِمْكَانِ؛ بَلْ لَا
يُفَرِّضُ وَ لَا يَتَصَوَّرُ إِلَّا مَا هُوَ مَوْجُودٌ فِي الْإِمْكَانِ قَبْلَ ذَلِكَ؛ وَ سَيَأْتِي بَيَانُ ذَلِكَ.

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فَفِي الْحَقِيقَةِ لَا يَتَحَقَّقُ الْقَاسِرُ إِلَّا بِقَلْبِ الشَّيْءِ إِلَى غَيْرِ مَا يَقْتَضِيهِ مِنْ ذَاتِ أَوْ
صِفَةٍ وَ هُوَ مِمَّا يُمَكِّنُ لَهُ فَهُوَ مَطَاوِعٌ. فَلَا قَلْبَ فَلَا امْتِنَاعَ فِي الْإِمْكَانِ؛ فَلَا قَمَرٍ وَ
لَا إِمْكَانَ فِي الْوَاجِبِ وَ لَا فِي الْمُسْتَحِيلِ. فَالشَّيْءُ الَّذِي هُوَ الشَّيْءُ لَا سِوَاهُ: لَا
إِمْكَانَ فِيهِ، وَ لَا رَجْحَانَ لَا يَمْنَعُ النَّقِیضُ؛ بَلْ هُوَ وَجُوبٌ بَحْثٌ. وَ الْمُسْتَحِيلُ الَّذِي

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54 T., p. 168. [أَشْبَهَهَا]

62 T., p. 170. [رَجْحَانَ وَ لَا رَجْحَانَ لَا]

هُوَ لَا شَيْءٌ بِكُلِّ أَعْتِبَارٍ، لَا إِمْكَانَ فِيهِ. فَافْهَمْ هَذِهِ الْعِبَارَاتِ الْمَكْرَرَةَ الْمُرَدَّدَةَ
لِلتَّفَهِيمِ.

63 T., p. 170. وَ لَا إِمْكَانَ إِلَّا إِمْكَانَ

الفائدة التاسعة

[في الإشارة إلى الإدراك بالفؤاد]

كُلُّ شَيْءٍ لَا يُدْرِكُ مَا وَرَاءَ مَبْدِئِهِ لِأَنَّ الْإِدْرَاكَ:
 إِنْ كَانَ بِالْفُؤَادِ، فَهُوَ أَعْلَى مَرَاتِبِ الذَّاتِ، وَ أَوَّلُ جُزْأَيْهَا، وَ أَغْلَا هُمَا، وَ
 أَشْرَفُهُمَا، وَ لَيْسَ لَهُ وَرَاءَ ذَلِكَ ذِكْرٌ فِي حَالٍ. فَلَا يَجِدُ نَفْسَهُ هُنَاكَ وَ لَا يَجِدُهُ غَيْرُهُ إِذْ
 5 أَوَّلُ وَجْدَانِهِ ذَلِكَ الْإِدْرَاكَ؛
 وَ إِنْ كَانَ بِالْعَقْلِ، وَ النَّفْسِ، وَ الْحِسِّ الْمُشْتَرَكِ، وَ بِالْحَوَاسِّ الظَّاهِرَةِ، [١٩٥]
 فَهِيَ، بِجَمِيعِ إِدْرَاكَاتِهَا وَ مُدْرَكَاتِهَا، دُونَ ذَلِكَ.
 فَلَا يُدْرِكُ الشَّيْءُ مَا وَرَاءَ كَوْنِهِ. فَإِذَا تَصَوَّرَ شَيْئًا بغيرِ الْفُؤَادِ، أَدْرَكَ مَا وَرَاءَهُ،
 أَيْ، أَنَّ وَرَاءَهُ شَيْئًا، يُدْرِكُهُ. فَإِذَا أَدْرَكَ ذَلِكَ الْأَعْلَى، أَدْرَكَ وَرَاءَهُ شَيْئًا. وَ هَكَذَا لَا
 10 يَقِفُ عَلَى حَدٍّ لَا يَجِدُ وَرَاءَهُ شَيْئًا.
 وَ هَذِهِ حُرُوفُ نَفْسِهِ وَ مَرَاتِبُهَا. وَ تِلْكَ الْحُرُوفُ وَ الْمَرَاتِبُ لَا تَتَنَاها نَفْسَهُ، أَيْ،
 لَا تَقِفُ عَلَى حَدٍّ. لَا تَتَوَهَّمُ إِلَّا قَبْلَ لَهُ؛ فَهِيَ لَا تَفْقِدُ نَفْسَهَا فِي تِلْكَ الْمَرَاتِبِ.
 فَإِذَا رَأَتْ ذَاتَهَا بِذَاتِهَا، أَيْ، نَظَرَتْ بِفُؤَادِهَا، انْقَطَعَ وُجُودُهَا وَ تَنَاهَى كَوْنُهَا إِذْ

T., p. 170. أَنَّ مَا وَرَاءَهُ شَيْءٌ [أَنَّ وَرَاءَهُ شَيْئًا] 9

T., p. 172. تَتَنَاها [تَتَنَاها] 11

T., p. 172. أَنَّ لَا [أَنَّ لَا] 12

T., p. 174. يَتَنَاها [يَتَنَاها] 13

ذَٰكَ لِأَنَّهَا نَظَرَتْ مِنْ مِثْلِ سَمِّ الْإِبْرَةِ فَاسْتَدَارَتْ عَلَى نَفْسِهَا. قَالَ الشَّاعِرُ:

قَدْ طَاشَتْ النَّقْطَةُ فِي الدَّائِرَةِ وَ لَمْ تَزَلْ فِي ذَاتِهَا حَائِرَةً

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إِلخ. قَالَ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ: «مَنْ عَرَفَ نَفْسَهُ فَقَدْ عَرَفَ رَبَّهُ»، وَ قَالَ (ع) لِكَمِيلٍ :
«مَخُو الْمَوْهُومِ وَ صَخُو الْمَعْلُومِ».

وَ كُلَّمَا وَصَلَ الْعَبْدُ إِلَى مَقَامٍ ظَهَرَ لَهُ الْجَبَّارُ فِيهِ حَصَلَ لَهُ الْمَخُو وَ الصَّخُو. فَهَنَّاكَ عَرَفَ رَبَّهُ لِأَنَّهُ عَرَفَ نَفْسَهُ بِالْمَخُو وَ الصَّخُو. فَإِذَا اسْتَقَامَ فِيهِ، كَمَا قَالَ سُبْحَانَهُ: «إِنَّ الَّذِينَ قَالُوا رَبُّنَا اللَّهُ ثُمَّ اسْتَقَامُوا»، حَتَّى ظَهَرَ لَهُ الْأَثَرُ، ظَهَرَ لَهُ الْجَبَّارُ فِي مَقَامٍ أَعْلَى مِنَ الْأَوَّلِ. فَيَعْرِفُ فِيهِ رَبَّهُ، بِحُكْمِ الْمَخُو وَ الصَّخُو، بِطَوْرِ أَعْلَى. وَ يَتَبَيَّنُ لَهُ أَنَّ الْمَقَامَ الْأَوَّلَ مَقَامُ خَلْقٍ؛ قَدْ تَعَرَّفَ لَهُ فِيهِ بِهِ؛ ثُمَّ تَعَرَّفَ لَهُ فِي الْأَعْلَى. قَالَ (ع) : «تُدْجِلُ بَيْنَ يَدَيِ الْمُدْجِلِ مِنْ خَلْقِكَ».

فَإِذَا عَرَفَ رَبَّهُ فِي الْأَعْلَى بِظُهُورِهِ لَهُ فِيهِ بِهِ، وَ نَظَرَ إِلَى الْأَسْفَلِ الَّذِي ظَهَرَ لَهُ أَنَّهُ مَقَامُ خَلْقٍ، وَجَدَ اللَّهَ عِنْدَهُ فَوْقَهُ حِسَابَهُ؛ وَ اللَّهَ سَرِيعَ الْحِسَابِ. وَ هَكَذَا أَبَدًا يَسِيرُ بِلَا نِهَايَةٍ. قَالَ (تع) فِي الْخَدِيثِ الْقُدْسِيِّ، حَدِيثِ الْأَسْرَارِ: «كُلَّمَا وَضَعْتُ لَهُمْ

16 T., p. 174. حَائِرَةً. وَ قَالَ [إِلخ. قَالَ 16

16 T., p. 174. عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ لِكَمِيلٍ (ره) [ع) لِكَمِيلٍ 16

21-22 T., p. 175. يَتَبَيَّنُ [يَتَبَيَّنُ 21-22

23 T., p. 175. عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ [ع) 23

25 T., p. 176. وَفَهُ [فَوْقَهُ 25

26 T., p. 176. تَعَالَى [تع) 26

26-27 T., p. 176. «كُلَّمَا رَفَعْتُ لَهُمْ عِلْمًا، وَضَعْتُ [«كُلَّمَا وَضَعْتُ لَهُمْ عِلْمًا، رَفَعْتُ 26-27

عِلْمًا، رَفَعْتُ لَهُمْ جِلْمًا، وَ لَيْسَ لِصَحْبِي غَايَةٌ وَ لَا نِهَايَةٌ»
 وَ هَذِهِ الْمَشَارُ إِلَيْهَا هِيَ الْمَقَامَاتُ الَّتِي لَا تَعْطِيلَ لَهَا فِي كُلِّ مَكَانٍ. قَالَ الْخُبَّجَةُ
 (ع) ، فِي الْإِشَارَةِ إِلَى ذَلِكَ، فِي دُعَاءِ رَجَبٍ: «وَ مَقَامَاتِكَ الَّتِي لَا تَعْطِيلَ لَهَا فِي كُلِّ
 30 مَكَانٍ، يَعْرِفُكَ بِهَا مَنْ عَرَفَكَ. [١٩٦] لَا فَرْقَ بَيْنَكَ وَ بَيْنَهَا إِلَّا أَنَّهُمْ عِبَادُكَ وَ خَلْقُكَ.
 فَتَقُهَا وَ رَتَقُهَا بَيْنَكَ؛ بَدُوها مِنْكَ، وَ عَوْدُهَا إِلَيْكَ» (الدُّعَاءُ). وَ قَالَ الصَّادِقُ (ع) :
 «لَنَا مَعَ اللَّهِ حَالَاتٌ نَحْنُ فِيهَا هُوَ، وَ هُوَ نَحْنُ، وَ هُوَ هُوَ، وَ نَحْنُ نَحْنُ». وَ هَذَا
 طَرِيقٌ إِلَى اللَّهِ سُبْحَانَهُ لَا نِهَايَةَ لَهُ وَ لَا غَايَةَ.
 ثُمَّ أَعْلَمَ أَنَّ كُلَّ مَقَامٍ ظَهَرَ اللَّهُ فِيهِ لِعَبْدِهِ فَهُوَ مَظْهَرُهُ وَ صِفَتُهُ. وَ هِيَ حُرُوفُ
 35 ذَاتِ الْعَبْدِ. لَا حَقِيقَةً لَهُ غَيْرُ ذَلِكَ لِأَنَّهُ سُبْحَانَهُ ظَهَرَ لَكَ بِكَ؛ وَ بِكَ آخَتَجَبَ عَنْكَ.
 فَلَا سَبِيلَ لَكَ إِلَى مَعْرِفَتِهِ إِلَّا بِمَا تَعَرَّفَ لَكَ بِهِ؛ وَ لَمْ يَتَعَرَّفَ لَكَ إِلَّا فِيكَ وَ بِكَ. قَالَ
 عَلِيُّ (ع) فِي نَهْجِ الْبَلَاغَةِ: «لَا تُحِيطُ بِهِ الْأَوْهَامُ؛ بَلْ تَجَلَّى لَهَا بِهَا، وَ بِهَا أَمْتَنَعَ مِنْهَا،
 وَ إِلَيْهَا حَاكَمَهَا»
 ثُمَّ أَعْلَمَ أَنَّ الْمَتَجَلَّى نُقْطَةٌ يَدُورُ عَلَيْهَا التَّجَلَّى. فَهُوَ كُرَّةٌ مُجَوَّفَةٌ لِفِعْلِ التَّجَلَّى. وَ
 40 فِي الْإِنْجِيلِ: «أَيُّهَا الْإِنْسَانُ! اعْرِفْ نَفْسَكَ، تَعْرِفْ رَبَّكَ. ظَاهِرُكَ لِلْفَنَاءِ، وَ بَاطِنُكَ أَنَا».
 فَلَجَمِيعِ الْخَلْقِ اسْتِدَارَةٌ عَلَى فِعْلِ اللَّهِ سُبْحَانَهُ وَاحِدَةٌ كُرِّيَّةٌ. فَكُلُّ الْخَلْقِ كُرَّةٌ

28-29 (ع) عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ T., p. 176.

31 (الدُّعَاءُ) T., p. 177

31 (ع) عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ T., p. 177.

37 (ع) عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ T., p. 179.

39 الْمَتَجَلَّى T., p. 180.

وَاحِدَةً مُجَوِّفَةً تَدُورُ عَلَى نُقْطَةٍ هِيَ فِعْلُهُ (تع) ؛ وَ أَصُولُ الْخَلْقِ كُرَاتٌ مُجَوِّفَةٌ. كَذَلِكَ
كُلُّ أَصْلٍ كُرَّةٌ تَامَّةٌ تَدُورُ عَلَى نُقْطَةٍ هِيَ وَجْهُ ذَلِكَ الْأَصْلِ مِنَ الْمَشِيَّةِ. وَ لَا تَدُورُ
عَلَى مَحْوَرٍ لِأَنَّ الْإِسْتِدَارَةَ عَلَى الْمَحْوَرِ تُحْدِثُ مِنْ أَجْزَاءِ الْكُرَّةِ دَوَائِرَ، لَا كُرَاتٍ؛
فَتَكُونُ الْإِسْتِدَارَةُ إِلَى جِهَةٍ؛ فَلَا تَكُونُ الْعِلَّةُ مُحِيطَةً بِالْمَعْلُولِ؛ وَ لَا تُسَاوِي الْأَجْزَاءَ
الْمُتَسَاوِيَةَ فِي الرُّتْبَةِ مُتَّصِفَ الْمَحْوَرِ الَّذِي هُوَ النُّقْطَةُ إِلَيْهَا لِأَنَّ مَا كَانَ مِنَ الْأَجْزَاءِ
فِي جِهَتَيِ الْقُطْبَيْنِ لِلْمَحْوَرِ لَا تَدُورُ عَلَى النُّقْطَةِ، وَ وَجْهُ الْكُرَّةِ مِنْ عِلَّتِهَا لَيْسَ
مَحْوَرًا مُسْتَطِيلًا، بَلْ نُقْطَةً.

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وَ الْأَصْلُ الثَّانِي يَدُورُ عَلَى الْأَوَّلِ لِأَنَّهُ لِلثَّانِي نُقْطَةٌ؛ وَ يَدُورُ عَلَى النُّقْطَةِ الْأُولَى.
فَلَهُ اسْتِدَارَتَانِ:

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ذَاتِيَّةٌ، تَدُورُ عَلَى نُقْطَةِ الْأَصْلِ الْأَوَّلِ؛

وَ عَرْضِيَّةٌ، تَدُورُ عَلَى الْأَوَّلِ إِذَا كَانَ مُتَرَتِّبًا عَلَيْهِ، وَ إِلَّا، فَعَلَى جِهَةٍ لَوَازِمِهِ مِنْ
وَضْعٍ، وَ إِضَافَةٍ، وَ غَيْرِهِمَا. وَ هُمَا اسْتِدَارَةٌ وَاحِدَةٌ يَلْحَظُ وَحْدَةُ الدَّائِرَةِ. وَ لِهَذَا
كَانَ أَبْطَى مِنَ الْأَصْلِ الْأَوَّلِ، كَاسْتِدَارَةِ الْكَوْكَبِ عَلَى قُطْبِ تَدْوِيرِهِ، وَ اسْتِدَارَتِهِ
عَلَى قُطْبِ الْخَارِجِ الْمُرَكِّزِ فَإِنَّ اسْتِدَارَتَهُ فِي التَّدْوِيرِ عَلَى نَفْسِهِ، فِيهِ عَرْضِيَّةٌ
بِالنِّسْبَةِ إِلَى تَحَقُّقِهِ وَ أَصَالَتِهِ. وَ اسْتِدَارَتُهُ عَلَى قُطْبِ الْخَارِجِ الْمُرَكِّزِ ذَاتِيَّةٌ لِأَنَّهَا
وَجْهُهُ إِلَى أَصْلِ تَحَقُّقِهِ لِأَنَّ هَذِهِ أَصْلٌ لِاسْتِدَارَتِهِ عَلَى تَدْوِيرِهِ، فَإِضْطَاعُ عَنْهَا، مُتَفَرِّعَةٌ

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42 T., p. 180. تعالى [تع]

45 T., p. 180. تَسَاوِي [تساوي]

47 T., p. 180. الْعِلَّةُ [علتها]

51 T., p. 182. اسْتِدَارَةٌ ذَاتِيَّةٌ [ذاتية]

54 T., p. 182. أَبْطَى [أبطأ]

عَلَيْهَا.

وَ إِنَّمَا كَانَتْ اسْتِدَارَةُ الثَّانِي بَطِيئَةً أَيْضًا لِحُصُولِ الْكَثْرَةِ فِيهَا. وَ كُلَّمَا كَثُرَتْ
 60 أَلْوَسَائِطُ كَثُرَتْ الْإِسْتِدَارَاتُ وَ كَانَ أَبْطَى. وَ تَتَرْتَّبُ الْعَرَضِيَّاتُ فِي الْقُوَّةِ وَ الضَّعْفِ.
 فَمَا قَرُبَ مِنَ الدَّائِرِ كَانَ أضعفَ وَ الدَّائِيَّةُ أَبَدًا وَاحِدَةً.

وَ هَكَذَا حُكْمُ كُلِّ أَصْلٍ؛ وَ لِفُرُوعِ ذَلِكَ الْأَصْلِ هَذَا الْحُكْمُ:
 كُلُّ فَرْعٍ كُرَّةٌ وَاحِدَةٌ. لَهُ دَوْرَاتٌ: دَوْرَةٌ عَلَى أَصْلِهِ؛ وَ عَلَى كُلِّ مَا سَبَقَهُ دَوْرَةٌ؛
 وَ عَلَى الْقُطْبِ الْأَوَّلِ كَذَلِكَ؛ وَ قِسْ عَلَيْهِ كُلَّ شَيْءٍ بِنِسْبَةِ حَالِ ذَاتِهِ وَ عَوَارِضِهَا.
 65 فَكُلُّ عَالَمٍ كُرَّةٌ؛ وَ كُلُّ نَوْعٍ كُرَّةٌ؛ وَ كُلُّ صِنْفٍ كُرَّةٌ؛ وَ كُلُّ شَخْصٍ كُرَّةٌ؛ وَ كُلُّ جُزْءٍ
 كُرَّةٌ.

وَ هَكَذَا أَحْكَامُهَا فِي الْأَوْضَاعِ وَ التَّضَايُفِ. وَ النَّسَبُ كُلُّهَا فِي التَّسَاوِي، وَ
 التَّعَارُفِ، وَ التَّنَاقُرِ، [١٩٧] إِلَّا أَنَّهَا فِي التَّنَاقُرِ تَدُورُ عَلَى التَّعَاكُسِ هَكَذَا: $C \supset C$ ؛
 وَ فِي التَّعَارُفِ عَلَى جِهَةِ التَّوَاجُهِ هَكَذَا: $C \supset C$ ؛ وَ فِي التَّسَاوِي عَلَى جِهَةِ الْمُمَاطَلَةِ
 70 هَكَذَا: $C \supset C$ ؛ وَ أَمَّا فِي التَّغَايُرِ فِي الْذَاتِ وَحْدَهَا فَهَكَذَا:

 $C \supset U$ $C \supset C$

وَ فِي الصِّفَاتِ وَحْدَهَا هَكَذَا:

 $C \supset C$ $U \supset U$

59 T., p. 182. بَطِيئَةً لِحُصُولِ [بَطِيئَةً أَيْضًا لِحُصُولِ

61 T., p. 182. الدَّائِرَةُ [الدَّائِرِ

وَفِيهِمَا مَعًا هُوَ التَّنَازُرُ كَمَا مَرَّ. قَالَ (ع) : «الْأَرْوَاحُ جُنُودٌ مُجَنَّدَةٌ. فَمَا تَعَارَفَ مِنْهَا
أَتَنَلَفَ؛ وَ مَا تَنَازَرَ مِنْهَا اخْتَلَفَ».

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وَمَعْنَى «تَعَارَفَ» : يَنْظُرُ أَحَدُهُمَا فِي وَجْهِ صَاحِبِهِ. وَمَعْنَى «تَنَازَرَ» :
ظَهَرَهُ إِلَى ظَهْرِ صَاحِبِهِ. وَ الْمَسَاوَاةُ مِنَ التَّعَارُفِ فِي التَّبَعِيَّةِ. وَ الْمُغَايِرَةُ أَحْوَالٌ. وَ
أَنْظُرْ إِلَى تَمَثِيلِ الْأَشْكَالِ.

وَلِكُلِّ رَأَيْتُ مِنْهُمْ مَقَامًا شَرَحَهُ فِي الْكِتَابِ بِمَا يَطُولُ.

ثُمَّ أَعْلَمَ أَنَّ الْكُرَّةَ، إِنْ كَانَتْ اسْتِدَارَتُهَا عِبَارَةً عَنِ اسْتِدَارَةِ قَوْسٍ مِّنْ مُحِيطِهَا،
فَهِىَ تَدُورُ عَلَى مَحْوَرٍ؛ وَ تُحَدِّثُ مِنَ الْأَجْزَاءِ الدَّوَائِرَ لَا الْكُرَاتِ. وَ لَيْسَ ذَلِكَ
الْاسْتِدَارَةُ الصُّدُورِيَّةُ عَنِ الْعِلَّةِ الْبَسِيطَةِ الَّتِي هِيَ فِعْلُ اللَّهِ سُبْحَانَهُ وَ مَشِئَتُهُ؛ بَلِ
الْاسْتِدَارَةُ الصُّدُورِيَّةُ أَنَّ يَدُورُ كُلُّ جُزْءٍ مِّنَ الْكُرَّةِ عَلَى قُطْبِهَا. فَتَكُونُ اسْتِدَارَةُ
الْكُرَّةِ عَلَى قُطْبِهَا لَيْسَتْ إِلَى خُصُوصِ جِهَةٍ لِأَنَّ ذَلِكَ مِنْ خَوَاصِّ الْأَجْسَامِ فِي
حَرَكَاتِهَا الْجِسْمَانِيَّةِ. وَ أَمَّا الْحَرَكَاتُ الْوُجُودِيَّةُ الصُّدُورِيَّةُ، فَلَيْسَتْ جِسْمَانِيَّةً وَ إِنْ
كَانَتْ مِنَ الْأَجْسَامِ. فَهِىَ دَوْرَاتٌ دَهْرِيَّةٌ وَ سَرْمَدِيَّةٌ، وَ إِلَّا، لَمْ تُحِطْ جِهَةُ الْعِلَّةِ بِجَمِيعِ
جِهَاتِ الْمَعْلُولِ. وَ لِهَذَا قُلْنَا: «كُلُّ جُزْءٍ كُرَّةٌ»، فَافْهَمْ، فَهَمَكَ اللَّهُ.

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وَ أَعْلَمَ أَنَّ هَذَا الطَّوْرَ مِنَ الْاسْتِدَارَةِ لَا تُدْرِكُهُ النَّفْسُ، وَ لَا الْعَقْلُ. وَ إِنَّمَا

74 T., p. 183. عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ [ع]

76 T., p. 186. التَّعَارُفُ [تَعَارَفَ]

76 T., p. 186. التَّنَازُرُ [تَنَازَرَ]

77 T., p. 186. فِي [مِنْ]

86 T., p. 187. تَحِطُّ [تُحِطُّ]

يُذَرِّكُهُ الْفُؤَادُ لِأَنَّهُ جِهَةُ الصُّدُورِ، وَ هِيَ رَبْطُ الدَّهْرِ بِالسَّرْمَدِ. وَ السَّلَامُ.

89. جِهَةُ الرِّبْطِ بِالسَّرْمَدِ [رَبْطُ الدَّهْرِ بِالسَّرْمَدِ] T., p. 188.

الفائدة العاشرة

[فِي خَلْقِ الْأَشْيَاءِ]

إِعْلَمَ أَنَّ اللَّهَ سُبْحَانَهُ خَلَقَ الْأَشْيَاءَ بِفِعْلِهِ وَ إِبْدَاعِهِ مِنْ غَيْرِ سَبْقٍ فِكْرٍ أَوْ رَوِيَّةٍ وَ كُلُّ شَيْءٍ فَاللَّهُ خَالِقُهُ سَوَاءً كَانَ فِي الْوُجُودِ الْخَارِجِيِّ أَمْ الدَّهْنِيِّ وَ مَا فِي الدَّهْنِ لَمْ يَوْجَدْ عَلَى اخْتِدَاءِ سَبْقٍ ذِهْنٍ فَالْوُجُودُ الدَّهْنِيُّ فِي الْوَقَاعِ وَجُودٌ خَارِجِيٌّ وَ إِنَّمَا قَسَمَ الْوُجُودَ إِلَى الدَّهْنِيِّ [١٩٨] وَ الْخَارِجِيِّ لِلْفَرْقِ بَيْنَ الْوُجُودِ الظَّلِّيِّ الْإِنْتِزَاعِيِّ وَ الْأَصْلِيِّ أَصْطِلَاحًا؛ وَ لَا مُشَاحَّةَ فِي الْأِصْطِلَاحِ وَ إِلَّا فَهِيَ، فِي الْحَقِيقَةِ، قِسْمٌ مِنَ الْوُجُودِ خَلَقَهُ اللَّهُ، لِحَاجَةِ الْخَلْقِ إِلَيْهِ فِي التَّفَاهُمِ وَ التَّعَارُفِ، لِيَحْصُلَ لَهُمْ إِدْرَاكُ مَا غَابَ عَنْ حَوَاسِهِمُ الظَّاهِرَةِ وَ ذَلِكَ مِمَّا يَتَوَقَّفُ عَلَيْهِ تَكْلِيفُهُمْ، وَ نِظَامُ أُمُورِهِمْ، وَ مَعَاشِهِمْ.

وَ إِنَّمَا قُلْنَا أَنَّهُ مَخْلُوقٌ لِلَّهِ (تع) لِمَا دَلَّ عَلَيْهِ الدَّلِيلُ الْقَاطِعُ بِأَنَّ اللَّهَ خَالِقُ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ قَالَ (تع): وَ إِنْ مِنْ شَيْءٍ إِلَّا عِنْدَنَا خَزَائِنُهُ؛ وَ مَا نُنَزِّلُهُ إِلَّا بِقَدَرٍ مَعْلُومٍ. وَ إِنْ قُلْتَ: مَعْنَى ذَلِكَ أَنَّ اللَّهَ (تع) جَعَلَ فِي النَّفْسِ قُدْرَةً عَلَى اخْتِرَاعِ مَا

3 T., p. 188. رُوِيَّةٍ [رَوِيَّةٍ]

7 T., p. 188. فَهُوَ [فَهِيَ]

11 T., p. 192. لِلَّهِ لِمَا [لِلَّهِ] (تع) لِمَا

12 T., p. 192. قَالَ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى [قَالَ] (تع)

13 T., p. 192. جَعَلَ اللَّهُ جَعَلَ [اللَّهُ] (تع) جَعَلَ

شَاءَتْ مِنْ الصُّورِ؛ فَهِيَ تَخْتَرِعُ تِلْكَ الصُّورَ بِمَا يُمَكِّنُ لَهَا. فَلَا يَكُونُ الوجودُ
الذَّهْنِي، فِي الْحَقِيقَةِ، خَارِجِيًّا. 15

قُلْتُ: إِنَّ مَا جَعَلَهُ فِيهَا وَ فِي غَيْرِهَا، مِمَّا تَجْرِي فِيهِ عَلَى اخْتِيَارِهَا، لَيْسَ حَيْثُ
أَعْطَاهَا رَفَعَ يَدَهُ عَنْهُ؛ بَلْ هُوَ فِي يَدِهِ بَعْدَ الْإِعْطَاءِ كَمَا هُوَ قَبْلَ الْإِعْطَاءِ؛ بَلْ هُوَ
حَالٌ وَاحِدَةٌ بِلَا تَعَدُّدٍ، إِلَّا فِي الْعِبَارَةِ، كِنَايَةً عَنْ ظُهُورِ الْعَطِيَّةِ فِي نَفْسِهَا.
وَ تِلْكَ الْقُوَّةُ الْمُشَارُ إِلَيْهَا فِعْلُهَا، وَ أَنْفِعَالُهَا، وَ إِضَافَتُهَا، وَ تَعَلُّقُهَا بِمُخْتَرَعِهَا،
إِنَّمَا كَانَ شَيْئًا فِي نَفْسِهِ بِكَوْنِهِ فِي يَدِهِ. فَإِذَا قَابَلَتِ الْمِرْءَاةَ الشَّيْءَ، أَوْجَدَ اللَّهُ بِهَا 20
فِيهَا: الصُّورَةَ. وَ إِنَّمَا لَهَا اخْتِيَارُ الْمُقَابَلَةِ وَ انْتِزَاعِ الصُّورَةِ، الَّذَانِ هُمَا شَيْءٌ بِكَوْنِهِمَا
فِي يَدِهِ، فَافْتَهُم. وَ إِلَى هَذَا الْإِشَارَةُ بِقَوْلِهِ (ع): «كُلَّمَا مَيَّزْتُمُوهُ بِأَوْهَامِكُمْ، فِي أَدَقِّ
مَعَانِيهِ، فَهُوَ مَخْلُوقٌ مِثْلُكُمْ، مَرْدُودٌ إِلَيْكُمْ». فَافْتَهُم قَوْلَهُ (ع): «مَخْلُوقٌ مِثْلُكُمْ، مَرْدُودٌ
إِلَيْكُمْ».

فَإِنْ قُلْتُ: يَلْزَمُكُمْ أَنَّ اللَّهَ (تَع) خَلَقَ الْمَعَاصِيَ وَ وَ الْكُفْرَ، وَ سَائِرَ الْقَبَائِحِ. 25
قُلْتُ: نَعَمْ، كَذَلِكَ اللَّهُ رَبُّنَا! قَالَ (تَع): قُلِ اللَّهُ خَالِقُ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ؛ وَ هُوَ الْوَاحِدُ
الْقَهَّارُ؛ وَ لَكِنْ لَيْسَ عَلَى مَا تَفْتَهُم. وَ ذَلِكَ لِأَنَّهُ سُبْحَانَهُ لَا يَخْلُقُ شَيْئًا إِلَّا عَلَى مَا

14 T., p. 192. [بِمَا]

16 T., p. 192. [إِنَّمَا إِنَّ مَا]

17 T., p. 192. [هُوَ يَدُهُ] هُوَ فِي يَدِهِ

22 T., p. 193. عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ [ع]

23 T., p. 193. عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ [ع]

25 T., p. . اللَّهُ خَلَقَ [اللَّهُ (تَع) خَلَقَ]

26 T., p. 194. [تَعَالَى] (تَع)

هُوَ عَلَيْهِ فِي ذَاتِهِ، وَ صِفَاتِهِ، وَ أَفْعَالِهِ. وَ إِلَّا لَمْ يَكُنْ ذَلِكَ الْمَخْلُوقُ كَذَلِكَ؛ بَلْ يَكُونُ قَدْ خُلِقَ عَلَى غَيْرِ مَا هُوَ عَلَيْهِ. فَخَيَّبَ لَمْ يَكُنْ هُوَ إِيَّاهُ وَ إِنَّمَا يَكُونُ هُوَ غَيْرُهُ. هف.

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وَ إِذَا خَلَقَهُ عَلَى مَا [١٩٥] هُوَ عَلَيْهِ، فَإِنَّمَا خَلَقَهُ عَلَى مُقْتَضَى سَبَبِ إِيجَادِهِ وَ قُبُولِهِ لِلْوُجُودِ. وَ ذَلِكَ بِالْأَسْبَابِ الْخَارِجَةِ عَنْ حَقِيقَةِ مَا أَفَاضَهُ اللَّهُ بِذَاتِ فِعْلِهِ، وَ إِن كَانَتْ بِعَوَارِضِهِ. وَ تِلْكَ الْأَسْبَابُ مُقْتَضِيَاتٌ لِتَغْيِيرِ الْحَقَائِقِ بِحُكْمِ الْوَضْعِ. وَ تِلْكَ الْمُقْتَضِيَاتُ مِنْ أَفْعَالِ الْخَلْقِ وَ أَوْضَاعِهِمْ. وَ لَوْ خُلِقَ عَلَى غَيْرِ الْمُقْتَضَى، لَكَانَ قَدْ مَنَعَ مَا أُعْطِيَ وَ أَبْطَلَ مَا قُدِّرَ.

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مَثَلًا خَلَقَ الْحَدِيدَ: يَقْطَعُ، وَ لَا يَقْطَعُ إِلَّا بِاللَّهِ. فَإِذَا ذَبَحَ زَيْدٌ عَمْرًا، ظُلْمًا بِالسَّيْفِ، فَإِنْ لَمْ يُوْجِدِ اللَّهُ الذَّبْحَ لِمُقْتَضَى فِعْلِ زَيْدٍ وَ الْحَدِيدِ، لَكَانَ قَدْ مَنَعَ الْحَدِيدَ مَا خَلَقَهُ عَلَيْهِ؛ فَلَمْ يَكُنِ الْحَدِيدُ حَدِيدًا. وَ مَنَعَ زَيْدًا مُقْتَضَى فِعْلِهِ؛ فَلَمْ يُمَكِّنْ زَيْدًا مِنْ فِعْلِ الْمَعْصِيَةِ. فَلَمْ يَقْدِرْ عَلَى الطَّاعَةِ لِأَنَّهَا لَا تَتَحَقَّقُ إِلَّا بِالتَّمْكِينِ مِنَ الْمَعْصِيَةِ. وَ إِذَا لَمْ يَكُنْ ذَلِكَ، لَمْ يَحْسُنْ تَكْلِيفُهُ؛ فَلَمْ يَكُنْ مُكَلَّفًا. وَ إِذَا كَانَ كَذَلِكَ، لَمْ يَحْسُنْ إِيجَادُهُ؛ وَ يُبْطَلُ الْإِيجَادُ مِنْ أَصْلِهِ. وَ الْوُجُودُ الذَّهْنِيُّ حَدَثٌ عَنِ اللَّهِ بِهَذَا

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28 T., p. 194. لَمْ يَكُنِ الْمَخْلُوقُ لَمْ يَكُنْ ذَلِكَ الْمَخْلُوقُ

29 T., p. 194. فَعِ [خَيَّبَ]

33 T., p. 195. [لِتَغْيِيرِ]

37 T., p. 197. [مُقْتَضَى]

39 T., p. 197. [بِالتَّمْكِينِ]

40-41 T., p. 197. لَمْ يَحْسُنْ إِيجَادُهُ [لَمْ يَحْسُنْ تَكْلِيفُهُ؛ فَلَمْ يَكُنْ مُكَلَّفًا. وَ إِذَا كَانَ كَذَلِكَ، لَمْ يَحْسُنْ إِيجَادُهُ]

النَّحْوِ.

[خَزَائِنَةُ الْأَشْيَاءِ]

ثُمَّ أَعْلَمَ أَنَّ فِي قَوْلِهِ (تَع) : وَ إِنْ مِنْ شَيْءٍ إِلَّا عِنْدَنَا خَزَائِنُهُ ، حَيْثُ أَتَى
لِلشَّيْءِ ، مِنْ جِهَةِ أَفْرَادِهِ ، بِجَمْعِ خَزَائِنٍ سِرًّا ، نَبَّهَ بِذَلِكَ عَلَيْهِ ؛ وَ هُوَ أَنَّ كُلَّ شَيْءٍ لَهُ
خَزَائِنٌ :

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* فَأَعْلَى خَزَائِنِهِ : الرَّحْمَةُ ؛

* ثُمَّ الرِّيحُ ؛

* ثُمَّ السَّحَابُ الْمُرْجِيُّ ؛

* ثُمَّ السَّحَابُ الْمَتَرَاكِمُ ؛

* ثُمَّ الْبَحْرُ الْمُمَكِنُ وَ هَبَاؤُهُ ؛

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* ثُمَّ سَحَابُهُ الْمُرْجِيُّ ؛

* ثُمَّ الْمَتَرَاكِمُ .

* ثُمَّ الْأَكْوَانُ السَّتَّةُ الَّتِي أَشَارَ إِلَيْهَا الصَّادِقُ (ع) :

43 T., p. 198. [تَع] تَعَالَى

43-44 T., p. 198. [لِلشَّيْءِ] الشَّيْءِ

53 T., p. 198. [أَشَارَ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ إِلَيْهَا] أَشَارَ إِلَيْهَا الصَّادِقُ (ع)

53 (ع) [أَشَارَ إِلَيْهَا الصَّادِقُ] In the autograph manuscript, Shaykh 'Aḥṣa'i mistakenly had written, instead of عَلِيُّ بْنُ الْحُسَيْنِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ, the name of the Sixth Imam, الصَّادِقُ (ع), the name of the Fourth Imam. As opposed to crossing out the Fourth Imam's name, the author circles it and points to the correction in the margin. This is indicative of the reverence of the author for his Imams, that he would not erase their names even in error.

- الْكَوْنُ التُّورَانِيُّ، وَ هُوَ الْمَاءُ الَّذِي بِهِ حَيَوَةُ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ؛
- 55 - ثُمَّ الْكَوْنُ الْجَوْهَرِيُّ، وَ هُوَ الْحِجَابُ الْأَبْيَضُ؛ وَ هُوَ الرُّكْنُ الْأَيْمَنُ الْأَعْلَى
عَنِ يَمِينِ الْعَرْشِ؛
- ثُمَّ الْكَوْنُ اَلْهَوَائِيُّ، وَ هُوَ الْحِجَابُ الْأَصْفَرُ؛ وَ هُوَ الرُّكْنُ الْأَيْمَنُ الْأَسْفَلُ عَنْ
يَمِينِ الْعَرْشِ؛
- 60 - ثُمَّ الْكَوْنُ الْمَائِيُّ، وَ هُوَ الْحِجَابُ الْأَخْضَرُ؛ وَ هُوَ حِجَابُ الرُّمُودِ؛ وَ هُوَ الرُّكْنُ
الْأَيْسَرُ الْأَعْلَى عَنْ يَسَارِ الْعَرْشِ؛
- ثُمَّ الْكَوْنُ النَّارِيُّ، وَ هُوَ الْحِجَابُ الْأَحْمَرُ؛ وَ قُصْبَةُ الْيَاقُوتِ؛ وَ هُوَ الرُّكْنُ
الْأَيْسَرُ الْأَسْفَلُ عَنْ يَسَارِ الْعَرْشِ؛
- ثُمَّ كَوْنُ الْأُطْلَةِ، وَ هُوَ اَلْهَبَاءُ الْآخِرُ، وَ كَوْنُ الذَّرِّ الثَّانِي؛
- * ثُمَّ الْعَرْشُ مُحَدَّدُ أَجْهَاتِ؛
- 65 * ثُمَّ الْكُرْسِيُّ؛
- * ثُمَّ فَلَكُ الْبُرُوجِ؛
- * ثُمَّ فَلَكُ الْمَنَازِلِ؛
- * ثُمَّ مِنْ فَلَكِ الشَّمْسِ فِي زُحَلٍ وَ فِي الْقَمَرِ؛
- * ثُمَّ مِنْ الشَّمْسِ فِي الْمُشْتَرِيِّ وَ فِي عُطَارِدَ؛

54 T., p. 198. وَ هُوَ حِجَابُ السَّرِّ [شَيْءٍ] 54

57 T., p. 199. الْأَسْفَلُ الْأَيْمَنُ [الْأَيْمَنُ الْأَسْفَلُ] 57

63 T., p. 199. الْكَوْنُ [كَوْنُ] 63

68 T., p. 200. فَلَكِ الشَّمْسِ [مِنْ فَلَكِ الشَّمْسِ] 68

69 T., p. 200. عُطَارِدَ [فِي عُطَارِدَ] 69

* ثُمَّ مِنَ الشَّمْسِ فِي الْمَرْيَحِ وَ فِي الزَّهَرَةِ.

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ثُمَّ يَنْزِلُ إِلَى الْأَذْهَانِ صُورَتُهُ، بِتَسْخِيرِ شَمْعُونَ وَ سِيمُونَ وَ زَيْتُونَ، لِحُجُودِهِمْ وَ أَعْوَانِهِمْ مِنَ الْمَلَائِكَةِ الْمُؤَكَّلُونَ بِفَلَكَ عُطَارِدٍ وَ مَا مُحِلٍّ مِنْ مُتَمَمَاتِهِ، وَ حَامِلِهِ، وَ مُدِيرِهِ، وَ تَدْوِيرِهِ، وَ كَوَكْبِهِ، وَ أَشِعَّتِهِ.

وَ إِنَّمَا يَنْزِلُ إِلَى الذَّهْنِ بَعْدَ أَنْ يَنْزِلَ مِنَ الْخَزَائِنِ الْعُلْيَا إِلَى مَا دُونَهَا، وَ هَكَذَا إِلَى أَنْ يَصَلَ إِلَى الذَّهْنِ فَقَوْلُهُ (تَع) : «وَمَا نُزِّلُهُ إِلَّا وَ مَا نُزِّلُهُ إِلَّا بِقَدَرٍ مَعْلُومٍ» ، يُشِيرُ إِلَى أَنَّ ذَلِكَ النَّازِلَ مِنْ كُلِّ مَرْتَبَةٍ إِنَّمَا يَنْزِلُ بِإِذْنٍ وَ أَجَلٍ وَ كِتَابٍ.

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وَ هَذِهِ الْمَرَاتِبُ كُلُّهَا مِنَ الْوُجُودِ الْخَارِجِيِّ. وَ مَا فِي الذَّهْنِ كَمَا فِي الْمِرَاةِ؛ فَإِنَّهُ وَجُودٌ خَارِجِيٌّ.

ثُمَّ مَا فِي هَذِهِ الْمَرَاتِبِ الَّتِي هِيَ الْخَزَائِنُ قِسْمَانِ: أَصْلٌ وَ ظِلٌّ. وَ الْمُنْتَقَشُ فِي مِرَاةِ الذَّهْنِ، إِنْ كَانَ مِنَ الْأَصْلِ، انْتَقَشَتْ صُورَتُهُ؛ وَ إِنْ كَانَ مِنَ الصُّورَةِ، انْتَقَشَتْ صُورَةُ الصُّورَةِ مَعَ مِرَاتِهَا إِلَّا أَنَّ الذَّهْنَ إِنَّمَا يُنْتَقَشُ فِيهِ عَلَى قَدَرِهِ مِنْ جِهَةِ الْكَمِّ وَ أَهْيَئَةِ وَ الْكَيْفِ. فَإِنْ كَانَ صَافِيًا مُسْتَقِيمًا، حَكَمَى مَا فِي الْقَابِلِ بِلَا تَغْيِيرٍ. وَ إِلَّا اخْتَلَفَتْ الْمُنْتَقَشُ فِيهِ - فِي الْكَمِّ بِكَمِّ الذَّهْنِ، وَ فِي أَهْيَئَةِ بِهَيْئَةِ الذَّهْنِ مِنَ الطُّولِ وَ الْعَرْضِ وَ الْأَعْوَجَاجِ وَ الْإِنْحِرَافِ، وَ فِي الْكَيْفِ بِكَيْفِهِ مِنْ بَيَاضٍ أَوْ سَوَادٍ وَ غَيْرِ ذَلِكَ - كَاخْتِلَافِ صُورَةِ صُورِ الْوَجْهِ الْوَاحِدِ فِي الْمَرَايَا الْمُخْتَلِفَةِ كَذَلِكَ. هَذَا إِذَا كَانَ مَا فِي الذَّهْنِ مِنْ ظِلٍّ الْحَقِّ.

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75 T., p. 202. [تَع]

81 T., p. 203. [مِنْ جِهَةٍ]

84 T., p. 203. [أَوْ]

85 T., p. 203. [صُورِ صُورَةٍ]

فَإِنْ كَانَ مَا فِيهِ مِنْ ظِلِّ الْبَاطِلِ، إِنْتَكَسَ إِلَى الْأَسْفَلِ؛ فَقَابَلَ الَّذِي فِي خَزَائِنِ
الْشَّمَالِ، وَ هِيَ ثَمَانِيَةُ عَشَرَ خَزَانَةً مَنكُوسَةً. كُلُّ مَا فِيهَا دَعَاوَى، لَا حَقَائِقَ، إِلَّا أَنَّهَا
تُشَبِّهُ مَا فِي الْحَقِّ. كُلُّ خَزَانَةٍ تُشَابِهُ ضِدَّهَا؛ فَيَنْتَقِشُ فِيهِ مَا قَابَلَهُ مَعَ مَا فِي الذَّهْنِ مِنْ
[٢٠١] أَهْيَئَةٍ، وَ الْكَيْفِ، وَ مَا لَهُ مِنْ الْكَمِّ. 90

وَ إِنَّمَا قُلْنَا أَنَّهُ ظِلِّيَّ اتِّزَاعِيٌّ فِي غَيْرِ ذَهْنٍ عِلَّةِ الْمَوْجُودَاتِ لِأَنَّكَ لَا تُدْرِكُ مَا
غَابَ عَنْ بَصْرِكَ بِخَيَالِكَ إِلَّا فِي وَقْتِهِ وَ مَكَانِهِ. وَ لَا يُمَكِّنُكَ أَنْ تُدْرِكَ شَيْئًا سَمِعْتَهُ أَوْ
نَظَرْتَهُ، إِذَا غَابَ عَنْكَ أَوْ غَبَتْ عَنْهُ، إِلَّا إِذَا التَّفَقَّتْ نَفْسُكَ إِلَى رَمَائِهِ وَ مَكَانِهِ الَّذِي
أَدْرَكْتَهُ فِيهِ أَوَّلًا؛ فَتُدْرِكُهُ فِيهِ. وَ إِنْ ذَهَبَتْ شَهَادَتُهُ، فَإِنَّ غَيْبَهُ لَمْ يَذْهَبْ؛ كَلَّمَا طَلَبْتَهُ
وَجَدْتَهُ فِيهِ. 95

كَمَا لَوْ ذَكَرَ لَكَ زَيْدٌ أَنَّكَ كَلَّمْتَ عَمْرًا أَمْسٍ بِكَذَا، فَإِنَّكَ لَمْ تَذْكُرْهُ حَتَّى تَلْتَفِتَ
نَفْسُكَ بِخَيَالِكَ إِلَى ذَلِكَ الْوَقْتِ وَ ذَلِكَ الْمَكَانِ؛ فَتَرَى فِيهِ عَمْرًا بِغَيْبِهِ وَ كَلَامَكَ بِغَيْبِهِ

87 T., p. 203. [إِنْتَكَسَ] 87

88 T., p. 203. [ثَمَانِيَةُ عَشَرَ] 88

88 T., p. 203. [أَنَّهَا] 88

89 T., p. 203. [تُشَابِهُ] 89

90 T., p. 203. [وَ] 90

93 T., p. 205. [الْتَفَقَتْ نَفْسُكَ] 93

96 T., p. 207. [ذَكَرَ لَكَ زَيْدٌ] 96

96 T., p. 207. [كَلَّمْتَ عَمْرًا] 96

97 T., p. 207. [وَ ذَلِكَ الْمَكَانِ] 97

97 T., p. 207. [عَمْرًا بِغَيْبِهِ وَ كَلَامَكَ بِغَيْبِهِ] 97

مَوْجُودَيْنِ فِي الْكِتَابِ الْخَفِيفِ. فَيُعْطَى الْكِتَابُ الْخَفِيفُ ذَهْنَكَ صُورَةَ الشَّخْصِ، وَ
الْكَلَامَ، وَ الْوَقْتَ، وَ الْمَكَانَ؛ فَتُخْبِرُ عَمَّا انْتَقَشَ فِي ذَهْنِكَ مِنْ ذَلِكَ عَلَى نَحْوِ مَا أَشْرْنَا
إِلَيْهِ مِنْ كَيْفِيَّةِ الْإِنْتِقَاشِ. 100

وَ اعْلَمْ أَنَّ الْوَقْتَ الَّذِي ذَكَرْتَ فِيهِ وَ الْمَكَانُ الَّذِي رَأَيْتَ فِيهِ الشَّخْصَ وَ الْكَلَامَ
هِيَ نَفْسٌ مَا رَأَيْتَ أَوَّلًا فِي الزَّمَانِ لِأَنَّ الْجِسْمَ الْمَرِيئِيَّ بِالْبَصَرِ وَ الْكَلَامَ الْمَسْمُوعَ
بِهَذِهِ الْأُذُنِ قَبْلَ هَذَا الذِّكْرِ فِي الزَّمَانِ؛ وَ هُوَ شَهَادَتُهُمَا. وَ أَمَّا إِذْرَاكَ لِحَالَتَيْهِمَا فِي
ظَرْفَيْهِمَا، فَفِي وَقْتٍ وَاحِدٍ وَ مَكَانٍ وَاحِدٍ. وَ نَظِيرُهُ فِي غَيْرِ الْوَقْتِ: لَوْ كَانَ عِنْدَكَ
كِتَابَةٌ فِي قِرْطَاسٍ، فَنَظَرْتَ إِلَيْهَا فِي وَقْتَيْنِ، فَإِنَّ الْمَرِيئِيَّ وَ الْمَكَانَ وَاحِدٌ. وَ مَا نَحْنُ
فِيهِ كَذَلِكَ إِلَّا أَنَّ الْوَقْتَ وَاحِدٌ، وَ هُوَ وَقْتُ الْأَطْلَةِ مِنْ يَوْمِ الْجُمُعَةِ وَقْتُ الْعَصْرِ
بَعْدَ الْأَذَانِ وَ الصَّلَاةِ، فَإِنْ كَانَ بَصْرُكَ حَدِيدًا، عَرَفْتَ هُنَاكَ ذَلِكَ الشَّخْصَ، هَلْ صَلَّى
أَمْ لَا، فَافْهَمْ. 105

الفائدة الحادية عشرة

في بيان صُورِ الأفعالِ مِنَ الإنسانِ
و الإشارةُ إليه

إِغْلَمْ أَنَّ الْإِنْسَانَ مُرَكَّبٌ مِّنَ الْوُجُودِ وَ الْمَاهِيَّةِ . وَ الْمَخْلُوقُ أَبَدًا مُحْتَاجٌ فِي بَقَائِهِ
إِلَى الْمَدَدِ مِنْ أَحَدِ طَرَفَيْنِ: طَرَفِ الْوُجُودِ وَ طَرَفِ الْمَاهِيَّةِ. ⁵

فَمَدَدُ الْوُجُودِ مِنْ فِعْلِ اللَّهِ الذَّاتِيِّ؛ فَهُوَ أَبَدًا قَائِمٌ بِأَمْرِهِ قِيَامَ صُورٍ وَ مِنْ فِعْلِهِ
لِلْأَعْمَالِ الصَّالِحَةِ: فَالْحَافِظُ فِعْلُ اللَّهِ، وَ الْمَدَدُ مِنَ الْأَعْمَالِ مِنْ فِعْلِ اللَّهِ وَ مِنْ فِعْلِ
الْعَبْدِ. فَمَا يَفْعَلُ اللَّهُ مَقْبُولٌ؛ وَ مَا مِنْ فِعْلِ الْعَبْدِ قَبُولٌ.

وَ مَدَدُ الْمَاهِيَّةِ يَفْعَلُ اللَّهُ الْعَرَضِيَّ؛ فَهِيَ أَبَدًا قَائِمَةٌ بِأَمْرِهِ الْعَرَضِيِّ قِيَامَ صُورٍ
وَ مِنْ فِعْلِهَا مِنَ الْأَعْمَالِ الْخَبِيثَةِ: فَالْحَافِظُ أَمْرُ اللَّهِ التَّابِعِ، وَ الْمَدَدُ بِالْأَعْمَالِ الْخَبِيثَةِ ¹⁰
يَفْعَلُ اللَّهُ وَ مِنْ فِعْلِ الْعَبْدِ. فَمَا يَفْعَلُ اللَّهُ مُقَرَّرٌ وَ مُقَوِّمٌ؛ وَ مَا مِنْ فِعْلِ الْعَبْدِ
مُقَوِّمٌ وَ مُتَكَوِّنٌ.

ثُمَّ لَمَّا كَانَ الْإِنْسَانُ فِي نَفْسِهِ مُرَكَّبٌ مِنْ صِدْقَيْنِ مُتَعَادِيَيْنِ فِي الذَّاتِ وَ الصِّفَةِ وَ
الْإِنْبِعَاثِ، مُحْدَثَيْنِ مُحْتَاجَيْنِ فِي تَقْوِيَمِهِمَا إِلَى الْمَدَدِ مِنْهُمَا أَوْ مِنْ أَحَدِهِمَا، فَإِنْ كَانَ

⁵ T., p. 210. الطَّرَفَيْنِ [طَرَفَيْنِ]

⁷ T., p. 210. الْأَعْمَالِ الصَّالِحَةِ [الْأَعْمَالِ]

⁹ T., p. 212. يَفْعَلُهُ الْعَرَضِيُّ [بِأَمْرِهِ الْعَرَضِيِّ]

15 مِنْهُمَا، جَرَى عَلَى ذَلِكَ الْإِنْسَانِ الْوِزْنُ يَوْمَ الْقِيَامَةِ وَ الْحِسَابِ؛ وَ إِنْ كَانَ مِنْ أَحَدِهِمَا ضَعْفَ الْآخَرِ وَ لَمْ يَتَّقِ مِنْهُ إِلَّا قَدْرُ مَا يَحْفَظُ الْآخَرُ؛ وَ يَكُونُ حُكْمُهُ حُكْمُ الْقَوِيِّ.

فَإِنْ كَانَ الْقَوِيُّ الْوُجُودَ، إِطْمَأَنَّتِ النَّفْسُ وَ كَانَتْ أُخْتُ الْعَقْلِ وَ رَقَّتِ الْمَاهِيَّةُ وَ شَابَهَتْ [٢٠٢] الْوُجُودَ، كَالْحَدِيدَةِ الْمَحْمَاةِ فِي النَّارِ. فَلَا فَرْقَ فِي الْفِعْلِ بَيْنَهُمَا، وَ إِنْ كَانَ مَا بَيْنَهُمَا بِالْعَرَضِ، كَالْحَدِيدِ. قَالَ الشَّاعِرُ:

رَقَّ الزُّجَاجُ وَ رَقَّتِ الْخَمْرُ فَتَشَاكَلَا وَ تَشَابَهَ الْأَمْرُ
فَكَأَنَّمَا خَمْرٌ وَ لَا قَدْحٌ وَ كَأَنَّمَا قَدْحٌ وَ لَا خَمْرٌ
وَ إِنْ كَانَ الْقَوِيُّ الْمَاهِيَّةَ كَانَ الْأَمْرُ عَلَى الْعَكْسِ. وَ كُلُّ وَاحِدٍ مِنْهُمَا إِنَّمَا يَسْتَمِدُّ
وَ يَقْوِي بِمَدَدٍ مِنْ جَنْبِهِ إِذْ لَا يَسْتَمِدُّ الشَّيْءُ مِنْ نَحْوِ مَا هُوَ مِنْ ضِدِّهِ. فَلَا يَسْتَمِدُّ
25 الْتُّورُ مِنَ الظُّلْمَةِ وَ لَا الْعَكْسُ مِنْ حَيْثُ هُوَ كَذَلِكَ. وَ مِثْلُ الْآخَرِ مَعَهُ، إِنَّمَا هُوَ لِبَقَائِهِمَا.

فَالْوُجُودُ يَسْتَمِدُّ مِنْ أَنْوَاعِ الْخَيْرَاتِ لِأَنَّهَا مِنْ نَوْعِهِ. وَ الْمَاهِيَّةُ يَسْتَمِدُّ مِنْ أَنْوَاعِ

16 عَنْهُ T., p. 212.

24 يَسْتَمِدُّ مِنْ [يَسْتَمِدُّ الشَّيْءُ مِنْ T., p. 214.

25 مِنْ [مِنْ T., p. 214.

15-16 [أَحَدِهِمَا] The word أَحَدِهِمَا is a correction, by the author, in the margin. Part of the pronoun هِمَا

is cut off in the manuscript, but from the context, as well from comparison with T., there is no doubt that

أَحَدِهِمَا is meant.

الشُّرُورِ لِأَنَّهَا مِنْ نَوْعِهَا. وَ الْمُرَكَّبُ الْوَاحِدُ لَا يَسْتَمِدُّ مِنْ طَرَفَيْهِ مَعًا، إِذَا كَانَا مُتَعَانِدَيْنِ، إِلَّا عَلَى التَّعَاقُبِ. وَإِذَا كَانَ وَجُودُ أَحَدِ الْجُزْأَيْنِ شَرْطًا لَوُجُودِ الْآخَرِ، لَزِمَ أَنْ يَكُونَ فِعْلُ ذَلِكَ الشَّيْءِ وَاحِدًا. وَلَوْ فَعَلَ الْوُجُودُ الْخَيْرَ وَالْمَآهِيَةَ الشَّرَّ، فِي حَالٍ وَاحِدٍ، لَزِمَ الْإِنْفِرَادُ الْمُسْتَلَزِمُ لِلْإِنْفِكَاحِ، الْمُسْتَلَزِمُ لِفَنَاءِ الشَّيْءِ، لِأَنَّهُ عِبَارَةٌ عَنْهُمَا مُنْضَمِّينَ. وَ يَفْتَنَانِ هُمَا أَيْضًا لِتَوَقُّفِ وَجُودِ كُلِّ مِّنْهُمَا عَلَى انْضِمَامِ الْآخَرِ عَلَيْهِ.

وَلَكِنْ يَتَعَارِضَانِ فِي الْمَلِيلِ الْمُنْبَعِثِ عَنْ شَهْوَةِ كُلِّ إِلَى الْإِسْتِمْدَادِ مِنْ جِنْسِهِ لِأَنَّ مِثْلَ أَحَدِهِمَا إِلَى شَيْءٍ يَقْتَضِي مِثْلَ الْآخَرِ إِلَى ضِدِّهِ، لِأَنَّهُمَا ضِدَّانِ فِي كُلِّ شَيْءٍ. وَ هَذَا يَضْعَفُ أَحَدُهُمَا بِفِعْلِ الْآخَرِ لِإِجْدَابِهِ مَعَ الْفَاعِلِ إِلَى خِلَافِ مَا يَتَقَوَّى بِهِ، وَ مِنْ ثَمَّ يَتَعَارِضَانِ. وَ يَطْلُبُ كُلُّ وَاحِدٍ مِنَ الْآخَرِ أَنْ يَكُونَ مَعَهُ فِي مَحَبَّتِهِ لِتَوَقُّفِ فِعْلِهِ لِمَا يُرِيدُ عَلَى تَحَقُّقِهِ فِي نَفْسِهِ. وَإِذَا فَارَقَهُ الْآخَرُ لَمْ يَتَحَقَّقْ.

وَأَمَّا مُجَرَّدُ الْمَلِيلِ، وَ هُوَ الْإِلْتِفَاتُ لِشَهْوَةِ الْمَشَاكِلِ، فَلَيْسَ كَالْفِعْلِ يَحْصُلُ بِهِ نَيْلُ الْمَدَدِ الْمُسَكِّنِ لِلشَّهْوَةِ؛ فَلَا يَحْصُلُ بِهِ السُّكُونُ وَ لَا تَرْجِيحُ أَحَدِ الْمَلِيلَيْنِ. وَ لَا يُمَكِّنُ أَنْبِعَاثَهُمَا مَعًا مُجْتَمِعَيْنِ إِلَّا أَنْ يَكُونَ أَحَدُهُمَا ذَاتِيًّا وَ الْآخَرُ عَرَضِيًّا؛ وَ لَا مُخْتَلِفَيْنِ لِاسْتِلْزَامِ ذَلِكَ الْمَفَارَقَةِ لِاسْتِحَالَةِ أَنْبِعَاثَيْنِ مُتَضَادَّيْنِ مِنَ الْمُرَكَّبِ الْوَاحِدِ الَّذِي لَا يُوْجَدُ إِلَّا بِالْإِنْضِمَامِ دَفْعَةً، لِاسْتِلْزَامِ ذَلِكَ عَدْمَهُمَا، لِتَوَقُّفِ تَحَقُّقِهِمَا عَلَى الْإِنْضِمَامِ. فَوَجِبَ أَنْ يَكُونَا عَلَى التَّعَاقُبِ.

28 طَرَفَيْهِ T., p. 215. طَرَفَيْهِ

35 عَلَى T., p. 216. إِلَى

38 لِشَهْوَةِ الْمَشَاكِلِ T., p. 216. لِشَهْوَةِ الْمَشَاكِلِ

28 طَرَفَيْهِ In A. we find طَرَفَيْهِ, but from the context and the commentary, it is clear that the author meant طَرَفَيْهِ. The difference is only in one dot.

فَإِذَا مَالَ الْوُجُودُ إِلَى الْخَيْرِ، مَالَ بِالْمَاهِيَّةِ؛ فَمَالَتْ مَعَهُ بِالْعَرَضِ عَلَى خِلَافِ مُحَبَّتِهَا.
 45 وَ إِذَا مَالَتْ إِلَى الشَّرِّ، مَالَتْ بِالْوُجُودِ؛ فَمَالَتْ مَعَهَا بِالْعَرَضِ عَلَى خِلَافِ مُحَبَّتِهِ. وَ
 يَتَعَايَنُ عَلَى هَذَا الْحَالِ؛ فَمَنْ رَجَعَ مِثْلُهُ، بِحَيْثُ لَا يَمِيلُ مَعَ الْآخِرِ، غَلَبَ. وَ فَعَلَ
 مَطْلُوبُهُ الْآخِرُ بِالْعَرَضِ وَ فَعَلَ الْغَالِبُ مَطْلُوبُهُ بِالذَّاتِ؛ فَيَقْوَى الْفَاعِلُ وَ يَضْعُفُ
 الْتَّابِعُ بِنِسْبَةِ مَا يَقْوَى بِهِ الْمُتَّبِعُ. وَ لَا يَحْصُلُ السُّكُونُ لِلْمُرَكَّبِ إِلَّا بِالْفِعْلِ. وَ لَا
 يَزَالُ كَذَلِكَ حَتَّى يَنْمَحِقَ مِثْلُ الضَّعِيفِ فِي مِثْلِ الْقَوِيِّ إِلَى أَلَّا يَبْقَى مِنَ الضَّعِيفِ إِلَّا
 50 مَا يَتَقَوَّمُ وَ يَتَحَقَّقُ بِهِ الْقَوِيُّ، لِأَنَّ وُجُودَ الضَّعِيفِ شَرْطٌ فِي تَحَقُّقِ وُجُودِ الْقَوِيِّ.
 وَ يَكْفِي فِيهِ نُقْطَةُ رَأْسِ الْمَخْرُوطِ. وَ إِنَّمَا قُلْنَا: «رَأْسُ الْمَخْرُوطِ»، لِأَنَّ الضَّعْفَ
 الْمُتَنَاسِبَ يَقْتَضِي حُصُولَ هَيْئَةِ الْمَخْرُوطِ لِأَنَّهُ، فِي كُلِّ مَرَّةٍ، يَضْعُفُ [٢٠٣] التَّابِعُ،
 وَ يَقْوَى الْفَاعِلُ.

وَ شَرُحَ حَالِ ذَلِكَ الشَّانِ أَنَّ الْوُجُودَ لَهُ وَجْهٌ إِلَى مِثْلِهِ وَ مَطْلَبُهُ الطَّيِّبَةُ: وَ هُوَ
 55 الْعَقْلُ؛ وَ هُوَ وَزِيرُهُ. وَ لِلْمَاهِيَّةِ وَجْهٌ إِلَى مِثْلِهَا وَ مَطْلَبُهَا الْخَبِيثَةُ: هُوَ النَّفْسُ
 الْأَمَّارَةُ بِالسُّوءِ؛ وَ هِيَ وَزِيرُهَا.

وَ لَمَّا كَانَ الْإِنْسَانُ هُوَ ذَلِكَ الْمُرَكَّبُ مِنْهُمَا، ظَهَرَتْ فِيهِ الْوَاحِدِيَّةُ بِصُورَتِهَا.
 فَوَجَبَ أَنْ يَكُونَ لَهُ جِسْمٌ وَاحِدٌ، وَ جَسَدٌ وَاحِدٌ، وَ إِنْهُم وَاحِدٌ، وَ آلَةٌ وَاحِدَةٌ.

44 T., p. 217. وَ إِذَا [فَإِذَا 44

46-47 T., p. 217. وَ مَالَ مَعَهُ الْآخِرُ [وَ فَعَلَ مَطْلُوبُهُ الْآخِرُ 46-47

رَأْسُ نُقْطَةِ الْمَخْرُوطِ، لِأَنَّ [نُقْطَةُ رَأْسِ الْمَخْرُوطِ. وَ إِنَّمَا قُلْنَا: «رَأْسُ الْمَخْرُوطِ»، لِأَنَّ الضَّعْفَ 51
 T., p. 217. الضَّعِيفَ

54 T., p. 218. ذَلِكَ أَنَّ [ذَلِكَ الشَّانِ أَنَّ 54

55-56 T., p. 218. الْأَمَّارَةُ [الْأَمَّارَةُ بِالسُّوءِ 55-56

فَوَجَبَ فِي ذَلِكَ أَنْ تَكُونَ كُلُّهَا صَالِحَةً لِاسْتِعْمَالِ الْوُجُودِ لَهَا عَلَى الْإِنْفِرَادِ، بِمُقْتَضَى
 60 فِعْلِهِ لِمَا قُلْنَا، وَ صَالِحَةً لِاسْتِعْمَالِ الْمَاهِيَّةِ لَهَا عَلَى الْإِنْفِرَادِ، بِمُقْتَضَى فِعْلِهَا. وَ
 كَذَلِكَ مُتَعَلِّقَاتِ أَفْعَالِهِمَا مِنَ الْمَأْكَلِ، وَ الْمَشَارِبِ، وَ الْمَلَابِسِ، وَ الْمَنَاجِحِ، وَ غَيْرِ ذَلِكَ.
 وَ كُلُّ مِنْهَا صَالِحٌ لِاسْتِعْمَالِهِمَا عَلَى الْإِنْفِرَادِ. وَ هِيَ كَافِيَةٌ لِلْوُجُودِ إِذَا اسْتَعْمَلَهَا
 بِوَاسِطَةِ الْعَقْلِ بِحَيْثُ لَا يَحْتَاجُ إِلَى شَيْءٍ فِي جَمِيعِ مَبُولَاتِهِ لَا يُوْجَدُ فِي مُقْتَضَى
 الْعَقْلِ مِنَ الْخَيْرَاتِ؛ وَ كَذَلِكَ الْمَاهِيَّةُ. بَلْ تَكُونُ تِلْكَ الْأُمُورُ مُغْنِيَةً لِكُلِّ مِنْهَا فِي كُلِّ
 65 شَيْءٍ.

ثُمَّ أَعْلَمَ أَنَّ الْعَقْلَ فِي الْإِنْسَانِ وَ النَّفْسِ الْأَمَّارَةَ مِرَاتَانِ. مِرَاةُ الْعَقْلِ عَنْ يَمِينِ
 الْقَلْبِ؛ وَجْهُهُ إِلَى السَّمَاءِ؛ فَتَنْطَبِعُ فِيهِ صُورَةُ الرَّأْسِ الْمُخْتَصِّ بِهِ مِنَ الْعَقْلِ الْأَوَّلِ وَ
 عَلَى الْأُذُنِ الْيُمْنَى مِنَ الْقَلْبِ الَّتِي هِيَ بَابُ وَحْيِهِ مَلَكٌ مُؤَيَّدٌ. وَ تَحْتَهُ جُنُودٌ كَثِيرَةٌ
 مِنَ الْمَلَائِكَةِ بِعَدَدِ أَفْعَالِ الْعَقْلِ وَ مَبُولَاتِ الْوُجُودِ؛ تُعِينُهُ عَلَى كُلِّ حَاجَةٍ وَ مِرَاةُ
 70 النَّفْسِ عَنْ يَسَارِ الْقَلْبِ؛ وَجْهُهَا إِلَى الْأَرْضِ؛ فَتَنْطَبِعُ فِيهَا صُورَةُ الرَّأْسِ الْمُخْتَصِّ بِهَا
 مِنَ الْجَهْلِ الْأَوَّلِ. وَ عَلَى الْأُذُنِ الْيُسْرَى مِنَ الْقَلْبِ الَّتِي هِيَ بَابُ وَحْيِهَا شَيْطَانٌ
 مُقَيَّضٌ. وَ تَحْتَهُ جُنُودٌ كَثِيرَةٌ مِنَ الشَّيَاطِينِ بِعَدَدِ أَفْعَالِ النَّفْسِ الْأَمَّارَةِ وَ مَبُولَاتِ
 الْمَاهِيَّةِ؛ تُعِينُهُ عَلَى كُلِّ شَرٍّ.

وَ كُلُّ مَلَكٍ مُوَكَّلٌ بِشَيْءٍ وَاحِدٍ مِنَ الْخَيْرِ لَا غَيْرَ. وَ ضِدُّهُ شَيْطَانٌ مُوَكَّلٌ بِضِدِّ مَا
 75 وَكَّلَ بِهِ الْمَلَكُ مِنَ الشَّرِّ لَا غَيْرَ. فَإِذَا طَلَبَ الْوُجُودَ مِنَ الْعَقْلِ شَيْئًا مِنَ الْخَيْرِ، وَ طَلَبَهُ
 الْعَقْلُ بِجُنُودِهِ، طَلَبَتِ الْمَاهِيَّةُ ضِدَّهُ مِنَ النَّفْسِ الْأَمَّارَةِ بِجُنُودِهَا؛ فَوَقَعَ بَيْنَهُمَا الْحَرْبُ.

60 T., p. 218. كَمَا قُلْنَا [لِمَا قُلْنَا]

74 T., p. 221. [بَشْيءٍ مِنْ] بَشْيءٍ وَاحِدٍ مِنْ

فَإِنْ غَلَبَ الْعَقْلُ، قَتَلَ ذَلِكَ الْمَلِكُ ذَلِكَ الشَّيْطَانَ الْخَاصَّ بِمُضَادَّتِهِ؛ وَ ذَلِكَ بِعَوْنِ مَنْ
 اللَّهُ سُبْحَانَهُ. وَإِنْ غَلَبَتِ النَّفْسُ الْأَمَّارَةُ، ذَهَبَ ذَلِكَ الْمَلِكُ عَنْ ذَلِكَ الشَّيْءِ وَ لَحِقَ
 بِمَرْكَزِهِ مِنَ الْوُجُودِ، يَعْبُدُ اللَّهَ؛ إِسْتَوَى ذَلِكَ الشَّيْطَانُ الْخَاصُّ عَلَى ذَلِكَ الشَّيْءِ؛ وَ
 ذَلِكَ بِتَخْلِيَةٍ مِنَ اللَّهِ سُبْحَانَهُ. 80

وَ لِذَلِكَ مِثَالٌ وَ بَيَانٌ عَلَى سَبِيلِ الْإِشَارَةِ. قَالُوا: إِنْ عَلِمَ أَنَّ الشَّمْسَ، إِذَا أَشْرَقَتْ
 عَلَى الْجِدَارِ، [٢٠٤] إِسْتِنَارَ وَجْهَهُ بِشِعَاعِ الشَّمْسِ وَ ظَهَرَ الظِّلُّ مِنْ خَلْفِهِ. وَ لَوْ لَا
 الْجِدَارُ، لَمَا ظَهَرَ نُورُ الشَّمْسِ، وَ إِنْ كَانَ مِنْهَا. وَ لَوْ لَا الشَّمْسُ، لَمَا ظَهَرَ الظِّلُّ مِنَ
 الْجِدَارِ، وَ إِنْ كَانَ مِنْهُ. قَالُوا: إِسْتِنَارَةُ مِنَ الشَّمْسِ بِالْجِدَارِ؛ وَ الظِّلُّ مِنَ الْجِدَارِ بِالشَّمْسِ.
 وَ أَعْلَمُ أَنَّا نُرِيدُ بِالْجِدَارِ نَفْسَ النُّورِ مِنْ حَيْثُ نَفْسِهِ، لَا مِنْ حَيْثُ الشَّمْسِ. 85
 قَالُوا: إِسْتِنَارَةُ تَقَوُّمَتْ بِنُورِ الشَّمْسِ تَقَوُّمَ صُدُورٍ، وَ بِالْجِدَارِ تَقَوُّمَ تَحَقُّقٍ. وَ الظِّلُّ تَقَوُّمَ
 بِالْجِدَارِ تَقَوُّمَ صُدُورٍ، وَ بِالشَّمْسِ تَقَوُّمَ تَحَقُّقٍ: «مَنْ جَعَلْنَا الشَّمْسَ عَلَيْهِ دَلِيلًا».
 قَالُوا: إِسْتِنَارَةُ آيَةُ الْحَسَنَةِ بِفِعْلِ الْعَبْدِ مِنْ قَدَرِ اللَّهِ؛ وَ الظِّلُّ آيَةُ الْمَعْصِيَةِ مِنْ فِعْلِ الْعَبْدِ
 بِقَدَرِ اللَّهِ.

وَ الثَّانِي: قَالَ اللَّهُ (تَع) فِي الْحَدِيثِ الْقُدْسِيِّ: «وَ ذَلِكَ أَنِّي أُولَى بِحَسَنَاتِكَ مِنْكَ وَ
 أَنْتَ أُولَى بِسَيِّئَاتِكَ مِنِّي». وَ هُوَ مَعْنَى: مَا أَصَابَكَ مِنْ حَسَنَةٍ فَمِنْ اللَّهِ - أَنِّي، أَنَا أُولَى
 بِهَا - وَ مَا أَصَابَكَ مِنْ سَيِّئَةٍ فَمِنْ نَفْسِكَ - أَنِّي، أَنْتَ أُولَى بِهَا - كَمَا فِي الْمِثَالِ تَقُولُ
 الشَّمْسُ: «يَا جِدَارُ! أَنَا أُولَى بِالْإِسْتِنَارَةِ مِنْكَ لِأَنَّهَا مِنْ نُورِي، وَ إِنْ كَانَتْ لَا
 تَتَحَقَّقُ إِلَّا بِكَ. وَ أَنْتَ أُولَى بِالظِّلِّ مِنِّي لِأَنَّهُ مِنْكَ، وَ إِنْ كَانَ لَا يَتَحَقَّقُ إِلَّا بِي».

فَالْحَسَنَةُ مِنَ اللَّهِ أَوَّلًا وَ بِالذَّاتِ، بِمَعْنَى رَاجِعَةٍ جِهَةِ الْوُجُودِ فِيهَا لِرُجُوعِهَا مِنْ 95

78 T., p. 221. الشَّخْصِ [الشَّيْءِ]

79 T., p. 221. الشَّخْصِ [الشَّيْءِ]

جَهَةِ قَدْرِ اللَّهِ إِلَى فِعْلِهِ، وَ بِالْعَبْدِ ثَانِيًا وَ بِالذَّاتِ أَيْضًا لِأَنَّهَا مِنْ وُجُودِهِ بِاللَّهِ؛ فَهِيَ، مِنْ جَهَةِ فِعْلِ الْعَبْدِ، يَرْجِعُ إِلَى وُجُودِهِ الرَّاجِعُ إِلَى فِعْلِ اللَّهِ (تع). وَ السَّيِّئَةُ مِنْ الْعَبْدِ أَوَّلًا وَ بِالذَّاتِ، بِمَعْنَى رَاجِحِيَّةِ مَا هِيَ فِيهَا، وَ بِاللَّهِ ثَانِيًا وَ بِالْعَرَضِ، بِمَعْنَى الْمُسَاوَةِ فِي الْوُجُودِ وَ تَحَقُّقِ الْمَاهِيَةِ بِالْوُجُودِ الْمُتَقَوِّمُ بِأَمْرِ اللَّهِ (تع).

100 فَمَشِيَّةُ الْعَبْدِ لِلْحَسَنَةِ بِالذَّاتِ [هِيَ] مِنْ مَشِيَّةِ اللَّهِ لَهَا بِالذَّاتِ. وَ مَشِيَّةُ الْعَبْدِ لِلْسَّيِّئَةِ بِالذَّاتِ [هِيَ] مِنْ مَشِيَّةِ اللَّهِ بِالْعَرَضِ، عَلَى نَحْوِ مَا أَشْرْنَا لَكَ إِلَيْهِ، وَ أَسْلُكَ طَرِيقًا بَيْنَ هَذِهِ اخْتِدَادٍ جَامِعًا لَهَا، عَلَى نَحْوِ مَا يَأْتِي؛ وَ هَذَا الطَّرِيقُ الْجَامِعُ هُوَ سَبِيلُ اللَّهِ. قَالَ (تع): «فَأَسْلُكِي سُبُلَ رَبِّكَ ذُلًّا».

105 وَ أَصْلُ الْمَسْأَلَةِ أَنْ تَعْلَمَ أَنَّ الشَّيْءَ إِنَّمَا يَتَحَقَّقُ بِوُجُودِهِ وَ مَا هِيَ. وَ ذَلِكَ لِأَنَّهُ (إِلَّا أَنَّهُ خ. ل.) لَا قِيَامَ لَهُ بِنَفْسِهِ، لَا فِي أَفْرَادِهِ وَ لَا فِي الْجُمُوعِ؛ وَ إِنَّمَا يَتَقَوِّمُ بِأَمْرِ اللَّهِ قِيَامَ صُدُورٍ. فَهُوَ قَائِمٌ بِهِ أَبَدًا قِيَامَ صُدُورٍ؛ فَهُوَ طَرِيقُ [٢٠٥] أَبَدًا. وَ إِلَيْهِ الْإِشَارَةُ بِقَوْلِهِ (تع): «وَمِنْ آيَاتِهِ أَنْ تَقُومَ السَّمَاءُ وَ الْأَرْضُ بِأَمْرِهِ». وَ فِي دُعَاءِ يَوْمِ السَّبْتِ - رَوَاهُ فِي الْمِصْبَاحِ - قَالَ (ع): «كُلُّ شَيْءٍ سِوَاكَ قَامَ بِأَمْرِكَ»، إِلَّا أَنَّهُ فِي كُلِّ حَالٍ نَهْرٌ يَجْرِي مُسْتَدِيرًا اسْتِدَارَتًا صَحِيحَةً. وَ لَيْسَ قَوْلُنَا أَنَّهُ «نَهْرٌ يَجْرِي» أَنَّهُ دَائِرَةٌ؛ بَلْ هُوَ كُرَّةٌ مُجَوَّفَةٌ. وَ أَفْعَالُهُ أَيْضًا قَائِمَةٌ بِأَمْرِ اللَّهِ، مِنْ جَهَةِ مَا تَقَوَّمَتْ بِهِ 110 ذَاتُهُ، تَقَوُّمًا تَبَعِيًّا، عَلَى نَحْوِ مَا أَشْرْنَا إِلَيْهِ سَابِقًا. وَ الْمُرَادُ بِالتَّبَعِيِّ أَنْ يَكُونَ نِسْبَةُ مَا

97 T., p. 230. تَرْجِعُ [يَرْجِعُ]

97 T., p. 230. الرَّاجِعُ [الرَّاجِعُ]

101 T., p. 231. لَهَا بِالْعَرَضِ [بِالْعَرَضِ]

104-105 T., p. 232. [لَأَنَّهُ لَا] [لَأَنَّهُ] (إِلَّا أَنَّهُ خ. ل.) لَا

106 T., p. 232. قَائِمٌ بِهِ قِيَامٌ [قَائِمٌ بِهِ أَبَدًا قِيَامٌ]

تَقَوَّمَتْ بِهِ الْأَفْعَالُ إِلَى مَا تَقَوَّمَتْ بِهِ الذَّاتُ نِسْبَةَ الشَّعَاعِ إِلَى الْمُنِيرِ، نِسْبَةُ وَاحِدٍ مِنْ سَبْعِينَ.

فَالذَّاتُ قَامَتْ بِأَمْرِ اللَّهِ، وَ أَفْعَالُهَا قَامَتْ بِنُورِ ذَلِكَ الْأَمْرِ، وَ اخْتِلَافُهَا عَلَى حَسَبِ 115
اخْتِلَافِ مَرَاتِبِهِ مِنْ ذَلِكَ الْأَمْرِ. فَالْأَمْرُ هُوَ الْخَفِيطُ لَهَا، كَمَا ذَكَرْنَا، وَ الْفِعْلُ الْمَحْفُوظُ مُسْتَنَدٌ إِلَى فَاعِلِهِ الْمَحْفُوظِ، وَ حِفْظُ الِاسْتِنَادِ مِنْ ذَلِكَ الْأَمْرِ أَيْضًا. وَ إِلَى هَذَا الْمَعْنَى الْإِشَارَةُ بِقَوْلِهِ الرَّضَا (ع): «هُوَ الْمَالِكُ لِمَا مَلَكَهُمْ؛ وَ الْقَادِرُ عَلَى مَا أَقْدَرَهُمْ عَلَيْهِ». وَ الْإِخْتِيَارُ الَّذِي فِي الْعَبْدِ نَشَأَ مِنْ اقْتِضَاءِ الصِّدِّيقِ، الوجودِ وَ الْمَاهِيَةِ، لِاقْتِضَاءِ مَا لُهُمَا، كَمَا مَرَّ، وَ مِنْ خَلْقِ آلَاءِ الصَّالِحَةِ لِلْمُتَصَادِّقِينَ، وَ مِنْ الِاسْتِطَاعَةِ 120
لِلْفِعْلِ فِي الْفِعْلِ، وَ مِنْ إِمْكَانِهَا قَبْلَ، أَيْ، الصَّحَّةِ، وَ هِيَ الَّتِي يَكُونُ الْعَبْدُ بِهَا مُتَحَرِّكًا مُسْتَطِيعًا لِلْفِعْلِ، وَ لِأَنَّهُ أَثَرُ الْمُخْتَارِ فَتَكُونُ مُخْتَارًا. قَالَ (تع): «فَجَعَلْنَاهُ سَمِيمًا بَصِيرًا».

فَإِذَا فَعَلَ الْعَبْدُ الْمُخْتَارُ الْمُتَقَوِّمُ بِأَمْرِ اللَّهِ الْفِعْلَ الْمُتَقَوِّمَ بِنُورِ أَمْرِ اللَّهِ، وَ هُوَ 125
قَادِرٌ عَلَى تَرْكِهِ، كَانَ قَدْ فَعَلَ فِعْلَهُ وَحْدَهُ بِقَدْرِ اللَّهِ لِأَنَّ الْفِعْلَ الْمَحْفُوظَ مُسْتَنَدٌ إِلَى فَاعِلِهِ الْمَحْفُوظِ وَحْدَهُ. فَبَقَدْرِ اللَّهِ تَقَوَّمَ الْفَاعِلُ وَ الْفِعْلُ؛ وَ تَقَوَّمَ اسْتِنَادُهُ إِلَى فَاعِلِهِ. وَ إِلَى ذَلِكَ يُشِيرُ تَأْوِيلُ قَوْلِهِ (تع): «ثُمَّ قَبَضْنَاهُ إِلَيْنَا قَبْضًا يَسْرًا». فَقَدَرَ اللَّهُ رُوحَ فِعْلِ الْعَبْدِ وَ فِعْلَ الْعَبْدِ جَسَدَهُ. وَ هَكَذَا فِي كُلِّ حَرَكَةٍ وَ سُكُونٍ؛ وَ هُوَ سِرُّ «الْأَمْرِ بَيْنَ الْأَمْرَيْنِ».

وَ مِثَالُ ذَلِكَ التَّقَوُّمِ كَمَا تَقَوَّمَتِ الِاسْتِضَاءَةُ فِي الْجِدَارِ بِنُورِ الشَّمْسِ؛ فَالْأَمْرُ وَجْهُهُ

117 T., p. 235. إِشَارَةُ [الْإِشَارَةُ]

120 T., p. 236. قَبْلَ الْفِعْلِ، أَيْ [قَبْلَ، أَيْ]

121 T., p. 236. فَيَكُونُ [فَتَكُونُ]

130 الشَّمْسِ؛ وَ النُّورُ الَّذِي هُوَ الْمَاءُ نُورُ الشَّمْسِ الْمُنْبَثُ؛ وَ الْإِسْتِضَاءَةُ فِي الْجِدَارِ
وُجُودَ الْإِنْسَانِ؛ وَ الْجِدَارُ، الَّذِي أَشْرْنَا إِلَيْهِ، وَ هُوَ نَفْسُ الْإِسْتِضَاءَةِ مِنْ حَيْثُ هِيَ
هِيَ، مَا هِيَئَتْ. وَ فِعْلُهُ الْمُنْسُوبُ إِلَيْهِ هُوَ مِثْلُ الْإِنْعِكَاسِ عَنِ الْإِسْتِضَاءَةِ وَ هُوَ نَوْعَانِ:
فَمَا أَنْعَكَسَ عَنْهَا مِنْ جِهَةِ نُورِ الشَّمْسِ فَهُوَ خَيْرٌ، وَ نُورٌ، وَ حَسَنَةٌ، وَ طَاعَةٌ؛ وَ مَا
أَنْعَكَسَ عَنْهَا مِنْ جِهَةِ نَفْسِهَا فَهُوَ شَرٌّ، وَ ظُلْمَةٌ، وَ سَيِّئَةٌ، وَ مَعْصِيَةٌ. فَالنُّوعُ الْأَوَّلُ
135 فِعْلُ الْعَقْلِ عَنِ الْوُجُودِ؛ وَ الثَّانِي [٢٠٦] فِعْلُ النَّفْسِ عَنِ الْمَاهِيَّةِ، فَتَفْهَمُ.

وَ أَعْلَمُ أَنَّ الْمَاهِيَّةَ مَوْجُودَةٌ بِوُجُودِ الْوُجُودِ مَا دَامَ مَوْجُودًا. وَ إِذَا لَمْ تَوْجَدْ، لَمْ
يُوجَدْ الْوُجُودُ لِأَنَّهَا شَرْطٌ لِإِبْجَادِهِ وَ تَمَامٌ لِقَابِلِيَّتِهِ لِلْإِبْجَادِ كَالْعَكْسِ. وَ إِنَّمَا قَالُوا أَنَّهَا
عَدَمٌ مَا شَمَّتْ رَآئِحَةُ الْوُجُودِ لِأَنَّهُمْ يُرِيدُونَ أَنَّهَا لَمْ تَوْجَدْ أَوَّلًا وَ بِالذَّاتِ قَطُّ لَا
أَنَّهَا لَمْ تَوْجَدْ أَصْلًا؛ بَلْ هِيَ مَوْجُودَةٌ بِفَاضِلِ إِبْجَادِ الْوُجُودِ، كَمَا قُلْنَا أِنْفًا. وَ ذَلِكَ
140 الْفَاضِلُ، إِذَا نُسِبَ إِلَى إِبْجَادِ الْوُجُودِ، كَانَ نِسْبَةُ الْوَاحِدِ مِنْ سَبْعِينَ، كَمَا هُوَ شَأْنُ
الْأَثَارِ وَ الصِّفَاتِ. هَذَا فِي الظَّاهِرِ.

وَ أَمَّا فِي الْحَقِيقَةِ الْمُطَابِقَةِ لِلْوَاقِعِ، فَهِيَ مَوْجُودَةٌ بِوُجُودِ آخَرٍ مُسْتَقِلٍّ فِي نَفْسِهِ،
وَ إِنْ كَانَتْ مُتَرَتِّبًا عَلَى الْأَوَّلِ. فَإِنَّ نِسْبَةَ وُجُودِهِ إِلَى الْأَوَّلِ كَنِسْبَةِ وُجُودِ الْإِنْكَسَارِ
إِلَى وُجُودِ الْكُسْرِ. وَ ذَلِكَ لِأَنَّ الْأَوَّلَ مِنْ تَمَامِ قَابِلِيَّةِ وُجُودِهَا لِلْإِبْجَادِ. فَالْوُجُودُ فِي
145 الْأَوَّلِ مَوْجُودٌ بِالْإِبْجَادِ الَّذِي هُوَ الْفِعْلُ - أَوْجَدَهُ بِنَفْسِهِ، لَا بِوُجُودِ مُغَايِرٍ لِنَفْسِهِ،
إِلَّا أَنْ إِبْجَادَهُ بِنَفْسِهِ إِدَارَتُهُ عَلَى نَفْسِهِ كُرَّةً تَدُورُ عَلَى كُرَّةٍ تَدُورُ عَلَى نُقْطَةٍ هِيَ

137 T., p. 240. وَ تَمَامُ الْقَابِلِيَّةِ [وَ تَمَامُ لِقَابِلِيَّتِهِ 137

138-139 T., p. 240. لِأَنَّهَا لَا أَنَّهَا 138-139

145-146 T., p. 243. إِنَّ [إِلَّا أَنْ 145-146

146 T., p. 243. بِنَفْسِهِ كُرَّةً تَدُورُ عَلَى نُقْطَةٍ [عَلَى نَفْسِهِ كُرَّةً تَدُورُ عَلَى كُرَّةٍ تَدُورُ عَلَى نُقْطَةٍ 146

الْحَرَكَةُ الْكُونِيَّةُ مِنَ الْفِعْلِ؛ وَ الْكُرَّةُ الظَّاهِرَةُ تَدُورُ عَلَى خِلَافِ التَّوَالِي، وَ الْبَاطِنَةُ عَلَى التَّوَالِي - وَ فِي الثَّانِي مَوْجُودٌ يُنَوِّرُ إِيجَادِ الْأَوَّلِ مِنَ الْفِعْلِ، وَ هُوَ نُقْطَةُ تَدُورُ نَفْسِ الْمَاهِيَةِ عَلَيْهَا عَلَى خِلَافِ التَّوَالِي. وَ الْمَاهِيَّةُ تَدُورُ عَلَى نَفْسِهَا عَلَى خِلَافِ هَيْئَتِهَا، وَ خِلَافِ التَّوَالِي، وَ عَلَى الْوُجُودِ فِي جِهَةٍ غَيْرِ جِهَتِهِ. 150

فَحَصَلَ مِنَ الْوُجُودِ وَ الْمَاهِيَّةِ كُرَّتَانِ مُتَدَاخِلَتَانِ فِي الْأَجْزَاءِ، مُتَمَارِجَانِ فِي الذَّرَاتِ، مُتَقَابِلَتَانِ فِي السُّطُوحِ، مُخْتَلِفَتَانِ فِي الدَّوَرَانِ. وَ تَمَارُجُهُمَا مِنْ غَيْرِ اسْتِهْلَاكِ شَيْءٍ مِنْ أَجْزَائِهِمَا وَ ذَرَاتِهِمَا فِي آخِرٍ، وَ لَا اسْتِثْنَاءَ شَيْءٍ مِنْ شَيْءٍ إِلَّا فِي الْإِغْتِبَارِ، وَ الْأَفْعَالِ، وَ الْمَيُولِ لِاخْتِلَافِ الشَّهَوَتَيْنِ لِنَعَانِدِ الدَّائِتَيْنِ.

وَ كُلَّمَا قَرَّبَ مِنَ النُّقْطَةِ الْكُونِيَّةِ كَانَ أَنْوَرُ لِغَلَبَةِ الْوُجُودِ؛ وَ كُلَّمَا بَعُدَ كَانَ أَشَدَّ ظُلْمَةً لِغَلَبَةِ الْمَاهِيَّةِ؛ حَتَّى تَنْتَهِيَ الشَّدَّةُ وَ الضَّعْفُ إِلَى نُقْطَةِ الْحَرَكَةِ الْكُونِيَّةِ وَ إِلَى مُحَدِّبِ الْكُرَّةِ. فَتَنْتَهِيَ الظُّلْمَةُ فِي جِهَةِ الْحَرَكَةِ الْكُونِيَّةِ إِلَى نُقْطَةٍ عِنْدَ وَجْهِ الْحَرَكَةِ الْكُونِيَّةِ؛ فَتَبْعُدُ مُنْفَرِجَةً عَلَى هَيْئَةِ مَخْرُوطٍ قَاعِدَتُهُ مُحَدِّبُ الْكُرَّةِ الظَّاهِرَةِ. وَ يَنْتَهِيَ النَّوْرُ فِي جِهَةِ مُحَدِّبِ الْكُرَّةِ إِلَى نُقْطَةٍ عَلَى هَيْئَةِ مَخْرُوطٍ قَاعِدَتُهُ عِنْدَ [٢٠٧] وَجْهِ الْحَرَكَةِ الْكُونِيَّةِ. 155 160

فَتَدُورُ الْكُرَّتَانِ الْمُتَمَرِّجَتَانِ عَلَى وَجْهِ الْحَرَكَةِ الْكُونِيَّةِ، فِي الْخَلْقِ، تَحْتَ الْحِجَابِ الْأَخْصَرِ، بِثَلَاثِ حَرَكَاتٍ أَبَدًا: حَرَكَةُ الْوُجُودِ الدَّائِيَّةِ عَلَى التَّوَالِي؛ وَ حَرَكَةُ الْمَاهِيَّةِ الدَّائِيَّةِ عَلَى خِلَافِ التَّوَالِي؛ وَ الْحَرَكَةُ الثَّلَاثَةُ عَرَضِيَّةٌ. فَفِي حَالِ الطَّاعَةِ تَدُورُ الْمَاهِيَّةُ عَلَى التَّوَالِي وَ بِحَرَكَتِهَا الدَّائِيَّةِ عَلَى خِلَافِ التَّوَالِي. وَ فِي حَالِ الْمَعْصِيَةِ يَدُورُ

153 الآخر [آخر] T., p. 244.

154 الميول [الميول] T., p. 244.

158 هَيْئَةُ مَخْرُوطَةٍ [هَيْئَةُ مَخْرُوطٍ] T., p. 245.

165 أَلْوُجُودُ بِالْحَرَكَةِ الْعَرَضِيَّةِ عَلَى خِلَافِ التَّوَالِي وَ بِحَرَكَتِهِ الذَّائِيَّةِ عَلَى التَّوَالِي. فَإِذَا تَتَابَعَتِ الطَّاعَاتُ ضَعُفَتْ حَرَكَةُ الْمَاهِيَةِ الذَّائِيَّةِ وَ أَبْطَأَتْ؛ وَ أَسْرَعَتْ عَرَضِيَّتُهَا. وَ إِذَا تَتَابَعَتِ الْمَعَاصِي ضَعُفَتْ حَرَكَةُ الْوُجُودِ الذَّائِيَّةِ وَ أَبْطَأَتْ؛ وَ أَسْرَعَتْ عَرَضِيَّتُهَا. وَ لِأَجْلِ أَنَّ الْحَرَكَةَ الذَّائِيَّةَ لَا تَتَّبِعُ الذَّائِيَّةَ الْأُخْرَى أَبَدًا وَ إِنَّمَا تَتَّبِعُ بِالْعَرَضِيَّةِ، ثَقُلَتِ الطَّاعَةُ وَ أَلْغَصِيَّتْهُ لِحُصُولِ التَّعَاكُسِ حَتَّى يَفْنِيَ أَعْتِبَارُ أَحَدِهِمَا لِصِلِهِ؛ فَيَخْفُ مُقْتَضَى الْمَوْجُودِ الْمَلِيلِ.

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وَ تَدُورُ الْكُرَتَانِ عَلَى وَجْهِ الْحَرَكَةِ الْكُونِيَّةِ، فِي الرِّزْقِ، تَحْتَ الْحِجَابِ الْأَبْيَضِ، بِثَلَاثِ حَرَكَاتٍ: حَرَكَةُ الْوُجُودِ الذَّائِيَّةِ لِمَدَدِ الرِّزْقِ عَلَى التَّوَالِي؛ وَ حَرَكَةُ الْمَاهِيَةِ الذَّائِيَّةِ لِمَدَدِ الْحِرْمَانِ عَلَى خِلَافِ التَّوَالِي؛ وَ الْحَرَكَةُ الثَّلَاثَةُ عَرَضِيَّةٌ. فَبِإِذَا حَالِ الرِّزْقِ تَدُورُ الْمَاهِيَةُ بِالْحَرَكَةِ الْعَرَضِيَّةِ عَلَى التَّوَالِي وَ بِالذَّائِيَّةِ بِالْعَكْسِ. وَ فِي حَالِ الْحِرْمَانِ يَدُورُ الْوُجُودُ بِالْعَرَضِيَّةِ عَلَى خِلَافِ التَّوَالِي وَ بِالذَّائِيَّةِ بِالْعَكْسِ.

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وَ تَدُورُ الْكُرَتَانِ عَلَى وَجْهِ الْحَرَكَةِ الْكُونِيَّةِ تَحْتَ الْحِجَابِ الْأَخْضَرِ، بِثَلَاثِ حَرَكَاتٍ، فِي الْمَوْتِ: حَرَكَةُ الْوُجُودِ الذَّائِيَّةِ عَلَى خِلَافِ التَّوَالِي؛ وَ حَرَكَةُ الْمَاهِيَةِ الذَّائِيَّةِ عَلَى التَّوَالِي؛ وَ عَرَضِيَّتُهُمَا عَلَى الْعَكْسِ.

وَ تَدُورُ الْكُرَتَانِ عَلَى وَجْهِ الْحَرَكَةِ الْكُونِيَّةِ فِي الْحَيَاةِ، تَحْتَ الْحِجَابِ الْأَصْفَرِ، بِثَلَاثِ حَرَكَاتٍ، كُلُّ وَاحِدَةٍ بِعَكْسِهَا فِي الْمَوْتِ فِي الذَّائِيَّةِ وَ الْعَرَضِيَّةِ.

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فَكَانَ لِلْوُجُودِ وَ الْمَاهِيَةِ فِي مَرَاتِبِ الْوُجُودِ الْأَرْبَعَةِ - الَّتِي بُنِيَ عَلَيْهَا الْعَرْشُ وَ تَجَلَّى الرَّحْمَنُ بِأَفْعَالِهِ عَلَى الْعَرْشِ بِهَا، وَ هِيَ الْخَلْقُ، وَ الرِّزْقُ، وَ الْمَوْتُ، وَ الْحَيَاةُ، كَمَا قَالَ اللَّهُ (تَع): «اللَّهُ الَّذِي خَلَقَكُمْ ثُمَّ رَزَقَكُمْ ثُمَّ يُمِيتُكُمْ ثُمَّ يُحْيِيكُمْ» - إِنَّنَا

168 T., p. 248. الذَّائِيَّةُ أَبَدًا [الذَّائِيَّةُ الْأُخْرَى أَبَدًا]

181 T., p. 252. بَنَى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهَا الْعَرْشَ [بَنَى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهَا الْعَرْشَ]

عَشْرَ حَرَكَةٍ، [٢٠٨] ثَمَانِ ذَاتِيَّاتٍ وَ أَرْبَعَ عَرَضِيَّاتٍ فِي عَالَمِ الْمَعَانِي عَالَمِ الْجَبْرُوتِ؛
 185 وَ إِثْنَتَا عَشْرَ حَرَكَةٍ كَذَلِكَ فِي عَالَمِ الصُّوْرِ عَالَمِ الْمَلَكُوتِ؛ وَ إِثْنَتَا عَشْرَ حَرَكَةٍ كَذَلِكَ
 فِي عَالَمِ الْأَجْسَامِ عَالَمِ الْمَلِكِ؛ وَ فِي عَالَمِ الرِّقَاقِ عَالَمِ الْأَطْلَلَةِ كَذَلِكَ؛ وَ فِي عَالَمِ
 الْأَشْكَالِ عَالَمِ الْإِثَالِ كَذَلِكَ؛ إِلَّا أَنَّ عَرَضِيَّتَهُمَا فِي عَالَمِ الْجَبْرُوتِ بِالْقُوَّةِ، وَ فِي عَالَمِ
 الْأَطْلَلَةِ بِالتَّهَيُّو، وَ فِي مَا دُونَ ذَلِكَ بِالْفِعْلِ. فَهَذِهِ سِتُّونَ حَرَكَةً لِلْوُجُودِ وَ لِلْمَاهِيَّةِ:
 أَرْبَعُونَ مِنْهَا ذَاتِيَّاتٌ؛ وَ عِشْرُونَ عَرَضِيَّةٌ.
 190 ثُمَّ أَعْلَمَ أَنَّ لِلْوُجُودِ وَ لِلْمَاهِيَّةِ، بِاعْتِبَارِ ذَرَاتِهِمَا، حَرَكَةً دَهْرِيَّةً غَيْرَ حَرَكَةِ الْكُلِّ.
 فَكُلُّ ذَرَّةٍ مِنَ الْوُجُودِ تَدُورُ عَلَى وَجْهِهَا، لَا إِلَى جِهَةٍ؛ وَ كُلُّ ذَرَّةٍ مِنَ الْمَاهِيَّةِ تَدُورُ
 عَلَى وَجْهِهَا، لَا إِلَى جِهَةٍ؛ وَ كَذَلِكَ نِهَايَاتُ كُلِّ مِنْهَا. وَ لِكُلِّ ذَرَّةٍ مِنْ كُلِّ مِنْهُمَا،
 بِالنِّسْبَةِ إِلَى الْمَجْمُوعِ، حُكْمٌ فَلِكِ التَّدْوِيرِ فِي الْحَامِلِ مِنَ الْإِسْرَاعِ، وَ الْإِبْطَاءِ، وَ
 الْإِقَامَةِ، وَ الرَّجُوعِ، وَ حُكْمُ الْمَجْمُوعِ فِي الْحَاجَةِ، وَ الْإِسْتِمْدَادِ، وَ الْكُرُوبَةِ. فَكُلُّ
 195 مُتَوَجِّهٍ إِلَى مَبْدَئِهِ، وَاقِفٌ بِمَسْأَلَتِهِ بِنَابِ رَبِّهِ، لَا يَذُفُّ فِي فَقْرِهِ بِحَبَابِ غِنَاهُ.
 ثُمَّ أَعْلَمَ أَنَّ عَرَضِيَّةَ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ مِمَّا ذَكَرْنَا هِيَ جِهَةٌ فَقْرِهِ إِلَى ضِدِّهِ. فَعَرَضِيَّةُ
 الْوُجُودِ جِهَةٌ فَقْرِهِ إِلَى الْمَاهِيَّةِ فِي الظُّهُورِ؛ وَ عَرَضِيَّتُهَا جِهَةٌ فَقْرِهَا إِلَى الْوُجُودِ فِي
 التَّحْقِيقِ. فَلِهَذَا تَتَّبِعُ عَرَضِيَّةُ كُلِّ وَاحِدٍ ذَاتِيَّةَ الْآخَرِ. [٢٠٩]

188 بِالتَّهَيُّو T., p. 252.

188-189 لِلْمَاهِيَّةِ: مِنْهَا أَرْبَعُونَ لِلْمَاهِيَّةِ: أَرْبَعُونَ مِنْهَا 188-189

190 ثُمَّ أَعْلَمَ وَ أَعْلَمَ T., p. 253.

الفائدة الثانية عشرة

في بيان ثبوت الاختيار

إِغْلَمْ أَنَّ الْإِخْتِيَارَ نَشَأَ مِنْ مِثْلِ الوجودِ إِلَى مَا يُنَاسِبُهُ وَ مِثْلِ الْمَاهِيَةِ إِلَى مَا يُنَاسِبُهَا، كَمَا ذَكَرْنَا مَرَارًا. وَ هُوَ ذَاتِيٌّ وَ فِعْلِيٌّ. فَالْأَوَّلُ هُوَ اسْتِدَارَةُ الشَّيْءِ بِوَجْهِ
 5 أَفْتِقَارِهِ عَلَى قُطْبِ اسْتِغْنَائِهِ، أَيْ، مَا يَطْلُبُ مِنْهُ الْإِسْتِغْنَاءُ. وَ قَدْ أَشْرْنَا إِلَى هَذَا فِيمَا سَبَقَ مِنْ حَرَكَتِهِ عَلَى قُطْبِهِ. وَ الثَّانِي اسْتِدَارَتُهُ بِآلَاةٍ عَلَى جِهَةِ قُطْبِهِ لِحَاجَتِهِ مِنْ أَحَدِهِمَا.

وَ حَيْثُ كَانَ لِلشَّيْءِ مِثْلَانِ مُتَعَاكِسَانِ - يَكْتَفِي بِمُتَعَلِّقٍ أَحَدِهِمَا - جَاءَ الْإِخْتِيَارُ. فَهُوَ «إِنْشَاءٌ، فَعْلٌ؛ وَ إِنْ شَاءَ، تَرَكَ». هَذَا فِي الْمَثَلِ الْفِعْلِيِّ. وَ أَمَّا الْمَثَلُ الذَّاتِيُّ، فَهُوَ
 10 مُخْتَارٌ فِي كُلِّ وَاحِدٍ مِنْ شَقَّيْهِ، أَيْ، مُخْتَارٌ فِي مِثْلِ الوجودِ نَفْسِهِ إِلَى مَا يَقْتَضِيهِ وَ فِي مِثْلِ الْمَاهِيَةِ نَفْسِهَا إِلَى مَا يَقْتَضِيهِ.

وَ بَيَانُ ذَلِكَ أَنَّ الوجودَ لَا يَشْتَبِي إِلَّا التَّوَرَّ. وَ لَا يَشْتَبِي لِذَاتِهِ الظُّلْمَةَ وَ إِنْ أَشْتَبَاهَا بِالْعَرَضِ وَ الْأَعْتِيَادِ الَّذِي هُوَ عَرَضِيٌّ. [٢١٠] وَ لَا يُمَكِّنُ فِي ذَاتِهِ، مِنْ
 حَيْثُ صُدُورِهِ بِفِعْلِ اللَّهِ، أَنْ يَشَاءَ الظُّلْمَةَ لِأَنَّهَا جِهَةُ الْمَاهِيَةِ مِنْهُ. فَلَا يُمَكِّنُ أَنْ يَشَاءَ
 15 إِلَّا يَشَاءَ مَا يَشَاوُهُ إِذِ الْمَشِيئَةُ وَاحِدَةٌ؛ فَلَا تَلْبَعُثُ حَيْثُ لَا تَلْبَعُثُ. وَ كَذَا الْكَلَامُ فِي الْمَاهِيَةِ نَفْسِهَا مِنْ حَيْثُ هِيَ.

T., p. 209. لِحَاجَةٍ [لِحَاجَتِهِ] 6

T., p. 259. [لِإِعْتِيَادِ] 13

و لَا تَظُنُّ أَنَّ هَذَا مُنَافٍ لِمَا نَذَرْنَاهُ مِنْ أَنَّهُ لَا يَكُونُ شَيْءٌ مِنْ شَيْءٍ إِلَّا بِاخْتِيَارٍ.
 وَ لَا جَبَرَ فِي جَمِيعِ الْأَشْيَاءِ، لَا لَهَا وَ لَا مِنْهَا، لِأَنَّ الْوُجُودَ لَا شَيْئَةَ لَهُ إِلَّا فِي
 الْمَاهِيَةِ؛ وَ الْمَاهِيَةُ لَا شَيْئَةَ لَهَا إِلَّا بِالْوُجُودِ. وَ مَا لَيْسَ لَهُ فِي حَقِيقَتِهِ بِكُلِّ اعْتِبَارٍ إِلَّا
 20 جِهَةٌ وَاحِدَةٌ لَا يُمَكِّنُ فِيهِ تَعَدُّدُ مِثْلِ أَوْ اخْتِلَافُ أَنْبَعَاثٍ. وَ لَيْسَ هَذَا جَبْرًا لِأَنَّ
 الْجَبَرَ أَنْ يُمِيلَ الشَّيْءَ غَيْرَهُ عَلَى خِلَافٍ مُقْتَضِي ذَاتِهِ أَوْ بَعِيرٍ مِثْلِ ذَاتِهِ. وَ هَذَا بِمِثْلِ
 ذَاتِهِ فَلَيْسَ جَبْرًا. فَهُوَ اخْتِيَارٌ، إِذْ لَا وَاسِطَةَ بَيْنَهُمَا، إِلَّا أَنَّهُ يُقَالُ عَلَيْهِ أَنَّهُ جُزْءُ اخْتِيَارٍ
 لِأَنَّ الْمَعْرُوفَ مِنَ الْاخْتِيَارِ هُوَ الْمِثْلُ إِلَى جِهَتَيْنِ مُخْتَلِفَتَيْنِ لِدَاعَيْنِ مُخْتَلِفَيْنِ عَنِ الْإِرَادَةِ
 الْمُرَكَّبَةِ مِنْ ذَلِكَ الشَّيْءِ الْمُرَكَّبِ؛ فَهَذَا الْاخْتِيَارُ هُوَ الْاخْتِيَارُ النَّاقِصُ. وَ نَظِيرُهُ
 25 الْمَعْنَى الَّذِي فِي الْحَرْفِ؛ فَإِنَّهُ، إِذَا صُمِّمَ إِلَى غَيْرِهِ، تَمَّ الْمَعْنَى.

وَ لَا يُقَالُ أَنَّ هَذَا هُوَ اخْتِيَارُ الْوَاجِبِ - لِبَسَاطَةِ ذَاتِهِ؛ فَلَيْسَ لَهُ إِلَّا اخْتِيَارُ جِهَةٍ،
 كَمَا قَالَ كَثِيرُونَ مِنْ أَنَّ وَاحِدَةَ مَشِيَّتِهِ يُنَافِي الْاخْتِيَارَ؛ وَ أَمَّا أَمْرٌ «إِنْ شَاءَ، فَعَلْ» وَ
 «إِنْ شَاءَ، تَرَكَ»، فَحُكْمٌ رَاجِعٌ إِلَى اَلْمُمْكِنِ مِنْ حَيْثُ هُوَ - لِأَنَّ هَذَا بَاطِلٌ. وَ ذَلِكَ لِأَنَّ
 الْاخْتِيَارَ الْمُنْسُوبَ إِلَى كُلِّ مُمَكِّنٍ يَحِثُّ «إِنْ شَاءَ، فَعَلْ» وَ «إِنْ شَاءَ، تَرَكَ» فَإِنَّمَا ذَلِكَ
 30 لِأَنَّ كُلَّ أَثَرٍ مُشَابِهٍ لِصِفَةِ مُؤَثِّرِهِ. وَ هُوَ مَا فِي الْمَشِيَّةِ فِي نَفْسِهَا إِذْ جَمِيعُ مَا يُمَكِّنُ أَنْ

19 T., p. 259. حَقِيقَتِهِ حَقِيقَةً بِكُلِّ [حَقِيقَتِهِ بِكُلِّ]

21 T., p. 259. ذَاتِهِ بَعِيرٍ [ذَاتِهِ أَوْ بَعِيرٍ]

22 T., p. 261. أَنْ يُقَالَ [أَنَّهُ يُقَالَ]

23 T., p. 261. اَلْمُخْتَلِفَتَيْنِ [مُخْتَلِفَتَيْنِ]

27 T., p. 261. أَنْ أَمْرٌ [أَمَّا أَمْرٌ]

29 T., p. 262. إِلَى اَلْمُمْكِنِ [إِلَى كُلِّ مُمَكِّنٍ]

يُنْسَبُ إِلَى الْمُمْكِنِ، مِنْ فِعْلٍ، أَوْ أَنْفِعَالٍ، أَوْ إِضَافَةٍ، أَوْ غَيْرِ ذَلِكَ، صِفَةٌ لِذَاتٍ ذَلِكَ الْمُمْكِنِ. فَمَا لَا يُمَكِّنُ فِي ذَاتِهِ لَا يُمَكِّنُ أَنْ يَكُونَ مِنْهُ أَوْ يُنْسَبُ إِلَيْهِ بِكُلِّ اعْتِبَارٍ. وَلَا يُمَكِّنُ فِي ذَاتِهِ إِلَّا مَا يُمَكِّنُ فِي الْمَشِيَّةِ. وَلَا يُمَكِّنُ فِي الْمَشِيَّةِ إِلَّا مَا يُمَكِّنُ فِي الْعِلْمِ، وَهُوَ الْذَّاتُ الْحَقُّ سُبْحَانَهُ وَتَعَالَى. فَاخْتِيَارُ الْمُمْكِنِ أَثَرٌ لِاخْتِيَارِ الْمَشِيَّةِ، وَاخْتِيَارُ الْمَشِيَّةِ أَثَرٌ لِاخْتِيَارِ الْوَاجِبِ. 35

فَإِنْ قِيلَ: هَلْ يَعْلَمُ فِي الْأَزَلِّ زَيْدًا فِي الْخُدُوثِ أَنَّهُ حَيَوَانٌ [٢١١] نَاطِقٌ أَمْ لَا؟ فَإِنْ كَانَ يَعْلَمُ ذَلِكَ، لَمْ يَحْزُ إِلَّا يَخْلُقْهُ أَوْ يَخْلُقْهُ فَرَسًا، وَإِلَّا أَنْقَلَبَ عِلْمُهُ جَهْلًا. وَإِنْ لَمْ يَعْلَمْ، لَزِمَ الْجَهْلُ بِمَا سَيَكُونُ؛ وَهُوَ بَاطِلٌ بِالضَّرُورَةِ. فَوَجَبَ أَنَّهُ يَعْلَمُ أَنَّهُ حَيَوَانٌ نَاطِقٌ. وَالْمَشِيَّةُ صِفَةٌ تَابِعَةٌ لِلْعِلْمِ، فَيَجِبُ أَنْ يَخْلُقْهُ كَذَلِكَ. وَلَا يُمَكِّنُ فِي حَقِّهِ غَيْرَ ذَلِكَ وَإِنْ كَانَ زَيْدٌ، فِي نَفْسِهِ مِنْ حَيْثُ هُوَ، مُمَكِّنًا فِي حَقِّهِ التَّغْيِيرِ؛ 40

قُلْنَا: هُوَ سُبْحَانَهُ يَعْلَمُ مَا يَكُونُ وَ مَا يَشَاءُ أَنْ يُغَيَّرَ إِلَى مَا شَاءَ. فَكُلُّ طَوْرٍ يُمَكِّنُ أَنْ يَكُونَ الْمُمْكِنُ عَلَيْهِ فَهُوَ يَعْلَمُهُ. وَ كُلُّ أَحْتِمَالٍ فِيمَا يَشَاءُ فَهُوَ يَعْلَمُهُ. وَ يَعْلَمُ مَا يَكُونُ مِمَّا يَكُونُ حِينَ يَشَاءُ كَيْفَ يَشَاءُ. فَإِذَا عَلِمَ زَيْدًا أَنَّهُ سَيَكُونُ حَيَوَانًا نَاطِقًا، فَهُوَ فِي عِلْمِهِ. وَإِذَا شَاءَ أَنْ يُغَيَّرَ إِلَى مَا يَشَاءُ، فَهُوَ فِي عِلْمِهِ. فَإِذَا أَرَادَ، غَيَّرَ

31 T., p. 262. فِعْلٍ، وَ أَنْفِعَالٍ، وَ إِضَافَةٍ [فِعْلٍ، أَوْ أَنْفِعَالٍ، أَوْ إِضَافَةٍ]

32 T., p. 262. فِي تِلْكَ الْذَّاتِ [فِي ذَاتِهِ]

38 T., p. 264. فَوَجَبَ أَنْ [فَوَجَبَ أَنَّهُ]

43 T., p. 265. مِمَّا يَشَاءُ [مِمَّا يَكُونُ]

38 [بِالضَّرُورَةِ] The second “ر” is missing in A., hence ضرورة; from the context, this is a most obvious slip

of the pen.

45 مَا يَشَاءُ كَيْفَ يَشَاءُ. وَ فِي كُلِّ تَغْيِيرٍ وَ تَقْرِيرٍ، وَ مَحْوٍ وَ إِثْبَاتٍ، فَهُوَ مُطَابِقٌ لِمَا هُوَ عَلَيْهِ فِي عِلْمِهِ. فَتَغْيِيرُ مَا عِلْمٌ إِذَا تَقْرِيرٌ لِمَا عِلْمٌ لِأَنَّهُ شَاءَ مَا عِلْمٌ. فَإِذَا شَاءَ تَغْيِيرَهُ، كَانَ شَائِيًا لِمَا عِلْمٌ سُبْحَانَهُ. سُبْحَانَهُ لَا يَقْدُرُ الْوَاصِفُونَ وَصْفَهُ!

وَ ذَلِكَ لِأَنَّ جَمِيعَ مَا يُمَكِّنُ فِي حَقِّ الْمُمَكِّنِ فَإِنَّمَا هُوَ مِنْ مَشِيئَتِهِ؛ وَ مَا فِي مَشِيئَتِهِ فِي عِلْمِهِ. فَإِذَا عِلْمٌ أَنَّ زَيْدًا يَكُونُ فِي الْوَقْتِ الْمَخْصُوصِ فِي الْمَكَانِ الْمَخْصُوصِ، ثُمَّ انْتَقَلَ زَيْدٌ عَنِ الْمَكَانِ، كَانَتْ الْحَالَةُ الْأُولَى فِي عِلْمِهِ وَ الْحَالَةُ الثَّانِيَّةُ 50 فِي عِلْمِهِ مِنْ غَيْرِ تَغْيِيرٍ - بَلْ هُوَ الثَّبَاتُ - إِلَّا أَنَّهُ فِي كَوْنِهِ فِي الْمَكَانِ الْأَوَّلِ هُوَ فِي عِلْمِهِ فِي الْمَكَانَيْنِ. فَإِذَا كَانَ فِي الْأَوَّلِ، وَقَعَ غَيْبُهُ عَلَى شَهَادَتِهِ. فَإِذَا انْتَقَلَ إِلَى الثَّانِي، فَارْقَتْ شَهَادَتُهُ غَيْبُهُ وَ وَقَعَ غَيْبُ الثَّانِي عَلَى شَهَادَتِهِ بِغَيْرِ تَغْيِيرٍ فِي الْعِلْمِ عَلَى الْحَالَيْنِ. وَ إِنَّمَا تَغْيِيرُ زَيْدٍ بِتَغْيِيرِهِ.

55 وَ ذَلِكَ لِأَنَّكَ إِذَا عَلِمْتَ زَيْدًا فِي مَكَانٍ أَوْ فِي وَقْتٍ، وَ عَلِمْتَ أَنَّهُ يَنْتَقِلُ إِلَى آخَرٍ، لَا يَتَغَيَّرُ عِلْمُكَ إِذَا انْتَقَلَ كَمَا عَلِمْتَ؛ بَلْ كَانَ عِلْمُكَ ثَابِتًا. وَ عِلْمُكَ بِهِ أَوَّلًا لَمْ يَتَغَيَّرْ بِتَغْيِيرِ حَالِ زَيْدٍ؛ بَلْ لَمْ تَزَلْ تَعْلَمُ أَنَّهُ كَانَ فِي الْأَوَّلِ. وَ الصُّورَةُ الْعِلْمِيَّةُ مِنْ حَالَتِهِ الْأُولَى بَاقِيَةٌ عِنْدَكَ. وَ الثَّانِيَّةُ الَّتِي طَابَقَهَا زَيْدٌ بِانْتِقَالِهِ بَاقِيَةٌ لَمْ تَتَغَيَّرْ؛ وَ إِنَّمَا

48 T., p. 266. [فِي حَقِّ الْمُمَكِّنِ]

51 T., p. 267. [الْأَوَّلِ فِي] الْأَوَّلِ هُوَ فِي

53 T., p. 267. [تَغْيِيرٍ]

55 T., p. 268. [مَكَانٍ فِي وَقْتٍ] مَكَانٍ أَوْ فِي وَقْتٍ

55 In A. there is a solitary أ between مَكَانٍ and فِي. I read it as أَوْ but perhaps

it is spurious or has some other significance that I have yet to discover.

أَنْطَبَقْتُ وَ وَقَعْتُ عَلَى الْمَعْلُومِ حِينَ أَنْتَقَلَ، فَافْهَمُ! ثُمَّ إِنَّكَ تَقُولُ بِالْبَدَاءِ، وَ أَنَّ اللَّهَ
60 «يَنْحُو... مَا يَشَاءُ وَ يَثْبُتُ».

وَ هَذَا شَرْحُ مَا نَحْنُ فِيهِ. وَ تَفْصِيلُ الْأَشْيَاءِ يَطُولُ بِهَا الْكَلَامُ؛ فَلَا فَايِدَةَ فِيهِ مَعَ
ظُهُورِ الْمَرَامِ. فَهُوَ سُبْحَانَهُ مُحْتَارٌ بِمَعْنَى «إِنْ شَاءَ، فَعَلَ؛ وَ إِنْ شَاءَ، تَرَكَ»؛ وَ لَيْسَ
عَلَى حَدِّ اخْتِيَارٍ مَا ذَكَرْنَا فِي الْوُجُودِ الْبَسِيطِ.

وَ لَا يُقَالُ: إِنَّ الْعِلَّةَ فِي الْوُجُودِ إِنَّمَا كَانَتْ لِبَسَاطَتِهِ، وَ ذَاتُ اللَّهِ سُبْحَانَهُ أَشَدُّ
65 بَسَاطَةً مِنْ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ؛ فَيَجْرِي ذَلِكَ فِيهِ بِالطَّرِيقِ الْأَوَّلِيِّ. فَيَكُونُ مَعْنَى أَنَّهُ مُحْتَارٌ أَنَّهُ
يَفْعَلُ مَا شَاءَ بِقَصْدٍ وَ رِضَى بِمَا فَعَلَ، لَا أَنَّهُ «إِنْ شَاءَ، فَعَلَ؛ وَ إِنْ شَاءَ، تَرَكَ»
[٢١٢] لِأَنَّ هَذَا مُفْتَضَى الْمُرَكَّبِ مِنَ الصَّدِّينِ كَمَا قَرَّرْنَاهُ سَابِقًا؛

لِأَنَّا نَقُولُ: قَدْ قَرَّرْنَا أَنَّهُ سُبْحَانَهُ يَتَّصِفُ بِجِهَتَيْ التَّقْيِضَيْنِ، وَ بِجِهَتَيْ ارْتِفَاعِهِمَا، وَ
بِجِهَةِ الْمُرَكَّبِ مِنْ حَيْثُ بَسَاطَتِهِ، لِأَنَّ كُلَّمَا يُمَكِّنُ فِي غَيْرِهِ يَمْتَنِعُ عَلَيْهِ؛ وَ كُلَّمَا يَمْتَنِعُ
70 فِي غَيْرِهِ يَجِبُ لَهُ. وَ هَذَا قَالَ الرَّضَا (ع): «كُنْهُ تَفْرِيقُ بَيْنِهِ وَ بَيْنَ خَلْقِهِ؛ وَ غُيُورُهُ
تَحْدِيدُ لِمَا سِوَاهُ». فَالْبَسِيطُ مِنْ حَيْثُ بَسَاطَتِهِ لَا تَصْدُرُ عَنْهُ آثَارُ الْمُرَكَّبِ وَ
بِالْعَكْسِ. هَذَا فِي الْخَلْقِ. وَ أَمَّا فِي ذَاتِهِ سُبْحَانَهُ، فَذَلِكَ بِخِلَافِ مَا يُمَكِّنُ فِي الْخَلْقِ.
فَهُوَ الْعَالِي فِي دُنُوهِ الدَّنَائِي فِي عُلوِّهِ بِجِهَةٍ وَاحِدَةٍ؛ الظَّاهِرُ فِي بُطُونِهِ الْبَاطِنُ فِي

61 T., p. 268. يَطُولُ بِهَا [يَطُولُ بِهَا]

65 T., p. 269. فِيهِ ذَلِكَ [ذَلِكَ فِيهِ]

66 T., p. 269. مَا يَشَاءُ [مَا يَشَاءُ]

66 T., p. 269; a particularly egregious copyist error in T. that makes the author's point completely meaningless.

73 T., p. 272. دُنُوهُ وَ الدَّنَائِي [دُنُوهُ الدَّنَائِي]

ظُهُورِهِ بِجِهَةٍ وَاحِدَةٍ؛ الْقَرِيبُ فِي بُعْدِهِ الْبَعِيدُ فِي قُرْبِهِ بِجِهَةٍ وَاحِدَةٍ؛ الْأَوَّلُ بِآخِرِيَّتِهِ
 75 الْآخِرُ بِأَوَّلِيَّتِهِ بِجِهَةٍ وَاحِدَةٍ. وَ لَا يَجْرِي ذَلِكَ وَ مَا أَشَبَّهُهُ فِي مَا سِوَاهُ؛ وَ يَجِبُ فِي
 حَقِّهِ سُبْحَانَهُ. فَهُوَ فِي بَسَاطَتِهِ أَحَدِيّ الْمَعْنَى. فَلَا تَكَثَّرُ فِي ذَاتِهِ، وَ لَا تَعُدُّدٌ، وَ لَا
 حَيْثُ وَ حَيْثُ، وَ لَا جِهَةٌ وَ جِهَةٌ. وَ لَا اخْتِلَافٌ فِي ذَاتِهِ بِكُلِّ اعْتِبَارٍ، لَا بِالْإِمْكَانِ،
 وَ الْفَرَضِ، وَ التَّوَهُّمِ، وَ لَا بِالْوَاقِعِ. فَ «كُلَّمَا مَيَّزْتُمُوهُ [بِأَوْهَامِكُمْ]، فِي أَدَقِّ مَعَانِيهِ،
 فَهُوَ مَخْلُوقٌ مِثْلُكُمْ، مَرْدُودٌ إِلَيْكُمْ»، يَعْنِي، مِنْكُمْ إِلَيْكُمْ. «وَ اللَّهُ الْغَنِيُّ وَ أَنْتُمْ
 80 الْفُقَرَاءُ».

وَ مَعَ هَذَا فَهُوَ الْمُؤَلَّفُ بَيْنَ الْمُتَعَادِيَاتِ، وَ الْجَامِعُ بَيْنَ الْمُتَعَانِدَاتِ، وَ تَصَدَّرُ
 عَنْهُ الْأَفْعَالُ الْمُضَادَّةُ. فَلَيْسَ بَيْنَ فِعْلِهِ وَ بَيْنَ مَا سِوَاهُ مُوَافَقَةٌ وَ لَا مُخَالَفَةٌ لِأَنَّهُ أَثَرُ
 ذَاتِهِ الَّتِي لَا يُضَادُّهَا شَيْءٌ، وَ لَا يُنَادُّهَا شَيْءٌ؛ هُوَ هُوَ، لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا هُوَ. إِنَّمَا الشَّيْءُ مِنْ
 مَشِيَّتِهِ؛ فَفِعْلُ الشَّيْءِ وَ تَرْكُهُ بِالنَّسْبَةِ إِلَى مَشِيَّةٍ سَوَاءٍ؛ وَ هُوَ «إِنْ شَاءَ، فَعَلَ؛ وَ إِنْ
 85 شَاءَ، تَرَكَ»، بِجِهَةٍ وَاحِدَةٍ وَ مَشِيَّةٍ وَاحِدَةٍ. كَذَلِكَ اللَّهُ رَبِّي، كَذَلِكَ رَبِّي !
 وَ التَّنْظِيرُ بِالْخَلْقِ تَشْبِيهٌ بِكُلِّ اعْتِبَارٍ. وَ فِي الدُّعَاءِ: «بَدَتْ قُدْرَتُكَ، يَا إِلَهِي! وَ لَمْ
 تَبْدِ هَيْئَةً فَشَبَّهْتُكَ، يَا سَيِّدِي! وَ جَعَلُوا بَعْضُ آيَاتِكَ أَرْبَابًا، يَا إِلَهِي! فَمِنْ شَمِّ لَمْ

74 T., p. 272. [بُعْدِهِ الْبَعِيدُ]

77-78 T., p. 272. [بِالْإِمْكَانِ، وَ لَا فِي الْفَرَضِ]

78 T., p. 273. [مَيَّزْتُمُوهُ بِأَوْهَامِكُمْ]

81 T., p. 273. [الْمُتَعَانِدَاتِ]

85 T., p. 273. [كَذَلِكَ اللَّهُ رَبِّي]

يَعْرِفُوكَ، يَا إِلَهِي!» وَ هَذَا حَالُ مَنْ عَرَفَ مِنْ نَفْسِهِ هَيْئَةً؛ فَعَرَفَ بِهَا رَبَّهُ. وَاللَّهُ لَا يُعْرِفُ بِخَلْقِهِ؛ بَلِ الْخَلْقُ يُعْرِفُونَ بِهِ.

90 فَإِنْ قُلْتُ: أَنَا عَالِمٌ وَ هُوَ عَالِمٌ؛ وَأَنَا حَيٌّ وَ هُوَ حَيٌّ؛ وَأَنَا مَوْجُودٌ وَ هُوَ

مَوْجُودٌ. وَ لَا يُسْتَدَلُّ عَلَى شَيْءٍ مِنْ وَصْفِهِ بِتِلْكَ الصِّفَاتِ إِلَّا بِمَا نَجِدُهُ؛

قُلْتُ: هَذَا مَعْنَى قَوْلِهِ (ع): «بَدَتْ قُدْرَتُكَ، يَا إِلَهِي! وَ لَمْ تَبْدُ هَيْئَتُهُ»، إلخ: إِنَّا

إِنَّمَا وَصَفْنَاهُ بِالْعِلْمِ لِأَنَّهُ خَلَقَ فِيْنَا الْعِلْمَ؛ وَ بِالْحَيَاةِ لِخَلْقِهِ فِيْنَا الْحَيَاةَ؛ وَ بِالْوُجُودِ

لِإِبْحَادِنَا؛ وَ لَيْسَ هَذَا كَمِثْلِ مَا هُوَ عَلَيْهِ. وَ إِنَّمَا قَبْلَ مِنْكُمْ هَذِهِ التَّوَصِيفَاتِ، وَ

95 تَعَبُّدُكُمْ بِهَا، لِأَنَّهَا مَبْلَغُ [٢١٣] وَسَعِيكُمْ وَ حَقِيقَةُ ذَوَاتِكُمْ الَّتِي تَعْرِفَ لَكُمْ بِهَا.

فَتَصِفُونَهُ بِمَا هُوَ كَمَالٌ عِنْدَكُمْ. وَ إِنَّ الذَّرَّةَ لَزَعَمَ أَنَّ لِلَّهِ رُبَانَيْنِ لِأَنَّ كَمَالَهَا فِي

وُجُودِهَا لَهَا. وَ هَذَا قَالَ الرَّضَا (ع): «وَ أَسْمَاؤُهُ تَغْيِيرٌ؛ وَ صِفَاتُهُ تَفْهِيمٌ». «سُبْحَانَ

رَبِّكَ رَبِّ الْعِزَّةِ عَمَّا يَصِفُونَ!»

ثُمَّ آغَلَمَ أَنَّمَا تَجِدُ مِنَ الْإِخْتِيَارِ التَّامِّ فَهُوَ أَثَرُ اخْتِيَارِ فِعْلِهِ. وَ اخْتِيَارُ فِعْلِهِ أَثَرُ

100 اخْتِيَارِ ذَاتِهِ. وَ الْوُجُودُ بِأَثَرِهِ، لَيْسَ فِي شَيْءٍ مِنْهُ اضْطِرَارٌ مُحْضٌ وَ لَا جَبْرٌ خَالِصٌ؛

بَلْ كُلُّهُ مُحْتَارٌ. وَ كُلُّ ذَرَّةٍ مِنَ الْوُجُودِ مُحْتَارَةٌ لِأَنَّ أَثَرَ الْمُخْتَارِ مُحْتَارٌ. وَ هَذِهِ الْحَقِيقَةُ،

88 T., p. 274. عَرَفَ نَفْسِهِ [عَرَفَ مِنْ نَفْسِهِ 88

88 T., p. 274. اَلرَّبُّ اَللَّهُ

92 T., p. 276. هَذَا [قُلْتُ: هَذَا

92-93 T., p. 276. إِنَّمَا إِنَّمَا إِنَّمَا

95-96 T., p. 276. بِهَا بِمَا [بِهَا. فَتَصِفُونَهُ بِمَا

100 T., p. 277. بِأَثَرِهِ [بِأَثَرِهِ

101-102 T., p. 278. اِشْتَرَكَ فِيهَا جَمِيعٌ [اِشْتَرَكَ جَمِيعٌ

إِشْتَرَكَ جَمِيعُ مَا خُلِقَ فِيهَا الْإِنْسَانُ وَالْجَمَادُ إِلَّا أَنَّهُ كُلُّمَا قَرُبَ مِنَ الْفِعْلِ كَانَ أَقْوَى
 اخْتِيَارًا وَأَظْهَرُ؛ وَكُلُّمَا بَعْدَ كَانَ أَوْ أَضْعَفَ اخْتِيَارًا وَأَخْفَى - كَالنُّورِ الْمُتَشَعِّعِ عَنِ
 الْمُنِيرِ: كُلُّمَا قَرُبَ مِنْهُ كَانَ أَشَدَّ نُورًا وَأَقْوَى إِظْهَارًا وَظُهُورًا؛ وَكُلُّمَا بَعْدَ كَانَ
 أَوْ أَضْعَفَ وَأَخْفَى - حَتَّى يَنْتَهِيَ الْوُجُودُ. فَيَفْنِي الْإِخْتِيَارُ حَيْثُ يَفْنِي الْوُجُودُ سَوَاءً
 105 كَانَ ذَاتِيًّا أَمْ عَرَضِيًّا؛ كُلُّ بِحَسَبِهِ.

وَمَا تَرَى مِنَ الْمَجْبُولِ، كَنُزُولِ الْحَجَرِ الَّذِي لَا يَقْوَى ظَاهِرًا عَلَى الصُّعُودِ،
 فَاعْلَمْ أَنَّ اللَّهَ سُبْحَانَهُ وَكَلَّ بِهِ مَلَكًا يَضَعُهُ حَيْثُ أَمَرَهُ اللَّهُ؛ وَذَلِكَ مِمَّا يُمَكِّنُ فِي
 الْحَجَرِ مِنَ النُّزُولِ. وَمَا تَرَى مِنَ الْمَجْبُورِ ظَاهِرًا، كَالْحَجَرِ الَّذِي يَذْفَعُهُ الشَّخْصُ إِلَى
 110 جِهَةِ الْعُلُوِّ فَيَضَعُهُ مَعَ أَنَّ شَأْنَهُ النُّزُولُ، فَاعْلَمْ أَنَّ اللَّهَ سُبْحَانَهُ وَكَلَّ بِهِ مَلَكًا كَانَ
 مُوَكَّلًا بِعُضْوِ الشَّخْصِ الدَّافِعِ؛ هُوَ أَقْوَى مِنَ الْمَلِكِ الْمُوَكَّلِ بِالنُّزُولِ. وَقَدْ أَمَرَ اللَّهُ
 الْمَلِكَ الْمُوَكَّلَ بِالنُّزُولِ أَنْ يُمَثِّلَ أَمْرَ الْمَلِكِ الْمُوَكَّلِ بِالدَّفْعِ إِلَى أَنْتِهَاءِ شِعَاعِ ذَلِكَ
 الْمَلِكِ. وَشَهْوَةُ الْحَجَرِ فِي شَهْوَةِ الْمَلِكِ الْمُوَكَّلِ بِالنُّزُولِ. فَإِذَا أَنْتَهَى شِعَاعُ الدَّفْعِ،
 إِشْتَهَى الْمُنْزِلُ النُّزُولَ وَاشْتَهَى الْحَجَرُ مَا اشْتَهَاهُ الْمَلِكُ. وَلَيْسَتْ فِي الْحَقِيقَةِ قَسْرًا.
 115 وَإِنَّمَا هُوَ شَهْوَةُ اخْتِيَارٍ، كَشَهْوَةِ الْجَائِعِ لِلْأَكْلِ؛ فَإِنَّهُ يَأْكُلُ وَلَكِنَّهُ مُحْتَارٌ مَعَ أَنَّكَ تَرَى
 أَنَّ الْجَائِعَ الَّذِي يُحْصَلُ لَهُ الطَّعَامُ - وَهُوَ قَادِرٌ عَلَى الْأَكْلِ مِنْهُ، وَلَيْسَ لَهُ مَانِعٌ، لَا

102 T., p. 278. [فِيهَا الْإِنْسَانُ وَالْجَمَادُ]

104 T., p. 278. [إِظْهَارًا أَوْ ظُهُورًا] [إِظْهَارًا وَظُهُورًا]

113 T., p. 281. [وَإِذَا أَنْتَهَى] [فَإِذَا أَنْتَهَى]

115 T., p. 281. [يَأْكُلُ لِكِنَّهُ] [يَأْكُلُ وَ لِكِنَّهُ]

T., p. 281. [مَانِعٌ مِنْ] [مَانِعٌ]، لَا مِنْ 116-117

مِنْ نَفْسِهِ وَ لَا مِنْ خَارِجٍ بِكُلِّ فَرَضٍ - لَا بُدَّ أَنْ يَأْكُلَ مَعَ أَنَّهُ مُخْتَارٌ قَطْعًا. هَذَا
كَمَثَالِ الْحَجَرِ حَرْفًا بِحَرْفٍ؛ لَا فَرْقَ بَيْنَهُمَا. [٢١٤]

وَلَكِنَّ الطَّرْفَ الْآخَرَ مِنْ اخْتِيَارِ الْحَجَرِ، وَ هُوَ عَدَمُ النُّزُولِ مِنْهُ بِاخْتِيَارِهِ، خَفِيٌّ
جِدًّا لِأَنَّ الْإِخْتِيَارَ مِنَ الْجَمَادَاتِ وَ النَّبَاتَاتِ لَا يَعْرِفُهُ الْإِنْسَانُ إِلَّا بِطَوْرِ وَرَاءِ الْعَقْلِ 120
وَذَلِكَ لِأَنَّهُ بِأَنْبَاءِ نَوْعِهِ وَ جِنْسِهِ؛ فَلَا يَعْرِفُ مِنَ الْإِخْتِيَارِ إِلَّا مَا كَانَ مِنْ نَوْعِهِ،
كَالْإِنْسَانِ، أَوْ مِنْ جِنْسِهِ، كَالْحَيَوَانِ. وَ إِذَا كَانَ يَمُنُّ لَهُ طَوْرٌ مِنَ الْمَشَاعِيرِ وَرَاءَ
الْعَقْلِ، عَرَفَ اخْتِيَارَ النَّبَاتَاتِ وَ الْجَمَادَاتِ. وَ أَنَا أَذْكُرُ لَكَ شَيْئَيْنِ مِثْلًا وَ بَيَانًا
تَسْتَدِلُّ بِهَا عَلَى إِثْبَاتِ اخْتِيَارِ النَّبَاتَاتِ وَ الْجَمَادَاتِ وَ شُعُورِهِمَا.

فَالْأَوَّلُ: إِيْلَمْ أَنَّ الوجودَ الصَّادِرَ عَنِ الْمَشِيَّةِ كَالنُّورِ الصَّادِرِ عَنِ السَّرَاجِ وَ مَعْلُومٌ 125
أَنَّ أَجْزَاءَ النُّورِ، كُلَّمَا قَرُبَ مِنَ السَّرَاجِ كَانَ أَقْوَى نُورًا وَ حَرَارَةً وَ يَبُوسَةً مِمَّا كَانَ
أَبْعَدَ مِنْهُ. وَ هَكَذَا حَتَّى يَكُونَ آخِرُ أَجْزَاءِ النُّورِ أَضْعَفَ الْأَجْزَاءِ نُورًا وَ حَرَارَةً وَ
يَبُوسَةً. فَإِذَا قُفِدَ النُّورُ، قُفِدَتِ الْحَرَارَةُ وَ الْيَبُوسَةُ. وَ لَا يُمَكِّنُ وُجُودَ أَحَدِ الثَّلَاثَةِ
الْأَوْصَافِ بِدُونِ الْآخَرَيْنِ. بَلْ إِذَا وُجِدَ وَاحِدٌ، وَجِدَتِ الثَّلَاثَةُ؛ وَ إِنْ قُفِدَ، قُفِدَتِ

119 T., p. 281. [خَفِيٌّ] 119

120 T., p. 281. [وَرَاءَ طَوْرِ الْعَقْلِ] 120

122 T., p. 281. وَ مِنْ [أَوْ مِنْ] 122

125 T., p. 282. [عَنِ السَّرَاجِ] 125

127 T., p. 282. [يَكُونُ آخِرُ أَجْزَاءِ] 127

128 T., p. 282. [وَلَا يُمَكِّنُ] 128

128-129 T., p. 282. [الْثَّلَاثَةُ الْأَوْصَافِ] 128-129

129 T., p. 282. وَ إِذَا [وَ إِنْ] 129

130 الثَّلَاثَةُ. فَكَذَلِكَ الْوُجُودُ الصَّادِرُ عَنِ الْمَشِيَّةِ: كُلَّمَا قَرُبَ مِنْهَا كَانَ أَقْوَى وَجُودًا وَ
شُعُورًا وَ اخْتِيَارًا، كَالْعَقْلِ الْأَوَّلِ؛ وَ كُلَّمَا بَعُدَ ضَعُفَتِ الثَّلَاثَةُ، عَلَى حَدِّ سَوَاءٍ، إِلَى
الْجَمَادَاتِ. فَتَكُونُ الْجَمَادَاتُ أضعفُ وَجُودًا وَ شُعُورًا وَ اخْتِيَارًا، كَمَا قُلْنَا فِي نُورِ
السَّرَاجِ لِأَنَّهُ آيَةُ اللَّهِ فِي الْأَفَاقِ لِهَذَا الْمَطْلَبِ لِمَنْ وَرَدَ هَذَا الْمَشْرَبِ. قَالَ (تع):
«سُبْرِهِمْ آيَاتُنَا فِي الْأَفَاقِ وَ فِي أَنْفُسِهِمْ حَتَّى يَتَبَيَّنَ لَهُمْ أَنَّهُ الْحَقُّ»، فَافْهَمْ!

135 وَ الثَّانِي: إِيْلَمْ أَنَّ الشَّيْءَ الْجَمَادَ، مَثَلًا، كَالْحَجَرِ، إِذَا أَتَاهُ شَيْءٌ دَفَعَهُ إِلَى الْعُلُوِّ، لَا
يُندَفِعُ إِلَّا إِذَا يُمَكِّنُهُ الْإِنْدِفَاعُ. وَ لَا يُمَكِّنُهُ مَا لَيْسَ فِي حَقِيقَتِهِ. بَلْ إِنَّمَا آندَفَعَ إِلَى
الْعُلُوِّ لِأَنَّ ذَاتَهُ قَابِلَةٌ لِذَلِكَ، كَمَا أَنَّ ذَاتَهُ قَابِلَةٌ لِلزُّوْلِ، بِنِسْبَةِ وَاحِدَةٍ. وَ لَكِنَّ اللَّهَ
سُبْحَانَهُ جَعَلَ عِلَّةَ الزُّوْلِ، وَ شَهْوَتَهُ، وَ اخْتِيَارَهُ، رَاجِعَةً مُلَازِمَةً لِلْجَمَادِ بِتَسْخِيرِ اللَّهِ
لِأَجْلِ مَنْفَعَةِ الْخَلْقِ. وَ أَبَانَ عِلَّةَ الصُّعُودِ، وَ شَهْوَتِهِ، وَ اخْتِيَارِهِ بِوُجُودِ الْمُقْتَضِي لَهُ،
140 كَمَا أَنَّ عِلَّةَ الزُّوْلِ، وَ شَهْوَتِهِ، وَ اخْتِيَارِهِ، بِوُجُودِ الْمُقْتَضِي لَهُ. وَ هُوَ مَا يُسَمُّوهُ
الْعَوَآمُّ بِالثَّقَلِ.

وَ إِذَا دَفَعَهُ إِلَى الْعُلُوِّ دَافِعٌ، [٢١٥] فَلَيْسَ فِي الْحَقِيقَةِ قَاسِرًا؛ بَلْ هُوَ مُعَيَّنٌ لِمَا
تَقْتَضِيهِ ذَاتُهُ لِأَنَّ الْقَاسِرَ هُوَ مَا يَسْلُكُ بِالشَّيْءِ مَا لَا يُمَكِّنُ فِي ذَاتِهِ. وَ هَذَا مُحَالٌ لِأَنَّهُ
إِذَا دَفَعَهُ وَ كَانَ الْإِنْدِفَاعُ غَيْرُ مُمَكِّنٍ فِي ذَاتِهِ، فَإِنْ لَمْ يَنْدَفِعْ، لَمْ يَقَعْ قَسْرٌ. وَ إِنْ
145 آندَفَعَ، فَلَيْسَ هُوَ ذَلِكَ؛ بَلِ الْمُنْدَفَعُ غَيْرُهُ لِأَنَّهُ إِذَا أُمَكِّنَ فِيهِ مَا لَا يُمَكِّنُ فِيهِ، لَا
يَكُونُ حَتَّى يُغَيَّرَ حَقِيقَتُهُ إِلَى مَا يُمَكِّنُ فِيهِ. فَلَا يَكُونُ هُوَ إِيَّاهُ لِأَنَّ مَا لَا يُمَكِّنُ فِيهِ

138 T., p. 283. [اللَّهُ سُبْحَانَهُ]

139 T., p. 283. [مُنْفَعَةٍ]

142 [مُعَيَّنٌ] is an alternative vowelization.

146 T., p. 284. [يُغَيَّرُ]

لَا يُمَكِّنُ أَنْ يُمَكِّنَ فِيهِ. فَإِذَا دَفَعَهُ فَأَنْدَفَعَ، كَانَ الْإِنْدِفَاعُ مُمَكِّنًا فِيهِ. وَ لَكِنْ لَطِيفَةٌ
 مِنْ الْوُجُودِ قَصَرَتْ عَمَّا يُمَكِّنُ فِيهِ أَنْ يَكُونَ بِنَفْسِهِ. فَكَانَ هَذَا الدَّفَاعُ مُعِينٌ لِمَا
 يُمَكِّنُ أَنْ يَنْدَفَعَ وَ مُتَمِّمًا لَهُ. فَكَانَ بِهِ الْإِنْدِفَاعُ مُمَكِّنًا فِي ذَاتِهِ لِمَا فِي ذَاتِهِ مِنْ قُوَّةِ
 الْإِنْقِيَادِ. وَ هُوَ مُطَاوَعَةٌ؛ وَ هِيَ اخْتِيَارٌ لَمَنْ يَفْهَمُ. 150

فَالْإِخْتِيَارُ لَا زِمٌ لِجَمِيعِ ذَرَاتِ الْوُجُودِ. وَ لَكِنْ الْأَمْرُ الْمُحْكَمُ أَنْ يَكُونَ الشَّيْءُ
 عَلَى كَمَالٍ مَا يَنْبَغِي. وَ كَمَالُ مَا يَنْبَغِي أَنْ يَكُونَ التَّابِعُ تَابِعًا بِاخْتِيَارِهِ لِأَحْوَالِ
 الْمَتَّبُوعِ مِنْ حَيْثُ الْمَتَّبُوعِيَّةِ. وَ إِلَّا لَمْ يَكُنِ التَّابِعُ تَابِعًا وَ لَا الْمَتَّبُوعُ مَتَّبُوعًا إِذِ
 التَّابِعِيَّةُ وَ الْمَتَّبُوعِيَّةُ نِسْبَةٌ أَرْتَبَاطٍ بَيْنَهُمَا، وَ مُشَابَهَةٌ فِي الذَّوَاتِ تَقْتَضِي الْمَجَانَسَةَ،
 الْمُقْتَضِيَةَ لِلْمِثْلِ الذَّاتِي، الْمُقْتَضِي لِاخْتِيَارٍ بِسَبَبِ اخْتِلَافِ جِهَةِ ذَاتِ كُلِّ مِنْهَا، كَمَا 155
 أَشْرْنَا إِلَيْهِ مَرَارًا. وَ لَوْ كَانَ تَابِعًا بِغَيْرِ اخْتِيَارِهِ، لَمْ يَكُنْ تَابِعًا لِمَا قُلْنَا. وَ النَّبَاتُ وَ
 الْجَمَادُ فِي الْوُجُودِ تَابِعَانِ لِلْحَيَوَانِ لِأَنَّهُمَا مِنْ فَاضِلِ طَبَقَتِهِ. فَيَجِبُ أَنْ يَكُونَ تَابِعًا
 فِي تِلْكَ الْأَحْوَالِ. فَيَجِبُ فِي الْحِكْمَةِ، لِانْتِظَامِ الْوُجُودِ، أَنْ يَكُونَ تَابِعٌ يَحْمِلُهُ وَ يُقْلَهُ،
 كَالْمَاءِ وَ التُّرَابِ؛ وَ تَابِعٌ يُظْلَهُ، كَالنَّارِ وَ السَّمَاءِ؛ وَ تَابِعٌ يُحِيطُ بِهِ، كَالْهَوَاءِ؛ لِأَنَّ جَمِيعَ
 الْأَكْوَانِ تَابِعٌ لِلْإِنْسَانِ. فَعِلَّةُ الصُّعُودِ وَ النُّزُولِ لِلتَّخْيِيرِ وَلِي التَّذْيِيرِ لِأَنَّهَا إِعَانَةٌ مِنْهُ 160
 لَهَا فِيمَا أَرَادَ مِنْهَا.

فَكَمَالُ التَّابِعِ عَلَى مَا يَنْبَغِي. وَ كَمَالُ مَا يَنْبَغِي أَنْ يَخْتَارَ الْمَتَّبُوعُ مَتَّبُوعِيَّةَ التَّابِعِ وَ

148 مُعِينٌ is an alternative vowelization.

149–150 T., p. 284. ذَاتِهِ وَ هُوَ مُطَاوَعَةٌ [ذَاتِهِ لِمَا فِي ذَاتِهِ مِنْ قُوَّةِ الْإِنْقِيَادِ. وَ هُوَ مُطَاوَعَةٌ

155 تَابِعٌ كُلٌّ [جِهَةِ ذَاتِ كُلِّ] T., p. 285.

162 وَ كَمَالُ مَا يَنْبَغِي T., p. 286 has كَمَا يَنْبَغِي In A. we find [وَ كَمَالُ مَا يَنْبَغِي] The context and

يُرِيدُهَا؛ وَ يَخْتَارُ التَّابِعَ تَبَعِيَّةَ الْمَشْبُوعِ وَ يُرِيدُهَا؛ وَ هُوَ الْمُرَادُ مِنَ الْإِخْتِيَارِ وَ سَحَرَ
 اللَّهُ كُلًّا مِنْهُمَا مَعُونَةً مِنْهُ لِمَا أَحَبَّ. وَ إِلَّا لَمْ يَكُونَا إِثَاهُمَا إِذْ لَا يَكُونُ الشَّيْءُ إِثَاهُ إِلَّا
 بِمَا يُمَكِّنُ لَهُ. فَافْهَمْ مَا كَرَرْنَا لَكَ! 165

وَ لَيْسَ تَسْخِيرُهُ (تَع) قَسْرًا؛ وَ إِنَّمَا خَلَقَهَا [٢١٦] عَلَى مَا هِيَ عَلَيْهِ. وَ مَا هِيَ
 عَلَيْهِ إِلَّا بِمَا سُئِلَتْهُ . وَ لَمْ يَجْبُرْهَا عَلَى السُّؤَالِ؛ بَلْ سَأَلَهَا بِاخْتِيَارِهَا. وَ لِهَذَا قَالَ: «أ
 لَسْتُ بِرَبِّكُمْ»، إِسْتِخْبَارًا وَ تَقْرِيرًا لِمَا عَلِمُوا. فَاتَّاهُمْ بِذِكْرِهِمْ وَ مَا أَنْطَوُوا عَلَيْهِ وَ
 رَضُوا بِهِ. فَلَمَّا أَتَاهُمْ بِالْإِخْتِيَارِ وَ خَيَّرَهُمْ، أَقَرَّ مَنْ أَقَرَّ وَ جَدَّ مَنْ جَدَّ. وَ لَوْ قَسَرَهُمْ
 لَمْ يَمْتَنِعَ مِنْهُمْ أَحَدٌ. وَ هَذَا الْبَيَانُ وَ الْمِثَالُ إِنَّمَا هُوَ بِاللِّسَانِ الظَّاهِرِيِّ. 170

وَ أَمَّ الْمَعْنَى الْبَاطِنِيَّ، فَهُوَ مَا ذَكَرْنَا لَكَ مِنْ أَنَّهُ مِنَ الْمَلَائِكَةِ . وَ كَمَالُ الْبَيَانِ يَطُولُ
 بِهِ الْكَلَامُ لِمَا فِي هَذَا الْمَقَامِ مِنَ الدَّقَائِقِ الْخَفِيَّةِ. وَ لَكِنْ هَذَا تَلْوِيحٌ، وَ تَمْثِيلٌ، وَ
 إِشَارَةٌ.

وَ أَعْلَمُ أَنَّ هَذَا التَّكْرِيرَ فِي الْعِبَارَاتِ وَ التَّرْدِيدَ إِنَّمَا هُوَ لِلتَّفْهِيمِ. وَ لَوْ هَذَبْتُ
 الْعِبَارَةَ وَ اقْتَصَرْتُ عَلَى الْإِشَارَةِ، لَكَلَّتِ الْبَصَائِرُ وَ انْسَدَّتِ الْمَذَاهِبُ إِلَى هَذِهِ 175
 الْمَطَالِبِ. وَ مَعَ هَذَا فَإِنْ عَرَفْتَ، فَأَنْتَ أَنْتَ، وَ اللَّهُ وَلِيُّ التَّوْفِيقِ.

وَ كَمَا يَنْبَغِي commentary indicate that the latter is what the author meant. In any case leaving it as

would create an extremely awkward sentence.

163-164 T., p. 287. اللَّهُ سُبْحَانَهُ

167 T., p. 287. إِلَّا سُئِلَتْهُ [إِلَّا بِمَا سُئِلَتْهُ

170 T., p. 287. الْبَيَانُ وَ الْبَيَانُ وَ الْمِثَالُ

171 T., p. 288. الْمَلَائِكَةِ [مَلَائِكَةِ

172 T., p. 288. فِي هَذَا الْمَقَامِ

Part V

Appendices

Appendix A

The Autograph Manuscript

This appendix consists of a copy of the autograph manuscript A. that we have relied upon for establishing the critical edition. As we discussed in Part I, Ch. 4, manuscript A. has no signature. This being the case, we give a sample of Shaykh 'Aḥmad's writing, — one that actually *does* contain his signature — for comparison. The comparison page is from the author's *Kashkūl*, a collection of alphabetically arranged research notes, mostly in the handwriting of the author. A comparison of this sample with A. shows that the handwritings are quite similar. Due to this and the other factors discussed in Part I, Ch. 4, we may be confident that A. is, if not the oldest, at least an actual autograph manuscript of the *Fawā'id Hikmiyyah*. Note that a draft of the Thirteenth Observation begins immediately after the end of the Twelfth. It does not continue on to the next page; rather, a new treatise begins. As we mentioned in Part I, Ch. 4, the rest of the autograph of those seven observations appended to the first twelve appear to be lost. Finally, we have appended copies of three pages taken from the Tabriz edition T. of

the *Fawā'id* and its commentary, inclusive of both its first and final excerpts from the original twelve observations.



Figure A.1: Sample page from the *Kashkūl*.




Figure A.2: Manuscript A..

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صالح لكلهم الشرف والكرام الوصنع وانما فيهما الصورة الثانية اية الكتابة هي التي
 وبها هي الثانية الثانية كذلك من الهيكلية من الوجوه والمناخية صالحة للذين
 والكامر ولا تسمية الا بالصورة الثانية التي هي خلق الثاني وهو الهيئة الثانية
 فاما لهم لعلهم بهم حين سألوا ان سألهم فقال لهم انتم بركم ومحمد بنكم
 وعلى ذلك فقالوا لاجلهم من قائلها مصداقاً بلسانه وقلبه عن علم كما قال
 الا من شهد بالحق وهم يعلمون فخلقهم من صورة التصديق والفرقة وهي الصورة الثانية
 وبها هيكل التوحيد وبها هيكل الروح وبها هيكل العقل والخيال والصدقون في الدنيا
 الباطن ومنهم من قائلها بلسانه وقلبه من كذب غير قابل فخلقهم من صورة الكذب
 والاشكار والحدود والصورة الحيوانية والشيعة وبها هيكل الكافرون والمنافقون واتباعهم
 ممن تبين له الهدى فاعرض عنه وبها هيكل الجبال والبراريين وانما كانت في الدنيا صورهم
 صور الانسان لاجلهم باللسان الذي هو الاذن وفي الآخرة تسببتهم في صورهم
 الحقيقية التابعة للقلب ومنهم من قائلها بلسانه وقلبه واقف لم يقر ولم يحكم ولا
 خلقهم امرهم من الصورة الانسانية ظاهراً لاقرار السببتهم فلم يكن بواطنهم حتى يقر
 او يحكم فخلقهم من حالهم وهم قائلون فمنهم الذين في الدنيا ومنهم في الآخرة فخلقهم
 انساناً في الجنة من خلق في النار وهذه الصور التي خلقها من الاجابة اوله انكار
 من الباطن وبالله الذي يسمع بطنها من صوتها بطنها من شيء وذلك بعد ان اعلمهم
 بالظن والظن اليه من الاجابة والظن للجنة التي هي الانكار وانما كانت لخلقهم الا

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 انما امان الله في غيرهم ومن لا زال يجمع كما والادغام وضع كل كلمتين وادغام
 الحاصل قال وطلعت على كتابه في احوال العرب في سنة ثمان مائة اربع مائة
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Figure A.3: Page 1 of T..

Figure A.4: Page 2 of T., with the first excerpt from the *Fawā'id*.



Figure A.5: Page 288 of T., containing the last lines of the original twelve observations.

Appendix B

Glossary

The purpose of this all too brief and incomplete glossary is to provide the beginnings of a key to the general philosophical terminology employed the *Fawā'id*, especially and particularly that terminology peculiar to Shaykh 'Aḥmad. Included are some terms that are not explicitly mentioned in the main text but which are discussed in the author's commentary and are indispensable in understanding the author's system. Since the commentary was written at least eight years after the main text, it is possible that some, though certainly not all, of this additional terminology was developed after the completion of the *Fawā'id*.

In addition to his own special terminology, Shaykh 'Aḥmad does employ certain standard terms of the post-Ṭūsī scholastic philosophical vocabulary of Eastern Islamic civilization without any significant change in sense. For definitions of standard philosophical terms we depend on many sources, most of which are cited in the list of abbreviations given towards the beginning of this study. Again, what follows constitutes only the beginnings of a true

glossary, and the entries are for the most part incomplete.

When, in the course of a given entry, an Arabic word is placed in bold type, this means that word has its own entry elsewhere in the glossary. When more than one possible translation is given for a term, the primary translation(s) is (are) given in italic.

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أثر ^{ʾaṭar} pl. آثار ^{ʾātāru}: remain, trace, signature, sign, signature, *impression*;
Latin *impressio*, *affectio*.

تأثير ^{taṭīr}: impressing, *occasioning of an impression*; Latin *impressio*, *agere*,
actio.

مؤثر ^{muṭṭir}: that which does تأثير ^{taṭīr}, agent; Latin *imprimens*, *agens*.

أجل ^{ʾaġal} pl. أجال ^{ʾāġāl}: *term [of duration]*, appointed time of death; one of
the three religious categories of essence, namely, أجل ^{ʾaġal}, *permission*,
إذن ^{ʾidn}, and *record* كتاب ^{kitāb}. In the *Fawā'id*, these are mentioned
alongside some of the traditional Peripatetic accidents. See Part II,
Ch. 3, sec. 3.2.5, as well as Part III, endnote 45. As Shaykh 'Aḥmad
explains in his commentary on the Seventh Observation[2, p. 138],
given an object in a given rank of existence, in the course that object's
descent from and ascent towards the Acting or Possibility, its أجل ^{ʾaġal}
is its duration (مُدَّة ^{muddat}) in that rank of existence. If the rank of
existence at issue is temporal (زَمَانِي ^{zamāniyy}), then this duration is
temporal; if the rank at issue is metatemporal (دَهْرِي ^{dahriyy}), then so
is the duration; if the rank at issue is sempiternal (سَرْمَدِي ^{sarmadiyy}),
then so is the duration. See وقت ^{waqt}.

إذن ^{ʾidn}: *permission*; one of the three religious categories of essence (see أجل ^{ʾaġal}).
Shaykh 'Aḥmad explains in his commentary on the Seventh
Observation[2, p. 138] that when — in the course of its overall descent

from Possibility — a given object passes from one *process-stage* (طور *ṭawr*) to an immediately posterior stage, then this takes place with divine permission. This permission is a coincident and coterminous aspect of the essence of that given object.

أَزَلُّ *ʾazalu*: *Preeternity*, eternal into the past; one of the names of God.

تَأْكِيدٌ *taḳīd*: ratification, *culmination*, corroboration, emphasis. See Part II, Ch. 2, sec. 2.4.3.

ب b

الإِبْدَاعُ *al-ʾibdāʿ*: the *Inventing*; also الإِبْتِدَاعُ *al-ʾibtidāʿ*. Used as a synonym for the *Willing* الْمَشِيَّةُ *al-mašīyyat*. See Part Three, Fourth Observation.

الإِبْتِدَاعُ *al-ʾibtidāʿ*: the *Inventing*; see الإِبْدَاعُ *al-ʾibdāʿ*.

الْبَدَاءُ *al-badāʾu*: appearance, *novelty*. An important and very controversial doctrine in Shīʿī theology. See Part III, endnote 123.

بُطُونٌ *buṭūn*: *occulting*, hiddenness, inwardness, innerness.

بَاطِنٌ *bāṭin*: *occult*, hidden, *inward*, inner. Opposed to ظَاهِرٌ *ẓāhir*.

الْبَيَانُ *al-bayān*: the explanation, *declaration*, disclosure, elucidation. For Shaykh ʾAḥmad, the science of the declaration (عِلْمُ الْبَيَانِ *ʿilmu ʾl-bayān*) is to Wisdom what theology is to metaphysics. The science of the declaration is a phenomenology which is ontologically grounded in those immediate outcomes of God’s Acting called “the Meanings”

(المَعَانِي *al-maʿānī*; see مَعْنَى *maʿnā*). ‘The Meanings’ is extensionally though not intensionally equivalent to ‘existence qua negatively conditioned’. The terms ‘بَيَان *bayān*’ and ‘مَعَانِي *maʿānī*’ derive from certain cryptic traditions of the Imams. In the *Commentary on the Grand Comprehensive Visitation*, Shaykh ʿAḥmad quotes the following tradition consisting of an exchange between the then very young Fifth Imam Muhammad al-Bāqir and the then very old companion of the Prophet, Jābir ibn ʿAbd Allah al-ʿAnṣārī: [6, p. 21]

Imam Bāqir: O Jābir! You must learn about *the Declaration* (البَيَان *al-bayān*) and *the Meanings* (المَعَانِي *al-maʿānī*).

Jābir: What are the declaration and the meanings?

Imam Bāqir: [The First Imam] Ali has said: As for the Declaration, it is that you become cognizant of Allah (Glorified is He!) and that there is nothing like him. Then you will [properly] worship him and associate nothing with Him. As for the Meanings, then we [the Imams] are His Meanings: we are His Aspect [by which He is known], His Hand, His Tongue, His Command, His Decree, His Knowledge, and His Truth. When we have willed, then Allah has Willed; Allah Desires that which we desire....

قَالَ: يَا جَابِرُ! عَلَيْكَ بِالْبَيَانِ وَ الْمَعَانِي. قَالَ: قُلْتُ: وَ مَا الْبَيَانُ وَ الْمَعَانِي؟ قَالَ: قَالَ عَلِيٌّ (ع): أَمَّا الْبَيَانُ، فَهُوَ أَنْ تَعْرِفَ اللَّهَ سُبْحَانَهُ؛ لَيْسَ كَمِثْلِهِ شَيْءٌ فَتَعْبُدُهُ وَ لَا تُشْرِكُ بِهِ شَيْئًا. أَمَّا الْمَعَانِي، فَنَحْنُ مَعَانِيهِ: وَ نَحْنُ جَنْبُهُ، وَ يَدُهُ، وَ لِسَانُهُ، وَ أَمْرُهُ، وَ حُكْمُهُ، وَ عِلْمُهُ،

وَحَقُّهُ إِذَا شِئْنَا، شَاءَ اللَّهُ؛ وَ يُرِيدُ اللَّهُ مَا نُرِيدُهُ

From this tradition we can see the germ of Shaykh 'Aḥmad's distinction between the phenomenological category of Real Existence and the ontological category of delimited existence *qua* immediate outcome of God's Acting. The Meanings constitute modalities of the immediate Act of delimited existence, which in turn is the culmination of the Process of Acting. See Part II, Ch. 2, sec. 2.5.5. The science of the declaration is a phenomenological science by means of which cognizance of God is attained. This cognizance in turn is ontologically grounded in the Meanings, which constitute the subject matter of the science of the declaration, as the author points out at the end of the Second Observation.

ت *t*

بِالتَّبَعِيَّةِ *bi-'t-taba'īyyat*: following, as a consequence of, *in succession to*, as an aftereffect of.

ث *t*

تُبُوتٌ *tubūt*: *affirmation*, subsistence, persistence, permanence.

إِثْبَاتٌ *itbāt*: *affirmation*, confirmation.

ج *ğ*

الْمُجَادَلَةُ بِالتِّي هِيَ أَحْسَنُ *al-muğādalatu bi-'llatī hiya aḥsanu*: argumentation by that which is best. Third of the three methods of proof الدَّلِيلُ

ad-dalīlu to which the Qur'an alludes (16:125). The method of proof by means of which one seeks to overcome an opponent in debate by means of logical demonstration. For al-'Aḥsā'ī this is the method of choice in the science of jurisprudence and its principles, mathematics, and to some degree in the natural sciences. Inadequate for attaining the cognizance (المعرفة *al-maʿrifatu*) of God and the realities (الحقائق *al-ḥaqāʾiqu*) of things. See Part II, Ch. 1

جزء *ǧuz*: part (opposed to whole (كُلُّ *kull*)).

جزئي *ǧuzʾiyyu*: particular (as opposed to universal (كُلِّي *kullīyyu*)).

الجعل *al-ǧaʿlu*: making. See Part III, endnote 65.

تجلى *tagallī*: self-manifestation, *self-revelation*, epiphany.

جنس *ǧins* pl. أجناس *ʾaǧnāsu*: kind, genus.

مجانسة *muǧānasat*: homogeneity, uniformity.

الجواز الراجح *al-ǧawāzu ʾr-rāǧiḥu*: Preponderating Permissibility. Another name for *Possibility* (إمكان *ʾimkān*). See الراجح الوجود *ar-rāǧiḥu ʾl-wuǧūdu*.

جوهر *ǧawhar* pl. جواهر *ǧawāhir*: substance; literally, “jewel”.

جوهر الهباء *ǧawhar al-habā*: substance of dust. This is an ontological rank that lies between the *mundus intelligibilis* and the *mundus imaginalis*.

أَلْحُدُوثُ *al-ḥudūtu*: *originating, occurring, happening, coming-into-being.*

أَلْحَدَثُ *al-ḥadatu*: *event, occurrence.*

أَلْحَادِثُ *al-ḥādītu*: *originating [entity], contingent, occurrence.*

حَرَكَةٌ *ḥarakat*: *motion.*

أَلْحِسِّ الْمَشْتَرَكِ *al-ḥiss al-muštarak*: *common sense. See Part III, endnote 76.*

أَلْحِصَّةُ *al-ḥiṣṣat* pl. أَلْحِصَصُ *al-ḥiṣṣaṣu*: *portion, quantum.*

حَقٌّ *ḥaqq*: *real, true, (legal) right; with the definite article, used as a name of God (the Real, the Truth); opposite of بَاطِلٌ *bāṭil* (false).*

تَحَقُّقٌ *taḥaqquq*: *becoming-realized, realization.*

أَلْحَقِيقَةُ الْمَحْمَدِيَّةِ *al-ḥaqīqat al-muḥammadiyyat*: *The Logos in the philosophy and mysticism of Muslim civilization. See Part II, Ch. 3, sec. 2.5.5.*

أَلْحِكْمَةُ *al-ḥikmat*: *Wisdom, sophia, philosophy. For al-'Aḥsā'ī, the method of Wisdom is fundamentally experiential. See Part II, Ch. 1.*

مَحَلٌّ *maḥall*: *locus; literally, place where something inheres.*

إِنْجِلَالٌ *inḥilāl*: *liquefaction, deliquescence, dissolving, dissolution. A term from chemistry, it is opposed to إِنْعِقَادٌ *in'iqād*.*

حَالٌ *ḥāl* pl. أَحْوَالٌ *aḥwāl*: *condition, state, circumstance.*

تَحَاوِيٌ *taḥāwī*: *mutual comprehension, mutual enveloping.*

حِوَايَةٌ *ḥiwāyat*: *comprehending, enveloping.*

حَيَاة *ḥayāt*: *living, life*. One of the four processes underlying the cycle of delimited existence, the others being *creating* (خَلَقَ *ḥalq*), *providing* (رَزَقَ *rizq*), and *dying* (مَوَتَ *mawt*).

ح ḥ

خُصُوص *ḥuṣūṣ*: *being-specific, specificity*; opposed to **الْعُمُومُ** *al-ʿumūmu* or *generality*.

خَلَقَ *ḥalq*: *creating, creation*. One of the four processes underlying the cycle of delimited existence, the others being *providing* (رَزَقَ *rizq*), *living* (حَيَاة *ḥayāt*), and *dying* (مَوَتَ *mawt*).

الْخَلْقُ الْأَوَّلُ *al-ḥalq al-ʾawwal*: *the first creation*. This is delimited existence *qua* the substrate of all created things. It contrasts with *the second creation* **الْخَلْقُ الثَّانِي** *al-ḥalqu ʾt-tānī*. See Part II, Ch. 3, sec 3.2.4.

الْخَلْقُ الثَّانِي *al-ḥalq at-tānī*: *the second creation*. This is delimited existence *qua* the substrate of any particular created thing. It contrasts with *the first creation* **الْخَلْقُ الْأَوَّلُ** *al-ḥalqu ʾl-ʾawwalu*. See Part II, Ch. 3, sec 3.2.4.

الْخَيَالُ *al-ḥayāl*: *the imaginal faculty*. See Part III, endnote 77.

د d

مَدْخَلٌ *madḥal*: *entrance, locus of ingress*.

الدُّرَّةُ *ad-durrat*: *the Pearl*. See Part III, endnote 67.

إِدْرَاكٌ *ʿidrāk*: *grasping*, perception. Perception is of many kinds, including not only the (five) external senses (أَحْوَاشُ الظَّاهِرَةِ *al-ḥawāssu ʿẓ-ẓāhirat*), but also the internal senses (أَحْوَاشُ الْبَاطِنَةِ *al-ḥawāss al-bāṭinatu*). The latter include the faculties of *thought* (فِكْرٌ *fikr*), the *imaginal* (الْخَيَالُ *al-ḥayāl*), and *instinct* or *estimation* (أَلْوَهْمُ *al-wahm*).

دَلِيلٌ *dalīl* pl. **أَدِلَّةٌ** *ʿadillat*: *proof*, demonstration, guide. Al-Jawharī (*S*, under د ل ل): “is that whereby one is directed or guided.” Al-Jurjānī[13, p. 93]: “Technically, is that for which knowledge of it necessitates knowledge of something else.” For al-ʿAḥsāʾī, as explained in the First Observation, there are three types of proof, corresponding to Qurʾan 16:125: wisdom (أَلْحِكْمَةُ *al-ḥikma*), good exhortation (أَلْوَعِظَةُ الْحَسَنَةُ *al-waʿiẓat al-ḥasnatu*), and argumentation in the best way (أَلْمُجَادَلَةُ بِأَلَّتِي هِيَ أَحْسَنُ *al-mujādlatu bi-āllī hihi aḥsanu*). See Part II, Ch. 1.

إِسْتِدْلَالٌ: *inference*, deduction.

أَلْدَّهْرُ: duration, *metatime*; the *durational mode* (وَقْتُ) of the *mundus intelligibilis*.

إِسْتِدَارَةٌ: circularity, sphericity, *revolution*.

ذ *d*

أَلْدُّرَّةُ *ad-durrat*: the mote of dust. See Part III, endnote 68.

ذَاتٌ *ḍḍāt*: essence, *quintessence*. See Part II, Ch. 2, sec 2.4.1.

ذَاتِيٌّ *ḍḍātiyy*: essential, *quintessential*. See Part II, Ch. 2, sec 2.4.1.

تَدَوُّتٌ *taḍawwutu* pl. تَدَوُّتَاتٌ *taḍawwutāt*: *quintessentialization*, becoming particularized as a quintessence.

ذِكْرٌ *ḍḍikru*: *presence* (as in the mind), remembrance, mentioning. See Part II, Ch. 1, footnote 36.

ر ^r

رَأْسٌ *raʿs*: head, peak, *mode*.

رُبُوبِيَّةٌ *rubūbiyyat*: lordship; opposed to *servitude* عُبُودِيَّةٌ *ʿubūdiyyat*. In general, Shaykh ʿAḥmad uses the term رُبُوبِيَّةٌ *rubūbiyyat* to refer to the active, material, realizational, or cause aspect of a given metaphysical polarity. The term عُبُودِيَّةٌ *ʿubūdiyyat* is used to refer to the receptive, formal, manifestational, or effect aspect of a given metaphysical polarity.

إِرْتِبَاطٌ *irtibāt*: *attachment*.

رُتْبَةٌ *rutbat* pl. رُتَبٌ *rutab*: *stage*, rank, level, degree; literally, a step of stairs. Signifies the ontological degree of a given essence; one of the six categories of essence or “days” through which any given essence becomes and which constitute that very essence.

الرَّجْحَانُ *ar-rağḥān*: preponderance. Contrasts with *possibility* (إِمْكَانٌ *imkān*) and *necessity* (وُجُوبٌ *wuğūb*). See الرَّاجِحُ الوجودُ *ar-rāğīḥu ʿl-wuğūdu*.

الْراجِحُ الوجودُ *ar-rāğīḥu ʿl-wuğūdu*: *That Whose Existence Preponderates*; a name for Absolute Existence (الوجود المطلق *al-wuğūd al-muṭlaq*).

Shaykh 'Aḥmad suggests this as an intermediary category between the traditional categories of *that whose existence is necessary* (وَاجِب الوجود *wāğib al-wuğūd*) and *that [concrete entity] whose existence is possible* (مُمْكِن الوجود *mumkin al-wuğūd*). According to Shaykh 'Aḥmad, a possible existent is possible due to other than itself (see the Fifteenth Observation). That is, the fact that existence or non-existence may equally apply to the possible existent is due to that possible existent's having a *presence* (ذِكْر *dikr*) in the realm of Possibility. Possibility (the receptive aspect of Absolute Existence) and its interaction with the Willing (the active aspect of Absolute Existence) constitute a process which in turn constitutes that through which concrete possible existents come to be. Also called *Preponderating Permissibility* (الْجَوَاز الرَّاجِح *al-ğawāz ar-rāğihu*).

تَرْجِيحُ *targhīḥu*: *occasioning of preponderance*. See Part III, endnote 141.

رِزْقُ *rizqu* pl. أَرْزَاقُ *arzāqu*: *provision, providence, providing*. One of the four processes underlying the cycle of delimited existence, the others being *creating* (خَلْق *ḥalq*), *living* (حَيَاة *ḥayāt*), and *dying* (مَوْت *mawt*).

ز ^z

الزَّمان *az-zamān*: *time; the durational mode of the mundus sensibilis*. See وَقْتُ *waqt*.

تَرْيِيلُ *tazyīl*: *discrimination, discernment*.

س ^s

تَسْخِير *tashīr*: constraining.

الْشَرَمَد *as-sarmad*: *sempiternity*; the durational mode of *Absolute Existence* (الْوُجُودُ الْمَطْلَقُ *al-wuġūd al-muṭlaq*) and *Possibility* (الْإِمْكَانُ *al-ʾimkān*).

See وَقْتُ *waqt*.

سُنَّة *sunnat*: *the Sunnah*: the way and example of the Prophet as expressed in the *tradition* (نَقْل *naql*).

مُسْتَنَد *mustanad*: buttress, *support*. See Part II, Ch. 1, sec. 1.5.

مُسَاوَقَة *musāwaqat*: *coterminousness, coincidence*.

تَسَاوُق *tasāwuq*: *mutual coterminousness, mutual coincidence*.

ش *š*

شَرَط *šarṭ*: condition. See Part II, Ch. 1, sec. 1.5.

بِشْرَطِ شَيْءٍ *bi-šarṭi šayʾ*: *conditioned by something*. The concepts of بِشْرَطِ شَيْءٍ *bi-šarṭi šayʾ*, لَا بِشْرَطٍ *bi-šarṭi lā* (*negatively conditioned*), and لَا بِشْرَطٍ *lā bi-šarṭ* (*unconditioned*) developed out of the essentialism that characterized most of Muslim scholasticism before the time of Mulla Ṣadra. The best introduction in English to this important topic is *Izutsu 1974*. For Shaykh ʾAḥmad's use of these terms, see Part II, Ch. 1, sec. 1.4.

بِشْرَطٍ لَا *bi-šarṭi lā*: *negatively conditioned*. See بِشْرَطِ شَيْءٍ *bi-šarṭi šayʾ*.

لَا بِشْرَطٍ *lā bi-šarṭ*: *totally unconditioned*. See بِشْرَطِ شَيْءٍ *bi-šarṭi šayʾ*.

شُعَاعٌ *šu‘ā‘u* pl. أَشْعَةُ *‘aši‘‘atu*: rays, radiation. For the plural case, we translate with ‘field(s)’.

مَشْعَرٌ *maš‘ar* pl. مَشَاعِرٌ *mašā‘ir*: locus of sensation, sense, the place where an organ of sensation is located; synonymous with حَاسَّةٌ *ḥāssat* (pl. حَوَاسٌّ *hawāss*) or sense (as in e.g., “the five senses”).

مُشَاكَلَةٌ *mušākalat*: conformability, homogeneity, *homology*,

شَيْءٌ *šay*: thing, object. In the philosophy of Shaykh ‘Aḥmad, any given “thing” is a composite or concrescence of essence and existence. One should note that, in contrast with common English usage, Shaykh ‘Aḥmad uses this term to refer to human beings.

الْمَشِئَةِ *al-mašīyyat*: The Willing. This is Absolute Existence. It may be considered with respect to itself, in which case it is called “Willing--in-Possibility” (الْمَشِئَةِ الْإِمْكَانِيَّةُ *al-mašīyyat al-‘imkāniyyat*). It may also be considered with respect to its attachment to its outcomes, in which case it is called “Willing-in-Being” (الْمَشِئَةِ الْكَوْنِيَّةُ *al-mašīyyat al-kawniyyat*). See Part II, Ch. 3, sec 3.3.

ص

صَدَرَ يَصْدُرُ صُدُورًا *ṣadara yaṣḍuru ṣudūran*: to emanate, proceed.

الصَّمَدُ *aṣ-ṣmadu*: the Impenetrable. A name of God.

صُورَةٌ *ṣūrat* pl. الصُّورُ *aṣ-ṣuwaru*: form, shape, image; contrasts with الْمَادَّةُ *al-māddatu* (matter). Coextensive with ‘essence’ (مَاهِيَّةٌ *māhiyyat*) and

with ‘*becoming-in-yielding-to-acting*’ (إِنْفِعال *ʾinfiʿāl*). See Part II, Ch. 3, and *passim*.

الصَّنْع *aṣ-ṣunʿu*: *fashioning*, making, manufacturing, doing; creation, the outcome of fashioning.

تَصَوُّر *taṣawwur*: *picturing*, *conceptualizing*.

ض *ḍ*

ضِدّ *didd* pl. أَضْدَاد *ʾaḍḍād*: *contrary*, *opposite*.

ضِدِّيَّة *diddiyyat*: *contrariness*.

تَضَادّ *taḍādd*: *mutual contrariness*

إِنضِمَام *ʾinḍimām*: *becoming-conjoined*.

إِسْتِضَاء *ʾistiḍāʿa*: *illumination*.

إِضَافَة *ʾiḍāfat*: (the category of) *correlation* or relation; a subbranch of نِسْبَة *nisbat* or relation in general.

ط *t*

طَبِيعَة *ṭabīʿat* pl. طَبَائِع *ṭabāʿiʿu*: *nature*.

الطَّرِيق *aṭ-ṭarīq*: *the way*, path, road; the spiritual journey to God through perfection of one’s ethics, character, and meditation.

طَرِيق *ṭariyy*: *fresh*, continually renewed.

إِطْلَاقٌ *ʾiṭlāq*: *absoluteness*, *unrestrictedness*; also *general*. Intensionally, virtually equivalent to ‘*totally unconditioned*’ (لَا بِشَرِيطٍ *lā bi-šarṭin*).

مُطْلَقٌ *muṭlaq*: *absolute*, *unrestricted*, *general*. See إِطْلَاقٌ *ʾiṭlāq*.

مُطَاوَعَةٌ *muṭāwaʿat*: *response*, *yielding*, *compliance*. See Part II, Ch. 3, sec. 3.2.3.

طَوْرٌ *ṭawr* pl. أَطْوَارٌ *ʾaṭwāru*: *degree*, *a time* (*fois* in French), *state*, *process--stage*. A stage in a cycle, process, or evolution.

ظ

ظُهُورٌ *ṣuhūr*: *manifesting*, *appearing*.

ظَاهِرٌ *ẓāhir*: *manifest*, *appearing*, *outward*, *outer*; opposed to بَاطِنٌ *bāṭin*.

مَظْهَرٌ *mazharu* pl. الْمَظَاهِرُ *al-maẓāhiru*: *manifestation*, *epiphany*.

ع

عُبُودِيَّةٌ *ʿubūdiyyat*: *servitude*. See رُبُوبِيَّةٌ *rubūbiyyat*.

عِبَارَةٌ *ʿibārat*: *expression*, *word*, *phrase*.

تَعَدُّ الْقَدَمَاءِ *taʿaddudu ʾl-qudamāʾ*: *multiplicity of Ancients or Eternals*; used whenever a line of thought entails a situation where there is more than one God.

عَدَمٌ *ʿadam*: *privation*, *non-existence*

مَعْدُومٌ *maʿdūm*: *a non-existent*, *non-being*.

مَعْرِفَة *maʿrifat*: cognizance, awareness, gnosis. The difference between knowledge (عِلْمٌ *ilm*) and cognizance is somewhat similar to the distinction in French between *savoir* and *connaître*. According to al-Jurjāni [13, p. 197], *maʿrifat* connotes “the perception of a thing in that [state] wherein it really is. It is [necessarily] preceded by ignorance, in contrast to knowledge (عِلْمٌ *ilm*). For this reason The Real (Exalted is He!) is named The Knower (الْعَالِمُ *al-ʿālim*) and not The Cognizant (الْعَارِفُ *al-ʿārif*)”. That is, ‘cognizance’ connotes a coming-to-be aware of something that one was previously unaware of. Cognizance of God being the aim of Wisdom, the method of Wisdom involves a continuous coming-to-be aware of God and reality.

الْمَعَارِفُ الإِلَهِيَّةُ *al-maʿārif al-ilāhiyyat*: the divine sciences; those branches of knowledge, whether philosophical, theological, or mystical, by means of which one seeks cognizance of God; from عَرَفَ *ʿarafa*, to have cognizance or gnosis of, and إِلَهِي *ilāhī*, divine.

تَعْرِيفٌ *taʿrīf*: definition, *occasioning cognizance* of something.

تَعْرِفُ لَهُ *taʿarruf lahū*: *becoming-the-subject-of-cognizance for someone*.

إِنْعِقَادٌ *inʿiqād*: synthesis, becoming knotted, *coagulation*, solidification.

الْعِلْمُ *al-ilmu*: knowledge.

عِلْمُ الْبَيَانِ *ilmu ʿl-bayāni*: science of the declaration. See بَيَان *bayān*.

عَالَمٌ *ʿalam*: a *world*, realm, or universe.

عَالَمُ الصُّورِ *‘ālamu ’ṣ-ṣuwarī*: the world of forms. Not Platonic Forms; rather, the lower regions of the realm of the *mundus intelligibilis*; includes souls and spirits; in Arabic also called عَالَمُ الْمَلَكَوَتِ *‘ālam al-malakūt* or the *World of Souls*.

عَالَمُ الْمَعْنَى *‘ālamu ’l-ma‘ānī*: the world of meanings. In some contexts (especially when contrasted with the *world of forms* عَالَمُ الصُّورِ *‘ālam aṣ-ṣuwar*) it also exclusively signifies the higher regions of the *mundus intelligibilis*, called in Arabic عَالَمُ الْجَبَرُوتِ *‘ālam al-ğabarūt* or the Realm of Might. See also مَعْنَى *ma‘nā*.

عَالَمُ الْأَعْيَانِ *‘ālam al-‘a‘yān*: the world of Entities. The realm of actuality as opposed to the realm of *Possibility* (إِمْكَانٍ *‘imkān*). See also عَيْن *‘ayn*.

عَالَمُ الْإِمْكَانِ *‘ālam al-‘imkān*: the world of Possibility. See إِمْكَانٍ *‘imkān*.

عُمُوم *‘umūm*: generality; opposed to اَلْخُصُوصُ *al-ḥuṣūṣu* or specificity.

مَعْنَى *ma‘nā*: *meaning*, intention, denotation, reference. According to Shaykh ‘Aḥmad, “*al-ma‘nā* is that which is intended by an expression لَفْظٌ *lafẓun* at the point of its being-assigned” [3, Vol. 1, pt. 2, pgs. 241]. This is in disagreement with al-Jurjānī, who defines *al-ma‘nā* to be that mental form in correspondence to which expressions are assigned [13, p. 196]. In his research notes, the Shaykh points out there is a difference of opinion about the signification of ‘*ma‘nā*’ ([7, folio 462]): “That which is intended by an expression is called the *ma‘nā* since it is that which the expression was assigned in correspondence to. It is also said that the *ma‘nā* is a *mental form* (الصُّورَةُ الدِّهْنِيَّةُ) *aṣ-ṣūrat*

ad-dihniyyat) because the expression is assigned in correspondence to it [that mental form]. Now this dispute is a branch of the dispute with regards to what it is in correspondence to which the assigner assigns the expression: is it the mental form, as held by ‘Allāmah al-Ḥillī (may Allah be pleased with him!) in his *Tahdhīb*; or is it the *extra-mental denotation* (الْمَعْنَى الْخَارِجِيَّةُ *al-ma‘nā ’l-ḥāriḡiyy*), while the mental form is only a tool for the assigning of the expression in correspondence to the extra-mental denotation because it [the extra-mental denotation] is that which is named by the expression, and the expression is an attribute (صِفَة *ṣifat*) and a sign which distinguishes it [the extra-mental denotation] from others, and the mental form is just abstracted by the assigner from the extra-mental denotation when he conceptualizes it so that he may make an expression for it that befits it so that it [the expression] may be an attribute for it, distinguishing it from others? Now the second [alternative] is the correct one, otherwise the use of an expression for an extra-mental denotation would be metaphorical since [in the former case] it was made for a mental form, which differs from an external denotation.” In his extensive work on semantics and philosophy of language, the Shaykh goes into much more detail on this topic.

It is important to note is that for Shaykh ‘Aḥmad, the *world of meanings* or *denotations* (عَالَمُ الْمَعْنَى *‘ālam al-ma‘ānī*) includes anything which the intellect can “point to” and delimit or conceptualize in some sense, from material objects to metamaterial and metatemporal — as a naturalist, he shies away from the terms ‘immaterial’ and ‘atemporal’;

rather, matter and time are ontologically graded — intellectual objects like numbers.

There is another important usage of ‘مَعْنَى’ *ma‘nā*. When used in the plural, ‘the Meanings’ is used to denote the outcomes of God’s Acting *qua* formal causes, i.e., principles of manifestation which underlie the phenomenon of *Real Existence* (الْوُجُودُ الْحَقُّ *al-wuǧūd al-ḥaqq*) or the Designation (الْفَنَوَانُ *al-‘unwān*). Each “meaning” corresponds to a station (مَقَامٌ *maqām*). They are the *essential aspects* (عَوَارِضٌ ذَاتِيَّةٌ - ‘*awāriḍ dātiyyat*) of the Designation when the latter is considered as the *subject matter* (مَوْضُوعٌ *mawḍū‘*) of the *science of the declaration* (عِلْمُ الْبَيَانِ *‘ilmu ‘l-bayān*). See (الْبَيَانُ *al-bayān*).

الْفَنَوَانُ *al-‘unwān*: the Designation. One of many names for the phenomenon of *Real Existence* (الْوُجُودُ الْحَقُّ *al-wuǧūd al-ḥaqq*). See Part II, Ch. 2, sec. 2.5.5.

عَيْنٌ *‘ayn* pl. أَعْيَانٌ *‘a‘yān*: concrete *entity*, thing, individual. When used in contrast to كَوْنٌ *kawn*, ‘عَيْنٌ’ *‘ayn*’ is virtually coextensive with ‘essence’. While further research is needed to say this for sure, it appears that in this case, ‘عَيْنٌ’ *‘ayn*’ is coextensive in particular with ‘essence *qua* negatively conditioned’.

غ *g*

غَايَةٌ *gāyat*: *limit*, extremity, goal, aim.

ف *f*

فُؤَاد *fu'ād*: the heart-flux. This is the highest organ of perception in Man, higher even than the *nous* (أَلْعَقْلُ *al-ʿaqlu*). It is that organ by which Wisdom is attained. See Part II, Ch. 1, sec. 1.5.1.

فِعْل *fiʿl*: act, *acting*, action, doing. Coextensive with ‘*existence*’ (وُجُود *wuğūd*) and ‘*matter*’ (مَادَّة *māddat*). The doctrine of the reality of **فِعْل** *fiʿl* is one about] which Shaykh ʿAḥmad is most passionate (see part II, Ch. 2, sec 2.4.2). The categories of acting and *becoming-in-yielding-to-acting* (إِنْفِعَال *ʾinfi-āl*) together constitute Shaykh ʿAḥmad’s two most fundamental metaphysical categories (see Part II, Ch. 3, sec. 3.2.3).

إِنْفِعَال *ʾinfi-āl*: passion, *becoming-in-yielding-to-acting*; coextensive with ‘*form*’ (صُورَة *ṣūrat*) and ‘*essence*’ (مَاهِيَّة *māhiyyat*). See **فِعْل** *fiʿl*.

مَفْقُود *mafqūd*: lost, missing, *non-existent*. opposite of **مَوْجُود** *mawğūd*.

ق q

مُقَابَلَة *muqābalat*: (mutual) opposition.

مِقْدَار *miqdār*: measure.

قَدِيم *qadīm*: *ancient*, eternal, old. With the definite article, this is a term for God used by the مُتَكَلِّمُونَ. It stands in contrast to *originating* حَادِث *ḥādīt*.

مُقَدَّمَات *muqaddamāt*: the preliminaries (of a science); the introductory definitions usually mentioned at the beginning of a book or treatise to help

the reader understand the main subject matter. In traditional logic, for example, the preliminaries would include explanations of the concepts of definition, description, genus, species, and signification, among other things.

مَقَام *maqām* pl. مَقَامَات *maqāmāt*: *station*. See Part II, Ch. 2, sec 2.5.5.

ك *k*

كِتَاب *kitāb*: book, *record*; one of the three religious categories of essence (see أَجَل *ağal*). According to Shaykh 'Aḥmad[2, p. 138], a record of a given thing at a given *process-stage* (طَوْر *tawr*) — in the course of that given thing's descent from Possibility — consists of an *imprint* (نَقْش *naqš*), at a higher rank of existence, of that stage. This imprint reflects all of the possible motions of the object, as well as its beginnings and endings. These imprints are ontologically graded; a given record “preserves” the object that is ontologically posterior to it and “is preserved” by a corresponding record located in an ontologically prior realm.

كُلّ *kull*: whole.

كُلِّيّ *kullīy*: universal.

كَمّ *kamm*: quantity.

مَكَان *makān*: the category of place, *space*.

كَيْف *kayf*: the category of *quality*.

كَيْفِيَّة *kayfiyyat*: *methodology*, manner, mode, fashion.

كُنْه *kunh*: ultimate reality.

اِكْتِنَاه *iktināh*: penetrating the ultimate reality of something.

كَوْن *kawn*: generation, *generated being*. See Part III, endnote 43. It is basically coextensive with ‘delimited existence’ (most likely ‘existence *qua* negatively conditioned’).

ل l

لَفْظ *lafz* pl. أَلْفَاف *alfāz*: *expression*, vocable, word. Opposed to مَعْنَى *ma-
‘nā*. An expression is coined in correspondence to a meaning. See مَعْنَى *ma-
‘nā*.

م m

مَادَّة *māddat* pl. مَوَادِّ *mawādd*: matter. Coextensive with ‘acting’ (فِعْل *fi‘l*) and with ‘existence’ (وُجُود *wuġūd*). See Part II, Ch. 3, and *passim*.

إِمْتِدَاد *‘imtidād*: extension.

مَاهِيَّة *māhiyyat*: *essence*, quiddity; coextensive with ‘form’ and ‘becoming-in-yielding-to-acting’. See Part II, Ch. 3, and *passim*.

مِثَال *mitāl*: example, similitude, pattern, model, *paradigm*. With the definite article, elliptical for عَالَمُ الْمِثَالِ *‘ālam al-mitāl* (the *imaginal realm* or *mundus imaginalis*). This is an interworld between the *mundus sensibilis* and the *mundus intelligibilis*. See Part III, endnotes 96 & 97.

إمكان *ʾimkān*: *possibility*, contingency. Some, like Morewedge, argue that *ʾimkān* should not be translated by ‘possibility’ because it makes no sense in Arabic to say that the existence of the Necessary is possible, whereas in scholastic and modern usage this locution would be allowable. I stick with ‘possibility’ because:

- *ʾimkān* literally means possibility;
- Shaykh ’Aḥmad’s use of the term *ʾimkān* is in closer conformity to the intension of ‘possibility’ than to the intension of ‘contingency’. In his commentary on the *Fawā’id* [2, p. 47], Shaykh ’Aḥmad explains that *that whose existence is possible (mumkin al-wuḡūd)* is such that existence or non-existence may equally apply to it.

With the definite article, ‘*al-ʾimkān*’ signifies the Realm of Possibility. This is Absolute Existence (*al-wuḡūd al-muṭlaq*) *qua* receptive. Note that Absolute Existence, for Shaykh ’Aḥmad, is at once receptive and active. See Part III, Ch. 3, sec. 3.3. See *ar-rāḡiḥu ’l-wuḡūdu*.

ممكن *mumkin*: *possible*, contingent. See إمكان *ʾimkān*.

إمْتِنَاع *ʾimtināʿ*: *impossibility*.

مُتَمَنِّع *mumtaniʿ*: *impossible*.

مَوْت *mawt*: *dying*, death. One of the four processes underlying the cycle of delimited existence, the others being *creating* (خَلْق *ḥalq*), *providing* (رِزْق *rizq*), and *living* (حَيَاة *ḥayāt*).

تَمْيِيز *tamyīz*: *discrimination*, distinction.

ن *n*

نسبة *nisbat*: relation in general.

نفس *nafs*: soul, self. This term is quite ambiguous. In general, it refers to the soul. In the context of cognizance of oneself and cognizance of God, it refers to the *heartflux*

نفي *nafy*: negation.

نقل *naql*: transmission, narration, *tradition*. With the definite article, refers to the Qur'an and the traditions of the Prophet, his daughter Fatimah, and the twelve Shi'i Imams.

انتقال *intiqāl*: transition

ه *h*

هيئة *hayat*: configuration, contour, shape, form

و *w*

وجوب *wuḡūb*: necessity. Contrasts with *possibility* (إمكان *imkān*) and *ponderance* (رجحان *raḡhān*). See ألزاج الوجود *ar-rāḡiḡu 'l-wuḡūdu*.

واجب *wāḡib*: necessary; with the definite article, *the Necessary* (short for الواجب الوجود *al-wāḡibu 'l-wuḡūdu*, *That whose Existence is Necessary*).

وجود *wuḡūd*: being, *existence*; coextensive with 'matter' (مادة *māddat*) and acting 'فعل *fi'l*'. See Part II, and *passim*.

الْوُجُودُ الْحَقُّ *al-wuġūd al-ḥaqq*: *Real Existence*, True Existence. This category can be considered in two ways: as the ontological category of Necessary Existence, or as the category of mystical experience called Its Designation (الْعُنْوَانُ *al-ʿunwānu*). See Part II, Chs. 1 & 2.

الْوِجْدَانُ *al-wiġdān*: *prehension*; an inner faculty. Al-Jurjāni: [13, p. 223] “The objects of prehension are those things grasped by the *inner senses* (الْحَوَاسُّ الْبَاطِنَةُ *al-ḥawāss al-bāṭinat*) [as opposed to the *outer five senses* (الْحَوَاسُّ الظَّاهِرَةُ *al-ḥawāss az-ẓāhirat*)]”. The inner senses include *common sense* (الْحِسُّ الْمَشْتَرَكُ *al-ḥiss al-muštarak*), *thought* (أَلْفِكْرُ *al-fikr*), and *mind* (وَهْمٌ *wahm*).

مَوْجُودٌ *mawġūd*: *existent*, being, found.

التَّوْحِيدُ *at-tawḥīd*: the profession of Divine Unity.

وَجْهٌ *waġh*: vector, *direction*, face, countenance.

جِهَةٌ *ġihat*: *orientation*, direction, aspect, mode. See Part II, Ch. 3, sec. 3.2.5.

وَصْفٌ *waṣf*: description, *characteristic*.

صِفَةٌ *ṣifat*: *quality*, property, attribute.

وَضَعٌ *wadʿ*: *assigning*, coining, forging, (a word); the category of *position*, collocation.

مَوْضُوعٌ *mawḍūʿ*: subject. One use of *al-mawḍūʿu* is in the traditional definition of substance: a substance is that which is not existent in a subject.

Another use of *al-mawḍūʿu* is to denote the subject matter of a science or branch of knowledge. According to al-Jurjānī: [13, p. 212] “The subject of any science comprises the essential aspects (الْعَوَارِضُ الدَّائِيَّةُ) *al-ʿawāriḍu ʿd-dātiyyatu*) of that which is discussed therein. Consider the body of the human being with respect to the science of medicine. In that science one discusses its [the body’s] states with regards to health and sickness.”

التَّوْعِظَةُ الْحَسَنَةُ *al-mawʿiẓatu ʿl-ḥasanatu*: good exhortation. The second method of proof الدَّلِيلُ *ad-dalīlu*. See Part II, Ch. 1, secs. 1.6 & 1.8.

وَقْتُ *waqt*: *durational mode*. There are three of these: الزَّمَانُ *al-zamān* (time), الدَّهْرُ *ad-dahr* (metatime), and السَّرْمَدُ *as-sarmad* (sempiternity). Time is the durational mode of the *mundus sensibilis* and the *mundus imaginalis*; metatime is the durational mode of the *mundus intelligibilis*; sempiternity is the durational mode of Absolute Existence. See Part III, the Eighth Observation and endnotes 85 & 88.

وَهْمٌ *wahm* pl. أَوْهَامٌ *ʾawhām*: *mind*, imagination, instinct estimative faculty. This is a difficult term to translate. In technical jargon it signifies the faculty of instinct or estimation. In the language of the Imams, it appears to mean the “mind”.

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